10/26/2012
The Nation, 9/2012
This is a review of Thomas Nagel's newest book "Mind And Cosmos; Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False". According to authors, there are two major arguments that Nagel levels. The first is the false promise that philosophers have about theoretical reductionism, in that all material facts in the sciences can ultimately be reduced to physical facts about the fundamental elements of the universe. The second is that many scientific discoveries are contrary to "common sense" and our natural understandings about ourselves. The authors discuss the first briefly, the second more thoroughly.
To Nagel's first objection to naturalism the authors generally concede the point: no one is working very hard in the sciences to provide reduction; it is unclear if there is much practical benefit to providing such a thing; it is unclear it is fully even possible. Regarding the second of Nagel's 'broadsides', the authors push back: Nagel's understanding is limited; common sense often is in error, even about ourselves. Nagel uses the supposition that there is an objective moral, mathematical, and logical truths to drive a wedge between human mentality/behavior and the 'Neo-Darwinian' conception. Authors represent Nagel as having "simplistic evolutionary reasoning" and focus more on the logical and mathematical truths rather than the supposed moral ones.
Nagel's argument: how would we know it is valid if all our methods of knowing have nothing to do with validity and more to do with evolutionary history?
Authors: Because when we use math, things work validly.
Author's use the analogy of Neurath's Boat, that validity is built as it continues to sustain solutions that work.
The last argument from Nagel that authors consider is one where it seems (currently) impossible for science to explain how consciousness came to be from evolutionary processes. Authors claim that some explanation is possible but to ask for prediction to accompany explanation is asking too much. There need not be predictive capabilities on a one-to-one basis with explanations, authors retort.
10/12/12
Priest, Graham - What is Philosophy?
10/12/2012
The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2006
Author starts the paper by stating that this question is itself a philosophical question, so it is not surprising that there has been disagreement and contention since it was first asked. Author believes that there are two views about the nature of philosophy that have wide acceptance: Wittgenstein's and Derrida's. Author goes through them both en route to author's own view.
Wittgenstein's later view of philosophy is rooted in his view of language, so author takes some time summarizing Wittgenstein's approach to language found in the Philosophical Investigations. The first discussion talks about how Wittgenstein rejected his previous view of language put forth in the Tractatus, and instead offered a rules-based "language game" that is partially arbitrary and justified by use. (pg190-1) Philosophical problems are what happens when terms from the language game are removed from it and tried to be examined out of context: they are meaningless without it and so philosophical problems go from "difficult" to "meaningless". (pg191) One case author uses is the case of free will: in this case the concept of "freedom" is employed, but outside of the normal context that gives the words their accepted usage. Author concludes the summary of Wittgenstein's view that philosophy is best re-characterized as a practice to un-metaphysicalize words and concepts (pg192).
For author, Wittgenstein's view of philosophy is a "disappointing one" (pg193). Author argues that even if Wittgenstein's view of language as put forth in the Investigations is correct, it does not follow from that view that philosophy is best employed as Wittgenstein sketches. The fundamental premise that author takes to be false is that: philosophical problems only arise when a "notion is pulled out of its linguistic home-game" (pg193). Author gives examples like ethical dilemmas and discussions as to the nature of time. More fundamentally, author objects to equating the meaning of terms within a language game with their truth: the truth they are trying to get at is a further matter (pg194).
Author now discusses Derrida's view of philosophy: beginning with his view of language. For Derrida, there is no determinate meaning for language since all searches for meaning end up with more language (pg195-6). The problem: clearly language is meaningful somehow: how? For Derrida, words get their meaning from contrasts with other words ("red" contrasted with "green"), but also by using references to other words from other contexts, a kind of promissory note or deference that Derrida called "differance" (pg196). One upshot of this theory is that no text has a determinate meaning.
Since it is unknown how Derrida believed his theories of deconstruction applied to philosophy, author instead looks at Rorty, who claims that his understanding of philosophy is from Derrida (pg197). When philosophers try to "get it right" about a determinate truth of ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, they are conducting a fools errand since if language has no determinate meaning, then how does one find its determinate truth? With Rorty channeling Derrida, philosophy is just another kind of writing. Just as author did with Wittgenstein, author grants that Derrida's views on language are correct. The first point against Rorty/Derrida's view of philosophy starts as follows: this doesn't just apply to philosophy. All linguistic enterprise finds no determinate truth, including science and mathematics. And yet there are standards within each discipline that lead to better and worse outcomes ("disagree at the risk of life and limb." pg199). Once philosophy is put into this category, "things are not so bad" (pg199). The second point is that just because language has no determinate truth doesn't mean there isn't a determinate truth: some enterprises seek that truth (and fail) and others don't even try (e.g. fictive writing). Indeed if the very enterprises that Derrida and Rorty use are not supposed to be truth-seeking, they are just fictions to be ignored or they are self-refuting (pg199-200).
Author claims that both Wittgenstein's and Derrida/Rorty's approaches are both self-refuting (giving a philosophical account of philosophy that denies that philosophy can give accounts) and are also dependent on a substantive theory of meaning. Instead, author puts forth the theory that philosophy is: critical, assumption-challenging, where "anything" can be scrutinized, subversive, unsettling, and universally applicable (pg201-3). On the positive side, philosophy is also constructive and creative with new theories and conceptions, author spends time arguing this is a corollary of the critical nature of philosophy (pg204-6).
The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2006
Author starts the paper by stating that this question is itself a philosophical question, so it is not surprising that there has been disagreement and contention since it was first asked. Author believes that there are two views about the nature of philosophy that have wide acceptance: Wittgenstein's and Derrida's. Author goes through them both en route to author's own view.
Wittgenstein's later view of philosophy is rooted in his view of language, so author takes some time summarizing Wittgenstein's approach to language found in the Philosophical Investigations. The first discussion talks about how Wittgenstein rejected his previous view of language put forth in the Tractatus, and instead offered a rules-based "language game" that is partially arbitrary and justified by use. (pg190-1) Philosophical problems are what happens when terms from the language game are removed from it and tried to be examined out of context: they are meaningless without it and so philosophical problems go from "difficult" to "meaningless". (pg191) One case author uses is the case of free will: in this case the concept of "freedom" is employed, but outside of the normal context that gives the words their accepted usage. Author concludes the summary of Wittgenstein's view that philosophy is best re-characterized as a practice to un-metaphysicalize words and concepts (pg192).
For author, Wittgenstein's view of philosophy is a "disappointing one" (pg193). Author argues that even if Wittgenstein's view of language as put forth in the Investigations is correct, it does not follow from that view that philosophy is best employed as Wittgenstein sketches. The fundamental premise that author takes to be false is that: philosophical problems only arise when a "notion is pulled out of its linguistic home-game" (pg193). Author gives examples like ethical dilemmas and discussions as to the nature of time. More fundamentally, author objects to equating the meaning of terms within a language game with their truth: the truth they are trying to get at is a further matter (pg194).
Author now discusses Derrida's view of philosophy: beginning with his view of language. For Derrida, there is no determinate meaning for language since all searches for meaning end up with more language (pg195-6). The problem: clearly language is meaningful somehow: how? For Derrida, words get their meaning from contrasts with other words ("red" contrasted with "green"), but also by using references to other words from other contexts, a kind of promissory note or deference that Derrida called "differance" (pg196). One upshot of this theory is that no text has a determinate meaning.
Since it is unknown how Derrida believed his theories of deconstruction applied to philosophy, author instead looks at Rorty, who claims that his understanding of philosophy is from Derrida (pg197). When philosophers try to "get it right" about a determinate truth of ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, they are conducting a fools errand since if language has no determinate meaning, then how does one find its determinate truth? With Rorty channeling Derrida, philosophy is just another kind of writing. Just as author did with Wittgenstein, author grants that Derrida's views on language are correct. The first point against Rorty/Derrida's view of philosophy starts as follows: this doesn't just apply to philosophy. All linguistic enterprise finds no determinate truth, including science and mathematics. And yet there are standards within each discipline that lead to better and worse outcomes ("disagree at the risk of life and limb." pg199). Once philosophy is put into this category, "things are not so bad" (pg199). The second point is that just because language has no determinate truth doesn't mean there isn't a determinate truth: some enterprises seek that truth (and fail) and others don't even try (e.g. fictive writing). Indeed if the very enterprises that Derrida and Rorty use are not supposed to be truth-seeking, they are just fictions to be ignored or they are self-refuting (pg199-200).
Author claims that both Wittgenstein's and Derrida/Rorty's approaches are both self-refuting (giving a philosophical account of philosophy that denies that philosophy can give accounts) and are also dependent on a substantive theory of meaning. Instead, author puts forth the theory that philosophy is: critical, assumption-challenging, where "anything" can be scrutinized, subversive, unsettling, and universally applicable (pg201-3). On the positive side, philosophy is also constructive and creative with new theories and conceptions, author spends time arguing this is a corollary of the critical nature of philosophy (pg204-6).
9/28/12
Priest, Graham - Philosophy Sans Frontieres: Analytic and Continental Philosophy - A View from the East
02/28/2012
Author begins by considering the supposed distinction between Analytic and Continental philosophy, and points out that there is little of substance between them and that from the perspective from the philosophy of the East (Asia) it is just bickering within a family. Author admits that much of what follows is broad and misses details and distinctions, but assumes that the broad strokes author presents are true in some 'gross terms'.
Author believes the divide between Analytic and Continental in the 20th century had 3 phases: constructive, destructive, and fragmentation. The rebellion against German Idealism was led by Frege and Husserl, both concerned with representation in language and thought. Frege developed logic and semantic theories about sense, reference, objects, concepts. Husserl developed phenomenology and how consciousness 'presents itself'. The tools 'took on a life of their own' and the first half of the 20th century was filled with optimism about solving old problems with the new tools. Wittgenstein and Russell, then the logical positivists on the Analytic side, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the Continental. Then the destructive phase, Kuhn (Analytic) and Foucault (Continental) and the 'specter of relativism' from without, and the internal attacks from Quine, Derrida. Author states that the novel techniques that launched the constructive phase ended up 'collapsing under their own weight'. What followed was a variety of influential philosophers, each with separate goals and arguments: a fragmentation. The core of both traditions, states author, is a concern for representation and that in the fragmentation there are many more commonalities to be appreciated.
Author moves on to consider "Asian Philosophy" and discounts it as a coherent thing; there are at least two distinct traditions: from India and from China. This is different from Western Philosophy, which author states solely originates from ancient Greece. There are three barriers to westerners studying Eastern Philosophy: language, style, and culture. Author discusses first Indian, the Chinese philosophical history. Author focuses on Buddhism cross-pollinating with T(D)aoism to create Chan/Zen Buddhism, and briefly discusses the distinctions between Indian and Chinese Buddhism.
Author argues that from the Eastern perspective, the Analytic/Continental divide looks like an 'in-house debate', while the different origins, languages, and styles of Indian/Chinese philosophy are 'definitely very different'. Author concludes with a prediction that Asia will rise as the dominant political force of the world and that philosophy will migrate its center of gravity from the US to Asia, and perhaps create a global philosophical culture which will make the Analytic/Continental divide irrelevant.
Author begins by considering the supposed distinction between Analytic and Continental philosophy, and points out that there is little of substance between them and that from the perspective from the philosophy of the East (Asia) it is just bickering within a family. Author admits that much of what follows is broad and misses details and distinctions, but assumes that the broad strokes author presents are true in some 'gross terms'.
Author believes the divide between Analytic and Continental in the 20th century had 3 phases: constructive, destructive, and fragmentation. The rebellion against German Idealism was led by Frege and Husserl, both concerned with representation in language and thought. Frege developed logic and semantic theories about sense, reference, objects, concepts. Husserl developed phenomenology and how consciousness 'presents itself'. The tools 'took on a life of their own' and the first half of the 20th century was filled with optimism about solving old problems with the new tools. Wittgenstein and Russell, then the logical positivists on the Analytic side, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the Continental. Then the destructive phase, Kuhn (Analytic) and Foucault (Continental) and the 'specter of relativism' from without, and the internal attacks from Quine, Derrida. Author states that the novel techniques that launched the constructive phase ended up 'collapsing under their own weight'. What followed was a variety of influential philosophers, each with separate goals and arguments: a fragmentation. The core of both traditions, states author, is a concern for representation and that in the fragmentation there are many more commonalities to be appreciated.
Author moves on to consider "Asian Philosophy" and discounts it as a coherent thing; there are at least two distinct traditions: from India and from China. This is different from Western Philosophy, which author states solely originates from ancient Greece. There are three barriers to westerners studying Eastern Philosophy: language, style, and culture. Author discusses first Indian, the Chinese philosophical history. Author focuses on Buddhism cross-pollinating with T(D)aoism to create Chan/Zen Buddhism, and briefly discusses the distinctions between Indian and Chinese Buddhism.
Author argues that from the Eastern perspective, the Analytic/Continental divide looks like an 'in-house debate', while the different origins, languages, and styles of Indian/Chinese philosophy are 'definitely very different'. Author concludes with a prediction that Asia will rise as the dominant political force of the world and that philosophy will migrate its center of gravity from the US to Asia, and perhaps create a global philosophical culture which will make the Analytic/Continental divide irrelevant.
9/21/12
Putnam, Hilary - A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy
09/21/2012
Renewing Philosophy, ch 9, Harvard University Press 1992
Author claims that Dewey's justification of democracy as a "form of social life" is epistemological, in contrast with Bernard Williams' discussion of ethical justifications as a "medical metaphor" and focused solely on the individual. For Williams, the justification for enforcing ethical rules, prototypically around flourishing, is that there is something objectively wrong with the individual who isn't flourishing: that individual is "ill" (pg180-2). Ethics would then be moved into some branch of human psychology, one that we have yet to fully flesh out (if at all). One chief problem author raises is that Williams' conception is 'radically individualistic' (pg182), and Dewey's is for a society in general. The problem is that the medical metaphor does not translate or anologize well into a societal picture.
Author goes on to talk about the problems in modern western society with critiquing other cultures. Besides the cultural relativism argument from anthropologists, there is a persistent idea of the "noble savage", which author tries to unpack as a belief that primitive cultures are superior to modern western ones (pg183-5). The other alternative is the "golden age" myth that points to a spot in history where society was rationally superior but that age is now gone (pg185). Both alternatives want to immunize that culture from suggestions of alternative ways of life, according to author.
The approach Dewey takes is that there are "better and worse resolutions to human predicaments" (pg186), and that this is discoverable through inquiry, hypothesis, experimentation and analysis: an epistemological approach. Author claims this is distinct from, say, Williams, who must have a prior "fact of the matter" established ontologically at which these better or worse resolutions aim. Without that, the resolutions are just "local" truths, not "absolute" ones. (pg187) Dewey believed that philosophy had no specific content for itself other than what was available to common sense and science, thus freedom and information were crucial for resolving problems (pg188). Furthermore, there is no one way to live, thus a democracy is needed to be responsive to further discussion and experimentation (pg189). This does not entail just relying on experts, as Durkheim concluded.
Author argues that Dewey's shortfall is when it comes to moral dilemmas, specifically ones where experimentation and optimizing policies will not work: author gives the example from Sartre's Pierre, who has to decide between joining the resistance (in WWII) or caring for his sick mother (pg190-1). Author talks about William James' Will To Believe essay and how this kind of existential decision can be made "in advance of the evidence". (pg191-2) This line of argumentation for James was criticized since he took belief in God to be an existential choice like Pierre's. Author argues that James falls in line with Wittgenstein that religious belief is a-rational, not irrational or rational. Author gives an extended discussion of the choice of belief in theories even in science (pg192-3), and distinguishes it from religion and other existential choices, whose "rightness" cannot be publicly confirmed (pg194-5). The idea here is that consequential 'estimated utilities' is no way to live a meaningful human life (pg194). Author speculates that Dewey's problem on the individual moral decision has to do with his dualistic conception of human life: the social and the aesthetic (pg196).
The final pages are a conclusion for the entire book, which argues that philosophy is the practice that 'unsettles' prejudices and 'pet convictions' but also changes both our lives and our self-perceptions (pg198-200).
Renewing Philosophy, ch 9, Harvard University Press 1992
Author claims that Dewey's justification of democracy as a "form of social life" is epistemological, in contrast with Bernard Williams' discussion of ethical justifications as a "medical metaphor" and focused solely on the individual. For Williams, the justification for enforcing ethical rules, prototypically around flourishing, is that there is something objectively wrong with the individual who isn't flourishing: that individual is "ill" (pg180-2). Ethics would then be moved into some branch of human psychology, one that we have yet to fully flesh out (if at all). One chief problem author raises is that Williams' conception is 'radically individualistic' (pg182), and Dewey's is for a society in general. The problem is that the medical metaphor does not translate or anologize well into a societal picture.
Author goes on to talk about the problems in modern western society with critiquing other cultures. Besides the cultural relativism argument from anthropologists, there is a persistent idea of the "noble savage", which author tries to unpack as a belief that primitive cultures are superior to modern western ones (pg183-5). The other alternative is the "golden age" myth that points to a spot in history where society was rationally superior but that age is now gone (pg185). Both alternatives want to immunize that culture from suggestions of alternative ways of life, according to author.
The approach Dewey takes is that there are "better and worse resolutions to human predicaments" (pg186), and that this is discoverable through inquiry, hypothesis, experimentation and analysis: an epistemological approach. Author claims this is distinct from, say, Williams, who must have a prior "fact of the matter" established ontologically at which these better or worse resolutions aim. Without that, the resolutions are just "local" truths, not "absolute" ones. (pg187) Dewey believed that philosophy had no specific content for itself other than what was available to common sense and science, thus freedom and information were crucial for resolving problems (pg188). Furthermore, there is no one way to live, thus a democracy is needed to be responsive to further discussion and experimentation (pg189). This does not entail just relying on experts, as Durkheim concluded.
Author argues that Dewey's shortfall is when it comes to moral dilemmas, specifically ones where experimentation and optimizing policies will not work: author gives the example from Sartre's Pierre, who has to decide between joining the resistance (in WWII) or caring for his sick mother (pg190-1). Author talks about William James' Will To Believe essay and how this kind of existential decision can be made "in advance of the evidence". (pg191-2) This line of argumentation for James was criticized since he took belief in God to be an existential choice like Pierre's. Author argues that James falls in line with Wittgenstein that religious belief is a-rational, not irrational or rational. Author gives an extended discussion of the choice of belief in theories even in science (pg192-3), and distinguishes it from religion and other existential choices, whose "rightness" cannot be publicly confirmed (pg194-5). The idea here is that consequential 'estimated utilities' is no way to live a meaningful human life (pg194). Author speculates that Dewey's problem on the individual moral decision has to do with his dualistic conception of human life: the social and the aesthetic (pg196).
The final pages are a conclusion for the entire book, which argues that philosophy is the practice that 'unsettles' prejudices and 'pet convictions' but also changes both our lives and our self-perceptions (pg198-200).
8/24/12
Bandman, Bertram - Ultimate Questions, Extraordinary Religious Beliefs and Ordinary Criteria: The Case Against Fideism in Wittgenstein's Later Work
08/24/2012
From: Wittgenstein: Toward a Re-Evaluation; Fourteenth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Haller & Brandl, eds 1990
A Fideism is defined by author as someone who believes that faith overrides reason. Author does not believe Wittgenstein is a fideist but instead someone who tries to apply ordinary language to inner processes. Author first gives some examples of Wittgenstein's method and statements about the non-sense found in philosophy. But in the next section (3), author gives some examples, including "God's Eye sees everything", which author abbreviates "E". This E is taken not simply as a given but as being embedded in a system of other beliefs, attitudes and expectations, "some of which are rationally examinable".
Author discusses Wittgenstein's conception of a 'Framework Belief', or a belief that is part of the riverbed of one's belief system, like: "I have forebears". Only the insane could doubt such a belief, and such doubt is taken to be hollow. Someone who doubts that 'motorcars grow from the earth' doesn't even accept our system of verification. This is more evidence author uses to claim that Wittgenstein is looking for criteria for belief; not faith. Further than that, there is the problem that expressions of religious faith do not have obvious FBs to 'secure' them.
Another facet of Wittgenstein's work author brings to bear is his adaptation of Moore's Paradigm Case Argument (PCA). Moore's PCA claims that religious beliefs can be reasoned about, and are either true or false. A Fideist might claim that religious beliefs are not intended to be T/F, but this is exactly what PCA scrutinizes. Author conducts an extended analysis of religious belief statements under the supposition that they "fit into a scheme of value statements". In a conservative but charitable understanding of value statements, they are not T/F but reasoned and open to evaluation once given criteria. But furthermore there is the problem that if religious belief is not T/F then the practices that are based on their truth are similarly undermined. (pg342)
From: Wittgenstein: Toward a Re-Evaluation; Fourteenth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Haller & Brandl, eds 1990
A Fideism is defined by author as someone who believes that faith overrides reason. Author does not believe Wittgenstein is a fideist but instead someone who tries to apply ordinary language to inner processes. Author first gives some examples of Wittgenstein's method and statements about the non-sense found in philosophy. But in the next section (3), author gives some examples, including "God's Eye sees everything", which author abbreviates "E". This E is taken not simply as a given but as being embedded in a system of other beliefs, attitudes and expectations, "some of which are rationally examinable".
Author discusses Wittgenstein's conception of a 'Framework Belief', or a belief that is part of the riverbed of one's belief system, like: "I have forebears". Only the insane could doubt such a belief, and such doubt is taken to be hollow. Someone who doubts that 'motorcars grow from the earth' doesn't even accept our system of verification. This is more evidence author uses to claim that Wittgenstein is looking for criteria for belief; not faith. Further than that, there is the problem that expressions of religious faith do not have obvious FBs to 'secure' them.
Another facet of Wittgenstein's work author brings to bear is his adaptation of Moore's Paradigm Case Argument (PCA). Moore's PCA claims that religious beliefs can be reasoned about, and are either true or false. A Fideist might claim that religious beliefs are not intended to be T/F, but this is exactly what PCA scrutinizes. Author conducts an extended analysis of religious belief statements under the supposition that they "fit into a scheme of value statements". In a conservative but charitable understanding of value statements, they are not T/F but reasoned and open to evaluation once given criteria. But furthermore there is the problem that if religious belief is not T/F then the practices that are based on their truth are similarly undermined. (pg342)
8/10/12
Putnam, Hilary - Wittgenstein and Realism
08/10/2012
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Ch 22 Harvard University Press, 2012
Author starts with Wittgenstein's line from the Tractatus proposing an equivalence between solipsism and "pure realism". In figuring out what notion of solipsism Wittgenstein had in mind, author turns to an interpretation offered by Brian McGuinness, whereby Wittgenstein was trying to both contradict and reconcile Schopenhauer's 'famous dictum' that the world is "my idea". (pg340) The idea here is that language is used to express propositions about the world and how the world could be configured, and solipsistic (or realist) propositions are not changing or adding anything intelligible to the language (pg341-2).
The next discussion adds Carnap to the mix, as a representative of the Vienna Circle, which had thoroughly discussed Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Carnap considered the Tractatus to be not entirely free of metaphysics, specifically about the logical structure of propositions/the world. Author investigates what Carnap meant with the term "metaphysics", which firstly was seen as nonsense because it was opposed to verifiability, but later became nonsense because it was the pursuit of external-sentences using language-terms from an internal-language. (pg344-5) Here author claims that Quine's indictment of Carnap's position would be similar to Wittgenstein's. Later, Carnap points out a problem for Wittgenstein: if the solipsist propositions are equivalent to the realist ones, then mustn't their logical form be also equivalent? But even if the propositions can be made into having the same outcomes, their logical form can't be equivalent (author and Carnap argues), thus a tenet of the Tractatus falls (pg346-7).
Author then moves to Reichenbach and his analysis of the "choice" of either the realist language or an "egocentric language". Reichenbach justifies our use of the realist language because it helps justify a great many human actions, like buying life insurance (pg347-8). Author believes this "egocentric language" is a stand-in for Carnap's solipsistic one. Author also argues that it is unlikely this "egocentric language" is even intelligible. (pg349) This leads to an interesting approach to the private language argument in the later Wittgenstein; though author first talks about Wittgenstein's notion how a logic and grammar may be "rotated" around the real need to understand, e.g. intention (pg350-1).
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Ch 22 Harvard University Press, 2012
Author starts with Wittgenstein's line from the Tractatus proposing an equivalence between solipsism and "pure realism". In figuring out what notion of solipsism Wittgenstein had in mind, author turns to an interpretation offered by Brian McGuinness, whereby Wittgenstein was trying to both contradict and reconcile Schopenhauer's 'famous dictum' that the world is "my idea". (pg340) The idea here is that language is used to express propositions about the world and how the world could be configured, and solipsistic (or realist) propositions are not changing or adding anything intelligible to the language (pg341-2).
The next discussion adds Carnap to the mix, as a representative of the Vienna Circle, which had thoroughly discussed Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Carnap considered the Tractatus to be not entirely free of metaphysics, specifically about the logical structure of propositions/the world. Author investigates what Carnap meant with the term "metaphysics", which firstly was seen as nonsense because it was opposed to verifiability, but later became nonsense because it was the pursuit of external-sentences using language-terms from an internal-language. (pg344-5) Here author claims that Quine's indictment of Carnap's position would be similar to Wittgenstein's. Later, Carnap points out a problem for Wittgenstein: if the solipsist propositions are equivalent to the realist ones, then mustn't their logical form be also equivalent? But even if the propositions can be made into having the same outcomes, their logical form can't be equivalent (author and Carnap argues), thus a tenet of the Tractatus falls (pg346-7).
Author then moves to Reichenbach and his analysis of the "choice" of either the realist language or an "egocentric language". Reichenbach justifies our use of the realist language because it helps justify a great many human actions, like buying life insurance (pg347-8). Author believes this "egocentric language" is a stand-in for Carnap's solipsistic one. Author also argues that it is unlikely this "egocentric language" is even intelligible. (pg349) This leads to an interesting approach to the private language argument in the later Wittgenstein; though author first talks about Wittgenstein's notion how a logic and grammar may be "rotated" around the real need to understand, e.g. intention (pg350-1).
8/3/12
Putnam, Hilary - Wittgenstein: A Reappraisal
08/03/2012
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author beings the chapter by mentioning some of the lessons author inherited from Wittgenstein that he believes are right; but the one that author takes as "quite wrong" is the notion that metaphysics is value-less, and should be cured by a type of therapy (pg483). Author first introduces the idea of what it is for things to not "make sense". For something to not make sense, author argues that it must be from the perspective of a philosophical argument or theory, not from an understanding of language or grammar (pg484). The idea here is to repudiate that the moniker "nonsense" can come about without using another (different) philosophical theory to justify its usage.
Author introduces two different interpretations of Wittgenstein, The New one embodied by Conant & Diamond, and the Orthodox, enumerated by Baker & Hacker. Both have different accounts of what a philosopher is doing when speaking nonsense, but both agree that philosophers speak nonsense most of the time, and both agree that this is a linguistic error. Author disagrees: these philosophers are making sense, though their metaphysics might lack "full intelligibility" since it may fail to show how something may be true (pg486).
There is a brief interlude about another way to answer skepticism, without claiming that skepticism is "nonsense" because it gets the grammar of the words "to know" or "to prove" wrong. Author believes that the skeptic can be answered by constructing an argument from premises that he must accept. That the skeptic does not accept them is not a concern; the premises are reasonable and therefore a suitable answer to the skeptic (pg488-9).
Author argues that Wittgenstein himself established the sort-of middle ground of "lacking full intelligibility" when it came to religious language; author suggests that had Wittgenstein taken an equally charitable approach toward philosophy he would allow metaphysics to be sensical though not fully intelligible (pg490). Author closes by giving a case of so-called scientists labeling a certain native tribe to be "soulless", though clearly there is no evidence for this. The question: are they making sense? Yes. But do they have a worldview that is alien (not fully intelligible) to us.
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author beings the chapter by mentioning some of the lessons author inherited from Wittgenstein that he believes are right; but the one that author takes as "quite wrong" is the notion that metaphysics is value-less, and should be cured by a type of therapy (pg483). Author first introduces the idea of what it is for things to not "make sense". For something to not make sense, author argues that it must be from the perspective of a philosophical argument or theory, not from an understanding of language or grammar (pg484). The idea here is to repudiate that the moniker "nonsense" can come about without using another (different) philosophical theory to justify its usage.
Author introduces two different interpretations of Wittgenstein, The New one embodied by Conant & Diamond, and the Orthodox, enumerated by Baker & Hacker. Both have different accounts of what a philosopher is doing when speaking nonsense, but both agree that philosophers speak nonsense most of the time, and both agree that this is a linguistic error. Author disagrees: these philosophers are making sense, though their metaphysics might lack "full intelligibility" since it may fail to show how something may be true (pg486).
There is a brief interlude about another way to answer skepticism, without claiming that skepticism is "nonsense" because it gets the grammar of the words "to know" or "to prove" wrong. Author believes that the skeptic can be answered by constructing an argument from premises that he must accept. That the skeptic does not accept them is not a concern; the premises are reasonable and therefore a suitable answer to the skeptic (pg488-9).
Author argues that Wittgenstein himself established the sort-of middle ground of "lacking full intelligibility" when it came to religious language; author suggests that had Wittgenstein taken an equally charitable approach toward philosophy he would allow metaphysics to be sensical though not fully intelligible (pg490). Author closes by giving a case of so-called scientists labeling a certain native tribe to be "soulless", though clearly there is no evidence for this. The question: are they making sense? Yes. But do they have a worldview that is alien (not fully intelligible) to us.
7/27/12
Albert, David - On the Origin of Everything
07/27/2012
New York Times, March 23, 2012
Review of A Universe From Nothing by Lawrence Krauss
Author (Albert) reviews a cosmology book by Krauss and disputes that it actually does explain why there is something rather than nothing. Apparently Krauss claims the laws of quantum physics explain why there isn't nothing. The first question author asks is where the laws of quantum mechanics come from-- what makes them true and laws of nature-- and why those laws are the way they are. Furthermore, author argues that even quantum fields need to be explained as to why they even exist too, a feat Krauss does not do.
The explanation for why Krauss thought that his cosmological explanation was superior to previous ones was that quantum fields can theoretically be arranged to reflect a "vacuum" state, in other words, be 'nothing' (in terms of particles). Thus the arrangement of quantum fields can produce no particles, which could be considered "nothing". Author points out the problem that this misses the point: the quantum fields are the elementary physical stuffs, true "nothing" would be the absence of those fields.
Finally, there is the Krauss' objection that this is changing the game or "moving the goal posts" because "nothing" as it has been traditionally understood meant "no particles", and he has explained how particles can arise from a no-particle state (of quantum fields). Author just replies that this just goes to show that we now know better that the fundamental make-up of the universe are not particles but fields. It isn't the endgame Krauss is assuming he has, and furthermore, author chides Krauss for thinking of the dialectic in cosmology as some sort of game.
New York Times, March 23, 2012
Review of A Universe From Nothing by Lawrence Krauss
Author (Albert) reviews a cosmology book by Krauss and disputes that it actually does explain why there is something rather than nothing. Apparently Krauss claims the laws of quantum physics explain why there isn't nothing. The first question author asks is where the laws of quantum mechanics come from-- what makes them true and laws of nature-- and why those laws are the way they are. Furthermore, author argues that even quantum fields need to be explained as to why they even exist too, a feat Krauss does not do.
The explanation for why Krauss thought that his cosmological explanation was superior to previous ones was that quantum fields can theoretically be arranged to reflect a "vacuum" state, in other words, be 'nothing' (in terms of particles). Thus the arrangement of quantum fields can produce no particles, which could be considered "nothing". Author points out the problem that this misses the point: the quantum fields are the elementary physical stuffs, true "nothing" would be the absence of those fields.
Finally, there is the Krauss' objection that this is changing the game or "moving the goal posts" because "nothing" as it has been traditionally understood meant "no particles", and he has explained how particles can arise from a no-particle state (of quantum fields). Author just replies that this just goes to show that we now know better that the fundamental make-up of the universe are not particles but fields. It isn't the endgame Krauss is assuming he has, and furthermore, author chides Krauss for thinking of the dialectic in cosmology as some sort of game.
7/13/12
Putnam, Hilary - Capabilities and Two Ethical Theories
07/13/2012
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author begins the paper by distinguishing between "Expressivist" and "Kantian" modes of thinking about ethical and normative questions. Expressivism is meant to capture the concept that ethical sentences are expressions of attitudes, not beliefs or facts. Author intends to take Simon Blackburn's theories as a reasonable expression. Kantian approach is less the actual ideas of Kant but more that ethics have a basis in reason and rational action. Blackburn claims that expressivism can fit in well with the demise of positivism and the rise of pluralistic accounts of the good, and (especially for this paper) the capabilities approach pioneered by Amartya Sen.
Author outlines Blackburn's main approach, which is to disentangle ethical terms into a descriptive notion and an attitude (pg301). The difficulty Blackburn points out now is that attitudes may be completely free of rational evaluation, which is a result of their being noncognitive. So Blackburn tries to show that indeed ethical discussion is important (pg302) and also show that discussions can be classified in terms of how they are conducted; evasion, concealment, ad hominem, etc are examples of bad argumentation, thus are not rational ways of conducting ethical discussion. Author points out these criteria are fraught with the same normative judgments Blackburn is supposed to be explaining, and that worse is that there is no independent evaluation of rational argumentation if the end-results of good process are not considered any more true than the end-results of bad process (because there is no truth of the matter). (pg303) Author claims Blackburn suffers from a "severe impoverishment of categories". (pg303) Blackburn is using a "procrustean" bed of world representation/attitude expression (pg304) that is descended from Hume.
Author contrasts Blackburn with Scanlon's view of ethics as contractual, in that an action should be avoided if it is one that others might reasonably reject. (pg303-5) Author claims that Scanlon's procedural ethics misses some of humanity's "basic interests", though we should resist the temptation to build a foundation for ethics on any one of them (pg305-6) because the bundle that holds together those interests is too thin. Author next considers 2 objections to Scanlon's view, that he perceives as age-old:
1) equality is fine within classes, or castes (the slave-holding class)
2) equality is fine for people with certain characteristics (the warriors of the society)
In the case of the second, author argues we have come to hold different interests. Those interests are "justified" from within morality, not from without it or below it. Author claims we no longer see the warrior lifestyle as the pinnacle of human excellence, and that we no longer see caste systems as a correct representation of superiority, and that we "appreciate the superiority of the ... 'democratic way of life'" (pg308).
Author talks about Habermas' conception of universal agreement and how the major objection, that it never happens in real life (when the norm is suitably broadly extending) is serious (pg309). This is not an objection to Scanlon, however, who offers a lower bar that no one can "reasonably" reject such norms. So author poses the question: when there is disagreement, how are we to decide? Author's answer is: Democracy and Fallibilism (pg310-11) In other words, bring all the stakeholders together to decide on the best course of action, and be ready to revise it, even revise the fundamental rights or approaches, as time goes on.
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author begins the paper by distinguishing between "Expressivist" and "Kantian" modes of thinking about ethical and normative questions. Expressivism is meant to capture the concept that ethical sentences are expressions of attitudes, not beliefs or facts. Author intends to take Simon Blackburn's theories as a reasonable expression. Kantian approach is less the actual ideas of Kant but more that ethics have a basis in reason and rational action. Blackburn claims that expressivism can fit in well with the demise of positivism and the rise of pluralistic accounts of the good, and (especially for this paper) the capabilities approach pioneered by Amartya Sen.
Author outlines Blackburn's main approach, which is to disentangle ethical terms into a descriptive notion and an attitude (pg301). The difficulty Blackburn points out now is that attitudes may be completely free of rational evaluation, which is a result of their being noncognitive. So Blackburn tries to show that indeed ethical discussion is important (pg302) and also show that discussions can be classified in terms of how they are conducted; evasion, concealment, ad hominem, etc are examples of bad argumentation, thus are not rational ways of conducting ethical discussion. Author points out these criteria are fraught with the same normative judgments Blackburn is supposed to be explaining, and that worse is that there is no independent evaluation of rational argumentation if the end-results of good process are not considered any more true than the end-results of bad process (because there is no truth of the matter). (pg303) Author claims Blackburn suffers from a "severe impoverishment of categories". (pg303) Blackburn is using a "procrustean" bed of world representation/attitude expression (pg304) that is descended from Hume.
Author contrasts Blackburn with Scanlon's view of ethics as contractual, in that an action should be avoided if it is one that others might reasonably reject. (pg303-5) Author claims that Scanlon's procedural ethics misses some of humanity's "basic interests", though we should resist the temptation to build a foundation for ethics on any one of them (pg305-6) because the bundle that holds together those interests is too thin. Author next considers 2 objections to Scanlon's view, that he perceives as age-old:
1) equality is fine within classes, or castes (the slave-holding class)
2) equality is fine for people with certain characteristics (the warriors of the society)
In the case of the second, author argues we have come to hold different interests. Those interests are "justified" from within morality, not from without it or below it. Author claims we no longer see the warrior lifestyle as the pinnacle of human excellence, and that we no longer see caste systems as a correct representation of superiority, and that we "appreciate the superiority of the ... 'democratic way of life'" (pg308).
Author talks about Habermas' conception of universal agreement and how the major objection, that it never happens in real life (when the norm is suitably broadly extending) is serious (pg309). This is not an objection to Scanlon, however, who offers a lower bar that no one can "reasonably" reject such norms. So author poses the question: when there is disagreement, how are we to decide? Author's answer is: Democracy and Fallibilism (pg310-11) In other words, bring all the stakeholders together to decide on the best course of action, and be ready to revise it, even revise the fundamental rights or approaches, as time goes on.
7/6/12
Putnam. Hilary - The Fact/Value Dichotomy and Its Critics
07/06/2012
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author begins this paper by revisiting an earlier book he wrote on the "fact/value distinction", where a notable economist (during the great depression) argued forcefully for reason to be relegated to means, and ends to be values that were in some sense subjective (pg283-5) This had similarities with the logical positivists, who claimed that value assertions lacked cognitive meaning.
Author introduces Charles Stevenson's Ethics and Language and Stanley Cavell's The Claim of Reason to show the emotivist and rationalist arguments about ethics. (pg285-88) Stevenson remarks about how all disagreement is either about beliefs or attitudes, but beliefs (as in science) can be revealed and tested, while attitudes cannot in anything like the same manner. Cavell points out that disagreement may still be rational even if there is no alignment of belief or attitude. (pg287) Cavell goes on to give 4 main disagreements with Stevenson (pg287).
Author asserts that Quine's demolition of the theory/description distinction also destroyed the fact/value dichotomy (pg288), though author starts with recounting the positivists account of the analytic/synthetic distinction for the sciences, and Quine's assault on it (pg289-90). Author points out that whatever failures the positivists had, it was at least after years of hard work. While Stevenson's belief/attitude distinction rested on no such hard work and is therefore even more questionable.
Author moves on to the "entanglement" of facts and values, in the two senses: (pg291)
1. factual judgments depend on epistemic values (like coherence, simplicity, elegance), and even possibly what predicates to use for induction is an epistemic value (see Goodman, new riddle)
2. Values tap into an "evaluative point of view" (pg292)
The idea here may be that there must be something that we're trying to get "right" when we discuss the difference between bravery and foolhardiness. McDowell affirms this by claiming that there is a current move by emotivists that there can be a "disentanglement" between the feature of the world that we're picking up on, and the 'special perspective' of evaluative judgment. The objection (pg 292-3) is that if this feature could be picked out, its application could be mastered independently of knowing what the evaluative judgment might mean. Author points out that for McDowell, all human life is conceptualized, since McDowell has Kantian roots. Author moves instead to Cavell and one of his quotes about morality, as being a kind-of reconciliation process that comes with disagreement (pg295).
Author ends with a conclusion about how the fact/value dichotomy is the top of a three-legged stool:
1) "the postulation of theory-free 'facts'" (fact/theory distinction)
2) the denial that evaluation is entangled in 'facts'/science
3) the claim that science proceeds roughly by a combination of induction and deduction
Each leg breaks for different reasons, from different areas of philosophy.
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author begins this paper by revisiting an earlier book he wrote on the "fact/value distinction", where a notable economist (during the great depression) argued forcefully for reason to be relegated to means, and ends to be values that were in some sense subjective (pg283-5) This had similarities with the logical positivists, who claimed that value assertions lacked cognitive meaning.
Author introduces Charles Stevenson's Ethics and Language and Stanley Cavell's The Claim of Reason to show the emotivist and rationalist arguments about ethics. (pg285-88) Stevenson remarks about how all disagreement is either about beliefs or attitudes, but beliefs (as in science) can be revealed and tested, while attitudes cannot in anything like the same manner. Cavell points out that disagreement may still be rational even if there is no alignment of belief or attitude. (pg287) Cavell goes on to give 4 main disagreements with Stevenson (pg287).
Author asserts that Quine's demolition of the theory/description distinction also destroyed the fact/value dichotomy (pg288), though author starts with recounting the positivists account of the analytic/synthetic distinction for the sciences, and Quine's assault on it (pg289-90). Author points out that whatever failures the positivists had, it was at least after years of hard work. While Stevenson's belief/attitude distinction rested on no such hard work and is therefore even more questionable.
Author moves on to the "entanglement" of facts and values, in the two senses: (pg291)
1. factual judgments depend on epistemic values (like coherence, simplicity, elegance), and even possibly what predicates to use for induction is an epistemic value (see Goodman, new riddle)
2. Values tap into an "evaluative point of view" (pg292)
The idea here may be that there must be something that we're trying to get "right" when we discuss the difference between bravery and foolhardiness. McDowell affirms this by claiming that there is a current move by emotivists that there can be a "disentanglement" between the feature of the world that we're picking up on, and the 'special perspective' of evaluative judgment. The objection (pg 292-3) is that if this feature could be picked out, its application could be mastered independently of knowing what the evaluative judgment might mean. Author points out that for McDowell, all human life is conceptualized, since McDowell has Kantian roots. Author moves instead to Cavell and one of his quotes about morality, as being a kind-of reconciliation process that comes with disagreement (pg295).
Author ends with a conclusion about how the fact/value dichotomy is the top of a three-legged stool:
1) "the postulation of theory-free 'facts'" (fact/theory distinction)
2) the denial that evaluation is entangled in 'facts'/science
3) the claim that science proceeds roughly by a combination of induction and deduction
Each leg breaks for different reasons, from different areas of philosophy.
6/29/12
Putnam, Hilary - A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics (Again)
06/29/2012
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author revisits the paper, "A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics", released before Bell's "famous" paper on the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen paradox. This was an occasion to flesh out the paradox that if non-locality in quantum mechanics was correct, Einsteinian special relativity is refuted (pg 127). Author then produces an extensive quote from his previous (1965) paper, where the "operationalist" theory of scientific method and theory is assumed to be false and his theory of scientific realism is proposed (pg128-131). Author sees a problem with the proposed version of scientific realism and quantum mechanics, and next goes on to describe what quantum mechanics posits, and the problems it raises. pg 131-3 [Summarizing author's summary of quantum physics is a misguided affair.]
The first problem considered is Schrodinger's cat, where a macro-level object (a cat) is in a superposition based on a quantum "state" (dead/alive). In effect, the probability of death/life is 50/50, but the cat is in a "superposition" based on the un-collapsed quantum state. At least, this is the interpretation given by Von Neumann, discussed next by author. With Von Neumann, the cat collapses into one particular physical state when it is "observed" (pg133-4). Author considers other interpretations to the quantum problems, including Bohm and Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW). (pg 134-5). For Bohm, particles have definite positions and momenta, but because of a "hidden-variable" that is from some sort of "velocity field". (pg135-6) The GRW theory posits that each particle has a tiny probability of collapsing, thus with macroscopic objects collapse is all but certain. (pg136-7)
Author recounts his meeting with Einstein, who said that he didn't really believe the Von Neumann "collapse" assumption (pg137), and then reviews the theory of quantum mechanics he found most plausible in his earlier paper. Author believed that there was a distinction between micro- and macro-observables, that macro- had definite positions and values at all times, but micro- did not, and that was a relationship between macro- measurement and micro-observables (pg138). Author then moves to a chart that maps four possible interpretations of QM, that is based primarily on whether there is collapse or not (pg139). Author then describes (reviews) the views in the table (pg140-1), and then argues for which theories he thinks we should discard (pg141-143).
Author has moved from the Von Neumann theory that macro-objects don't have superposition and therefore when they interact with micro-objects that do, they cause collapse (in other words, collapse is external to the system), to the idea of spontaneous collapse (like GRW). However, author does not fully support GRW because each particle may violate the law of conservation of energy (pg142). Author gives a thought experiment to make the multiple worlds/no collapse theory seem implausible (pg143-4), by showing that the probability of one outcome in a Schrodinger's cat-like experiment will be irrelevant because the actual worlds will roughly be 50/50 (dead/alive). Thus either a GRW-esque theory of collapse or a Bohm-esque theory of hidden variables are what we are left with. The next difficulty, as well, is that for either of these interpretations to work, "absolute time" must also be included (pg145-6). Author suggests the possibility that space-time is literally super-imposed onto itself, like two discrete space-times, both of which are internally Einsteinian, and then "background time" is only necessary when they are combined.
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author revisits the paper, "A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics", released before Bell's "famous" paper on the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen paradox. This was an occasion to flesh out the paradox that if non-locality in quantum mechanics was correct, Einsteinian special relativity is refuted (pg 127). Author then produces an extensive quote from his previous (1965) paper, where the "operationalist" theory of scientific method and theory is assumed to be false and his theory of scientific realism is proposed (pg128-131). Author sees a problem with the proposed version of scientific realism and quantum mechanics, and next goes on to describe what quantum mechanics posits, and the problems it raises. pg 131-3 [Summarizing author's summary of quantum physics is a misguided affair.]
The first problem considered is Schrodinger's cat, where a macro-level object (a cat) is in a superposition based on a quantum "state" (dead/alive). In effect, the probability of death/life is 50/50, but the cat is in a "superposition" based on the un-collapsed quantum state. At least, this is the interpretation given by Von Neumann, discussed next by author. With Von Neumann, the cat collapses into one particular physical state when it is "observed" (pg133-4). Author considers other interpretations to the quantum problems, including Bohm and Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW). (pg 134-5). For Bohm, particles have definite positions and momenta, but because of a "hidden-variable" that is from some sort of "velocity field". (pg135-6) The GRW theory posits that each particle has a tiny probability of collapsing, thus with macroscopic objects collapse is all but certain. (pg136-7)
Author recounts his meeting with Einstein, who said that he didn't really believe the Von Neumann "collapse" assumption (pg137), and then reviews the theory of quantum mechanics he found most plausible in his earlier paper. Author believed that there was a distinction between micro- and macro-observables, that macro- had definite positions and values at all times, but micro- did not, and that was a relationship between macro- measurement and micro-observables (pg138). Author then moves to a chart that maps four possible interpretations of QM, that is based primarily on whether there is collapse or not (pg139). Author then describes (reviews) the views in the table (pg140-1), and then argues for which theories he thinks we should discard (pg141-143).
Author has moved from the Von Neumann theory that macro-objects don't have superposition and therefore when they interact with micro-objects that do, they cause collapse (in other words, collapse is external to the system), to the idea of spontaneous collapse (like GRW). However, author does not fully support GRW because each particle may violate the law of conservation of energy (pg142). Author gives a thought experiment to make the multiple worlds/no collapse theory seem implausible (pg143-4), by showing that the probability of one outcome in a Schrodinger's cat-like experiment will be irrelevant because the actual worlds will roughly be 50/50 (dead/alive). Thus either a GRW-esque theory of collapse or a Bohm-esque theory of hidden variables are what we are left with. The next difficulty, as well, is that for either of these interpretations to work, "absolute time" must also be included (pg145-6). Author suggests the possibility that space-time is literally super-imposed onto itself, like two discrete space-times, both of which are internally Einsteinian, and then "background time" is only necessary when they are combined.
6/22/12
Putnam, Hilary - The Content and Appeal of "Naturalism"
06/22/2012
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author complains that "naturalism" is often undefined but ascribed to, and one place it is defined, in Boyd, Gasper, & Trout's Philosophy of Science glossary, is a disjunctive definition, comprised of two possibilities:
1. all phenomena are subject to natural laws
2. the methods of natural science is applicable in every area of inquiry
Author considers both using an example of a phenomenon of a usually clear writer composing a paragraph that is difficult to interpret. (pg 110-111) In the first case, the definition is trivial or absurd, and in the second it seems risible to claim that interpretation has a scientific approach like physics does, author argues. To really understand naturalism, author argues, one must inspect the alternative; it isn't "supernaturalism" or "occult", but "conceptual pluralism". Author's conceptual pluralism involves the "insistence that various sorts of statements" are as fully valid and true as the statements of empirical science. (pg112)
Author starts with the instability of the naturalist approach; that it can slip into Richard Rorty's anti-naturalism or a kind of Lewisonian Aristotelianism. Author talks about a common move in naturalism: to take a "minimalist" perspective toward one's ontology, in that anything that is real can be reduced to a description in "first grade" conceptual systems. The problem is (as usual) intentional conceptual schemes, where meaning, reference, beliefs and so on enter. Quine famously denied these were real things, most notably (according to author) by attacking reference (pg115). Quine argued that "x verbs y" is equivalent to "(cosmos minus x) verbs (cosmos minus y)." Because of the indeterminacy of reference, it does not pick anything out. (Using causation rather than correspondence is no help-pg116) Thus language is an internal system that does not extensionally connect to the world (pg116), which author points out looks a lot like Rorty's anti-realist picture. So minimalist naturalism may collapse into Rortian anti-realism. (pg117) Author pauses briefly to give a preview of his alternative picture (pg118). Author points out an alternative picture of reference, given by Lewis, in which there are "objective similarities" between objects/properties/classes. Author argues that in order to capture predicates like "is a chair", you need to add sortal elements like "affords sitting" rather than just color, shape, mass, etc. Thus there may be objective intentional objects, which author declares to be highly medieval/Aristotelian. (pg118-9)
The next (final) discussion is about the appeal of naturalism, and author discusses two arguments:
1. Argument from composition/evolution: the origin of the universe was fields and particles, until evolution, which is composed of fields and particles. (pg119-120)
2. If you can't reduce everything, something is "unexplained" (pg120)
Author spends the most time refuting 1 by first attacking how using 'mereological sums' to reduce objects will miss the similarities between objects that are slightly composed differently, and will miss modal discussions, since there is no "me" that ate a different dinner last night-- that would be a different person. (pg 120-123)
To deal with argument 2, this is simply something not to be afraid of. Author talks about how philosophers admit that an empirical inquiry like geology is legitimate but has yet to be reduced to physics, but nevertheless has acceptable terms like "true/false" "refer", etc. (pg124)
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author complains that "naturalism" is often undefined but ascribed to, and one place it is defined, in Boyd, Gasper, & Trout's Philosophy of Science glossary, is a disjunctive definition, comprised of two possibilities:
1. all phenomena are subject to natural laws
2. the methods of natural science is applicable in every area of inquiry
Author considers both using an example of a phenomenon of a usually clear writer composing a paragraph that is difficult to interpret. (pg 110-111) In the first case, the definition is trivial or absurd, and in the second it seems risible to claim that interpretation has a scientific approach like physics does, author argues. To really understand naturalism, author argues, one must inspect the alternative; it isn't "supernaturalism" or "occult", but "conceptual pluralism". Author's conceptual pluralism involves the "insistence that various sorts of statements" are as fully valid and true as the statements of empirical science. (pg112)
Author starts with the instability of the naturalist approach; that it can slip into Richard Rorty's anti-naturalism or a kind of Lewisonian Aristotelianism. Author talks about a common move in naturalism: to take a "minimalist" perspective toward one's ontology, in that anything that is real can be reduced to a description in "first grade" conceptual systems. The problem is (as usual) intentional conceptual schemes, where meaning, reference, beliefs and so on enter. Quine famously denied these were real things, most notably (according to author) by attacking reference (pg115). Quine argued that "x verbs y" is equivalent to "(cosmos minus x) verbs (cosmos minus y)." Because of the indeterminacy of reference, it does not pick anything out. (Using causation rather than correspondence is no help-pg116) Thus language is an internal system that does not extensionally connect to the world (pg116), which author points out looks a lot like Rorty's anti-realist picture. So minimalist naturalism may collapse into Rortian anti-realism. (pg117) Author pauses briefly to give a preview of his alternative picture (pg118). Author points out an alternative picture of reference, given by Lewis, in which there are "objective similarities" between objects/properties/classes. Author argues that in order to capture predicates like "is a chair", you need to add sortal elements like "affords sitting" rather than just color, shape, mass, etc. Thus there may be objective intentional objects, which author declares to be highly medieval/Aristotelian. (pg118-9)
The next (final) discussion is about the appeal of naturalism, and author discusses two arguments:
1. Argument from composition/evolution: the origin of the universe was fields and particles, until evolution, which is composed of fields and particles. (pg119-120)
2. If you can't reduce everything, something is "unexplained" (pg120)
Author spends the most time refuting 1 by first attacking how using 'mereological sums' to reduce objects will miss the similarities between objects that are slightly composed differently, and will miss modal discussions, since there is no "me" that ate a different dinner last night-- that would be a different person. (pg 120-123)
To deal with argument 2, this is simply something not to be afraid of. Author talks about how philosophers admit that an empirical inquiry like geology is legitimate but has yet to be reduced to physics, but nevertheless has acceptable terms like "true/false" "refer", etc. (pg124)
6/15/12
Putnam, Hilary - From Quantum Mechanics to Ethics and Back Again
06/15/2012
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press 2012
This chapter is first autobiographical about author's interests in ethics throughout author's career. Author continues to believe that ethics is a legitimate realm of knowledge, as author wrote in 1974. But the autobiographical remarks go on to consider how author is misunderstood to be leaving behind scientific realism for "common sense realism". This kicks off an examination of the term "scientific realism". The first discussion of "internal realism", which Putnam is accused of being in his mid-career, came in 1976 under the "Realism and Reason" address to the APA (Eastern). But really author prefers to have used "scientific realism" rather than "internal" in his opening remarks back then. By the end of the 1976 paper, author had formulated a new theory called "internal realism", which was different from the quick reference author made at the outset. This led to much confusion, particularly evident in De Gaynesford's book. What this confusion brought out was a deeper understanding of the limit of scientific realism, or of internal realism, in that author advanced it as another empirical theory, but as such the anti-realist must reject at least one empirical theory. This, according to author, begs the question against anti-realism, or at least should allow one to be both an anti-realist for language but a scientific realist for empiricism (pg56).
Author attempts to show how conceptual relativity may be compatible with realism in metaphysics (pg56). The idea is that cognitive equivalence of theories and preservation of explanations do not need to preserve "ontology", or the real objects that are supposed by the theory. Author also talks about not needing mereological sums or all the particular axioms that mereology may entail, and the question about whether sums /really/ exist as a pseudo-question. (pg57-8)
The next discussion is about why author gave up functionalism: two reasons: (1) it wouldn't allow for reference to objects in the world, it didn't allow for "world-involving abilities" and (2) not only are mental states compositionally plastic, but also computationally plastic [this somehow is a refutation...]. (pg59) With reference being a relation between people and actual objects, it is possible to avoid the layer of sensations that were part of Cartesian dualism (pg60-1).
The point of this discussion was to return to rejecting one form of metaphysical realism (that there is precisely one way to describe the world), and also still allow for other forms, compatible with conceptual relativity. Author then describes how that is possible (pg63-4): allow for independent descriptions of the same one world. This is different, according to author, from conceptual pluralism (pg64) which has non-translatable forms of the world (levels). Within the field of science, physics perhaps the most salient case, there are translatable but also separate interpretations of the physical world.
Author then turns to a few objections and sore spots his view might touch. The first is the Wittgensteinian sense that thinking about realism and anti-realism is just thinking about nonsense. Author rejects that out of hand. The second is that talk of "states of affairs" ("aspects of reality") is unclear and imprecise; this is a sort of Quinean/Davidsonian objection (pg66-7). Quine eschewed in ontology anything without precise identity and non-identity conditions, and with things like states of affairs (and many intentional states), they were not precise enough and thus were discarded in science. Author answers by claiming that the term "states of affairs" is a 'broad-spectrum notion' that is a paraphrase of more precise understandings of objects. Davidson's purpose is to remain far away from even the specter of the correspondence theory of truth. Author: use a disquotational theory of truth where nothing is added by asserting the truth of a proposition (pg68).
Author closes by considering himself in the pragmatist tradition, and specifically admiring two beliefs from them: (1) language is not just description and evaluation, two categories which must never touch. (2) Philosophy should matter to our "moral and spiritual lives". (pg71) Interestingly author says that it is a "pipe dream" that philosophy will become a "cumulative body of knowledge".
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press 2012
This chapter is first autobiographical about author's interests in ethics throughout author's career. Author continues to believe that ethics is a legitimate realm of knowledge, as author wrote in 1974. But the autobiographical remarks go on to consider how author is misunderstood to be leaving behind scientific realism for "common sense realism". This kicks off an examination of the term "scientific realism". The first discussion of "internal realism", which Putnam is accused of being in his mid-career, came in 1976 under the "Realism and Reason" address to the APA (Eastern). But really author prefers to have used "scientific realism" rather than "internal" in his opening remarks back then. By the end of the 1976 paper, author had formulated a new theory called "internal realism", which was different from the quick reference author made at the outset. This led to much confusion, particularly evident in De Gaynesford's book. What this confusion brought out was a deeper understanding of the limit of scientific realism, or of internal realism, in that author advanced it as another empirical theory, but as such the anti-realist must reject at least one empirical theory. This, according to author, begs the question against anti-realism, or at least should allow one to be both an anti-realist for language but a scientific realist for empiricism (pg56).
Author attempts to show how conceptual relativity may be compatible with realism in metaphysics (pg56). The idea is that cognitive equivalence of theories and preservation of explanations do not need to preserve "ontology", or the real objects that are supposed by the theory. Author also talks about not needing mereological sums or all the particular axioms that mereology may entail, and the question about whether sums /really/ exist as a pseudo-question. (pg57-8)
The next discussion is about why author gave up functionalism: two reasons: (1) it wouldn't allow for reference to objects in the world, it didn't allow for "world-involving abilities" and (2) not only are mental states compositionally plastic, but also computationally plastic [this somehow is a refutation...]. (pg59) With reference being a relation between people and actual objects, it is possible to avoid the layer of sensations that were part of Cartesian dualism (pg60-1).
The point of this discussion was to return to rejecting one form of metaphysical realism (that there is precisely one way to describe the world), and also still allow for other forms, compatible with conceptual relativity. Author then describes how that is possible (pg63-4): allow for independent descriptions of the same one world. This is different, according to author, from conceptual pluralism (pg64) which has non-translatable forms of the world (levels). Within the field of science, physics perhaps the most salient case, there are translatable but also separate interpretations of the physical world.
Author then turns to a few objections and sore spots his view might touch. The first is the Wittgensteinian sense that thinking about realism and anti-realism is just thinking about nonsense. Author rejects that out of hand. The second is that talk of "states of affairs" ("aspects of reality") is unclear and imprecise; this is a sort of Quinean/Davidsonian objection (pg66-7). Quine eschewed in ontology anything without precise identity and non-identity conditions, and with things like states of affairs (and many intentional states), they were not precise enough and thus were discarded in science. Author answers by claiming that the term "states of affairs" is a 'broad-spectrum notion' that is a paraphrase of more precise understandings of objects. Davidson's purpose is to remain far away from even the specter of the correspondence theory of truth. Author: use a disquotational theory of truth where nothing is added by asserting the truth of a proposition (pg68).
Author closes by considering himself in the pragmatist tradition, and specifically admiring two beliefs from them: (1) language is not just description and evaluation, two categories which must never touch. (2) Philosophy should matter to our "moral and spiritual lives". (pg71) Interestingly author says that it is a "pipe dream" that philosophy will become a "cumulative body of knowledge".
6/1/12
Gilmore, James - The Good and the Good of the Soul
06/01/2012
(Unpublished)
Author discusses how just action relates to the soul, and how knowledge relates to the soul, in Plato's Socratic dialogues. There are three ways it seems knowledge is related to the soul:
1) Wisdom is a virtue, characteristic of excellence of the soul
2) Knowledge of justice and avoiding injustice will mean you will know what to do (and what to avoid), thus putting your soul aright
3) Knowledge is pleasurable
The classic interpretation is that knowledge in general, and knowledge of justice, contribute to "psychic welfare", or the goodness of one's soul. Thus "the good is one's own good". The difficulty lies in "framing" the relationship between justice and the good of the soul. Author continues to talk about problems with this the classic interpretation.
The first discussion is sparked by Sachs, who points out that the well-ordered soul has intelligence, courage, and self-control, though none of these qualities are particularly just, e.g. could be also held by an evildoer, or someone who commits injustice. Further, Sachs raises the issue of whether anything in particular is required of the just man, or if it is to simply avoid injustice. Author argues that Plato does give prescriptive actions to the just philosopher, namely the burden of ruling.
Author uses Irwin's notation for two kinds of justice, one that is just for the city, or c-justice (encompassing just actions, just behavior), and the other kind will be personal orderliness, psychic welfare, or p-justice. With these two kinds in place, Plato needs to prove that a c-just person is also p-just, and also that a p-just person will be c-just. Sachs argues that Plato does not show the connections. There is a problem between the 'thin' account of p-justice and the need for a richer account of the permissible and required acts of c-justice.
Author tries to diagnose the problem: things that are good-for-me (p-just) don't seem to be good-in-general, or c-just. However, author instead argues that things are only good-for-me if they are indeed good-in-general. This may dispel some confusion around the apparent hedonistic view Socrates dons in Republic Book 9. Instead, author takes the Philebus to be Plato's settled view on pleasure, in that it is a 'value-tracker' or pleasure is the upshot of good "processes". Second, author argues that Plato needs to talk about pleasure as a good-in-itself in the Republic since that is what Socrates' interlocutors assumed it is. The biggest advantage the c-unjust man has is pleasure, so Plato needs to argue that the c-unjust man has less pleasure than the c-just, though this leaves it open whether pleasure really is a good-in-itself.
Author moves to his discussion, first of "psychic harmony". For Plato, the human good is being a certain kind of person, the one with a well-ordered soul, or with knowledge of justice. There is a functional account of what psychic harmony is in Republic Books 5-7, and then Book 9 tells why PH is good. The functional account of PH is that reason instructs all other parts of the soul by its access to truth about "what is best". But that still leaves the content of goodness, or justice, undiscovered. Author claims it can't be that the good is just the ordering of the soul, since then the good = ordering the soul, and ordering the soul = the good. Author claims this is uninformative and does not say why goodness is worthwhile. The problem here is that not only does c-justice seem under-defined, so does p-justice.
Author continues by exploring Plato's other thoughts in the Republic Book 4 about the human good. Perhaps it's reason managing all the different desires of all the different parts, in some sort of optimal or maximal way. But this doesn't seem right since reason's desires get preferential treatment. It may be that Plato wants there to be two elements: all desire satisfaction (for all parts of the soul), and also the intrinsic value of rational agency, or of the rule of reason. But even if this is the p-justice, the only relevant part for c-justice is reason; and Plato even suggests that other desires are weighted hardly at all even for p-justice. Author reviews the arguments in Republic Book 9 for p-justice, and the value of it and compares them to the Philebus. Importantly, author points out that Plato doesn't want to consider three pleasurable things: wisdom, honor, and money. Instead, these are three kinds of pleasure, each providing its own kind of pleasure. But then a problem arises in attempts to compare these three kinds. The first argument is that the philosopher has experienced all the kinds, and therefore can judge. The second argument is that each kind of pleasure has "intrinsic features" that make them more or less "true" or 'legitimate'. The argument here is that wisdom is stronger than honor or money since wisdom partakes in something eternal, while honor or money are changeable and 'mortal'.
Author discusses pleasure as a process, a 'filling-up' (greek: plerosis) rather than a state. Knowledge, then, would not technically be pleasurable, though learning would be. Author circles back to what is doing the filling, e.g.: wisdom (which is more eternal and truer), or food (mortal, changeable). What is more the issue, rather than the process/state distinction, is the nature of the lack, and what it needs to fulfill it. Instead of having desires fulfilled being good, it's that getting what you're missing is the good, and it is better to get wisdom than food, since wisdom is satisfying permanently, and food is only temporarily satisfying. This interpretation also has the advantage of 'ecology', being that our soul naturally lacks certain things but pursues them according to those lacks-- food being lower than wisdom, but both are constitutive lacks of the human being.
Author circles back to pleasure being either the value-maker or the value-tracker. The favored interpretation from the author is pleasure is the value-tracker. Pleasure is identified with a process, which is a becoming, not a being, and thus not a good-in-itself. [Interestingly, it is Millgram who equates conviction in belief with pleasure in an end or activity.]
(Unpublished)
Author discusses how just action relates to the soul, and how knowledge relates to the soul, in Plato's Socratic dialogues. There are three ways it seems knowledge is related to the soul:
1) Wisdom is a virtue, characteristic of excellence of the soul
2) Knowledge of justice and avoiding injustice will mean you will know what to do (and what to avoid), thus putting your soul aright
3) Knowledge is pleasurable
The classic interpretation is that knowledge in general, and knowledge of justice, contribute to "psychic welfare", or the goodness of one's soul. Thus "the good is one's own good". The difficulty lies in "framing" the relationship between justice and the good of the soul. Author continues to talk about problems with this the classic interpretation.
The first discussion is sparked by Sachs, who points out that the well-ordered soul has intelligence, courage, and self-control, though none of these qualities are particularly just, e.g. could be also held by an evildoer, or someone who commits injustice. Further, Sachs raises the issue of whether anything in particular is required of the just man, or if it is to simply avoid injustice. Author argues that Plato does give prescriptive actions to the just philosopher, namely the burden of ruling.
Author uses Irwin's notation for two kinds of justice, one that is just for the city, or c-justice (encompassing just actions, just behavior), and the other kind will be personal orderliness, psychic welfare, or p-justice. With these two kinds in place, Plato needs to prove that a c-just person is also p-just, and also that a p-just person will be c-just. Sachs argues that Plato does not show the connections. There is a problem between the 'thin' account of p-justice and the need for a richer account of the permissible and required acts of c-justice.
Author tries to diagnose the problem: things that are good-for-me (p-just) don't seem to be good-in-general, or c-just. However, author instead argues that things are only good-for-me if they are indeed good-in-general. This may dispel some confusion around the apparent hedonistic view Socrates dons in Republic Book 9. Instead, author takes the Philebus to be Plato's settled view on pleasure, in that it is a 'value-tracker' or pleasure is the upshot of good "processes". Second, author argues that Plato needs to talk about pleasure as a good-in-itself in the Republic since that is what Socrates' interlocutors assumed it is. The biggest advantage the c-unjust man has is pleasure, so Plato needs to argue that the c-unjust man has less pleasure than the c-just, though this leaves it open whether pleasure really is a good-in-itself.
Author moves to his discussion, first of "psychic harmony". For Plato, the human good is being a certain kind of person, the one with a well-ordered soul, or with knowledge of justice. There is a functional account of what psychic harmony is in Republic Books 5-7, and then Book 9 tells why PH is good. The functional account of PH is that reason instructs all other parts of the soul by its access to truth about "what is best". But that still leaves the content of goodness, or justice, undiscovered. Author claims it can't be that the good is just the ordering of the soul, since then the good = ordering the soul, and ordering the soul = the good. Author claims this is uninformative and does not say why goodness is worthwhile. The problem here is that not only does c-justice seem under-defined, so does p-justice.
Author continues by exploring Plato's other thoughts in the Republic Book 4 about the human good. Perhaps it's reason managing all the different desires of all the different parts, in some sort of optimal or maximal way. But this doesn't seem right since reason's desires get preferential treatment. It may be that Plato wants there to be two elements: all desire satisfaction (for all parts of the soul), and also the intrinsic value of rational agency, or of the rule of reason. But even if this is the p-justice, the only relevant part for c-justice is reason; and Plato even suggests that other desires are weighted hardly at all even for p-justice. Author reviews the arguments in Republic Book 9 for p-justice, and the value of it and compares them to the Philebus. Importantly, author points out that Plato doesn't want to consider three pleasurable things: wisdom, honor, and money. Instead, these are three kinds of pleasure, each providing its own kind of pleasure. But then a problem arises in attempts to compare these three kinds. The first argument is that the philosopher has experienced all the kinds, and therefore can judge. The second argument is that each kind of pleasure has "intrinsic features" that make them more or less "true" or 'legitimate'. The argument here is that wisdom is stronger than honor or money since wisdom partakes in something eternal, while honor or money are changeable and 'mortal'.
Author discusses pleasure as a process, a 'filling-up' (greek: plerosis) rather than a state. Knowledge, then, would not technically be pleasurable, though learning would be. Author circles back to what is doing the filling, e.g.: wisdom (which is more eternal and truer), or food (mortal, changeable). What is more the issue, rather than the process/state distinction, is the nature of the lack, and what it needs to fulfill it. Instead of having desires fulfilled being good, it's that getting what you're missing is the good, and it is better to get wisdom than food, since wisdom is satisfying permanently, and food is only temporarily satisfying. This interpretation also has the advantage of 'ecology', being that our soul naturally lacks certain things but pursues them according to those lacks-- food being lower than wisdom, but both are constitutive lacks of the human being.
Author circles back to pleasure being either the value-maker or the value-tracker. The favored interpretation from the author is pleasure is the value-tracker. Pleasure is identified with a process, which is a becoming, not a being, and thus not a good-in-itself. [Interestingly, it is Millgram who equates conviction in belief with pleasure in an end or activity.]
5/25/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 35 Nietzsche
Author introduces the Convergence Claim, which is that agreement in moral belief if everyone had the non-moral facts, used similar normative concepts, and were not affected by distorting influences. This is contrary to the Argument from Disagreement, which must involve denying moral principles due to fundamental normative disagreement. Author sees Nietzsche as a thinker who presents fundamental disagreement.
The first apparent disagreement is about suffering, and how it may be intrinsically good. Author argues that Nietzsche seems to suggest that suffering is good because of his principle that everything is good. (pg571) This could be about accepting the whole of the universe, or fate, and finding some kind of solace in it. (pg572) Author suggests this may have been a view held by Nietzsche for biographical reasons.
Further disagreement may be found in Nietzsche's view of the suffering of others, or in the value of compassion. Here author helps himself again to Nietzsche's biography, pointing out that he was deeply compassionate (pg574). Instead, author argues Nietzsche thinks rather that compassion has bad effects, specifically in weakening the healthy (pg573). This leads to a deeper discussion about the virtues Nietzsche found valuable in life, especially 'warlike virtues' which author interprets more to be about being bold, taking risks, and struggling to create great works. (pg574-6) More trouble arises when Nietzsche discusses the 'healthy aristocracy', which will be both great and also subject 'untold' humans to degradation and suffering. (pg577)
Author turns to exploring why Nietzsche had these beliefs to find their (partial) justification (pg578-9), calling attention to Nietzsche's insanity near the end of his life as partial evidence for the views he held. Author comes to claim (pg581) that often Nietzsche is not aiming at moral truth, but instead at other goals for humanity. Thus the disagreement isn't comparable. But what is happening is that Nietzsche is appealing to reasons beyond the moral; for author reason is more fundamental anyway, so the discussion moves to Nietzsche's proposed reason-giving alternatives to morality.
Author moves to discuss Nietzsche's view of moral truth, and the concepts of moral goodness and evil in general (pg582). Author first examines Nietzsche's view about moral responsibility, which he says we cannot have because we don't have the type of freedom necessary for guilt. Second, there is the Nietzschean view that morality involves a false psychology of acting from obligation or altruism, which does not exist as an intention or motivation. Author claims morality does not rest on this psychology. (pg583) Author takes a brief apparent detour into the Kantian double meaning of "sollen", a German word that can be both "shall" and "ought", one of which can be true/false, the former other cannot. (pg584-5) Schopenhauer argued against the 'shall' version of 'sollen' after it first gets admittance by reason with the sense of 'ought'. (pg585) The detour through 'sollen' and Schopenhauer comes back to Neitzsche because both believed that the concept of God underpinned morality in the 'shall' sense, and since God did not exist, morality fell too. (pg586-7) Author reasserts that there are reasons for morality even without God, and that commands should not be equated with 'oughts' (pg588). Thus author concludes that Nietzsche takes the fundamental moral relationship to be one of 'shalls' rather than 'oughts'. Thus the disagreement is not comparable to author's sequence of reason-based oughts.
The next biggest challenge involves the Nietzschean view that equal rights for all is misguided, or false-- since the creative geniuses deserve much greater consideration and can trample others. But author takes the statements that the whole of society would benefit from the works of great people to mean that Nietzsche also gave consideration to the 'mediocre'. (pg590-1) Author interprets Nietzsche to agree about the badness of suffering (pg591-2), and also to back into a kind of utilitarianism that justifies the suffering of many for the great works of the few for which such suffering may exist. (pg592-3) Author moves to the discussion of morality and happiness, or virtue and flourishing, and the strained relationship between them (pg594-5) in Nietzsche. However, author claims contradictory comments are inconclusive.
The discussion is really on the "meaning of life", or for Nietzsche whether there is such a goal or destiny. Since God is out of the picture, another possibility is that nature, or life itself, has one for humanity. But in this case, consciousness, especially of agreeable or disagreeable conditions (e.g. suffering, pleasure) are means for achieving some end (since life gave us consciousness along with all our other tools for achieving whatever end it has for us). (pg596-7) Thus suffering isn't bad in itself. Author denies that nature's goal for humans should be our goal, or that nature might even have a goal for us. Nietzsche however goes further in that life or nature may not provide the goals, instead that values are our own-- and he seeks a new value system once morality has been felled (pg599-600). Author summarizes the various claims on pg 602-3. Author chalks much of the perceived disagreement to either Nietzsche's mistaking commands for oughts, or insanity.
The first apparent disagreement is about suffering, and how it may be intrinsically good. Author argues that Nietzsche seems to suggest that suffering is good because of his principle that everything is good. (pg571) This could be about accepting the whole of the universe, or fate, and finding some kind of solace in it. (pg572) Author suggests this may have been a view held by Nietzsche for biographical reasons.
Further disagreement may be found in Nietzsche's view of the suffering of others, or in the value of compassion. Here author helps himself again to Nietzsche's biography, pointing out that he was deeply compassionate (pg574). Instead, author argues Nietzsche thinks rather that compassion has bad effects, specifically in weakening the healthy (pg573). This leads to a deeper discussion about the virtues Nietzsche found valuable in life, especially 'warlike virtues' which author interprets more to be about being bold, taking risks, and struggling to create great works. (pg574-6) More trouble arises when Nietzsche discusses the 'healthy aristocracy', which will be both great and also subject 'untold' humans to degradation and suffering. (pg577)
Author turns to exploring why Nietzsche had these beliefs to find their (partial) justification (pg578-9), calling attention to Nietzsche's insanity near the end of his life as partial evidence for the views he held. Author comes to claim (pg581) that often Nietzsche is not aiming at moral truth, but instead at other goals for humanity. Thus the disagreement isn't comparable. But what is happening is that Nietzsche is appealing to reasons beyond the moral; for author reason is more fundamental anyway, so the discussion moves to Nietzsche's proposed reason-giving alternatives to morality.
Author moves to discuss Nietzsche's view of moral truth, and the concepts of moral goodness and evil in general (pg582). Author first examines Nietzsche's view about moral responsibility, which he says we cannot have because we don't have the type of freedom necessary for guilt. Second, there is the Nietzschean view that morality involves a false psychology of acting from obligation or altruism, which does not exist as an intention or motivation. Author claims morality does not rest on this psychology. (pg583) Author takes a brief apparent detour into the Kantian double meaning of "sollen", a German word that can be both "shall" and "ought", one of which can be true/false, the former other cannot. (pg584-5) Schopenhauer argued against the 'shall' version of 'sollen' after it first gets admittance by reason with the sense of 'ought'. (pg585) The detour through 'sollen' and Schopenhauer comes back to Neitzsche because both believed that the concept of God underpinned morality in the 'shall' sense, and since God did not exist, morality fell too. (pg586-7) Author reasserts that there are reasons for morality even without God, and that commands should not be equated with 'oughts' (pg588). Thus author concludes that Nietzsche takes the fundamental moral relationship to be one of 'shalls' rather than 'oughts'. Thus the disagreement is not comparable to author's sequence of reason-based oughts.
The next biggest challenge involves the Nietzschean view that equal rights for all is misguided, or false-- since the creative geniuses deserve much greater consideration and can trample others. But author takes the statements that the whole of society would benefit from the works of great people to mean that Nietzsche also gave consideration to the 'mediocre'. (pg590-1) Author interprets Nietzsche to agree about the badness of suffering (pg591-2), and also to back into a kind of utilitarianism that justifies the suffering of many for the great works of the few for which such suffering may exist. (pg592-3) Author moves to the discussion of morality and happiness, or virtue and flourishing, and the strained relationship between them (pg594-5) in Nietzsche. However, author claims contradictory comments are inconclusive.
The discussion is really on the "meaning of life", or for Nietzsche whether there is such a goal or destiny. Since God is out of the picture, another possibility is that nature, or life itself, has one for humanity. But in this case, consciousness, especially of agreeable or disagreeable conditions (e.g. suffering, pleasure) are means for achieving some end (since life gave us consciousness along with all our other tools for achieving whatever end it has for us). (pg596-7) Thus suffering isn't bad in itself. Author denies that nature's goal for humans should be our goal, or that nature might even have a goal for us. Nietzsche however goes further in that life or nature may not provide the goals, instead that values are our own-- and he seeks a new value system once morality has been felled (pg599-600). Author summarizes the various claims on pg 602-3. Author chalks much of the perceived disagreement to either Nietzsche's mistaking commands for oughts, or insanity.
5/11/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 7 Moral Concepts
05/11/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 7, Oxford University Press 2011
This is author's first main chapter on morality, and it starts by enumerating the various senses of "wrong"-- first the the ordinary sense, where someone has all the morally-relevant facts. The successive senses involve cases of partial ignorance:
Fact-relative: x is wrong if B had all the relevant facts
Belief-relative: x is wrong if B had true beliefs about the relevant facts
Evidence-relative: x is wrong if B had enough evidence to believe relevant facts
The reason for drawing these distinctions is to account for moral luck, where the consequences turn out right despite one's beliefs, or one's available evidence, or one's intentions. Author goes through a variety of cases. Cases one and two show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than belief-relative cases. (pg151-2) Cases three and four show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than evidence-relevant senses. (pg152-3) Cases five and six try to show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than fact-relevant senses. (pg153) Interestingly, author places epistemic incompetence, or failing to believe x when presented with relevant evidence, as not morally culpable, even if such incompetence fails to correct an unjustified belief that plays a part in deliberation in a moral situation. (pg153) Author's first reason for using all three senses is that other people use all three senses, so it is wise to keep the usage but guide the terminology (pg153-4).
The next discussion is about what the different senses of "wrong" pick out, and the importance of what is picked out. With the belief-relevant senses, if B was right about the facts, B's acts would be ordinarily wrong (trying to kill someone). So for blameworthiness, belief-relevance is crucial. Fact-relevance is less so, or at least that is an intuition shared especially by kantians. However, author discusses and rejects semi-kantians (pg156-7) who believe that fact-relevance in blameworthiness is sometimes partially a factor. Author introduces another sense of "wrong": the moral-belief-relative sense: when B believes x is wrong in the ordinary sense. This is meant to accommodate the Thomistic view, which is that: if you think you're doing something wrong, you're doing something wrong. Author agrees this might be blameworthy in the moral-belief-relative sense, even if it is not wrong in the evidence- or fact-relevant sense.
Another important question aside from blameworthiness is deliberation about what to do (pg159-. Here author hews toward evidence-relative factors and "expectablism", especially when looking for outcomes (pg160-1).
What relevance does the fact-relevant sense of "wrong" or "ought" have then? Author answers by claiming that discovering true moral principles is one reason to use the fact-relevant sense. Fact-relevant senses of ought are the most fundamental, leading most straight-forwardly to the ordinary sense of wrong and ought. (pg162) Then there are senses of what B ought-practically to do, where evidence-relevant senses come into play, as do belief-relative and "moral/normative-belief-relative" senses.
Author then moves from the ordinary sense of wrong (which took the various different senses, above) to other possible senses of the concept (pg164-5). The first major point author makes is that there is a basic sense of wrong that is indefinable. There are other senses like "blameworthiness" and "unjustifiable" that are definable (pg165-6). Next author discusses the language of morality at the nexus of reason-implying senses of the words. (pg166-8) Most interestingly, author considers Rational Egoism an "external rival" to morality. But similarly, Act Consequentialism, the most fundamental form of Utilitarianism, is also considered an external rival (pg168-9).
Author circles back to the multiple senses of "wrong" and why author holds there are many (pg169-170). One reason writers think there is only one sense is that we believe we are in legitimate disagreement when we argue over moral cases. Author considers these weak and not plausible enough to underwrite one sense of "wrong" (pg170-1). Lastly, author discusses the reason-implying senses of "ought" and "wrong" (pg172-4).
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 7, Oxford University Press 2011
This is author's first main chapter on morality, and it starts by enumerating the various senses of "wrong"-- first the the ordinary sense, where someone has all the morally-relevant facts. The successive senses involve cases of partial ignorance:
Fact-relative: x is wrong if B had all the relevant facts
Belief-relative: x is wrong if B had true beliefs about the relevant facts
Evidence-relative: x is wrong if B had enough evidence to believe relevant facts
The reason for drawing these distinctions is to account for moral luck, where the consequences turn out right despite one's beliefs, or one's available evidence, or one's intentions. Author goes through a variety of cases. Cases one and two show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than belief-relative cases. (pg151-2) Cases three and four show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than evidence-relevant senses. (pg152-3) Cases five and six try to show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than fact-relevant senses. (pg153) Interestingly, author places epistemic incompetence, or failing to believe x when presented with relevant evidence, as not morally culpable, even if such incompetence fails to correct an unjustified belief that plays a part in deliberation in a moral situation. (pg153) Author's first reason for using all three senses is that other people use all three senses, so it is wise to keep the usage but guide the terminology (pg153-4).
The next discussion is about what the different senses of "wrong" pick out, and the importance of what is picked out. With the belief-relevant senses, if B was right about the facts, B's acts would be ordinarily wrong (trying to kill someone). So for blameworthiness, belief-relevance is crucial. Fact-relevance is less so, or at least that is an intuition shared especially by kantians. However, author discusses and rejects semi-kantians (pg156-7) who believe that fact-relevance in blameworthiness is sometimes partially a factor. Author introduces another sense of "wrong": the moral-belief-relative sense: when B believes x is wrong in the ordinary sense. This is meant to accommodate the Thomistic view, which is that: if you think you're doing something wrong, you're doing something wrong. Author agrees this might be blameworthy in the moral-belief-relative sense, even if it is not wrong in the evidence- or fact-relevant sense.
Another important question aside from blameworthiness is deliberation about what to do (pg159-. Here author hews toward evidence-relative factors and "expectablism", especially when looking for outcomes (pg160-1).
What relevance does the fact-relevant sense of "wrong" or "ought" have then? Author answers by claiming that discovering true moral principles is one reason to use the fact-relevant sense. Fact-relevant senses of ought are the most fundamental, leading most straight-forwardly to the ordinary sense of wrong and ought. (pg162) Then there are senses of what B ought-practically to do, where evidence-relevant senses come into play, as do belief-relative and "moral/normative-belief-relative" senses.
Author then moves from the ordinary sense of wrong (which took the various different senses, above) to other possible senses of the concept (pg164-5). The first major point author makes is that there is a basic sense of wrong that is indefinable. There are other senses like "blameworthiness" and "unjustifiable" that are definable (pg165-6). Next author discusses the language of morality at the nexus of reason-implying senses of the words. (pg166-8) Most interestingly, author considers Rational Egoism an "external rival" to morality. But similarly, Act Consequentialism, the most fundamental form of Utilitarianism, is also considered an external rival (pg168-9).
Author circles back to the multiple senses of "wrong" and why author holds there are many (pg169-170). One reason writers think there is only one sense is that we believe we are in legitimate disagreement when we argue over moral cases. Author considers these weak and not plausible enough to underwrite one sense of "wrong" (pg170-1). Lastly, author discusses the reason-implying senses of "ought" and "wrong" (pg172-4).
5/4/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 6 Morality
05/04/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 6, Oxford University Press 2011
Author is firmly in the objective reasons theory now, comparing different kinds. Author starts with a discussion of Rational Egoism and Rational Impartialism being combined into Sidgwick's dualism, which states that it is rational to be either impartial or egoistic in any circumstance (pg131). Author believes that for Sidgwick it is the incomparability of egoistic and impartial reasons that means either are rational. This is rooted (for Sidgwick) in the separateness of persons and the duality of standpoints (pg133). Author believes that some reasons, even across kinds, are comparable (pg132) and uses an example of trying to build a building and account for both aesthetics and economics. Author then takes on Sidgwick's reasoning by enumerating it (pg134) and then rejecting portions of it.
Sidgwick:
(A) There are two standpoints which both give reasons for act, personal and impartial.
(B-C) From both perspectives, different reasons are supreme
(D) Comparison between kinds of reasons requires a third point-of-view
(E) There is no such point of view
Conclusion: Both personal and impartial views are rational
Author first rejects (A), then (D), then (B) by giving the example of saving yourself the pain of the prick of a pin versus the death of 1M people (pg135). Next author attacks the solely first-personal basis for personal action, by using the claim that the close ties we have with others give us personal reasons to care about the well-being of others. This is underwritten not by our personal identity, but by our "various psychological relations between ourselves as we are now and our future selves [and psychological relations with others]" (pg136). Author also argues we have impartial reasons to care about everyone's well-being.
Author partially agrees with Sidgwick in that different kinds of reasons are not fully comparable, though they are imprecisely so. Author unveils the Wide Value-Based Objective View here (pg137). Author argues we all have an impartial reason to alleviate suffering, wherever we can, though our relationship to our pain is different from our relationship to a stranger's pain (pg138-9).
One problem is the imprecise comparability of person-neutral and person-relative reasons. Can person-neutral reasons override person-relative ones only when hugely magnified? Author is inclined to disagree, saying that even a one-to-one swap of life (First Shipwreck) would be rational. The result is Wide Dualism, where we can be permitted to act in accord with our own well-being, or be permitted to be impartial; either reasoning is rational. (pg140)
Author next considers "the profoundest problem", where self-interested reasons and impartial reasons (the obligation to do one's duty) conflict. In short, a conflict between Moral Rationalism and Rational Egoism. Sidgwick tried to encompass the dualism by claiming that in cases of conflict, reason gives no guidance (pg142-3). This is really two problems (at least), according to author. First is the moralist's problem: in cases of conflict, people have good reason to act wrongly (in self-interest rather than morally). The other is the rationalist's problem: reason should give us guidance in these cases, or else reason is not our only (or ultimate) guide. (pg143-4)
Author discusses norms and different kinds of rules, lumping morality in with other kinds of norms. The problem is when multiple rules give conflicting guides. The solution is to find an impartial criterion for judgment, which author takes to be reason (pg146). Reason, according to author, "is wider, and more fundamental" (pg147). However, it isn't the case simply that reason is more important in the reason-implying sense (that would be circular). Instead, reason is the end of justification. (pg148)
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 6, Oxford University Press 2011
Author is firmly in the objective reasons theory now, comparing different kinds. Author starts with a discussion of Rational Egoism and Rational Impartialism being combined into Sidgwick's dualism, which states that it is rational to be either impartial or egoistic in any circumstance (pg131). Author believes that for Sidgwick it is the incomparability of egoistic and impartial reasons that means either are rational. This is rooted (for Sidgwick) in the separateness of persons and the duality of standpoints (pg133). Author believes that some reasons, even across kinds, are comparable (pg132) and uses an example of trying to build a building and account for both aesthetics and economics. Author then takes on Sidgwick's reasoning by enumerating it (pg134) and then rejecting portions of it.
Sidgwick:
(A) There are two standpoints which both give reasons for act, personal and impartial.
(B-C) From both perspectives, different reasons are supreme
(D) Comparison between kinds of reasons requires a third point-of-view
(E) There is no such point of view
Conclusion: Both personal and impartial views are rational
Author first rejects (A), then (D), then (B) by giving the example of saving yourself the pain of the prick of a pin versus the death of 1M people (pg135). Next author attacks the solely first-personal basis for personal action, by using the claim that the close ties we have with others give us personal reasons to care about the well-being of others. This is underwritten not by our personal identity, but by our "various psychological relations between ourselves as we are now and our future selves [and psychological relations with others]" (pg136). Author also argues we have impartial reasons to care about everyone's well-being.
Author partially agrees with Sidgwick in that different kinds of reasons are not fully comparable, though they are imprecisely so. Author unveils the Wide Value-Based Objective View here (pg137). Author argues we all have an impartial reason to alleviate suffering, wherever we can, though our relationship to our pain is different from our relationship to a stranger's pain (pg138-9).
One problem is the imprecise comparability of person-neutral and person-relative reasons. Can person-neutral reasons override person-relative ones only when hugely magnified? Author is inclined to disagree, saying that even a one-to-one swap of life (First Shipwreck) would be rational. The result is Wide Dualism, where we can be permitted to act in accord with our own well-being, or be permitted to be impartial; either reasoning is rational. (pg140)
Author next considers "the profoundest problem", where self-interested reasons and impartial reasons (the obligation to do one's duty) conflict. In short, a conflict between Moral Rationalism and Rational Egoism. Sidgwick tried to encompass the dualism by claiming that in cases of conflict, reason gives no guidance (pg142-3). This is really two problems (at least), according to author. First is the moralist's problem: in cases of conflict, people have good reason to act wrongly (in self-interest rather than morally). The other is the rationalist's problem: reason should give us guidance in these cases, or else reason is not our only (or ultimate) guide. (pg143-4)
Author discusses norms and different kinds of rules, lumping morality in with other kinds of norms. The problem is when multiple rules give conflicting guides. The solution is to find an impartial criterion for judgment, which author takes to be reason (pg146). Reason, according to author, "is wider, and more fundamental" (pg147). However, it isn't the case simply that reason is more important in the reason-implying sense (that would be circular). Instead, reason is the end of justification. (pg148)
4/27/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 5 Rationality
04/27/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 3, Oxford University Press 2011
First two paragraphs lay out the relation between reason-giving facts and beliefs, which offer apparent reasons. When beliefs are true, then B not only has apparent reason to act, but real reason. B acts rationally when acting on apparent reasons. This is different from causal dependence, on which beliefs desires depend. Author lays out the nexus of beliefs, desires, reasons and rationality on pg112-3. Author rejects the view that it is irrational to have a desire iff it is based on an irrational belief. Author argues that it is a belief's content (pg113) that makes it rational or irrational. In other words, if the content of the belief would support the desire rationally, then the desire is rational, regardless of whether the belief is true (pg119). In some ways, a desire is rational when it is properly supported by a belief (whether that belief is rational or irrational). In other ways, not. Author works on hammering this out (pg115-7). Author concludes that there is epistemic irrationality, but that does not get transmitted over into desires, which can only have practical irrationality. A key distinction for author is that practical reasoning results in voluntary acts, but we have non-voluntary responses to epistemic reasons (pg118).
With meta-beliefs about normativity, the same division might not work (pg119). Author considers the case of Scarlet, Crimson, and Pink (pg120). All three have "true believes about what it is like to be in agony and in slight pain, and about personal identity, time and all the other relevant non-normative facts." Scarlet prefers agony on any Tuesday vs pain on any other day of the week, Crimson prefers agony tomorrow vs any shorter pain today, and Pink prefers pain tomorrow over slightly smaller pain today. Author argues that Scarlet and Crimson are irrational, though practically rational by matching their preferences up to their beliefs (pg121). Pink is also irrational because his recognition of the irrelevance of time is correct, yet Pink still picks the pain tomorrow. However this is outweighed by having "rational beliefs about reasons" (pg122).
Next author considers the case of whether it makes any difference whether Scarlet or Crimson are subjectivists about reasons. For author, the answer is no: they are still irrational. However, it is not irrational to be a subjectivist (pg124). Author further claims that equating "rational" with "maximize expected utility" is a definitional claim, not a substantive one (pg125). Author considers other ways of using the term "rational". An interesting case is inconsistent desires. To author, they are not irrational, though acting on them both may be (pg127-8).
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 3, Oxford University Press 2011
First two paragraphs lay out the relation between reason-giving facts and beliefs, which offer apparent reasons. When beliefs are true, then B not only has apparent reason to act, but real reason. B acts rationally when acting on apparent reasons. This is different from causal dependence, on which beliefs desires depend. Author lays out the nexus of beliefs, desires, reasons and rationality on pg112-3. Author rejects the view that it is irrational to have a desire iff it is based on an irrational belief. Author argues that it is a belief's content (pg113) that makes it rational or irrational. In other words, if the content of the belief would support the desire rationally, then the desire is rational, regardless of whether the belief is true (pg119). In some ways, a desire is rational when it is properly supported by a belief (whether that belief is rational or irrational). In other ways, not. Author works on hammering this out (pg115-7). Author concludes that there is epistemic irrationality, but that does not get transmitted over into desires, which can only have practical irrationality. A key distinction for author is that practical reasoning results in voluntary acts, but we have non-voluntary responses to epistemic reasons (pg118).
With meta-beliefs about normativity, the same division might not work (pg119). Author considers the case of Scarlet, Crimson, and Pink (pg120). All three have "true believes about what it is like to be in agony and in slight pain, and about personal identity, time and all the other relevant non-normative facts." Scarlet prefers agony on any Tuesday vs pain on any other day of the week, Crimson prefers agony tomorrow vs any shorter pain today, and Pink prefers pain tomorrow over slightly smaller pain today. Author argues that Scarlet and Crimson are irrational, though practically rational by matching their preferences up to their beliefs (pg121). Pink is also irrational because his recognition of the irrelevance of time is correct, yet Pink still picks the pain tomorrow. However this is outweighed by having "rational beliefs about reasons" (pg122).
Next author considers the case of whether it makes any difference whether Scarlet or Crimson are subjectivists about reasons. For author, the answer is no: they are still irrational. However, it is not irrational to be a subjectivist (pg124). Author further claims that equating "rational" with "maximize expected utility" is a definitional claim, not a substantive one (pg125). Author considers other ways of using the term "rational". An interesting case is inconsistent desires. To author, they are not irrational, though acting on them both may be (pg127-8).
4/20/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 4 Further Arguments
04/20/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 4, Oxford University Press 2011
Subjectivists are committed, according to author, to claim that someone is rational in pursuing a future period of agony, if that is what their ideally informed desires are. This is Case Two (pg83) and is an argument against subjectivism due to the absurdity. A subjectivist cannot argue that this is inconceivable because "we can want what we know will be bad for us." (pg84). Refinement to this by the subjectivist could go as follows:
-There must be a reason people have to hold a desire. Like: B wants to avoid some future agony.
Author replies by framing an example that someone wouldn't want to avoid some agony for instrumental reasons (pg85). A subjectivist might further argue that it is possible to act in accordance with a desire by having a second-order desire to have a first order desire (which one does not currently have) (pg85). Author argues this will not always do for wanting to avoid future agony either, because it might be unavoidable and just thinking about it induces anxiety, which B wants to avoid (pg86).
Author then considers cases where B could avoid the future agony. This would mean that B could have a "desire-based reason" to have the desire to avoid some future agony. This leads to a "rationally self-justifying" fulfill-able desires, which author claims are clearly false (pg87). Author claims that without having reasons to backstop desires, there is "no reason" to desire to avoid agony, or have future periods of happiness (pg87). Author concludes that the notion of reasons underwriting desires ("desire-based reasons") is a contradiction (and infinite regress) to the subjectivist approach (pg88).
Author continues to argue against subjectivism using Case Two, that there is no reason to avoid a future agony, if B desires that future agony (pg89). Author rejects subjectivists who claim an asymmetry between desires to avoid agony and no desires to avoid agony (pg89). This is the All or None Argument: that the subjectivist doesn't get to pick or choose which desires are reason-giving: either they all are or none of them are.
Author claims the only times subjectivist theories seem ok is when they overlap with objective theories of value. Author compares epistemic cases to normative ones (pg92-3). Author rejects that subjectivists even want to know all the facts relevant to their situation, since they would be sneaking in reason-giving facts into deliberation about desires (pg93-4). Author proceeds to claim that wanting being fully informed about desires is incoherent to the subjectivist view (pg95). This is the Incoherence Argument. The idea is that more information would only shed light on the intrinsic features of what is desired, in other words, what facts are truly reason-giving. Since that is an objectivist claim and not a subjectivist one, the subjectivist cannot appeal to it. "Most of us want to have better informed desires or aims because we believe what objective theories claim" (pg96).
Author believes that facts only are reason-giving for value, not for informing us as to the efficacy of our aims or for playing a part in desire creation. Or, rather, author does not admit that there can be any facts that can play a part in desire creation that isn't part of an objectivist account. (pg96). Author discusses a supposed subjectivist (Harry Frankfurt) who he believes is either a covert objectivist or incoherent (pg97-100). Author argues Frankfurt is not a nihilist about objective ends, but a pluralist (pg100).
Author goes back to clarifying the terms used with "best possible" and "better" and "best-for-someone", and so on (pg101-2). According to author, subjectivists can't use "best-for-someone" in any reason-implying sense, since that implies an objective way someone's life will go. Accordingly, subjectivists have no "self-interested" or "moral" reasons (just desires that give reasons). Author considers other ways to use "best-for-someone", using Rawls' thin theory of the good as a lens (pg103). Author considers other ways of evaluating whether one's life will be "best-for-[someone]" (pg105). People can mean:
-greatest sum of happiness minus suffering
-the possible life where all desires are fulfilled (or most are)
Author believes these claims are either tautological (pg105) or does not really help out the subjectivist. The subjectivist is still pegged to the conclusion that B can rationally pursue a fully-informed desire for agony, even if it is not best for B. (pg106)
Author considers versions of the "ought implies can" defense of subjectivism, which says that you cannot be compelled to do something if you are not motivated to do it (pg107-8). In other words, the only way we do anything is through desires, not reason-giving facts. Author does not believe this because it confuses normative reasons with motivating ones.
Lastly, author mentions the Metaphysical Naturalists, who claim that reasons are irreducibly normative, not fact-based, because all facts are scientific. (pg109) Again author believes this conflates motivating reasons with normative ones. Author also claims that this kind of naturalism applies to epistemic reasoning too, thus naturalism's own claims are not "true" in an objective-descriptive manner (pg110).
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 4, Oxford University Press 2011
Subjectivists are committed, according to author, to claim that someone is rational in pursuing a future period of agony, if that is what their ideally informed desires are. This is Case Two (pg83) and is an argument against subjectivism due to the absurdity. A subjectivist cannot argue that this is inconceivable because "we can want what we know will be bad for us." (pg84). Refinement to this by the subjectivist could go as follows:
-There must be a reason people have to hold a desire. Like: B wants to avoid some future agony.
Author replies by framing an example that someone wouldn't want to avoid some agony for instrumental reasons (pg85). A subjectivist might further argue that it is possible to act in accordance with a desire by having a second-order desire to have a first order desire (which one does not currently have) (pg85). Author argues this will not always do for wanting to avoid future agony either, because it might be unavoidable and just thinking about it induces anxiety, which B wants to avoid (pg86).
Author then considers cases where B could avoid the future agony. This would mean that B could have a "desire-based reason" to have the desire to avoid some future agony. This leads to a "rationally self-justifying" fulfill-able desires, which author claims are clearly false (pg87). Author claims that without having reasons to backstop desires, there is "no reason" to desire to avoid agony, or have future periods of happiness (pg87). Author concludes that the notion of reasons underwriting desires ("desire-based reasons") is a contradiction (and infinite regress) to the subjectivist approach (pg88).
Author continues to argue against subjectivism using Case Two, that there is no reason to avoid a future agony, if B desires that future agony (pg89). Author rejects subjectivists who claim an asymmetry between desires to avoid agony and no desires to avoid agony (pg89). This is the All or None Argument: that the subjectivist doesn't get to pick or choose which desires are reason-giving: either they all are or none of them are.
Author claims the only times subjectivist theories seem ok is when they overlap with objective theories of value. Author compares epistemic cases to normative ones (pg92-3). Author rejects that subjectivists even want to know all the facts relevant to their situation, since they would be sneaking in reason-giving facts into deliberation about desires (pg93-4). Author proceeds to claim that wanting being fully informed about desires is incoherent to the subjectivist view (pg95). This is the Incoherence Argument. The idea is that more information would only shed light on the intrinsic features of what is desired, in other words, what facts are truly reason-giving. Since that is an objectivist claim and not a subjectivist one, the subjectivist cannot appeal to it. "Most of us want to have better informed desires or aims because we believe what objective theories claim" (pg96).
Author believes that facts only are reason-giving for value, not for informing us as to the efficacy of our aims or for playing a part in desire creation. Or, rather, author does not admit that there can be any facts that can play a part in desire creation that isn't part of an objectivist account. (pg96). Author discusses a supposed subjectivist (Harry Frankfurt) who he believes is either a covert objectivist or incoherent (pg97-100). Author argues Frankfurt is not a nihilist about objective ends, but a pluralist (pg100).
Author goes back to clarifying the terms used with "best possible" and "better" and "best-for-someone", and so on (pg101-2). According to author, subjectivists can't use "best-for-someone" in any reason-implying sense, since that implies an objective way someone's life will go. Accordingly, subjectivists have no "self-interested" or "moral" reasons (just desires that give reasons). Author considers other ways to use "best-for-someone", using Rawls' thin theory of the good as a lens (pg103). Author considers other ways of evaluating whether one's life will be "best-for-[someone]" (pg105). People can mean:
-greatest sum of happiness minus suffering
-the possible life where all desires are fulfilled (or most are)
Author believes these claims are either tautological (pg105) or does not really help out the subjectivist. The subjectivist is still pegged to the conclusion that B can rationally pursue a fully-informed desire for agony, even if it is not best for B. (pg106)
Author considers versions of the "ought implies can" defense of subjectivism, which says that you cannot be compelled to do something if you are not motivated to do it (pg107-8). In other words, the only way we do anything is through desires, not reason-giving facts. Author does not believe this because it confuses normative reasons with motivating ones.
Lastly, author mentions the Metaphysical Naturalists, who claim that reasons are irreducibly normative, not fact-based, because all facts are scientific. (pg109) Again author believes this conflates motivating reasons with normative ones. Author also claims that this kind of naturalism applies to epistemic reasoning too, thus naturalism's own claims are not "true" in an objective-descriptive manner (pg110).
4/13/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 3 Subjective Theories
04/13/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 3, Oxford University Press 2011
Notes:
The simplest subjectivist about reasons might claim a simple desire-based theory: B has reason to act on whatever B's present desires are. The trouble is some desires should give reasons, e.g. when you have conflicting desires, or desires based on false beliefs, or faulty means-ends reasoning. (pg58-9) A small alteration to fit these cases is to claim that only telic (ends-desired-for-their-own-sakes) desires give us reasons to act.
Author brings up the case of when telic desires rest on false beliefs. Author asserts the subjectivist should deny these give reasons too (pg60). So present telic desires are reason giving only if error-free, as another amendment. Further refinement shows that telic desires from ignorance are not reason-giving; thus desires you would have with more knowledge (but don't have right now) are (might be) reason-giving. Discussion on informed desire theories (pg61).
Other subjective theories focus on choices made once someone is informed, not the desires they have. (pg61) This is distinct from an objectivist who might claim the same thing, but as a procedure to reach the right reason, not as a justification about what reason is right. (pg62-3)
Author thinks all versions of subjectivism should be rejected. Why is subjectivism so readily accepted by so many? Author offers reasons: (pg65-68) 1- we often desire what we have good reason to do. 2- we sometimes desire what would be good. 3- some people accept desire-based theories of well-being. 4- we often appeal to our desires when asked to explain our motivation, why we acted as we did (but not normative reason why). 5- derivative or instrumental reasons can be desire-based, thus people confuse them. 6- we value other people's desires, even if they have no reason to have them, for the sake of respecting autonomy. 7- we confuse rationally acting to fulfill a desire with having a reason for acting. 8- desire-based subjectivism gets assumed in hedonic reasons for acting, since it is assumed we desire what is pleasurable. Except when we desire something that we falsely believe is pleasurable. 9- we confuse the desire to avoid pain with the dislike of a painful sensation, and assume that "hedonic reasons are desire-based". No: hedonic reasons can create the desire to end/start x; it isn't the desire that gives the reason. 10- sometimes desires create reasons for acting since the reason is causally dependent on there being a desire. But a reason that is normatively dependent on a desire is different from one that is causally dependent on a desire.
In discussion that follows, author claims that other facts ("desire-dependent"), not the desire itself, is what gives the reasons for acting. (pg68-9)
Author claims another reason people think there are subjective reasons is that they are taken by analytic claims (tautologies) that are either open or closed, but both avoid substantive claims (pg70-72). The most serious is to use the term "reason" for action as a desire-fulfillment term. This creates a tautology that is not substantive.
Author claims that subjectivism can lead to odd outcomes, like not having the desire to avoid future agony (pg73-4). Author claims attempts to fix this oddity strays from subjectivism. Using this case, author argues that the agony argument defeats subjectivism. Author then replies to possible objections (pg76-7). The most significant objection to the agony argument is that informed and rational deliberation would transmit future desire into the present. Author claims that subjectivists can only help themselves to procedural rationality (means-ends rationality?). But the problem for subjectivists is that they can't appeal to facts to make their case for rationality (like the fact that the future is the same as the present) (pg78-9). So author believes the agony argument stands and subjectivism falls. Argument goes as follows:
1. Subjectivists must accept the possibility that B can have no reason to avoid future agony because B has no fully informed desire to do so.
2. We all have reason to avoid future agony.
3. Thus, subjectivism is false.
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 3, Oxford University Press 2011
Notes:
The simplest subjectivist about reasons might claim a simple desire-based theory: B has reason to act on whatever B's present desires are. The trouble is some desires should give reasons, e.g. when you have conflicting desires, or desires based on false beliefs, or faulty means-ends reasoning. (pg58-9) A small alteration to fit these cases is to claim that only telic (ends-desired-for-their-own-sakes) desires give us reasons to act.
Author brings up the case of when telic desires rest on false beliefs. Author asserts the subjectivist should deny these give reasons too (pg60). So present telic desires are reason giving only if error-free, as another amendment. Further refinement shows that telic desires from ignorance are not reason-giving; thus desires you would have with more knowledge (but don't have right now) are (might be) reason-giving. Discussion on informed desire theories (pg61).
Other subjective theories focus on choices made once someone is informed, not the desires they have. (pg61) This is distinct from an objectivist who might claim the same thing, but as a procedure to reach the right reason, not as a justification about what reason is right. (pg62-3)
Author thinks all versions of subjectivism should be rejected. Why is subjectivism so readily accepted by so many? Author offers reasons: (pg65-68) 1- we often desire what we have good reason to do. 2- we sometimes desire what would be good. 3- some people accept desire-based theories of well-being. 4- we often appeal to our desires when asked to explain our motivation, why we acted as we did (but not normative reason why). 5- derivative or instrumental reasons can be desire-based, thus people confuse them. 6- we value other people's desires, even if they have no reason to have them, for the sake of respecting autonomy. 7- we confuse rationally acting to fulfill a desire with having a reason for acting. 8- desire-based subjectivism gets assumed in hedonic reasons for acting, since it is assumed we desire what is pleasurable. Except when we desire something that we falsely believe is pleasurable. 9- we confuse the desire to avoid pain with the dislike of a painful sensation, and assume that "hedonic reasons are desire-based". No: hedonic reasons can create the desire to end/start x; it isn't the desire that gives the reason. 10- sometimes desires create reasons for acting since the reason is causally dependent on there being a desire. But a reason that is normatively dependent on a desire is different from one that is causally dependent on a desire.
In discussion that follows, author claims that other facts ("desire-dependent"), not the desire itself, is what gives the reasons for acting. (pg68-9)
Author claims another reason people think there are subjective reasons is that they are taken by analytic claims (tautologies) that are either open or closed, but both avoid substantive claims (pg70-72). The most serious is to use the term "reason" for action as a desire-fulfillment term. This creates a tautology that is not substantive.
Author claims that subjectivism can lead to odd outcomes, like not having the desire to avoid future agony (pg73-4). Author claims attempts to fix this oddity strays from subjectivism. Using this case, author argues that the agony argument defeats subjectivism. Author then replies to possible objections (pg76-7). The most significant objection to the agony argument is that informed and rational deliberation would transmit future desire into the present. Author claims that subjectivists can only help themselves to procedural rationality (means-ends rationality?). But the problem for subjectivists is that they can't appeal to facts to make their case for rationality (like the fact that the future is the same as the present) (pg78-9). So author believes the agony argument stands and subjectivism falls. Argument goes as follows:
1. Subjectivists must accept the possibility that B can have no reason to avoid future agony because B has no fully informed desire to do so.
2. We all have reason to avoid future agony.
3. Thus, subjectivism is false.
2/24/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 15 Contractualism
02/24/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 15, Oxford University Press 2011
This chapter goes through three main formulations of non-utilitarian Contractualism, namely Rawls, Kant, and Scanlon. While it is mainly an introduction and exploration of the moral theory, author does make some arguments relating to the kind of moral philosophy Contractualism is, and its autonomy from utilitarianism.
Author first starts with a formulation of Contractualism: it is following universal principles to which everyone rationally agreed. The first element discussed is the rational agreement: one would not rationally agree to a principle that advantaged another group over yours, e.g. men over women. Author however also adds some description to the idealized process of universal rational agreement, and contrasts it with the possibility of finding no agreement. Author casts Contractualism as using a series of smaller votes on elements of the total principle, with adequate discussion, and then one final big vote on the whole contract, with the requirement of unanimity (pg344-5). If this big vote fails, people go on without a contract, which might actually favor some people, especially those who have more talent, wealth, or other forms of power. Given that these people know this, they may enter the debate with the threat of 'no-agreement', which could change the outcome of the final contract. Author considers this possibility Hobbesian, and rejects it as a 'minimal version' of morality (Gauthier is one of its defenders).
Author then moves to consider Rawls' formulation of Contractualism not for the just institutions of society but instead for morality. Rawls starts with individuals acting in their own rational interests, which many assume would be Rational Egoism, though Rawls leaves open the possibility that one's rational interests can easily include the interests of justice or of other people just as much (pg347). But author states that Rawls' theory contains a fundamental flaw: it is a subjective, desire-based theory (pg347-8) (pg354) where it is assumed everyone would promote their own interests. To weed out the Hobbesian problem, Rawls works in a "veil of ignorance", which does not offer an advantage in negotiations, and is supposed to make each person impartial (pg349). The next trouble for Rawls is distinguishing his Contractualism from Utilitarianism. According to author, it comes down to Rawls rejecting the "equal chance formula" in favor of a "no knowledge formula" about which positions within a society (or a circumstance) the actors will take. The contrast is as follows: (pg350)
-ECF: Equal Chance Formula: each actor has an equal chance of being in any position. Hence, choose the equivalent of the Utilitarian Average Principle.
-NKF: No Knowledge Formula: each actor has no knowledge of what probability there is she will be in any of the positions. [This seems more like a societal/institutional formulation rather than an individual one.] According to Rawls, this will allow for non-Utilitarian options.
Author argues that the NKF is not distinct enough from the ECF, and thus Rawls' theory is not distinct from Utilitarianism. (pg350-5) During the argument author discusses Rawls' interpretation of his own formula through Kantian language, which seems to add a 'thicker' veil of ignorance. Author responds that this makes informed choice difficult, if not impossible, which is contrary to the conditions needed for Contractualism to have a footing (pg351). Author portrays the Maximin Argument as the final attempt to justify the NKF, since one would try to minimize the poorest position in a situation because she would have no knowledge of the probabilities of being in that poorest position (supposedly an equal chance might be an acceptable risk). This argument fails to backstop NKF because it is a bad argument with wrong outcomes (pg353). The problem with Rawls' formula being Utilitarian is that it allows for great burdens to be placed onto a small number if it gives more goods to enough others (the old problem) (pg357).
Author's last objection to Rawls' theory is related to the first one: that it does not include any other interests beyond the self-interested ones: it leaves out an individual's beliefs about desert, responsibility, gratitude, etc. (pg354)
Author reprises Kant's Contractualism but claims that is has a structural advantage over other forms of Contractualism because it allows for an individual principles that can be rationally adopted, not the unanimous adoption of universal principles. (pg355-6) Author also believes this avoids the possibility of a veto queering the entire contract, which is a weaker version of the Hobbesian problem. (pg356-7). Furthermore, author argues Kant does not need the veil of ignorance, which is a 'crude' device. (pg357)
The argument for Kantian Contractualism comes to a rejection of Rational Egoism (pg358) because it is too narrow. According to author, a Rational Egoist would not accept this:
A- Everyone could rationally choose the principle that, in such cases, gives everyone equal shares. (pg359) This would be rejected because the Rational Egoist would want an unequal advantage.
The last Contractualist to consider is Scanlon: which author uses also as a foil for a potential problem for most Contractualis theories: they risk defining wrongness, instead of giving an account of one procedure for finding wrongness. But first author discusses Scanlon's formulation and defends it through generally defending Contractualism: when trying to determine whether an act is wrong, you use the system given, not intuitive moral beliefs that reject the Harmful Means Principle (using someone as a means for helping another, where the help outweighs the harm). (pg360-2)
Author states that Contractualism is a theory that many have sought because they wish to avoid the conclusions, most notably the Harmful Means conclusions, in Act Utilitarianism (AU). AU might justify your doctor taking your organs and giving them to 5 needy people (Harmful Means). A Contractualist might claim that if this was widespread practice it could not be beneficial to everyone because no one would trust her doctor. (pg363-4) The troubling part is that the Harmful Means principle seems intuitively wrong (but we cannot appeal to intuitions), but contractually it is indistinguishable from an "Emergency Principle"where you're allowed to flip a switch that would cause someone to fall in front of a train that would kill 5, stopping the train but killing the 1. The conceptual distinction is that the Harmful Means principle uses a person as a means, while the Emergency Principle tries to get at that, but can't. Author argues that Scanlon can't find this distinction in his Contractualism (pg364-6).
The last section talks about the problem of fitting "deontic" moral considerations into a Contractualist view. Rawls seems to countenance that his theory is not the sole determinant of wrongness. However Scanlon often falls into the difficulty of claiming that his Contractualism is giving the definition of wrongness. (pg367-9) For author, this is problematic because it makes Contractualist claims tautological.
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 15, Oxford University Press 2011
This chapter goes through three main formulations of non-utilitarian Contractualism, namely Rawls, Kant, and Scanlon. While it is mainly an introduction and exploration of the moral theory, author does make some arguments relating to the kind of moral philosophy Contractualism is, and its autonomy from utilitarianism.
Author first starts with a formulation of Contractualism: it is following universal principles to which everyone rationally agreed. The first element discussed is the rational agreement: one would not rationally agree to a principle that advantaged another group over yours, e.g. men over women. Author however also adds some description to the idealized process of universal rational agreement, and contrasts it with the possibility of finding no agreement. Author casts Contractualism as using a series of smaller votes on elements of the total principle, with adequate discussion, and then one final big vote on the whole contract, with the requirement of unanimity (pg344-5). If this big vote fails, people go on without a contract, which might actually favor some people, especially those who have more talent, wealth, or other forms of power. Given that these people know this, they may enter the debate with the threat of 'no-agreement', which could change the outcome of the final contract. Author considers this possibility Hobbesian, and rejects it as a 'minimal version' of morality (Gauthier is one of its defenders).
Author then moves to consider Rawls' formulation of Contractualism not for the just institutions of society but instead for morality. Rawls starts with individuals acting in their own rational interests, which many assume would be Rational Egoism, though Rawls leaves open the possibility that one's rational interests can easily include the interests of justice or of other people just as much (pg347). But author states that Rawls' theory contains a fundamental flaw: it is a subjective, desire-based theory (pg347-8) (pg354) where it is assumed everyone would promote their own interests. To weed out the Hobbesian problem, Rawls works in a "veil of ignorance", which does not offer an advantage in negotiations, and is supposed to make each person impartial (pg349). The next trouble for Rawls is distinguishing his Contractualism from Utilitarianism. According to author, it comes down to Rawls rejecting the "equal chance formula" in favor of a "no knowledge formula" about which positions within a society (or a circumstance) the actors will take. The contrast is as follows: (pg350)
-ECF: Equal Chance Formula: each actor has an equal chance of being in any position. Hence, choose the equivalent of the Utilitarian Average Principle.
-NKF: No Knowledge Formula: each actor has no knowledge of what probability there is she will be in any of the positions. [This seems more like a societal/institutional formulation rather than an individual one.] According to Rawls, this will allow for non-Utilitarian options.
Author argues that the NKF is not distinct enough from the ECF, and thus Rawls' theory is not distinct from Utilitarianism. (pg350-5) During the argument author discusses Rawls' interpretation of his own formula through Kantian language, which seems to add a 'thicker' veil of ignorance. Author responds that this makes informed choice difficult, if not impossible, which is contrary to the conditions needed for Contractualism to have a footing (pg351). Author portrays the Maximin Argument as the final attempt to justify the NKF, since one would try to minimize the poorest position in a situation because she would have no knowledge of the probabilities of being in that poorest position (supposedly an equal chance might be an acceptable risk). This argument fails to backstop NKF because it is a bad argument with wrong outcomes (pg353). The problem with Rawls' formula being Utilitarian is that it allows for great burdens to be placed onto a small number if it gives more goods to enough others (the old problem) (pg357).
Author's last objection to Rawls' theory is related to the first one: that it does not include any other interests beyond the self-interested ones: it leaves out an individual's beliefs about desert, responsibility, gratitude, etc. (pg354)
Author reprises Kant's Contractualism but claims that is has a structural advantage over other forms of Contractualism because it allows for an individual principles that can be rationally adopted, not the unanimous adoption of universal principles. (pg355-6) Author also believes this avoids the possibility of a veto queering the entire contract, which is a weaker version of the Hobbesian problem. (pg356-7). Furthermore, author argues Kant does not need the veil of ignorance, which is a 'crude' device. (pg357)
The argument for Kantian Contractualism comes to a rejection of Rational Egoism (pg358) because it is too narrow. According to author, a Rational Egoist would not accept this:
A- Everyone could rationally choose the principle that, in such cases, gives everyone equal shares. (pg359) This would be rejected because the Rational Egoist would want an unequal advantage.
The last Contractualist to consider is Scanlon: which author uses also as a foil for a potential problem for most Contractualis theories: they risk defining wrongness, instead of giving an account of one procedure for finding wrongness. But first author discusses Scanlon's formulation and defends it through generally defending Contractualism: when trying to determine whether an act is wrong, you use the system given, not intuitive moral beliefs that reject the Harmful Means Principle (using someone as a means for helping another, where the help outweighs the harm). (pg360-2)
Author states that Contractualism is a theory that many have sought because they wish to avoid the conclusions, most notably the Harmful Means conclusions, in Act Utilitarianism (AU). AU might justify your doctor taking your organs and giving them to 5 needy people (Harmful Means). A Contractualist might claim that if this was widespread practice it could not be beneficial to everyone because no one would trust her doctor. (pg363-4) The troubling part is that the Harmful Means principle seems intuitively wrong (but we cannot appeal to intuitions), but contractually it is indistinguishable from an "Emergency Principle"where you're allowed to flip a switch that would cause someone to fall in front of a train that would kill 5, stopping the train but killing the 1. The conceptual distinction is that the Harmful Means principle uses a person as a means, while the Emergency Principle tries to get at that, but can't. Author argues that Scanlon can't find this distinction in his Contractualism (pg364-6).
The last section talks about the problem of fitting "deontic" moral considerations into a Contractualist view. Rawls seems to countenance that his theory is not the sole determinant of wrongness. However Scanlon often falls into the difficulty of claiming that his Contractualism is giving the definition of wrongness. (pg367-9) For author, this is problematic because it makes Contractualist claims tautological.
1/27/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 11 Free Will and Desert
01/27/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1Ch 11, Oxford University Press 2011
In this chapter author goes about showing that Kant's conception of determinism is too strict to allow for free choice, or rather choices made based on reasons. For Kant, morality is possible only if free will is, and free will is not within the world of space-time, because that is the world where determinism reigns (pg258-9). The most valuable premise for Kant here is the 'ought implies can' premise, where a presupposition of what one ought to do is what one can do. If determinism makes it so one cannot do anything other than what she is, through causal forces, fated to do, then 'ought' is destroyed because 'can' is. (pg259-60) This is the incompatibilist view.
Author argues that there is a compatibilist way of understanding 'can', not in a 'categorical' sense (the actual world could have been different), but in a 'hypothetical' sense (this world could have been slightly different, thus a different outcome). (pg260) This compatibilist view gives space for agents to have acted differently, based on decision making and evaluating past actions (pg261). The reason Kant does not see this is because, according to author, he conflates fatalism with determinism. (pg261-2) Author claims that the compatibilist view of freedom is all that is necessary to underwrite morality (pg263).
The next discussion is an extension of the previous one, because Kant believes that part of morality is the desert of suffering because of to moral turpitude. Kant says that if all actions are 'merely events in space-time', then we could not deserve to suffer for wrongdoing. Author twists his premise to affirm the antecedent and also affirm the consequent. (pg264) Author wants to keep compatibilism about choice but reject compatibilism about desert. (pg265) Author interestingly talks about the search for reasons for action, eventually ending in an ultimate reason (pg266).
One of Kant's arguments for being an incompatibilist about desert is that how we are depends on our actions and decisions in prior versions of ourselves, which were determined by prior decisions, and so on, back to our very creation, for which we were not responsible. (pg267-8) Author affirms this, but denies Kant's later claim that since we do deserve to suffer for bad acts, that acts aren't solely space-time determined. Author argues against the graspable incomprehensibility of the noumenal world, arguing that determinism and choice from another realm is irreconcilable (pg269).
Author ties the whole thing together: (pg 270)
-We can have freedom of choice with actions that are solely space-time
-Thus we can reject Kant's conclusion that our actions cannot be within space-time
-Since Kant's argument is valid, we must reject a premise too
-Reject that we deserve to suffer from our poor choices
Author ends with talking about what we as agents do and don't deserve, and punishment (in the form of suffering) for wrongdoing is not one of them.
On What Matters, Vol 1Ch 11, Oxford University Press 2011
In this chapter author goes about showing that Kant's conception of determinism is too strict to allow for free choice, or rather choices made based on reasons. For Kant, morality is possible only if free will is, and free will is not within the world of space-time, because that is the world where determinism reigns (pg258-9). The most valuable premise for Kant here is the 'ought implies can' premise, where a presupposition of what one ought to do is what one can do. If determinism makes it so one cannot do anything other than what she is, through causal forces, fated to do, then 'ought' is destroyed because 'can' is. (pg259-60) This is the incompatibilist view.
Author argues that there is a compatibilist way of understanding 'can', not in a 'categorical' sense (the actual world could have been different), but in a 'hypothetical' sense (this world could have been slightly different, thus a different outcome). (pg260) This compatibilist view gives space for agents to have acted differently, based on decision making and evaluating past actions (pg261). The reason Kant does not see this is because, according to author, he conflates fatalism with determinism. (pg261-2) Author claims that the compatibilist view of freedom is all that is necessary to underwrite morality (pg263).
The next discussion is an extension of the previous one, because Kant believes that part of morality is the desert of suffering because of to moral turpitude. Kant says that if all actions are 'merely events in space-time', then we could not deserve to suffer for wrongdoing. Author twists his premise to affirm the antecedent and also affirm the consequent. (pg264) Author wants to keep compatibilism about choice but reject compatibilism about desert. (pg265) Author interestingly talks about the search for reasons for action, eventually ending in an ultimate reason (pg266).
One of Kant's arguments for being an incompatibilist about desert is that how we are depends on our actions and decisions in prior versions of ourselves, which were determined by prior decisions, and so on, back to our very creation, for which we were not responsible. (pg267-8) Author affirms this, but denies Kant's later claim that since we do deserve to suffer for bad acts, that acts aren't solely space-time determined. Author argues against the graspable incomprehensibility of the noumenal world, arguing that determinism and choice from another realm is irreconcilable (pg269).
Author ties the whole thing together: (pg 270)
-We can have freedom of choice with actions that are solely space-time
-Thus we can reject Kant's conclusion that our actions cannot be within space-time
-Since Kant's argument is valid, we must reject a premise too
-Reject that we deserve to suffer from our poor choices
Author ends with talking about what we as agents do and don't deserve, and punishment (in the form of suffering) for wrongdoing is not one of them.
1/20/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 10 Respect and Value
1/20/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1Ch 10, Oxford University Press 2011
In this chapter author explores the concept that Kant has about respect for the dignity of rational beings. This is different from the concept that all rational beings are good-- some (most/many) aren't. But all rational beings deserve respect because they have dignity. Author's point is that respect for rational beings does not get us much foothold in assessing which acts are right and which are wrong.(pg235)
This analysis starts with claiming that Kant meant that all wrong acts treat people in ways that disrespect their dignity. Surely this is true of some wrong acts like humiliating punishment, defamation, ridicule, acts that display contempt. But it is a stronger claim that all wrong acts fail to respect dignity. Kant wishes to build in the claims that acts like lying, suicide, and masturbation are also against human dignity, but this is hard to swallow (pg234-5). Instead, it seems Kant's claim is better suited to be limited in scope.
Author discusses the taxonomy of Kant's moral system, one that assigns value and a separate system that assigns moral worth, or the rightness or wrongness of actions. Author first starts with laying out a basic distinction between valuable things that can be promoted, and valuable things that aren't promoted in the same way-- they are respected instead. Author uses the term 'good events', but I believe the proper terminology is that there are valued events. Some events (states of affairs, outcomes, acts) are valued instrumentally, some are valued intrinsically. The most inclusive account of valued events is "Actualism": possible acts are valued as ends when they have intrinsic properties that "give us reason to want them to be actual", and means are valued when their ends are valued. (pg236) This account takes both intrinsically valued events and also events that are valued as means. Interestingly, author denies that Acualism applies to things other than events (taken broadly), for instance: it doesn't apply to persisting things like people or artworks. (pg237)
Actualism is not the only account of value: there are other things like objects, people, and concepts that are valuable but aren't teleological. These can't be 'promoted' but are instead 'respected'. Because these things are to be respected, author argues it is good to treat them with the respect they deserve (pg238). Author takes a weird direction though, appearing to argue that acts that respect the value of such things are good as ends (intrinsically valuable?) because they are acts that accord with Actualism.(pg238)
Kant's kinds of ends: ends-to-be-promoted, existent ends, and then ends-in-themselves. Ends-in-themselves are things Kant says have dignity and considers its value incomparable.(pg 239) Kant puts in the ends-to-be-promoted category the value of a good will, which is the will to do one's duty because it is one's duty. Author also claims Kant wants a possible world to be promoted where everyone has a good will. (However we shall see later that this end-to-be-promoted does not place any additional obligation on anyone other than having a good will.) Finally, the ultimate end-to-be-promoted (for Kant) is a world everyone receives happiness in proportion to the goodness of their will. So the steps of the ends-to-be-promoted are: (pg240)
1. Have a good will
2. Live in a world where everybody has a good will
3. Live in a world where we're all appropriately compensated for our good wills
Author goes on to claim that for Kant rationality is an an end-to-be-promoted rather than an end-in-itself. Things that have value as ends-in-themselves have 'dignity', which are of a value incomparable to those that have 'price'. But if rationality had dignity its price would be infinitely higher than other ends-to-be-promoted, like the avoidance of pain. Author claims this view is crazy, so Kant must not hold it. (pg241-2) Instead, author makes a distinction between rationality and humanity. Humanity is the capacity for morality, while rationality is "our other rational capacities and abilities" (pg242) Rationality is an end-to-be-promoted, e.g. worked on, while humanity i.e. the capacity for morality is the end-in-itself and has dignity.
Because we're talking about value and not goodness, every rational being, despite their goodness (or badness) has the value of rationality and therefore deserves respect. (pg240-1) Author suggests that Kant did not hold some common views about the relation between goodness and value (pg243), but that Kant does believe that a good will, the world where all have good will, and where all get their just desserts-- is both valuable and good. (pg244) Author describes Kant's views on the greatest goodness (to-be-promoted) in the "Formula of the Greatest Good" (pg245). Author reads Kant as giving a values-based end-to-be-promoted, similar to a consequentialist.
Author moves next into discussing consequentialism, which is a value-based theory of good action, but the terms to change to "the good" and "ought". (pg246) Most consequentialism uses the good to define the ought. This is distinct from Kant because Kant takes the good and ought to be distinct and one concept not more fundamental than the other (pg247-8). Author contrasts between Moore's tautological formulation of the good and the ought with Kant's (pg248-9). Author then explores how Kant's Formula of the Greatest Good (the world of good will and just dessert) relates to his other formulas (pg250), with the conclusion that if everyone did their duty, this is the best way to promote Kant's Greatest Good. (pg251)
The next line of discussion is about the possibility of connecting act-consequentialism with rule-consequentialism. In this pursuit, author claims we must appeal "to some view about how we ought to assess the effects of our acts." (pg252). Author considers three:
-Marginalist View
-Share of the Total View
-Whole Scheme View
These views are tested against a thought experiment "Rescue", in which four people are needed to save the lives of miners, but five people are unnecessary. (pg253) The Marginalist view suggests that the fifth person joining the mission makes all the actors inconsequential, which is absurd unless you add to it the Share of the Total View. Author casts both Hume and Kant as committed to the Whole Scheme View, since for Kant the achievement of the Greatest Good is by each person doing their duty. In this sense, Kant is a rule-consequentialist (pg255-6). However, author rejects the Whole Scheme View of both Hume and Kant-- the strict rule-following-- in favor of the Martinalist/Total View (pg256). This view, however, implies that Rule- and Act-consequentialism cannot be reconciled.
On What Matters, Vol 1Ch 10, Oxford University Press 2011
In this chapter author explores the concept that Kant has about respect for the dignity of rational beings. This is different from the concept that all rational beings are good-- some (most/many) aren't. But all rational beings deserve respect because they have dignity. Author's point is that respect for rational beings does not get us much foothold in assessing which acts are right and which are wrong.(pg235)
This analysis starts with claiming that Kant meant that all wrong acts treat people in ways that disrespect their dignity. Surely this is true of some wrong acts like humiliating punishment, defamation, ridicule, acts that display contempt. But it is a stronger claim that all wrong acts fail to respect dignity. Kant wishes to build in the claims that acts like lying, suicide, and masturbation are also against human dignity, but this is hard to swallow (pg234-5). Instead, it seems Kant's claim is better suited to be limited in scope.
Author discusses the taxonomy of Kant's moral system, one that assigns value and a separate system that assigns moral worth, or the rightness or wrongness of actions. Author first starts with laying out a basic distinction between valuable things that can be promoted, and valuable things that aren't promoted in the same way-- they are respected instead. Author uses the term 'good events', but I believe the proper terminology is that there are valued events. Some events (states of affairs, outcomes, acts) are valued instrumentally, some are valued intrinsically. The most inclusive account of valued events is "Actualism": possible acts are valued as ends when they have intrinsic properties that "give us reason to want them to be actual", and means are valued when their ends are valued. (pg236) This account takes both intrinsically valued events and also events that are valued as means. Interestingly, author denies that Acualism applies to things other than events (taken broadly), for instance: it doesn't apply to persisting things like people or artworks. (pg237)
Actualism is not the only account of value: there are other things like objects, people, and concepts that are valuable but aren't teleological. These can't be 'promoted' but are instead 'respected'. Because these things are to be respected, author argues it is good to treat them with the respect they deserve (pg238). Author takes a weird direction though, appearing to argue that acts that respect the value of such things are good as ends (intrinsically valuable?) because they are acts that accord with Actualism.(pg238)
Kant's kinds of ends: ends-to-be-promoted, existent ends, and then ends-in-themselves. Ends-in-themselves are things Kant says have dignity and considers its value incomparable.(pg 239) Kant puts in the ends-to-be-promoted category the value of a good will, which is the will to do one's duty because it is one's duty. Author also claims Kant wants a possible world to be promoted where everyone has a good will. (However we shall see later that this end-to-be-promoted does not place any additional obligation on anyone other than having a good will.) Finally, the ultimate end-to-be-promoted (for Kant) is a world everyone receives happiness in proportion to the goodness of their will. So the steps of the ends-to-be-promoted are: (pg240)
1. Have a good will
2. Live in a world where everybody has a good will
3. Live in a world where we're all appropriately compensated for our good wills
Author goes on to claim that for Kant rationality is an an end-to-be-promoted rather than an end-in-itself. Things that have value as ends-in-themselves have 'dignity', which are of a value incomparable to those that have 'price'. But if rationality had dignity its price would be infinitely higher than other ends-to-be-promoted, like the avoidance of pain. Author claims this view is crazy, so Kant must not hold it. (pg241-2) Instead, author makes a distinction between rationality and humanity. Humanity is the capacity for morality, while rationality is "our other rational capacities and abilities" (pg242) Rationality is an end-to-be-promoted, e.g. worked on, while humanity i.e. the capacity for morality is the end-in-itself and has dignity.
Because we're talking about value and not goodness, every rational being, despite their goodness (or badness) has the value of rationality and therefore deserves respect. (pg240-1) Author suggests that Kant did not hold some common views about the relation between goodness and value (pg243), but that Kant does believe that a good will, the world where all have good will, and where all get their just desserts-- is both valuable and good. (pg244) Author describes Kant's views on the greatest goodness (to-be-promoted) in the "Formula of the Greatest Good" (pg245). Author reads Kant as giving a values-based end-to-be-promoted, similar to a consequentialist.
Author moves next into discussing consequentialism, which is a value-based theory of good action, but the terms to change to "the good" and "ought". (pg246) Most consequentialism uses the good to define the ought. This is distinct from Kant because Kant takes the good and ought to be distinct and one concept not more fundamental than the other (pg247-8). Author contrasts between Moore's tautological formulation of the good and the ought with Kant's (pg248-9). Author then explores how Kant's Formula of the Greatest Good (the world of good will and just dessert) relates to his other formulas (pg250), with the conclusion that if everyone did their duty, this is the best way to promote Kant's Greatest Good. (pg251)
The next line of discussion is about the possibility of connecting act-consequentialism with rule-consequentialism. In this pursuit, author claims we must appeal "to some view about how we ought to assess the effects of our acts." (pg252). Author considers three:
-Marginalist View
-Share of the Total View
-Whole Scheme View
These views are tested against a thought experiment "Rescue", in which four people are needed to save the lives of miners, but five people are unnecessary. (pg253) The Marginalist view suggests that the fifth person joining the mission makes all the actors inconsequential, which is absurd unless you add to it the Share of the Total View. Author casts both Hume and Kant as committed to the Whole Scheme View, since for Kant the achievement of the Greatest Good is by each person doing their duty. In this sense, Kant is a rule-consequentialist (pg255-6). However, author rejects the Whole Scheme View of both Hume and Kant-- the strict rule-following-- in favor of the Martinalist/Total View (pg256). This view, however, implies that Rule- and Act-consequentialism cannot be reconciled.
1/6/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 9 Merely as a Means
1/6/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 9, Oxford University Press 2011
This chapter is an examination of Kant's contention, under the Humanity Principle, that it is wrong to treat persons "merely as a means". On the face of it, it is ok to treat someone 'as a means', but perhaps not 'merely' as such. Author suggests as well that there is a distinction between 'doing something to someone to achieve some aim' and 'treating a person as a means'. (pg213) [This distinction is baffling to me.]
The problem with the prohibition against acting in a way that treats someone 'merely as a means' is that it is either too weak or too strong. Author first talks about how it can be too weak: a slave-owner might let his slaves rest during the hottest part of the day, thereby attending to some degree to their well-being or acting according to some weak (but present) moral principle. Thus, his slaves are not treated 'merely' as a means. (pg213) This is not strong enough, so author suggests it is a matter of degree: you can "come close" to treating some 'merely as a means' (MAAM). (pg214)
Author then introduces two new exceptions to the (treating someone) MAAM prohibition: (pg214)
1) treatment of another is guided by a relevant moral standard in a 'sufficiently important' way
2) you would bear a great burden for this other person
Author is not clear what these conditions amount to, and moves on from them to discuss the differences between acting toward someone MAAM, and regarding someone MAAM. (pg215-6) The trouble with a prohibition against acting toward someone MAAM, is that you can keep your promise by saving a child's life, for the sake of keeping the promise. Thus, you act toward the child MAAM of keeping your promise. If acting MAAM was impermissible, you could not save the child's life. Thus it might be necessary to add:
3) you do not act MAAM if your acts will not harm the other person
Author argues that this will not stop some acts MAAM because of the use of expedient solutions. Perhaps Green would want to act toward Gold in a harmful way, but decides the most expedient is to be kind. This act might still be wrong because Green treats Gold MAAM, but it abides by 3). (pg217) [This may mean that 3) should be thrown away.]
Author tries to revise the principle again, suggesting the provision about avoiding harm is built into the MAAM prohibition: It is wrong to treat someone MAAM (or do so by degree) if the act harms that person. (pg217) Author then considers the usual kill-one-to-save-five trolley problems: (pg218)
Lifeboat (one lifeboat, save either 5 people or 1)
Tunnel (divert a train from hitting 5 and instead it hits 1)
Bridge (operate a trap door to let 1 person fall in front of the train, saving 5)
In all of these cases, someone is harmed in the process of saving 5. However, only in Bridge could the case really be made that one acted MAAM. (pg219) Author tries to figure out whether the prohibition against MAAM would/should stop the operation of the trap door in Bridge. Author argues that because in all cases it is rational for the 1 to consent to saving the 5, including giving up his own life, then the MAAM prohibition is superseded by the Consent Principle, thus making all cases morally permissible. (pg220) Curiously, author argues that the Consent Principle overrides the MAAM prohibition, if someone gives consent. (pg220-1)
The above outcome seems to make the MAAM prohibition very weak. Author considers the "Standard View" of the MAAM prohibition: (pg221)
Harm a person, without her consent, as a means of achieving some aim: this is prohibited as treating someone MAAM.
Author argues that this is wrong in three ways:
a: you may not be treating a person MAAM (instead treating their bodies?)
b: you may be treating them as a means, but not merely
c: even if so, this act might not be impermissible
Author explores the case of injuring someone in self-defense, making it thereby impossible for her to continue to pursue you (breaking Brown's leg when she is running after you intending to kill you). This is an illustration of (a). (pg222)
Author then discusses a complex example where you could save your child's life (from an earthquake) by crushing Black's toe. Crush another of Black's toes and you can save your own life too. However, you believe it is wrong to save your own life this way. Thus, you act according to some moral principle (1), and you endure great harm for Black's sake (2) (see above for these provisos) Thus you treat Black as a means, but not MAAM. This is an illustration of (b). Author considers further refinement to the MAAM prohibition but argues it will not do the trick to bolster the "Standard View" or make Bridge wrong. (pg223-4)
Author considers the case that deception is wrong because it violates the MAAM prohibition, but offers a counter-example to it (pg225)-- deception is wrong for other reasons, not for the MAAM prohibition. Author then discusses whether Kant uses the MAAM language in some special way, so that we are using lay terms for philosophically technical terms-- author finds this unconvincing. (pg226-7)
Though it may be wrong to regard someone MAAM, it is not wrong to act in a way that treats someone MAAM. This was shown in the egoist/promise-keeper-saves-a-child case. The Standard View needs revision that stipulates that it is ok to harm someone as a means for achieving some end, as long as that harm is not too great, and there is no other way to do it (pg229) (Because without this revision, you can't crush Black's toe to save your child).
When considering this harm, author argues that the factors for the decision might include whether someone is treated as a means. But adding 'merely' does not factor into the decision about making the act wrong. (pg230) And furthermore, author cannot find good enough reason to consider an act wrong when adding that someone is being used as a means. We know it is wrong to regard someone as a means, and wrong to regard someone as a mere thing (not a person) (pg226), but that does not prohibit acts that treat people as means, and adding 'merely' does not change the situation.
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 9, Oxford University Press 2011
This chapter is an examination of Kant's contention, under the Humanity Principle, that it is wrong to treat persons "merely as a means". On the face of it, it is ok to treat someone 'as a means', but perhaps not 'merely' as such. Author suggests as well that there is a distinction between 'doing something to someone to achieve some aim' and 'treating a person as a means'. (pg213) [This distinction is baffling to me.]
The problem with the prohibition against acting in a way that treats someone 'merely as a means' is that it is either too weak or too strong. Author first talks about how it can be too weak: a slave-owner might let his slaves rest during the hottest part of the day, thereby attending to some degree to their well-being or acting according to some weak (but present) moral principle. Thus, his slaves are not treated 'merely' as a means. (pg213) This is not strong enough, so author suggests it is a matter of degree: you can "come close" to treating some 'merely as a means' (MAAM). (pg214)
Author then introduces two new exceptions to the (treating someone) MAAM prohibition: (pg214)
1) treatment of another is guided by a relevant moral standard in a 'sufficiently important' way
2) you would bear a great burden for this other person
Author is not clear what these conditions amount to, and moves on from them to discuss the differences between acting toward someone MAAM, and regarding someone MAAM. (pg215-6) The trouble with a prohibition against acting toward someone MAAM, is that you can keep your promise by saving a child's life, for the sake of keeping the promise. Thus, you act toward the child MAAM of keeping your promise. If acting MAAM was impermissible, you could not save the child's life. Thus it might be necessary to add:
3) you do not act MAAM if your acts will not harm the other person
Author argues that this will not stop some acts MAAM because of the use of expedient solutions. Perhaps Green would want to act toward Gold in a harmful way, but decides the most expedient is to be kind. This act might still be wrong because Green treats Gold MAAM, but it abides by 3). (pg217) [This may mean that 3) should be thrown away.]
Author tries to revise the principle again, suggesting the provision about avoiding harm is built into the MAAM prohibition: It is wrong to treat someone MAAM (or do so by degree) if the act harms that person. (pg217) Author then considers the usual kill-one-to-save-five trolley problems: (pg218)
Lifeboat (one lifeboat, save either 5 people or 1)
Tunnel (divert a train from hitting 5 and instead it hits 1)
Bridge (operate a trap door to let 1 person fall in front of the train, saving 5)
In all of these cases, someone is harmed in the process of saving 5. However, only in Bridge could the case really be made that one acted MAAM. (pg219) Author tries to figure out whether the prohibition against MAAM would/should stop the operation of the trap door in Bridge. Author argues that because in all cases it is rational for the 1 to consent to saving the 5, including giving up his own life, then the MAAM prohibition is superseded by the Consent Principle, thus making all cases morally permissible. (pg220) Curiously, author argues that the Consent Principle overrides the MAAM prohibition, if someone gives consent. (pg220-1)
The above outcome seems to make the MAAM prohibition very weak. Author considers the "Standard View" of the MAAM prohibition: (pg221)
Harm a person, without her consent, as a means of achieving some aim: this is prohibited as treating someone MAAM.
Author argues that this is wrong in three ways:
a: you may not be treating a person MAAM (instead treating their bodies?)
b: you may be treating them as a means, but not merely
c: even if so, this act might not be impermissible
Author explores the case of injuring someone in self-defense, making it thereby impossible for her to continue to pursue you (breaking Brown's leg when she is running after you intending to kill you). This is an illustration of (a). (pg222)
Author then discusses a complex example where you could save your child's life (from an earthquake) by crushing Black's toe. Crush another of Black's toes and you can save your own life too. However, you believe it is wrong to save your own life this way. Thus, you act according to some moral principle (1), and you endure great harm for Black's sake (2) (see above for these provisos) Thus you treat Black as a means, but not MAAM. This is an illustration of (b). Author considers further refinement to the MAAM prohibition but argues it will not do the trick to bolster the "Standard View" or make Bridge wrong. (pg223-4)
Author considers the case that deception is wrong because it violates the MAAM prohibition, but offers a counter-example to it (pg225)-- deception is wrong for other reasons, not for the MAAM prohibition. Author then discusses whether Kant uses the MAAM language in some special way, so that we are using lay terms for philosophically technical terms-- author finds this unconvincing. (pg226-7)
Though it may be wrong to regard someone MAAM, it is not wrong to act in a way that treats someone MAAM. This was shown in the egoist/promise-keeper-saves-a-child case. The Standard View needs revision that stipulates that it is ok to harm someone as a means for achieving some end, as long as that harm is not too great, and there is no other way to do it (pg229) (Because without this revision, you can't crush Black's toe to save your child).
When considering this harm, author argues that the factors for the decision might include whether someone is treated as a means. But adding 'merely' does not factor into the decision about making the act wrong. (pg230) And furthermore, author cannot find good enough reason to consider an act wrong when adding that someone is being used as a means. We know it is wrong to regard someone as a means, and wrong to regard someone as a mere thing (not a person) (pg226), but that does not prohibit acts that treat people as means, and adding 'merely' does not change the situation.
4/22/11
Dreyfus, Hubert & Kelly, Sean - Conclusion: Lives Worth Living In a Secular Age
04/22/2011
Book Chapter from All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to find Meaning in a Secular Age, Free Press, 2011
This is the final chapter in a book that attempts to find meaning in a world of post-modern technological progress. Authors talk about two kinds of sacredness, or spheres of life that deserve reverence: physis and poietics. Physis involves a mass communal experience and 'wooshing', poietics is about the kind of reverence and understanding that comes from having intimate knowledge with a portion of the world.
Authors start by describing the kind of experience that people have when observing a sports competition, where they get carried away by the roar of the crowd. The first and primary example is the farewell speech and ceremonies for Lou Gehrig. The second example uses David Foster Wallace's exultation of Roger Federer (pg194-6). Authors claim: "There is no essential difference, really, in how it feels to rise as one in joy to sing the praises of the Lord, or to rise as one in joy to sing the praises of the Hail Mary pass..." (pg192-3) The claim is that it is partially due to the community experienced in each, and that such experiences "bring out everything that is important in the situation, letting each thing shine at its very best." (pg193) This is a kind of 'embodied' ecstasy, a celebration of bodily accomplishments. Authors claim that such an aesthetic experience cannot be "approached directly" and instead 'inclines toward reconciliation instead of purification' (pg198). The suggestion is that this sacredness is both fragile and also overpoweringly amoral.
Authors describe four points about the 'sacred moments in sport'. First is the wave metaphor, the wooshing. (pg199) Second is the connection to 'realness', or physis. Third, this phenomenon is not unique to sport but any communal embodied experience (MLK's speech, a family Thanksgiving, are two other given examples- pg202). Fourth, there is something amoral and inherently dangerous about participation in this experience, since one can be drawn in to immoral projects just as easily.(pg202-3) Here authors discuss the risk of being too 'enlightened' and having an overly autonomous reaction to physis events.(pg203-5)
The next section moves to another sacred sphere, that or poiesis or poietics. This is most notably exemplified in the way a craftsman treats her work, and perhaps more importantly, the resource she works. Author claim that "Learning a skill is learning to see the world differently" (pg207) and yet this kind of learning is being 'flattened' in our modern technological age, where technology makes many accomplishments easy. (pg213) The primary example here is the wheelwright, the person who made carriage wheels by hand and needed to know how to treat the wood that was used in the process. That treatment led to a powerful way of seeing the wood (pg208) and also a reverence for the trees, the land, as the origins of the wood the wheelwright must work (pg210). Author point out the need for 'meta-poiesis', which is the skill at recognizing where value is to be had, where meaning can be cultivated or discovered.
The claim that poiesis is being lost in the technological age is next discussed, and the paradigm example is the GPS system that takes all the skill out of navigation. (pg213-215) Authors claim not just that we lose a reverence for the world-- it looks 'increasingly nondescript', but also that we lose an understanding of ourselves (pg213).
The next discussion is around finding the sacred in what might have been considered every-day activities, like having the morning cup of coffee. (pg215-8) The thesis here is that these types of sacred spheres are different for different people and that one cannot just lay-out ahead of time which ones will be considered sacred, and how. One has to experiment, and try it out, to see. (pg218-9) This is very much like the call for the skill at meta-poiesis, with which authors close.
Book Chapter from All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to find Meaning in a Secular Age, Free Press, 2011
This is the final chapter in a book that attempts to find meaning in a world of post-modern technological progress. Authors talk about two kinds of sacredness, or spheres of life that deserve reverence: physis and poietics. Physis involves a mass communal experience and 'wooshing', poietics is about the kind of reverence and understanding that comes from having intimate knowledge with a portion of the world.
Authors start by describing the kind of experience that people have when observing a sports competition, where they get carried away by the roar of the crowd. The first and primary example is the farewell speech and ceremonies for Lou Gehrig. The second example uses David Foster Wallace's exultation of Roger Federer (pg194-6). Authors claim: "There is no essential difference, really, in how it feels to rise as one in joy to sing the praises of the Lord, or to rise as one in joy to sing the praises of the Hail Mary pass..." (pg192-3) The claim is that it is partially due to the community experienced in each, and that such experiences "bring out everything that is important in the situation, letting each thing shine at its very best." (pg193) This is a kind of 'embodied' ecstasy, a celebration of bodily accomplishments. Authors claim that such an aesthetic experience cannot be "approached directly" and instead 'inclines toward reconciliation instead of purification' (pg198). The suggestion is that this sacredness is both fragile and also overpoweringly amoral.
Authors describe four points about the 'sacred moments in sport'. First is the wave metaphor, the wooshing. (pg199) Second is the connection to 'realness', or physis. Third, this phenomenon is not unique to sport but any communal embodied experience (MLK's speech, a family Thanksgiving, are two other given examples- pg202). Fourth, there is something amoral and inherently dangerous about participation in this experience, since one can be drawn in to immoral projects just as easily.(pg202-3) Here authors discuss the risk of being too 'enlightened' and having an overly autonomous reaction to physis events.(pg203-5)
The next section moves to another sacred sphere, that or poiesis or poietics. This is most notably exemplified in the way a craftsman treats her work, and perhaps more importantly, the resource she works. Author claim that "Learning a skill is learning to see the world differently" (pg207) and yet this kind of learning is being 'flattened' in our modern technological age, where technology makes many accomplishments easy. (pg213) The primary example here is the wheelwright, the person who made carriage wheels by hand and needed to know how to treat the wood that was used in the process. That treatment led to a powerful way of seeing the wood (pg208) and also a reverence for the trees, the land, as the origins of the wood the wheelwright must work (pg210). Author point out the need for 'meta-poiesis', which is the skill at recognizing where value is to be had, where meaning can be cultivated or discovered.
The claim that poiesis is being lost in the technological age is next discussed, and the paradigm example is the GPS system that takes all the skill out of navigation. (pg213-215) Authors claim not just that we lose a reverence for the world-- it looks 'increasingly nondescript', but also that we lose an understanding of ourselves (pg213).
The next discussion is around finding the sacred in what might have been considered every-day activities, like having the morning cup of coffee. (pg215-8) The thesis here is that these types of sacred spheres are different for different people and that one cannot just lay-out ahead of time which ones will be considered sacred, and how. One has to experiment, and try it out, to see. (pg218-9) This is very much like the call for the skill at meta-poiesis, with which authors close.
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