05/29/2009
The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 4, RA Putnam ed, 1997
Though mostly an overview, this paper argues that the WK Clifford quoted in James' Will to Believe was largely misrepresented by James, in particular regarding the willingness of someone who guides her beliefs only with sufficient evidence to act without enough of it. James seems to cast Clifford as staunchly opposed to it, when author claims instead that Clifford was more reasoned and sophisticated. Clifford wrote The Ethics of Belief, which (according to author) took as the root concern the 'structure of plausibility' (pg70)-- meaning what those with intellectual (scientific) mindsets would consider acceptable additions to their worldview prior to receiving the evidence.
Most of the paper explores the arguments given by Clifford and James and gives their context. James suggests in Will to Believe that in the two scientific passions-- the desire to find truth and avoid error-- the desire to avoid error will paralyze you in times where action is required (forced choice) but there isn't sufficient evidence to fix a belief. James quotes Clifford as an example of the passion to avoid error: a reasonable conclusion is that Clifford would advocate withholding action. But Clifford understood this problem well and suggested instead that we act on probabilities in such cases. (pg71) Other misrepresentations occurred with James' discussion of the uniformity of nature. (pg72-3) Author grants that in some respects the impression James left was fair: Clifford was more hostile to religion and more positive about the previous advancements of scientific knowledge than James was (pg73, 75).
The Jamesian program was to give an essentially personal defense of a theistic religious commitment, though particular pillars of such a belief were largely unexplored (pg74-5). The break with Clifford was that Clifford put religious belief in the same sphere as all other beliefs-- there wasn't a special realm for religious ones. One of Clifford's main tenets was that beliefs had actional and therefore (probably) social consequences, making it a general moral concern that you avoid errors in your beliefs. Clifford used an example of a ship-owner who uncritically believed (falsely) that his ship was sea-worthy, sent it out and it sunk, killing the passengers. (pg76) While James did also emphasize the behavioristic consequences of belief, he leaves religious belief personal and isolated, and does not discuss what actional results it would take; author calls this 'obscurantist'. (pg77) James made a distinction between questions that could be settled 'on intellectual grounds' and those that 'by nature' could not; this was a distinction that allowed for the freedom of belief, and one Clifford did not abide. (pg79) Author takes this divide to be at odds with Peirce, and eventually the later James in his work Pragmatism.
This paper also gives attention to the context and concerns of the writers. Clifford wrote in England and perceived a milieu of wary skepticism about the abilities and worth of science, while James wrote in America and echoed a concern that science was intimidating the laymen.(pg78, 80-1)
5/22/09
James, William - The Will To Believe
05/22/2009
Essays In Popular Philosophy, Ch 1 Longmans Green & Co 1911
This well-known paper is about the permissibility of belief in religion, probably considered now to be a stand-in for belief in the divine. The main argument is that when you are forced to make a momentous choice where there is some credibility for either option, making either choice is beyond rebuke. Author first spends time investigating kinds of hypotheses and the nature of science and scientific investigation.
The first move is to discuss different kinds of hypotheses-- live or dead, forced or unforced, momentous or trivial. The most interesting is the live or dead hypothesis: a live hypothesis is subjective and relative-- if the hypothesis proposed 'appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed' (I) then it is live. A dead hypothesis isn't considered a possibility related to action-- something that individual would take up as true. (A momentous hypothesis is also subjective and relative). Author readily concedes that as a matter of psychology choosing to believe A over B simply for expediency or for the benefits (e.g. Pascal's wager) isn't possible. (II) However, author interprets this as largely applicable for dead hypotheses, not necessarily live ones. Instead, he believes that our passions do influence what beliefs we readily keep. He points out that many of our beliefs we accept on 'authority' or because they carry 'prestige' (e.g. that democracy or progress is worthwhile); such beliefs would not hold up to serious skeptical challenge. (III)
The next distinction to draw is between an 'empiricist' and an 'absolutist' approach to truth. Roughly, the absolutist contends that once we've made a hypothesis T covering cases A, and experiment E confirms T, we will also be able to tell whether T is the final and true characterization for A. In other words, we can know that we know T. The empiricist-- once E confirms T-- says that T is the current knowledge on A but we do not know for sure that it is the final and irrevocable characterization. (V) According to author, most of science has adopted the empiricist bent, while most of philosophy is absolutist. Moreover, being absolutist is mostly our tendency-- we are only empiricists (if we ever are) 'on reflection'. Author endorses empiricism, even though 'objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals', we have no good procedure to determine what underwrites an absolutist's claim. (VI) More importantly the the purpose of this argument, the empiricist acknowledges that what may be true will not necessarily announce itself to us as true-- we may believe it for whatever reason (or for good reasons) but we understand that we are not waiting for some additional level of certitude to appear.
The last bit of preliminaries author discusses (VII) are the ideals (passions) that abide in scientific life: those of finding truth or avoiding error. While the two sound similar, author argues that they are 'two materially different laws', one of which must be given priority in belief-fixing pursuits. For James, he prefers the seeking of truth as primary. More importantly, for live momentous forced choices, the ideal/passion of avoiding falsehood will lead to withholding a decision, which in forced choices is equivalent to making one. (VIII) An example of such choices are questions of the truth of morals-- that is whether arguments to be moral are 'true' or binding. A skeptical approach or withholding judgment 'until all facts are in' will result in opting out of morality. Author uses the example of building friendship. (IX) In the case of becoming a friend to someone, I must first act as though I like her, and/or act as though she likes me. I can't 'stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence' that the other wants to befriend me-- this will probably lead to failure. This is considered a matter of faith helping to create the fact it is looking to find. (IX)
In the case of religious belief, we see also that it is a momentous forced choice. For those for whom it is live, and who take the pursuit of truth to be a higher value than avoidance of error, believing in religion is justified. Since the hypothesis is momentous (very important to the individual making the decision), author argues that whatever choice we make we are entitled to make. Author argues that taking avoidance of error as a higher ideal in this case will also lead to the same conclusion-- since it is a forced choice-- as disbelieving. Moreover, author argues that the absolute approach to truth may easily result in withholding judgment (=disbelieving) since in such matters there is no scientific resolution available and therefore no certitude given from that quarter. (X) The abstract conclusion is that 'we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will'. While this may sound silly, it is because we forget that a live hypothesis is something that is legitimately tempting to believe (and is therefore not ruled out by the whole of science and rational argument). If a particular hypothesis isn't legitimately possible (living), then this whole endeavor will appear to be Pascal's wager. Yet if it is alive for an individual, and since it is a momentous forced choice, the individual is given the freedom to believe.
Essays In Popular Philosophy, Ch 1 Longmans Green & Co 1911
This well-known paper is about the permissibility of belief in religion, probably considered now to be a stand-in for belief in the divine. The main argument is that when you are forced to make a momentous choice where there is some credibility for either option, making either choice is beyond rebuke. Author first spends time investigating kinds of hypotheses and the nature of science and scientific investigation.
The first move is to discuss different kinds of hypotheses-- live or dead, forced or unforced, momentous or trivial. The most interesting is the live or dead hypothesis: a live hypothesis is subjective and relative-- if the hypothesis proposed 'appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed' (I) then it is live. A dead hypothesis isn't considered a possibility related to action-- something that individual would take up as true. (A momentous hypothesis is also subjective and relative). Author readily concedes that as a matter of psychology choosing to believe A over B simply for expediency or for the benefits (e.g. Pascal's wager) isn't possible. (II) However, author interprets this as largely applicable for dead hypotheses, not necessarily live ones. Instead, he believes that our passions do influence what beliefs we readily keep. He points out that many of our beliefs we accept on 'authority' or because they carry 'prestige' (e.g. that democracy or progress is worthwhile); such beliefs would not hold up to serious skeptical challenge. (III)
The next distinction to draw is between an 'empiricist' and an 'absolutist' approach to truth. Roughly, the absolutist contends that once we've made a hypothesis T covering cases A, and experiment E confirms T, we will also be able to tell whether T is the final and true characterization for A. In other words, we can know that we know T. The empiricist-- once E confirms T-- says that T is the current knowledge on A but we do not know for sure that it is the final and irrevocable characterization. (V) According to author, most of science has adopted the empiricist bent, while most of philosophy is absolutist. Moreover, being absolutist is mostly our tendency-- we are only empiricists (if we ever are) 'on reflection'. Author endorses empiricism, even though 'objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals', we have no good procedure to determine what underwrites an absolutist's claim. (VI) More importantly the the purpose of this argument, the empiricist acknowledges that what may be true will not necessarily announce itself to us as true-- we may believe it for whatever reason (or for good reasons) but we understand that we are not waiting for some additional level of certitude to appear.
The last bit of preliminaries author discusses (VII) are the ideals (passions) that abide in scientific life: those of finding truth or avoiding error. While the two sound similar, author argues that they are 'two materially different laws', one of which must be given priority in belief-fixing pursuits. For James, he prefers the seeking of truth as primary. More importantly, for live momentous forced choices, the ideal/passion of avoiding falsehood will lead to withholding a decision, which in forced choices is equivalent to making one. (VIII) An example of such choices are questions of the truth of morals-- that is whether arguments to be moral are 'true' or binding. A skeptical approach or withholding judgment 'until all facts are in' will result in opting out of morality. Author uses the example of building friendship. (IX) In the case of becoming a friend to someone, I must first act as though I like her, and/or act as though she likes me. I can't 'stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence' that the other wants to befriend me-- this will probably lead to failure. This is considered a matter of faith helping to create the fact it is looking to find. (IX)
In the case of religious belief, we see also that it is a momentous forced choice. For those for whom it is live, and who take the pursuit of truth to be a higher value than avoidance of error, believing in religion is justified. Since the hypothesis is momentous (very important to the individual making the decision), author argues that whatever choice we make we are entitled to make. Author argues that taking avoidance of error as a higher ideal in this case will also lead to the same conclusion-- since it is a forced choice-- as disbelieving. Moreover, author argues that the absolute approach to truth may easily result in withholding judgment (=disbelieving) since in such matters there is no scientific resolution available and therefore no certitude given from that quarter. (X) The abstract conclusion is that 'we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will'. While this may sound silly, it is because we forget that a live hypothesis is something that is legitimately tempting to believe (and is therefore not ruled out by the whole of science and rational argument). If a particular hypothesis isn't legitimately possible (living), then this whole endeavor will appear to be Pascal's wager. Yet if it is alive for an individual, and since it is a momentous forced choice, the individual is given the freedom to believe.
5/15/09
Putnam, Hilary - A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy
05/15/2009
Renewing Philosophy, Harvard Press 1992 Ch 9
This chapter tries to establish Dewey's defense of democracy as an argument for social morality. Author beings by quoting Bernard Williams when it comes to giving a justification of moral claims-- forget trying to convince someone to be moral and instead try to justify the concepts and particulars to someone already committed to being moral. Williams' shortfall however was in giving an objective justification for ethics as an individual case of having a personally deleterious moral character-- a justification coming from psychology. This is considered a personal, ontological justification, which is orthogonal to Dewey's social, epistemological one (pg182). It is social because it addresses society and societal problems. It is epistemological in that it posits that intelligent empirical investigation is the best chance at finding effectual strategies for fixing social problems.(pg186) Author considers this anti-metaphysical because it doesn't presuppose that there is one 'absolute' answer outside of whatever we can find in scientific investigation. (pg187) So the grounds of moral activity comes from the shortcomings of the current social situation and the likelihood that science will find a solution. This jointly justifies 'democratic institutions as freedom of thought and speech' (pg188). One important factor in this argument is that Dewey doesn't leave it to the 'experts' (pg189) to show us progress, since privilege can easily create privileged interests and 'cognitive distortion' about the good. Instead, social progress must be done in the same way (by analogy) that scientific progress is done: with open, informed, free democratic investigation and thus justification.
The worth of democracy is occasionally objected two by two different sources, according to author. They include extreme relativists who object to interventions into any other culture's traditions, even the most undemocratic (pg183-5). They also include the reactionaries who believe that society begins to regress once democracy is established-- author considers Alasdair MacIntyre as an example (pg185-6).
One criticism author levels at Dewey's approach is that it lacks the content required to settle personal ontic anxiety-- existential moral questions-- such as the one posed by Sartre about staying at home to help your elderly mother or going off to join the anti-fascist revolution. (pg190-2) More importantly, James extends this criticism (in The Will To Believe) to be against scientific inquiry when it comes to many deep personal decisions-- you can't try both and see which suit you better. (pg192-6)
The chapter (and book?) ends with a conclusion and discusses how important true equality is in a liberal democracy-- so that everyone can partake in the free play of their natural endowments. (pg198-199)
Renewing Philosophy, Harvard Press 1992 Ch 9
This chapter tries to establish Dewey's defense of democracy as an argument for social morality. Author beings by quoting Bernard Williams when it comes to giving a justification of moral claims-- forget trying to convince someone to be moral and instead try to justify the concepts and particulars to someone already committed to being moral. Williams' shortfall however was in giving an objective justification for ethics as an individual case of having a personally deleterious moral character-- a justification coming from psychology. This is considered a personal, ontological justification, which is orthogonal to Dewey's social, epistemological one (pg182). It is social because it addresses society and societal problems. It is epistemological in that it posits that intelligent empirical investigation is the best chance at finding effectual strategies for fixing social problems.(pg186) Author considers this anti-metaphysical because it doesn't presuppose that there is one 'absolute' answer outside of whatever we can find in scientific investigation. (pg187) So the grounds of moral activity comes from the shortcomings of the current social situation and the likelihood that science will find a solution. This jointly justifies 'democratic institutions as freedom of thought and speech' (pg188). One important factor in this argument is that Dewey doesn't leave it to the 'experts' (pg189) to show us progress, since privilege can easily create privileged interests and 'cognitive distortion' about the good. Instead, social progress must be done in the same way (by analogy) that scientific progress is done: with open, informed, free democratic investigation and thus justification.
The worth of democracy is occasionally objected two by two different sources, according to author. They include extreme relativists who object to interventions into any other culture's traditions, even the most undemocratic (pg183-5). They also include the reactionaries who believe that society begins to regress once democracy is established-- author considers Alasdair MacIntyre as an example (pg185-6).
One criticism author levels at Dewey's approach is that it lacks the content required to settle personal ontic anxiety-- existential moral questions-- such as the one posed by Sartre about staying at home to help your elderly mother or going off to join the anti-fascist revolution. (pg190-2) More importantly, James extends this criticism (in The Will To Believe) to be against scientific inquiry when it comes to many deep personal decisions-- you can't try both and see which suit you better. (pg192-6)
The chapter (and book?) ends with a conclusion and discusses how important true equality is in a liberal democracy-- so that everyone can partake in the free play of their natural endowments. (pg198-199)
5/8/09
Dewey, John - Antinaturalism In Extremis
05/08/2009
Naturalism & The Human Spirit, ch 1 Columbia University Press, 1944
This paper is more polemical and rhetorical than many current philosophy papers usually are. The main point is to defend naturalism from criticism leveled by 'supernaturalists'. Author argues against what he considers to be the orthodox position that moral virtue is only acquired through supernatural means, instead arguing that all virtues we find worthwhile come solely from human nature. Author considers this the 'Pauline' and 'Augustinian' doctrines of natural degradation and supernatural salvation. (pg2)
Author points out the tremendous advancement that naturalism (in this case considered scientific materialism) has made through the centuries and how the same scientific inquiries relating to humans have been blocked by a religion's supernaturalist doctrines (pg3-4).
The main bulk of the paper is devoted to taking examples of anti-naturalist statements and rebutting or attacking them. (part II) Notably GK Chesterton writes that democracy would not survive if it didn't have a catholic or christian underpinning (pg8), to which author responds with a fundamental thesis: 'naturalism finds the values in question, the worth and dignity of men and women, residing in human nature itself, in the connections, actual and potential, that human beings sustain to one another in the natural environment.' (pg9)
The consequences of being an anti-naturalist, author argues, is to discount the natural resources available for the betterment of humans and to discount the possibility of gains made by the sciences into human nature. (pg10-11) The biggest rub comes from the problem of whether to accept the numerous biological findings placing humankind 'squarely within the natural world' (pg11). Yet at the same time (some) anti-naturalists wish to deny that humans are 'simply a highly developed animal' (pg7). This tension leave anti-naturalists in a contradictory position when it comes to accepting scientific discovery.
The final discussion is about moral virtue and normative standards; anti-naturalists hold that naturalism cannot provide for them. (pg12-15) Author finds this is a deeply pessimistic view of human nature, and of scientific progress.
Naturalism & The Human Spirit, ch 1 Columbia University Press, 1944
This paper is more polemical and rhetorical than many current philosophy papers usually are. The main point is to defend naturalism from criticism leveled by 'supernaturalists'. Author argues against what he considers to be the orthodox position that moral virtue is only acquired through supernatural means, instead arguing that all virtues we find worthwhile come solely from human nature. Author considers this the 'Pauline' and 'Augustinian' doctrines of natural degradation and supernatural salvation. (pg2)
Author points out the tremendous advancement that naturalism (in this case considered scientific materialism) has made through the centuries and how the same scientific inquiries relating to humans have been blocked by a religion's supernaturalist doctrines (pg3-4).
The main bulk of the paper is devoted to taking examples of anti-naturalist statements and rebutting or attacking them. (part II) Notably GK Chesterton writes that democracy would not survive if it didn't have a catholic or christian underpinning (pg8), to which author responds with a fundamental thesis: 'naturalism finds the values in question, the worth and dignity of men and women, residing in human nature itself, in the connections, actual and potential, that human beings sustain to one another in the natural environment.' (pg9)
The consequences of being an anti-naturalist, author argues, is to discount the natural resources available for the betterment of humans and to discount the possibility of gains made by the sciences into human nature. (pg10-11) The biggest rub comes from the problem of whether to accept the numerous biological findings placing humankind 'squarely within the natural world' (pg11). Yet at the same time (some) anti-naturalists wish to deny that humans are 'simply a highly developed animal' (pg7). This tension leave anti-naturalists in a contradictory position when it comes to accepting scientific discovery.
The final discussion is about moral virtue and normative standards; anti-naturalists hold that naturalism cannot provide for them. (pg12-15) Author finds this is a deeply pessimistic view of human nature, and of scientific progress.
5/1/09
Schaub, Edward - Dewey's Interpretation of Religion
05/01/2009
The Philosophy of John Dewey, Ch 13, Schilpp ed., 1951
This is a general review of Dewey's work on religion and also of the work of his students and followers; the conclusion is that they are more extreme than Dewey was. Author first tries to give a state-of-religion overview and then takes some time to develop the concept of religion as a human activity whose explanation should be 'less impersonal than the standpoint of functionalism and instrumentalism'(pg400-1).
Dewey's early exposition against religion as having a monopoly over the spiritual led many of his followers to take a decidedly anti-religion stance (pg401-4), yet author claims many were confused about whether it was naively naturalistic or fulfilling some specific practical human need.(pg401) The author concludes here that instrumentalism was inadequate to give an account of religion.(pg404)
In part III, author reviews the most sustained work Dewey did on religion in A Common Faith. Author claims that Dewey did not seriously attempt to work religion through the instrumentalist/utilitarian psychology that he had created, nor did he wish to critically engage with modern-day religious theology (pg406-7). Instead his major target is 'supernaturalism', a belief system author thinks is a strawman or at least very outdated. (pg407) Moreover, author claims Dewey levels an a priori argument against a kind-of remote supernaturalism, god(s) in another world apart from the natural one that we all live in. This doesn't account for the varieties of different religious beliefs that contradict that a priori analysis (pg409). Author then reviews Dewey's account of a religious outlook as opposed to 'a religion' (pg411-13) and specifically pinpoints the argument that the seat of religious attitudes is an imaginative ideal. Author argues that Dewey hasn't established that we can be sufficiently motivated by an ideal if we don't take it to be metaphysically active in the world (pg414-416). The argument offered by the author is that the terrifyingly finite, mortal aspects of humans have been the primary motivations for the establishing of religion, but these are metaphysical aspects of living in 'Nature'-- hence a metaphysical 'Reality' that is the proper seat of religious ideals.
Dewey Replies to Schaub in Experience, Knowledge and Value; he mostly argues that his earlier work that was quoted was taken out of context: it was a discussion that religion should not be taught in public schools, not a discussion on the general problems of religion.
The Philosophy of John Dewey, Ch 13, Schilpp ed., 1951
This is a general review of Dewey's work on religion and also of the work of his students and followers; the conclusion is that they are more extreme than Dewey was. Author first tries to give a state-of-religion overview and then takes some time to develop the concept of religion as a human activity whose explanation should be 'less impersonal than the standpoint of functionalism and instrumentalism'(pg400-1).
Dewey's early exposition against religion as having a monopoly over the spiritual led many of his followers to take a decidedly anti-religion stance (pg401-4), yet author claims many were confused about whether it was naively naturalistic or fulfilling some specific practical human need.(pg401) The author concludes here that instrumentalism was inadequate to give an account of religion.(pg404)
In part III, author reviews the most sustained work Dewey did on religion in A Common Faith. Author claims that Dewey did not seriously attempt to work religion through the instrumentalist/utilitarian psychology that he had created, nor did he wish to critically engage with modern-day religious theology (pg406-7). Instead his major target is 'supernaturalism', a belief system author thinks is a strawman or at least very outdated. (pg407) Moreover, author claims Dewey levels an a priori argument against a kind-of remote supernaturalism, god(s) in another world apart from the natural one that we all live in. This doesn't account for the varieties of different religious beliefs that contradict that a priori analysis (pg409). Author then reviews Dewey's account of a religious outlook as opposed to 'a religion' (pg411-13) and specifically pinpoints the argument that the seat of religious attitudes is an imaginative ideal. Author argues that Dewey hasn't established that we can be sufficiently motivated by an ideal if we don't take it to be metaphysically active in the world (pg414-416). The argument offered by the author is that the terrifyingly finite, mortal aspects of humans have been the primary motivations for the establishing of religion, but these are metaphysical aspects of living in 'Nature'-- hence a metaphysical 'Reality' that is the proper seat of religious ideals.
Dewey Replies to Schaub in Experience, Knowledge and Value; he mostly argues that his earlier work that was quoted was taken out of context: it was a discussion that religion should not be taught in public schools, not a discussion on the general problems of religion.
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