12/15/2006
Presidential Address
The Jerry Fodor Over-used Latin Glossary:
Mutatis Mutandis: 'with the necessary changes having been made'
Ipso Facto: 'by the fact itself'
A Fortiori: 'from the stronger reason'
Ceteris Paribus: 'all else being equal'
Inter Alia: 'among other things'
Author begins with a review of the 'baptismal' account of fixing the names of natural kinds terms; fixing the referents for names.
1, the word 'water' lacks descriptive content.
2, baptism occurs when the speaker has the intention to name something. The flow of explanation goes from the mental state to the linguistic expression. The way author indicates it goes is as follows: "Let's call this kind of stuff: 'water'.".
3, the name 'water' is a rigid designator for possible worlds (modality), designating the same kind of stuff in all worlds where it exists at all.
Author claims that you need the modal to get necessary a posteriori facts. The modal is underwritten by the baptismal account of naming, since this account of naming designates rigidly and doesn't seek to describe the kind it designates, just designates the kind as 'water'.
Author then claims that the baptism intention can't match up to rigid designation. There are some possibilities:
1. You need the concept of water before you baptize that stuff as 'water'. Author likes this, but nobody else does. This still falls short, because you have to let people know that you're using the concept WATER when you're baptizing water as 'water', so you have to have 'water' be in the language prior to baptizing it as 'water'. Nobody likes this outcome. But as a solution, you have to baptize a natural kind using a representation that doesn't involve a concept. See next...
2. You try to say "this kind of stuff is 'water'." This uses a demonstrative, not a concept to baptize. The new problem, author points out, is that nobody really knows what you're pointing out when you say 'this kind of stuff'. Do you mean the stuff granny uses for brushing teeth? Do you mean the kind of stuff that fills a glass? Each token refers to multiple kinds.
Author considers various 'NP-- Not-Pooh' fixes to this problem and rejects them. He closes with a 'deeper problem' in trying to secure nomological necessity with semantic necessity.
12/15/06
12/8/06
Kim, Jaegwon - The Mind-Body Problem at Century's Turn
12/08/2006
The Future of Philosophy, Brian Leiter, editor. 2004
Author begins with claming that physicalism is close enough to the right answer, and better than substance dualism and property dualism.
Substance dualism: the idea that Cartesian minds of a different substance can act causally on the physical plain cannot be supported. Causation needs spatial relations, or relational properties that can be laid out in space. Space, at least, is the thing that allows us to 'pair' causes with their effects. Author argues that since cartesian minds are non-spatial, we have no possibility of pairing them with spatially allocated items. There is also way that we can think of for non-spatial objects to cause and effect each other, let alone spatial objects.
Property dualism: most famous version of 'nonreductive materialism'. Beliefs, desires, feelings and so on cannot be reduced to the physical. They play a causal role. But how, author questions? Brings same arguments to bear, since now we're wondering how beliefs and desires move our physical bodies to do anything at all.
"If mentality is to have any causal efficacy at all-- it must be physically reducible" pg 138.
Mental Residue: Inverted qualia is a genuine possibility. Author concedes that the nature of qualia might be non-reducible, but also, luckily, causally impotent. The similarities and differences between qualia ought to be causally potent, and also reducible, but the feel and nature of this or that quale cannot be explained.
The subjective is the first-personal aspect of the mind, and is currently incompatible with the reductive program. The cogito 'I exist' is not the same proposition as 'Descartes exists', or 'that man exists', and so on. The special status of this proposition [is it a proposition?] and the privileged access we have to our mentality is lost on reduction, and is different from the mind-body problem, but needs attention. Review pg 149.
The Future of Philosophy, Brian Leiter, editor. 2004
Author begins with claming that physicalism is close enough to the right answer, and better than substance dualism and property dualism.
Substance dualism: the idea that Cartesian minds of a different substance can act causally on the physical plain cannot be supported. Causation needs spatial relations, or relational properties that can be laid out in space. Space, at least, is the thing that allows us to 'pair' causes with their effects. Author argues that since cartesian minds are non-spatial, we have no possibility of pairing them with spatially allocated items. There is also way that we can think of for non-spatial objects to cause and effect each other, let alone spatial objects.
Property dualism: most famous version of 'nonreductive materialism'. Beliefs, desires, feelings and so on cannot be reduced to the physical. They play a causal role. But how, author questions? Brings same arguments to bear, since now we're wondering how beliefs and desires move our physical bodies to do anything at all.
"If mentality is to have any causal efficacy at all-- it must be physically reducible" pg 138.
Mental Residue: Inverted qualia is a genuine possibility. Author concedes that the nature of qualia might be non-reducible, but also, luckily, causally impotent. The similarities and differences between qualia ought to be causally potent, and also reducible, but the feel and nature of this or that quale cannot be explained.
The subjective is the first-personal aspect of the mind, and is currently incompatible with the reductive program. The cogito 'I exist' is not the same proposition as 'Descartes exists', or 'that man exists', and so on. The special status of this proposition [is it a proposition?] and the privileged access we have to our mentality is lost on reduction, and is different from the mind-body problem, but needs attention. Review pg 149.
12/1/06
Stump, Eleonore - Love, By All Accounts
12/01/2006
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA
Author briefly reviews the three general approaches to the nature of love. The responsiveness account, the volitional account, and the relational account. Each has faults:
Responsiveness account: the features possessed by the beloved are also possessed by others, undercutting the non-substitutivity of love. Also love may alter when the intrinsic features of the beloved alter.
Volitional account: the will to love a the beloved could be equally applied to anyone else, for no good reason one way or another. Example: I do love you, but for no good reason.
Relational account: we value a relationship, a history, a connection, ongoing and interactive-- but Dante doesn't satisfy this account, since he loved Beatrice from afar and also had a wife Gemma Donati, who lived in another town (that he made no efforts to be close to). [This 'Dante Argument' is a poor reply to the relational account.]
Author turns to Thomas Acquinas' account of love, which is two-fold:
1) the desire the objective good of the beloved
2) the desire for union with the beloved
To desire the objective good of the beloved: you don't always know what you're desiring, since it is an objective matter what the good of the beloved is. This could mean that you think you love A, but you actually don't.
'Union' isn't well defined in Acquinas, but author argues that it provides for multiple 'offices of love', because different unions are appropriate due to different relational and intrinsic aspects of the beloved and the lover. Ex: friend, lover, parent. It also makes it possible to abuse an office of love by desiring a union that is outside of the appropriate office. Ex: incest, molesting priests
Self-love means you want to be integrated (union) and that you want the best for yourself.
The claim is that this account responds to much of the difficulties earlier found. The lover can list intrinsic/relational aspects of the beloved that fit into an office of love, and the volitional account is satisfied in spirit, since at it's backbone is the desire for the good of another.
Finally, this can give an account of forgiveness as trying to find an appropriate office of love.
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA
Author briefly reviews the three general approaches to the nature of love. The responsiveness account, the volitional account, and the relational account. Each has faults:
Responsiveness account: the features possessed by the beloved are also possessed by others, undercutting the non-substitutivity of love. Also love may alter when the intrinsic features of the beloved alter.
Volitional account: the will to love a the beloved could be equally applied to anyone else, for no good reason one way or another. Example: I do love you, but for no good reason.
Relational account: we value a relationship, a history, a connection, ongoing and interactive-- but Dante doesn't satisfy this account, since he loved Beatrice from afar and also had a wife Gemma Donati, who lived in another town (that he made no efforts to be close to). [This 'Dante Argument' is a poor reply to the relational account.]
Author turns to Thomas Acquinas' account of love, which is two-fold:
1) the desire the objective good of the beloved
2) the desire for union with the beloved
To desire the objective good of the beloved: you don't always know what you're desiring, since it is an objective matter what the good of the beloved is. This could mean that you think you love A, but you actually don't.
'Union' isn't well defined in Acquinas, but author argues that it provides for multiple 'offices of love', because different unions are appropriate due to different relational and intrinsic aspects of the beloved and the lover. Ex: friend, lover, parent. It also makes it possible to abuse an office of love by desiring a union that is outside of the appropriate office. Ex: incest, molesting priests
Self-love means you want to be integrated (union) and that you want the best for yourself.
The claim is that this account responds to much of the difficulties earlier found. The lover can list intrinsic/relational aspects of the beloved that fit into an office of love, and the volitional account is satisfied in spirit, since at it's backbone is the desire for the good of another.
Finally, this can give an account of forgiveness as trying to find an appropriate office of love.
11/17/06
Wartenberg, Tom - Thinking Inside the Frame: How Films Philosophize (manuscript)
11/17/2006
Unpublished, Chapters 6-8
Chapter 6 is a discussion of the filming of philosophy in the movie The Third Man. Author argues this movie is a filming of Aristotle's discussion on the nature of friendship and what it takes to break a relationship with a friend and for what reasons. First the protagonist proves he is a friend by resisting the 'slander' of his friend by another, and he tries to solve his friend's death out of loyalty, then he is turned from being his friend by an 'up-close' and 'movie-like' viewing of the friend's bad deeds, but he remains unwilling to help the police catch him. This, author claims, mirrors the extended discussion of when to dissolve a relationship in Aristotle. Finally the protagonist turns in the former friend due to full realization of his bad deeds. This, author claims, is doing philosophy since it deals with a real example of Aristotle's hypothetical discussion on the nature of friendship.
Chapter 7 discusses two structural films, Empire and Flicker. Both, author claims, comment on the nature of film itself, and qualify as doing philosophy insofar as philosophizing about film is philosophy. Empire films the empire state building as night comes in, filming a static object and is conveying stasis. Since essentialist analyses of film said it was necessary for film to show motion, this is a counterexample, or at least adding that film is the only thing that can show stasis as well.
Flicker also adds to the philosophy of film in that it shows that objects do not need to be filmed in order to show motion and shape. Since Flicker is just blacked out film frames and white film frames in different successions, there are no objects or motions shown. Author claims that eventually the viewer sees motion, color and objects in an optical illusion effect. So the film itself does not contain motion or objects but they are seen anyway. Author claims this is chaning the philosophical analysis of film.
Chapter 8 is the summary and conclusion chapter. Author emphasizes the importance of counterexamples and thought experiments in philo and re-hashes the three objections given in the beginning of the book. Author also explains the need to have philosophy enter the public arena more than it has before, and that film might be a good way to do that.
Unpublished, Chapters 6-8
Chapter 6 is a discussion of the filming of philosophy in the movie The Third Man. Author argues this movie is a filming of Aristotle's discussion on the nature of friendship and what it takes to break a relationship with a friend and for what reasons. First the protagonist proves he is a friend by resisting the 'slander' of his friend by another, and he tries to solve his friend's death out of loyalty, then he is turned from being his friend by an 'up-close' and 'movie-like' viewing of the friend's bad deeds, but he remains unwilling to help the police catch him. This, author claims, mirrors the extended discussion of when to dissolve a relationship in Aristotle. Finally the protagonist turns in the former friend due to full realization of his bad deeds. This, author claims, is doing philosophy since it deals with a real example of Aristotle's hypothetical discussion on the nature of friendship.
Chapter 7 discusses two structural films, Empire and Flicker. Both, author claims, comment on the nature of film itself, and qualify as doing philosophy insofar as philosophizing about film is philosophy. Empire films the empire state building as night comes in, filming a static object and is conveying stasis. Since essentialist analyses of film said it was necessary for film to show motion, this is a counterexample, or at least adding that film is the only thing that can show stasis as well.
Flicker also adds to the philosophy of film in that it shows that objects do not need to be filmed in order to show motion and shape. Since Flicker is just blacked out film frames and white film frames in different successions, there are no objects or motions shown. Author claims that eventually the viewer sees motion, color and objects in an optical illusion effect. So the film itself does not contain motion or objects but they are seen anyway. Author claims this is chaning the philosophical analysis of film.
Chapter 8 is the summary and conclusion chapter. Author emphasizes the importance of counterexamples and thought experiments in philo and re-hashes the three objections given in the beginning of the book. Author also explains the need to have philosophy enter the public arena more than it has before, and that film might be a good way to do that.
11/10/06
Wartenberg, Tom - Thinking Inside the Frame: How Films Philosophize (manuscript)
11/10/2006
Unpublished, Chapters 4-5
Ch 4 is about a thought experiment in The Matrix. The thought experiment rehearses Descartes' evil demon hypothesis about the external world. But the claim is that because it also puts the viewer into the same place that a subject deceived by the evil demon would be, it is a new approach or counts as 'doing philosophy'.
Ch 5 claims to be a reply to utilitarian arguments about the good. Author explains the use of a counterexample in philosophy as challenging one of the premises in a general argument. Extended discussion about the contrast between narrative vs. broad argumentation. Counterexamples may use narrative to refute a claim that 'A is an essential feature of F' by finding one example of an A not being an F.
The claim is that Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind provides a counterexample to an argument that people will be better off if they do not have bad memories. Author denies the claim that he is using his own philo background to interpret this movie.
Unpublished, Chapters 4-5
Ch 4 is about a thought experiment in The Matrix. The thought experiment rehearses Descartes' evil demon hypothesis about the external world. But the claim is that because it also puts the viewer into the same place that a subject deceived by the evil demon would be, it is a new approach or counts as 'doing philosophy'.
Ch 5 claims to be a reply to utilitarian arguments about the good. Author explains the use of a counterexample in philosophy as challenging one of the premises in a general argument. Extended discussion about the contrast between narrative vs. broad argumentation. Counterexamples may use narrative to refute a claim that 'A is an essential feature of F' by finding one example of an A not being an F.
The claim is that Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind provides a counterexample to an argument that people will be better off if they do not have bad memories. Author denies the claim that he is using his own philo background to interpret this movie.
11/3/06
Wartenberg, Tom - Thinking Inside the Frame: How Films Philosophize (manuscript)
11/03/2006
Unpublished, Chapters 1-3
Author wants to establish a firm basis for taking film to be 'doing philosophy', or that film can be a place where philosophy is 'screened'. There are three general objections to this idea: Explicitness objection, Generality objection, Imposition objection. Author suggests that the most effective doing of philo in film is by using the counterexample.
Explicitness: philo tries to be clear and unambiguous, art tries not and is not
Author's response: Really, the objection is about implicit argumentation and explicit argumentation. And implicit argumentation isn't necessarily imprecise.
Generality: philo is about universals, or at least abstract, art is normally about particulars
Author's response: There are some academic subjects that translate well into narrative, for instance history. Really the objection is about a narrative versus argumentation. But not all philosophy uses general argumentation only! Some use thought experiments, and examples. Some of these thought experiments/examples are indispensable to the arguments. These are just like narratives.
Imposition: any philo interpreted to be in film is the philosopher's imposition, not from the art
Author's response: we must be careful not to attribute meaning to a work that was not intended by the author. Don't use an 'audience-oriented' interpretation, use instead 'creator-oriented' interpretation.
The final chapter deals with a supposed difference between film as an 'illustration' of a philosophical point, and actually making a philosophical point. Some illustrations or examples are essential to a philosophical argument, just as some illustrations are essential to other works.
Unpublished, Chapters 1-3
Author wants to establish a firm basis for taking film to be 'doing philosophy', or that film can be a place where philosophy is 'screened'. There are three general objections to this idea: Explicitness objection, Generality objection, Imposition objection. Author suggests that the most effective doing of philo in film is by using the counterexample.
Explicitness: philo tries to be clear and unambiguous, art tries not and is not
Author's response: Really, the objection is about implicit argumentation and explicit argumentation. And implicit argumentation isn't necessarily imprecise.
Generality: philo is about universals, or at least abstract, art is normally about particulars
Author's response: There are some academic subjects that translate well into narrative, for instance history. Really the objection is about a narrative versus argumentation. But not all philosophy uses general argumentation only! Some use thought experiments, and examples. Some of these thought experiments/examples are indispensable to the arguments. These are just like narratives.
Imposition: any philo interpreted to be in film is the philosopher's imposition, not from the art
Author's response: we must be careful not to attribute meaning to a work that was not intended by the author. Don't use an 'audience-oriented' interpretation, use instead 'creator-oriented' interpretation.
The final chapter deals with a supposed difference between film as an 'illustration' of a philosophical point, and actually making a philosophical point. Some illustrations or examples are essential to a philosophical argument, just as some illustrations are essential to other works.
10/27/06
Sleutels, Jan - Greek Zombies
10/27/2006
Routledge, Philosophical Psychology April 2006
Julian Jaynes writes that the Homeric Greeks might not have had some level of consciousness, or some level of concepts. This is dismissed by most, save possibly Dan Dennett, but in particular dismissed by Ned Block. Sleutels argues that this is not as obviously wrong as it first appears.
These might be 'fringe minds', but unfortunately we modern-day humans don't have the resources to think about what kind of consciousness might be in fringe minds. Jaynes gives a poor, negative example of what consciousness isn't on pg 181. He indicates two levels of consciousness, the 'mind-space' and the 'analog I'. The analog I does the introspection on concepts in the 'mind-space'. The Greeks have neither, according to Jaynes.
Block has the distinction between Phenomenal consciousness and Access consciousness, and clearly Greeks have P-con. Block doesn't take seriously that humans that are the same as we biologically not have A-con.
Author suggests the debate is over A-con. If consciousness is a social construction, this won't work to get A-con going, since A-con is the thing that considers the concepts involved in the very social construction itself. Social constructions take place in the realm of concepts, and without concepts, no social construction. Author suggests other concepts, B-concepts. These have only behavioral conditions to their identity-- they don't have 'inferential relations' cannot be introspected. This may avoid the primacy problem of concepts for social constructions.
Routledge, Philosophical Psychology April 2006
Julian Jaynes writes that the Homeric Greeks might not have had some level of consciousness, or some level of concepts. This is dismissed by most, save possibly Dan Dennett, but in particular dismissed by Ned Block. Sleutels argues that this is not as obviously wrong as it first appears.
These might be 'fringe minds', but unfortunately we modern-day humans don't have the resources to think about what kind of consciousness might be in fringe minds. Jaynes gives a poor, negative example of what consciousness isn't on pg 181. He indicates two levels of consciousness, the 'mind-space' and the 'analog I'. The analog I does the introspection on concepts in the 'mind-space'. The Greeks have neither, according to Jaynes.
Block has the distinction between Phenomenal consciousness and Access consciousness, and clearly Greeks have P-con. Block doesn't take seriously that humans that are the same as we biologically not have A-con.
Author suggests the debate is over A-con. If consciousness is a social construction, this won't work to get A-con going, since A-con is the thing that considers the concepts involved in the very social construction itself. Social constructions take place in the realm of concepts, and without concepts, no social construction. Author suggests other concepts, B-concepts. These have only behavioral conditions to their identity-- they don't have 'inferential relations' cannot be introspected. This may avoid the primacy problem of concepts for social constructions.
10/20/06
Townley, Cynthia - A Defense of Ignorance
10/20/2006
Chapter 4, rough draft for review for PATF
Argument against 'epistemophilia', the focus on increasing knowledge as the sole purpose of epistemology, or that more knowledge is the only epistemic virtue.
Seeks to place other concepts like 'trust' and 'ignorance' as epistemic virtues, or make them indispensable in the framework of epistemology. E.g. you need to trust another epistemic agent for you to actually gain new knowledge from them, and you also have to admit that you're ignorant about a particular subject.
Important to acquire knowledge in a responsible manner from other epistemic agents and treat them with respect, not just as sources for information.
The possibility of incoherence in a body of knowledge, or multiple incommensurate bodies of knowledge, possibly even about the same subject matter. For instance compare western medicine and other traditional healing practices. If true, this undercuts the idea that knowledge can be added up to form a complete singular body of work.
Discusses the copyright issues and problems when western scientific models interact with other culture's knowledge base.
Chapter 4, rough draft for review for PATF
Argument against 'epistemophilia', the focus on increasing knowledge as the sole purpose of epistemology, or that more knowledge is the only epistemic virtue.
Seeks to place other concepts like 'trust' and 'ignorance' as epistemic virtues, or make them indispensable in the framework of epistemology. E.g. you need to trust another epistemic agent for you to actually gain new knowledge from them, and you also have to admit that you're ignorant about a particular subject.
Important to acquire knowledge in a responsible manner from other epistemic agents and treat them with respect, not just as sources for information.
The possibility of incoherence in a body of knowledge, or multiple incommensurate bodies of knowledge, possibly even about the same subject matter. For instance compare western medicine and other traditional healing practices. If true, this undercuts the idea that knowledge can be added up to form a complete singular body of work.
Discusses the copyright issues and problems when western scientific models interact with other culture's knowledge base.
10/13/06
Previous Papers
10/13/2006 Rowlands, M - The Normativity of Action, Philosophical Psychology Jun 2006
10/06/2006 Sutton, J - Introduction: Memory, Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind, Philosophical Psychology Jun 2006
10/06/2006 Clark, Andy - Material Symbols, Philosophical Psychology Jun 2006
09/29/2006 Sen, Amaryta - What Do We Want From A Theory Of Justice? Journal of Philosophy May 2004
09/22/2006 Lormand, E - The Explanatory Stopgap, Philosophical Review July 2004
09/15/2006 Shoemaker, Sydney - On Projecting the Unprojectible
09/08/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Grammar of 'Believe'
09/01/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Grammar of 'Believe'
08/25/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Argument from Illusion: Objects and Objections Mind, April 1972
08/18/2006 Martin, M - Perception, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 24 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
08/11/2006 Segal, G - Intentionality, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 11 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
08/04/2006 Causation, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 19 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
07/28/2006 Vogel, Jonathan - Causation and Subjectivity
07/21/2006 Matthews, Gary - On the Very Idea of Infused Virtues
07/14/2006 Mele, Alfred - Action, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 13 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
07/07/2006 Devitt, Michael - Scientific Realism, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 26 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/30/2006 Albert, David - The Foundations of Physics, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 29 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/23/2006 Knoeldge and Scepticism, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 23 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/16/2006 Davies, M - Cognitive Science, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 14 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/09/2006 Boyer, Peter - A Church Asunder, The New Yorker 04/17/2006
06/02/2006 Jackson, Frank - Consciousness, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 12 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
05/19/2006 Sterelny, Kim - The Evolution and Evolvability of Culture, Mind & Language April 2006
05/12/2006 Marcs, G - Startling Starlings, Nature April 2006
05/12/2006 Gentner, T et al - Recursive Syntactic Pattern Learning by Songbirds, Nature April 2006
05/05/2006 McGinn, Colin - Is Wittgenstein Losing his Hold?
04/21/2006 Moore, GE - Proof of an External World
04/14/2006 Viger, C - Learning to Think: A Response to the Language of Thought Argument for Innateness, Mind & Language Jun 2005
04/07/2006 Franks, B - The Role of 'the Environment' in Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology, Philosophical Psychology Feb 2005
03/31/2006 Knobe, J - Folk Psychology: Science and Morals
03/24/2006 Kelly, S - Closing the Gap: Phenomenology and Logical Analysis, Harvard Reivew of Philosophy Vol 13 No 2
03/17/2006 Azzouni, J & Armour-Garb, B - Standing on Common Ground, Journal of Philosophy Oct 2005
03/10/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 12 & 13
03/03/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 3 & 4
02/24/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 1 & 2
02/17/2006 Nussbaum, Martha - What Does Philosophy Contribute to Public Life?
02/10/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Argument from Illusion: Objects and Objections, Mind 1972
02/03/2006 On Taking Stances: An Interview with Bas Van Frassen, Harvard Review of Philosophy Vol 13 No 2 2005
01/27/2006 Danto, Arthur - What Does Philosophy Contribute to Public Life?
01/20/2006 Nahmias, E et al - Surveying Freedom: Fold Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Philosophical Psychology Oct 2005
01/13/2006 Sosa, E - Dreams and Philosophy, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
01/06/2006 Appiah, A - The Case for Conatamination, New York Times Magazine 1/1/06
12/16/2005 Kelly, E - Against Naturalism in Ethics, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
12/09/2005 Kitcher, P - The Hall of Mirrors, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
12/02/2005 Dreyfus, H - Overcoming the Myth of the Mental, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
11/18/2005 Sizer, Laura - Good and Good for You: An Affect Theory of Happiness
11/11/2005 Davidson, Donald - Could There be a science of Rationality? Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
11/04/2005 Bhushan, Nalini - Situating Jiddu Krishnamurti within the Frame of Western Varieties of Cosmopolitanism
10/28/2005 Price, H - Naturalism without Representationalism, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/21/2005 Putnam, Hilary - The Content and Appeal of Naturalism, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/14/2005 McDowell, J - Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/07/2005 Levy, N - Imaginative Resistance and the Moral/Conventional Distinction, Philosophical Psychology April 2005
09/30/2005 Collins, J - Nativism: In Defense of a Biological Understanding, Philosophical Psychology April 2005
09/23/2005 Sen, Amaryta - Capability and Well-Being, The Quality of Life Nussbaum & Sen eds, 1993
09/16/2005 Darwall, S - Valuing Activity: Golub's Smile, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 4 2002
09/09/2005 Darwall, S - Empathy, Sympathy, Care, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 3 2002
09/02/2005 Darwall, S - Welfare and Care, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 2 2002
08/26/2005 Darwall, S - Welfare's Normativity, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 1 2002
08/12/2005 Tiberius, V - Wisdom and Perspective, Journal of Philosophy April 2005
07/29/2005 Cohen, GA - Deeper into Bullshit
07/29/2005 Frankfurt, Harry - Reply to GA Cohen, Contours of Agency 2003 Buss & Overton eds
07/22/2005 Priest, G & Read, S - Intentionality: Meinongianism and the Medievals, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
07/15/2005 Frankfurt, Harry - On Bullshit, The Importance of What We Care About
07/08/2005 Orr, HA - Devolution: Why Intelligent Design Isn't, The New Yorker May 30 2005
07/01/2005 Levy, N - The Evolution of Morality, What Makes Us Moral Ch 2
06/24/2005 Fish, Stanley - Chickens: the Ward Churchill and Larry Summers Story, The Chronicle of Higher Education, May 13 2005
06/17/2005 Tymozcko, Tom - An Anecdote about Plato and Mathematics
06/10/2005 Quine, Willard Van - Epistemology Naturalized, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
06/03/2005 - How to Read Epistemology Naturalized, Journal of Philosophy
05/13/2005 Leigh, Fiona - Thought without Attitudes: Davidson, Aristotle and Animal Minds
05/06/2005 Rini, Adriane - Introduction: A Hitchhikers Guide to Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic
04/29/2005 Greenberg, G - As Good As Dead, The New Yorker Aug 13, 2001
04/22/2005 Maiborn, Heidi - Must We Feel for Others to be Moral?
04/15/2005 Churchland, Paul - Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective, Journal of Philosophy Jan 2005
04/08/2005 Rorty, Richard - How Many Grains Make a Heap?, London Review of Books, Jan 2005
04/01/2005 Fodor, Jerry - Reply to Steven Pikner: So How Does the Mind Work?, Mind and Language Feb 2005
04/01/2005 Pinker, Steven - Reply to Jerry Fodor on how the Mind Works, Mind and Language Feb 2005
03/25/2005 Pinker, Steven - So How Does the Mind Work?, Mind and Language Feb 2005
03/18/2005 Paoli, F - Implicational Paradoxes and the Meaning of Logical Constants
03/11/2005 Atran, S - Adaptationism for Human Cognition: Strong, Spurious or Weak?, Mind and Language Feb 205
02/25/2005 Peacock, C - Moral Rationalism, Journal of Philosophy Oct 2004
02/18/2005 Nehamas, A - Art, Interpretation and the Rest of Life, APA Proceedings and Addresses Vol 78 No 3
02/11/2005 Kiteley, Murray - Sellars' Ontology of Categories, Nous May 1973
02/04/2005 Darwall, S - Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint, APA Proceedings and Addresses Vol 78 No 2
01/28/2005 Velleman, D - Love as a Moral Emotion, Ethics 109 Jan 1999
01/14/2005 Kolodny, N - Love as Valuing a Relationship, Philosophical Review April 2003
01/07/2005 Annas, J - Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2004
12/17/2004 Aune, Bruce - Wetzel on Types and Tokens
12/10/2004 Aune, Bruce - Knowing and Philosophical Analysis
12/03/2004 Carruthers, Peter - Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind, Mind & Language June 2004
11/19/2004 Sterelny, Kim - Thought in a Hostile World, Selections
11/12/2004 Sterelny, Kim - Thought in a Hostile World, Selections
11/05/2004 Connolly, John - What's the Problem with Akrasia? A Medieval Perspective
10/29/2004 Papineau et al - Critical Discussion: Kim Sterelny's Thought in a Hostile World, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
10/22/2004 Marcus, Eric - Why Zombies are Inconceivable, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
10/15/2004 Rupert, R - Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition, Journal of Philosophy Aug 2004
10/08/2004 Atkinson & Wheeler - The Grain of Domain: The Evolutionary-Psychological Case Against Domain-General Cognition, Mind & Language Vol 19 No 2 2004
10/01/2004 deVries, Bill - Unpublished Manuscript on Sellars: Ch 7 Intentionality and the Mental
09/24/2004 deVries, Bill - Unpublished Manuscript on Sellars: Ch 5 Knowledge and the Given
09/17/2004 Mayr, E - The Biology of Race and the Concept of Equality, Daedalus 2002
09/17/2004 Cavalli-Sforza, L - Genes, People, and Languages, Ch 1 2002
09/10/2004 Graves, J - The Race Myth, Chapter 1
09/03/2004 Mosley, Al - Are Racial Categories Racist?
08/27/2004 Glasgow, J - The New Biology of Race, Journal of Philosophy Sept 2003
08/20/2004 Andreasen, R - Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct?, Philosophy of Science 67 2000
08/13/2004 Hardimon, M - The Ordinary Concept of Race, Journal of Philosophy Sept 2003
07/30/2004 Levin, J - Coult Love Be Like a Heatwave: Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience, Philosophical Studies Vol 59 No 2 1986
07/23/2004 Sizer, Laura - What Feelings Can't Do
07/16/2004 Rudd, AJ - What It's Like and What's Really Wrong With Physicalism, Journal of Consciousness Studies 5, No 4 1998
07/09/2004 Horgan, P - Quantum Philosophy
07/02/2004 Rorty, Richard - Philosophical Convictions, The Nation June 14 2004
06/25/2004 Block, Ned - The Harder Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Philosophy Aug 2002
06/11/2004 Hohwy, J - Evidence, Explanation and Experience: on the Harder Problem of Consciousness
05/21/2004 Singer, P - War: Iraq, Chapter 8 The President of Good & Evil
05/21/2004 Dutton & Savoy - The Moral Case Against the Iraq War
04/16/2004 Fodor, J - Having a Concept: A Brief Refutation of the 20th Century
03/12/2004 Webster, WR - Wavelength Theory of Color Strikes Back: The Return of the Physical
10/06/2006 Sutton, J - Introduction: Memory, Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind, Philosophical Psychology Jun 2006
10/06/2006 Clark, Andy - Material Symbols, Philosophical Psychology Jun 2006
09/29/2006 Sen, Amaryta - What Do We Want From A Theory Of Justice? Journal of Philosophy May 2004
09/22/2006 Lormand, E - The Explanatory Stopgap, Philosophical Review July 2004
09/15/2006 Shoemaker, Sydney - On Projecting the Unprojectible
09/08/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Grammar of 'Believe'
09/01/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Grammar of 'Believe'
08/25/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Argument from Illusion: Objects and Objections Mind, April 1972
08/18/2006 Martin, M - Perception, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 24 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
08/11/2006 Segal, G - Intentionality, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 11 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
08/04/2006 Causation, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 19 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
07/28/2006 Vogel, Jonathan - Causation and Subjectivity
07/21/2006 Matthews, Gary - On the Very Idea of Infused Virtues
07/14/2006 Mele, Alfred - Action, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 13 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
07/07/2006 Devitt, Michael - Scientific Realism, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 26 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/30/2006 Albert, David - The Foundations of Physics, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 29 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/23/2006 Knoeldge and Scepticism, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 23 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/16/2006 Davies, M - Cognitive Science, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 14 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/09/2006 Boyer, Peter - A Church Asunder, The New Yorker 04/17/2006
06/02/2006 Jackson, Frank - Consciousness, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 12 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
05/19/2006 Sterelny, Kim - The Evolution and Evolvability of Culture, Mind & Language April 2006
05/12/2006 Marcs, G - Startling Starlings, Nature April 2006
05/12/2006 Gentner, T et al - Recursive Syntactic Pattern Learning by Songbirds, Nature April 2006
05/05/2006 McGinn, Colin - Is Wittgenstein Losing his Hold?
04/21/2006 Moore, GE - Proof of an External World
04/14/2006 Viger, C - Learning to Think: A Response to the Language of Thought Argument for Innateness, Mind & Language Jun 2005
04/07/2006 Franks, B - The Role of 'the Environment' in Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology, Philosophical Psychology Feb 2005
03/31/2006 Knobe, J - Folk Psychology: Science and Morals
03/24/2006 Kelly, S - Closing the Gap: Phenomenology and Logical Analysis, Harvard Reivew of Philosophy Vol 13 No 2
03/17/2006 Azzouni, J & Armour-Garb, B - Standing on Common Ground, Journal of Philosophy Oct 2005
03/10/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 12 & 13
03/03/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 3 & 4
02/24/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 1 & 2
02/17/2006 Nussbaum, Martha - What Does Philosophy Contribute to Public Life?
02/10/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Argument from Illusion: Objects and Objections, Mind 1972
02/03/2006 On Taking Stances: An Interview with Bas Van Frassen, Harvard Review of Philosophy Vol 13 No 2 2005
01/27/2006 Danto, Arthur - What Does Philosophy Contribute to Public Life?
01/20/2006 Nahmias, E et al - Surveying Freedom: Fold Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Philosophical Psychology Oct 2005
01/13/2006 Sosa, E - Dreams and Philosophy, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
01/06/2006 Appiah, A - The Case for Conatamination, New York Times Magazine 1/1/06
12/16/2005 Kelly, E - Against Naturalism in Ethics, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
12/09/2005 Kitcher, P - The Hall of Mirrors, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
12/02/2005 Dreyfus, H - Overcoming the Myth of the Mental, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
11/18/2005 Sizer, Laura - Good and Good for You: An Affect Theory of Happiness
11/11/2005 Davidson, Donald - Could There be a science of Rationality? Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
11/04/2005 Bhushan, Nalini - Situating Jiddu Krishnamurti within the Frame of Western Varieties of Cosmopolitanism
10/28/2005 Price, H - Naturalism without Representationalism, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/21/2005 Putnam, Hilary - The Content and Appeal of Naturalism, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/14/2005 McDowell, J - Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/07/2005 Levy, N - Imaginative Resistance and the Moral/Conventional Distinction, Philosophical Psychology April 2005
09/30/2005 Collins, J - Nativism: In Defense of a Biological Understanding, Philosophical Psychology April 2005
09/23/2005 Sen, Amaryta - Capability and Well-Being, The Quality of Life Nussbaum & Sen eds, 1993
09/16/2005 Darwall, S - Valuing Activity: Golub's Smile, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 4 2002
09/09/2005 Darwall, S - Empathy, Sympathy, Care, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 3 2002
09/02/2005 Darwall, S - Welfare and Care, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 2 2002
08/26/2005 Darwall, S - Welfare's Normativity, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 1 2002
08/12/2005 Tiberius, V - Wisdom and Perspective, Journal of Philosophy April 2005
07/29/2005 Cohen, GA - Deeper into Bullshit
07/29/2005 Frankfurt, Harry - Reply to GA Cohen, Contours of Agency 2003 Buss & Overton eds
07/22/2005 Priest, G & Read, S - Intentionality: Meinongianism and the Medievals, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
07/15/2005 Frankfurt, Harry - On Bullshit, The Importance of What We Care About
07/08/2005 Orr, HA - Devolution: Why Intelligent Design Isn't, The New Yorker May 30 2005
07/01/2005 Levy, N - The Evolution of Morality, What Makes Us Moral Ch 2
06/24/2005 Fish, Stanley - Chickens: the Ward Churchill and Larry Summers Story, The Chronicle of Higher Education, May 13 2005
06/17/2005 Tymozcko, Tom - An Anecdote about Plato and Mathematics
06/10/2005 Quine, Willard Van - Epistemology Naturalized, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
06/03/2005 - How to Read Epistemology Naturalized, Journal of Philosophy
05/13/2005 Leigh, Fiona - Thought without Attitudes: Davidson, Aristotle and Animal Minds
05/06/2005 Rini, Adriane - Introduction: A Hitchhikers Guide to Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic
04/29/2005 Greenberg, G - As Good As Dead, The New Yorker Aug 13, 2001
04/22/2005 Maiborn, Heidi - Must We Feel for Others to be Moral?
04/15/2005 Churchland, Paul - Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective, Journal of Philosophy Jan 2005
04/08/2005 Rorty, Richard - How Many Grains Make a Heap?, London Review of Books, Jan 2005
04/01/2005 Fodor, Jerry - Reply to Steven Pikner: So How Does the Mind Work?, Mind and Language Feb 2005
04/01/2005 Pinker, Steven - Reply to Jerry Fodor on how the Mind Works, Mind and Language Feb 2005
03/25/2005 Pinker, Steven - So How Does the Mind Work?, Mind and Language Feb 2005
03/18/2005 Paoli, F - Implicational Paradoxes and the Meaning of Logical Constants
03/11/2005 Atran, S - Adaptationism for Human Cognition: Strong, Spurious or Weak?, Mind and Language Feb 205
02/25/2005 Peacock, C - Moral Rationalism, Journal of Philosophy Oct 2004
02/18/2005 Nehamas, A - Art, Interpretation and the Rest of Life, APA Proceedings and Addresses Vol 78 No 3
02/11/2005 Kiteley, Murray - Sellars' Ontology of Categories, Nous May 1973
02/04/2005 Darwall, S - Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint, APA Proceedings and Addresses Vol 78 No 2
01/28/2005 Velleman, D - Love as a Moral Emotion, Ethics 109 Jan 1999
01/14/2005 Kolodny, N - Love as Valuing a Relationship, Philosophical Review April 2003
01/07/2005 Annas, J - Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2004
12/17/2004 Aune, Bruce - Wetzel on Types and Tokens
12/10/2004 Aune, Bruce - Knowing and Philosophical Analysis
12/03/2004 Carruthers, Peter - Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind, Mind & Language June 2004
11/19/2004 Sterelny, Kim - Thought in a Hostile World, Selections
11/12/2004 Sterelny, Kim - Thought in a Hostile World, Selections
11/05/2004 Connolly, John - What's the Problem with Akrasia? A Medieval Perspective
10/29/2004 Papineau et al - Critical Discussion: Kim Sterelny's Thought in a Hostile World, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
10/22/2004 Marcus, Eric - Why Zombies are Inconceivable, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
10/15/2004 Rupert, R - Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition, Journal of Philosophy Aug 2004
10/08/2004 Atkinson & Wheeler - The Grain of Domain: The Evolutionary-Psychological Case Against Domain-General Cognition, Mind & Language Vol 19 No 2 2004
10/01/2004 deVries, Bill - Unpublished Manuscript on Sellars: Ch 7 Intentionality and the Mental
09/24/2004 deVries, Bill - Unpublished Manuscript on Sellars: Ch 5 Knowledge and the Given
09/17/2004 Mayr, E - The Biology of Race and the Concept of Equality, Daedalus 2002
09/17/2004 Cavalli-Sforza, L - Genes, People, and Languages, Ch 1 2002
09/10/2004 Graves, J - The Race Myth, Chapter 1
09/03/2004 Mosley, Al - Are Racial Categories Racist?
08/27/2004 Glasgow, J - The New Biology of Race, Journal of Philosophy Sept 2003
08/20/2004 Andreasen, R - Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct?, Philosophy of Science 67 2000
08/13/2004 Hardimon, M - The Ordinary Concept of Race, Journal of Philosophy Sept 2003
07/30/2004 Levin, J - Coult Love Be Like a Heatwave: Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience, Philosophical Studies Vol 59 No 2 1986
07/23/2004 Sizer, Laura - What Feelings Can't Do
07/16/2004 Rudd, AJ - What It's Like and What's Really Wrong With Physicalism, Journal of Consciousness Studies 5, No 4 1998
07/09/2004 Horgan, P - Quantum Philosophy
07/02/2004 Rorty, Richard - Philosophical Convictions, The Nation June 14 2004
06/25/2004 Block, Ned - The Harder Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Philosophy Aug 2002
06/11/2004 Hohwy, J - Evidence, Explanation and Experience: on the Harder Problem of Consciousness
05/21/2004 Singer, P - War: Iraq, Chapter 8 The President of Good & Evil
05/21/2004 Dutton & Savoy - The Moral Case Against the Iraq War
04/16/2004 Fodor, J - Having a Concept: A Brief Refutation of the 20th Century
03/12/2004 Webster, WR - Wavelength Theory of Color Strikes Back: The Return of the Physical
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