10/29/2010
The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan Vol 1 Historical Understanding and the History of Philosophy, Ch 12. Malpas, Eds. University of Chicago Press, 1994
In this paper Author tries to revive Bertrand Russell's realist theory of universals. Author lays it out using Russell's own language from Problems of Philosophy: 'I am in my room' has a relation 'in' that connects me with my room. The 'in' relation itself has a reality to it. (pg211) The reality of relations like 'in' gives way to the reality of universals quite immediately: me being in my room and your being in your room is not two different cases of 'in'. They are the same case; they aren't two particulars. But they happen at two different places (perhaps at the same time). Thus the two cases of 'in' aren't one particular either. So, the 'in' is a universal. (pg212)
The possibility of the existence of a relational universal is met with the following objection: it seems possible to establish the reality of any particular relational entity by means of a negation proposition. A negation proposition is something like ~x(Relation)y. This is because we use relational entities in negative statements (which are also true or false) just as much as we do in positive ones. For instance: "x isn't in bed" is ~(x (in) bed), and seems to establish the reality of the relational universal 'in', but without, in this circumstance, the 'in' being exemplified (the proposition is true: x doesn't stand to the bed with the 'in' relation). This leads to the absurd conclusion that there are hundreds of existing relations that aren't exemplified. Author claims Russell tried to finesse this by having a Principal of Acquaintance: we have had immediate acquaintance with every understandable proposition; no acquaintance, no apprehension. Author pushes back that this won't do, since it is possible that there are relations we don't in fact understand but we could nevertheless put into a negation proposition. (pg 215-6) [What is author's way out? To assert that it is ok to have such real un-exemplified universals?]
The first objection and reply author discusses is the objection that the universal entity is caught between being divisible among all the places it is exemplified, or that it is indivisible but somehow present in multiple places at the same time. This is the original problem Plato encountered. Author denies that the second choice is problematic: it is only problematic for particulars, not for universals. Universals are naturally indivisible and exemplified multiply: that's what they do. (pg218) An issue along this same difficulty arises regarding the nature of exemplification. Exemplification seems to occur when there are true instances of a universal relating to particulars. But the trouble arises when one tries to explain the relation: x is related to y with the exemplification of the relational universal 'in'. In other words, the exemplification relation is exemplified in the case of x, 'in', and y. In trying to explain the relation of exemplification, an infinite regress arises. (pg219-220) The solution comes from denying that exemplification is a relation. The difference between "x is in bed" and "x isn't in bed" is that one is true and another is false, not that, in one case, 'in' is exemplified and in the other case, 'in' isn't exemplified. (pg221)
The second objection asks whether Russell's version of real universals is too bold. A more moderate Aristotelian version talks about essences and the sharing of them in particulars; yet not every relation has an essence. (pg222) The Aristotelian story has an essence unified as one thing in the human mind through a process of abstraction, yet it is distributed through the various particulars it is instantiated in. Author criticizes this as being even more obscure than Russell's theory of universals (pg223).
A completely different objection is raised by Quine (and, to a lesser extent, Goodman) in the nominalist program. For Quine, what exists is a function of what items are quantified in a set of true statements. Because you can construct a set of quantified statements no variables of which are universals or relations, then you don't need them in your ontology: they are dispensable. Against this objection, Donagan offers two replies: 1) Sellars has argued that quantifying over variables is not the way to determine ontological commitments. 2) if you admit that "two dogs are white", then isn't there a quality that the two dogs both have? (pg224-5)
The next objection might have been offered up inadvertently by Russell himself when he suggested that there could be an artificial language where normal predicates like '...is white' are replaced by a name for a 'discontinuous particular' like 'White'. So, to say that a wall is white, you might express 'wall white', the meeting of two particulars, 'white' and 'wall'. Author pushes back against this, claiming that it wouldn't be possible to establish the name 'White' without reference to the color white, which would have to be put together using some sort of predicate. But of course the language has no predicates, so there wouldn't be a way to establish that 'White' is white. (pg227)
Another objection is Pears': that realism seeks to provide an escape from the 'maze of words' into the real world by means of asserting that the words all refer (at least all the primitive ones do). While this seems informative, it doesn't do the work of actually getting out of the 'maze', and is therefore unhelpful. It is uninformative but appears to inform; it is just a circular system of words. (pg228) Author just says that realism is informative because it explains a fact about language '... is white' using a fact about the world: whiteness. (pg229-230)
The final section of the paper involves the author looking at Russell's motivations to hold his "Realist Principle": 1) not all relational predicates can be disposed of-- some are necessary for a language about the world (pg232-3); and 2) that statements with primitive predicates will be true or false based on how the world is comprised, not based on fantasy or idealism or nominalist acrobatics. (pg233) While it seems modest, this seems to be a realism worth having, since the price of not having it entails errors of idealism or nominalism. (pg234)
10/22/10
Anscombe, Elizabeth - Mr Truman's Degree
10/22/2010
The Collected Philosophical Papers of GEM Anscombe, Vol 3: Ethics, Religion and Politics Ch 7 University of Minnesota Press, 1981 (Reprinted from pamphlet, Oxford 1957)
This paper takes a stance against Oxford's granting Harry Truman an honorary degree. Author considers Truman to be a villain, or at least unworthy of an honor. Author first starts with a series of fact-statements or observations: (pg62-4)
1) The Allies said they would follow the basic tenants of wartime respect for civilians as long as the Germans did too (assume this extends to the Japanese).
2) The goal of the war in Europe was established as 'unconditional surrender'. This absolutist position is questionable to author.
3) The Germans did seem to bomb indiscriminately.
4) Rhetoric surrounding the war was often about it being a fight between two whole nations, not two armies. The distinction between civilians and the military was deliberately blurred.
5) When the US declared war on Japan, they sought the objective of 'unconditional surrender'.
6) The Allies changed their strategy to involve widespread, mass bombings
7) The Allies refused to let Japan negotiate a surrender but instead use a new kind of weapon against them.
Author's primary principle in this paper is that to kill the innocent as a means to an end is, always, murder. (pg64) This isn't about 'following the rules as long as the other guy does', it is morally wrong no matter what. The argument is simple:
p1) The atomic bomb was dropped as a means of getting Japan to surrender unconditionally
p2) Innocent lives were undoubtedly killed by the bomb
c1) The person responsible for dropping the bomb killed innocent lives as a means to get Japan to surrender unconditionally.
p3) President Truman is responsible for dropping the bomb.
p4) To kill innocents as a means to an end (getting Japan to surrender unconditionally) is murder
c2) President Truman is responsible for murder.
Author first disputes that Truman is somehow courageous because he made a tough decision. And, given the conditions, many lives were saved by dropping the bomb. But author points out the conditions were inappropriate, 'barbarous'-- those of insisting on unconditional surrender. (pg65) Author further reformulates the argument that you can 'do evil so that good may come' as 'any fool can be as much of a knave as suits him'. (pg65)
In the second section of the paper, author explores how war can sometimes allow for the killing of innocents, perhaps as accidental to attacking valid military targets. Yet if the means for accomplishing a military end involve the killing of innocents, this is not accidental-- this is murder. (pg66-7) This leads to a larger discussion of who compromises 'the innocent' in a war. The people who work in the factories that make munitions? The farmers who grow the food for the front? The conscripts who would prefer not to fight but were drafted? Relating to conscripts, they are not innocent because "innocent" refers not to a condition but an action: someone who is trying to harm you is not an innocent.(pg67)
Author also examines the argument that 'all war is horror; it is only a matter of how much'. Author believes that denying this argument also involves denying pacifism, which author believes is a false doctrine. For author, there are legitimate killings, especially ones to stop injustice or harm to peoples. (pg68-9) Author also briefly describes a justification for the death penalty-- the killing of someone who has been determined to be a malefactor to society. (pg68-9) Author then makes a mockery of the argument that, since all war is evil, it doesn't matter whether innocents die or not-- author considers the argument absurd, even if the premise were true.
Author ends the paper by commenting on the state of moral philosophy at Oxford that might have sanctioned giving Truman the honorarium. (pg71)
The Collected Philosophical Papers of GEM Anscombe, Vol 3: Ethics, Religion and Politics Ch 7 University of Minnesota Press, 1981 (Reprinted from pamphlet, Oxford 1957)
This paper takes a stance against Oxford's granting Harry Truman an honorary degree. Author considers Truman to be a villain, or at least unworthy of an honor. Author first starts with a series of fact-statements or observations: (pg62-4)
1) The Allies said they would follow the basic tenants of wartime respect for civilians as long as the Germans did too (assume this extends to the Japanese).
2) The goal of the war in Europe was established as 'unconditional surrender'. This absolutist position is questionable to author.
3) The Germans did seem to bomb indiscriminately.
4) Rhetoric surrounding the war was often about it being a fight between two whole nations, not two armies. The distinction between civilians and the military was deliberately blurred.
5) When the US declared war on Japan, they sought the objective of 'unconditional surrender'.
6) The Allies changed their strategy to involve widespread, mass bombings
7) The Allies refused to let Japan negotiate a surrender but instead use a new kind of weapon against them.
Author's primary principle in this paper is that to kill the innocent as a means to an end is, always, murder. (pg64) This isn't about 'following the rules as long as the other guy does', it is morally wrong no matter what. The argument is simple:
p1) The atomic bomb was dropped as a means of getting Japan to surrender unconditionally
p2) Innocent lives were undoubtedly killed by the bomb
c1) The person responsible for dropping the bomb killed innocent lives as a means to get Japan to surrender unconditionally.
p3) President Truman is responsible for dropping the bomb.
p4) To kill innocents as a means to an end (getting Japan to surrender unconditionally) is murder
c2) President Truman is responsible for murder.
Author first disputes that Truman is somehow courageous because he made a tough decision. And, given the conditions, many lives were saved by dropping the bomb. But author points out the conditions were inappropriate, 'barbarous'-- those of insisting on unconditional surrender. (pg65) Author further reformulates the argument that you can 'do evil so that good may come' as 'any fool can be as much of a knave as suits him'. (pg65)
In the second section of the paper, author explores how war can sometimes allow for the killing of innocents, perhaps as accidental to attacking valid military targets. Yet if the means for accomplishing a military end involve the killing of innocents, this is not accidental-- this is murder. (pg66-7) This leads to a larger discussion of who compromises 'the innocent' in a war. The people who work in the factories that make munitions? The farmers who grow the food for the front? The conscripts who would prefer not to fight but were drafted? Relating to conscripts, they are not innocent because "innocent" refers not to a condition but an action: someone who is trying to harm you is not an innocent.(pg67)
Author also examines the argument that 'all war is horror; it is only a matter of how much'. Author believes that denying this argument also involves denying pacifism, which author believes is a false doctrine. For author, there are legitimate killings, especially ones to stop injustice or harm to peoples. (pg68-9) Author also briefly describes a justification for the death penalty-- the killing of someone who has been determined to be a malefactor to society. (pg68-9) Author then makes a mockery of the argument that, since all war is evil, it doesn't matter whether innocents die or not-- author considers the argument absurd, even if the premise were true.
Author ends the paper by commenting on the state of moral philosophy at Oxford that might have sanctioned giving Truman the honorarium. (pg71)
10/15/10
Bennett, Jonathan - Whatever The Consequences
10/15/2010
Ethics, Thomson & Dworkin Eds, Harper & Row 1968
This paper seeks to dispute the so-called principle of double effect, which posits a moral difference between actively doing x and passively allowing x to happen (when you could have stopped it). The example that author uses throughout the entire paper is one of a woman who is in labor but has reached complications and will die unless a late-term abortion is performed. However, it is also possible to deliver the baby alive, but the mother will suffer complications and eventually die. Author wants to attack those who believe that there is a moral difference between killing the baby and 'letting the mother die' by delivering the baby. The principle under attack is: "It would always be wrong to kill an innocent human, whatever the consequences of not doing so", though at the outset (pg212) author acknowledges that it isn't possible to refute that principle directly. Instead the strategy will be to show that the structure of the principle, something like 'always don't do x, whatever the consequences' is morally vacuous.
To start, author does not seek discussion with interlocutors who take religious authority or divine command as the basis for the principle; author wants to talk with those who believe there is an independent way to ascertain the validity of the principle. (pg213) Those who follow the principle are provisionally stipulated as 'conservative'. Author argues the conservative makes the following claims: (pg214)
-It is wrong to kill an innocent, whatever the consequences
-operating on the baby will kill it
-not operating (and delivering the baby) is not killing the mother, since her death is only a consequence, not an act of killing
-operating is wrong, not operating is permissible
What is going on here is an Action/Consequence distinction, which author tries to unpack in most of the rest of the paper. An action is considered motion in the physical environment, but will also typically include some of the 'upshots', that is what happened as a result of the physical motion. But not all the 'upshots' or consequences will be included in an action-- some could be considered to fall on the side of mere consequences. Author believes this is a valid distinction, but wonders if there is moral salience to it, especially in the case of the woman in labor. For author, there are 6 ways to approach the distinction between a human action and the consequences that come from it: (pg216-7 & pg222-3)
a) The actor was highly confident that the upshot (consequences) would follow from the action
b) There was a high degree of certainty or high likelihood that the upshot would follow from the action, even if the actor didn't know it
c) The aim or intention with which the action is performed does not include the upshot (consequence), even though such a consequence may inevitably follow
d) An impartial observer who assesses the entire situation would assign a particular upshot to be part of an action
e) There is a high degree of immediacy, 'simplicity of causal connections', short time-lag, etc. for actions but not for consequences
f) Actions can only be activities of a person, while not-doing something, whatever the consequences, is not an action.
Author argues there is moral salience to a-c but they do not apply to the 'obstetrics case', and d-f do apply to the obstetrics case but aren't morally significant. (pg216) To start, a and b both are stipulated in the case that the doctor knows either the woman or the child will die depending on the doctor's actions. So the obstetrics case does not have these elements. And with c, the doctor doesn't kill the baby for the sake of killing the baby-- the doctor does so to save the mother. And vice-versa with saving the baby but killing the mother-- in neither case is the action performed for the sake of killing the innocent human. (pg217)
Author then takes an elaborate detour into the general philosophy behind the conservative principle. The conservative might want to argue that there is a higher degree of immediacy or certainty that the child will die compared to the dying mother. However, author believes this is the wrong kind of argument the conservative would want to make to justify her position. If that argument underwrites the distinction between an action and its consequence, then it might be possible to concoct a case where performing some intentional voluntary motion would create a small chance of killing an innocent but have a large immediate upshot of saving more innocents. This kind of argument is not a 'whatever the consequences' argument. Author discusses how a conservative like Anscombe first denies this kind of argument as an underwriter, but then helps herself to it in her footnotes. (pg218-221) In general, this is a discussion about the permissibility of using 'fantastical' examples in moral theory.
The second group of ways to support an Action/Consequence distinction d-f might have differences in the obstetrics case, but author claims that no one should consider them morally relevant. Author claims that d would actually argue against the conservative position and moves to e, the case of a closer causal connection or a higher degree of immediacy in the killing than in the letting die. Author believes this element is loosely connected with a and b. But e has a difference in immediacy in the obstetrics case, (pg224) where there is no asymmetry in cases a and b (author claims). Author ties e and f together as basically using a distinction between actions and refraining-from-acting to do its work. Though there is a difference, author claims the difference isn't morally relevant. The difference between acting so that x happens and not-acting and allowing x to happen are laid out by author: (pg225-7)
Similarities:
-bodily movements
-the happening of x (e.g. someone dying)
Differences:
-there is a limited set of activities that could be performed in order to kill
-there is a wide set of activities that could be performed when letting-die
These differences are merely of degree, which may not be comforting to the conservative anyway, since it is possible to construct a circumstance where actions are so limited to destroy the difference in set size. More immediately, your moral judgment on whether someone is responsible for a death does not lessen once you learn that A could have killed B a whole variety of ways, not just the way A actually killed B. (pg228-229) And this is the fatal difference-- the set size of the ways in which an impermissible action might have occurred is metaphysically significant but not morally so.
The last portion of the paper discusses the reasons to perhaps stick with such a 'whatever the consequences' rule like the one. A conservative might object to the example, claiming it is too fantastic or fanciful and that it unfairly tests a good rule. Author counters that the example used in the paper is of a kind: there will be other times where this kind of case might come up. A conservative who pushes further might use two different arguments: (pg231-2)
1) You missed something when you analyzed the elements of the Action/Consequence distinction-- something that is morally salient but not nameable. Reply: this is a serious issue; do the tough work to elucidate the moral difference. If you can't, then drop the reply.
2) We must have some rules, or else we would never be able to decide anything on time. A host of particular situations are too complex to try to resolve one-by-one-- we need rules to do it efficiently. Reply: This is a focus on the particular, not the specific. You can make two rules: one that specifies what to do in certain kinds of situations, another that specifies what to do in other kinds of situation. The objection is about the particular, not the specific. Further, this argument is consequentialist: 'if we don't have rules to follow, look at the consequences that might occur!', which doesn't seem to be appealing to the conservative anyway. (pg234)
Ethics, Thomson & Dworkin Eds, Harper & Row 1968
This paper seeks to dispute the so-called principle of double effect, which posits a moral difference between actively doing x and passively allowing x to happen (when you could have stopped it). The example that author uses throughout the entire paper is one of a woman who is in labor but has reached complications and will die unless a late-term abortion is performed. However, it is also possible to deliver the baby alive, but the mother will suffer complications and eventually die. Author wants to attack those who believe that there is a moral difference between killing the baby and 'letting the mother die' by delivering the baby. The principle under attack is: "It would always be wrong to kill an innocent human, whatever the consequences of not doing so", though at the outset (pg212) author acknowledges that it isn't possible to refute that principle directly. Instead the strategy will be to show that the structure of the principle, something like 'always don't do x, whatever the consequences' is morally vacuous.
To start, author does not seek discussion with interlocutors who take religious authority or divine command as the basis for the principle; author wants to talk with those who believe there is an independent way to ascertain the validity of the principle. (pg213) Those who follow the principle are provisionally stipulated as 'conservative'. Author argues the conservative makes the following claims: (pg214)
-It is wrong to kill an innocent, whatever the consequences
-operating on the baby will kill it
-not operating (and delivering the baby) is not killing the mother, since her death is only a consequence, not an act of killing
-operating is wrong, not operating is permissible
What is going on here is an Action/Consequence distinction, which author tries to unpack in most of the rest of the paper. An action is considered motion in the physical environment, but will also typically include some of the 'upshots', that is what happened as a result of the physical motion. But not all the 'upshots' or consequences will be included in an action-- some could be considered to fall on the side of mere consequences. Author believes this is a valid distinction, but wonders if there is moral salience to it, especially in the case of the woman in labor. For author, there are 6 ways to approach the distinction between a human action and the consequences that come from it: (pg216-7 & pg222-3)
a) The actor was highly confident that the upshot (consequences) would follow from the action
b) There was a high degree of certainty or high likelihood that the upshot would follow from the action, even if the actor didn't know it
c) The aim or intention with which the action is performed does not include the upshot (consequence), even though such a consequence may inevitably follow
d) An impartial observer who assesses the entire situation would assign a particular upshot to be part of an action
e) There is a high degree of immediacy, 'simplicity of causal connections', short time-lag, etc. for actions but not for consequences
f) Actions can only be activities of a person, while not-doing something, whatever the consequences, is not an action.
Author argues there is moral salience to a-c but they do not apply to the 'obstetrics case', and d-f do apply to the obstetrics case but aren't morally significant. (pg216) To start, a and b both are stipulated in the case that the doctor knows either the woman or the child will die depending on the doctor's actions. So the obstetrics case does not have these elements. And with c, the doctor doesn't kill the baby for the sake of killing the baby-- the doctor does so to save the mother. And vice-versa with saving the baby but killing the mother-- in neither case is the action performed for the sake of killing the innocent human. (pg217)
Author then takes an elaborate detour into the general philosophy behind the conservative principle. The conservative might want to argue that there is a higher degree of immediacy or certainty that the child will die compared to the dying mother. However, author believes this is the wrong kind of argument the conservative would want to make to justify her position. If that argument underwrites the distinction between an action and its consequence, then it might be possible to concoct a case where performing some intentional voluntary motion would create a small chance of killing an innocent but have a large immediate upshot of saving more innocents. This kind of argument is not a 'whatever the consequences' argument. Author discusses how a conservative like Anscombe first denies this kind of argument as an underwriter, but then helps herself to it in her footnotes. (pg218-221) In general, this is a discussion about the permissibility of using 'fantastical' examples in moral theory.
The second group of ways to support an Action/Consequence distinction d-f might have differences in the obstetrics case, but author claims that no one should consider them morally relevant. Author claims that d would actually argue against the conservative position and moves to e, the case of a closer causal connection or a higher degree of immediacy in the killing than in the letting die. Author believes this element is loosely connected with a and b. But e has a difference in immediacy in the obstetrics case, (pg224) where there is no asymmetry in cases a and b (author claims). Author ties e and f together as basically using a distinction between actions and refraining-from-acting to do its work. Though there is a difference, author claims the difference isn't morally relevant. The difference between acting so that x happens and not-acting and allowing x to happen are laid out by author: (pg225-7)
Similarities:
-bodily movements
-the happening of x (e.g. someone dying)
Differences:
-there is a limited set of activities that could be performed in order to kill
-there is a wide set of activities that could be performed when letting-die
These differences are merely of degree, which may not be comforting to the conservative anyway, since it is possible to construct a circumstance where actions are so limited to destroy the difference in set size. More immediately, your moral judgment on whether someone is responsible for a death does not lessen once you learn that A could have killed B a whole variety of ways, not just the way A actually killed B. (pg228-229) And this is the fatal difference-- the set size of the ways in which an impermissible action might have occurred is metaphysically significant but not morally so.
The last portion of the paper discusses the reasons to perhaps stick with such a 'whatever the consequences' rule like the one. A conservative might object to the example, claiming it is too fantastic or fanciful and that it unfairly tests a good rule. Author counters that the example used in the paper is of a kind: there will be other times where this kind of case might come up. A conservative who pushes further might use two different arguments: (pg231-2)
1) You missed something when you analyzed the elements of the Action/Consequence distinction-- something that is morally salient but not nameable. Reply: this is a serious issue; do the tough work to elucidate the moral difference. If you can't, then drop the reply.
2) We must have some rules, or else we would never be able to decide anything on time. A host of particular situations are too complex to try to resolve one-by-one-- we need rules to do it efficiently. Reply: This is a focus on the particular, not the specific. You can make two rules: one that specifies what to do in certain kinds of situations, another that specifies what to do in other kinds of situation. The objection is about the particular, not the specific. Further, this argument is consequentialist: 'if we don't have rules to follow, look at the consequences that might occur!', which doesn't seem to be appealing to the conservative anyway. (pg234)
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