Parfit, Derek - Ch 10 Respect and Value

1/20/2012

On What Matters, Vol 1Ch 10, Oxford University Press 2011

In this chapter author explores the concept that Kant has about respect for the dignity of rational beings. This is different from the concept that all rational beings are good-- some (most/many) aren't. But all rational beings deserve respect because they have dignity. Author's point is that respect for rational beings does not get us much foothold in assessing which acts are right and which are wrong.(pg235)

This analysis starts with claiming that Kant meant that all wrong acts treat people in ways that disrespect their dignity. Surely this is true of some wrong acts like humiliating punishment, defamation, ridicule, acts that display contempt. But it is a stronger claim that all wrong acts fail to respect dignity. Kant wishes to build in the claims that acts like lying, suicide, and masturbation are also against human dignity, but this is hard to swallow (pg234-5). Instead, it seems Kant's claim is better suited to be limited in scope.

Author discusses the taxonomy of Kant's moral system, one that assigns value and a separate system that assigns moral worth, or the rightness or wrongness of actions. Author first starts with laying out a basic distinction between valuable things that can be promoted, and valuable things that aren't promoted in the same way-- they are respected instead. Author uses the term 'good events', but I believe the proper terminology is that there are valued events. Some events (states of affairs, outcomes, acts) are valued instrumentally, some are valued intrinsically. The most inclusive account of valued events is "Actualism": possible acts are valued as ends when they have intrinsic properties that "give us reason to want them to be actual", and means are valued when their ends are valued. (pg236) This account takes both intrinsically valued events and also events that are valued as means. Interestingly, author denies that Acualism applies to things other than events (taken broadly), for instance: it doesn't apply to persisting things like people or artworks. (pg237)

Actualism is not the only account of value: there are other things like objects, people, and concepts that are valuable but aren't teleological. These can't be 'promoted' but are instead 'respected'. Because these things are to be respected, author argues it is good to treat them with the respect they deserve (pg238). Author takes a weird direction though, appearing to argue that acts that respect the value of such things are good as ends (intrinsically valuable?) because they are acts that accord with Actualism.(pg238)

Kant's kinds of ends: ends-to-be-promoted, existent ends, and then ends-in-themselves. Ends-in-themselves are things Kant says have dignity and considers its value incomparable.(pg 239) Kant puts in the ends-to-be-promoted category the value of a good will, which is the will to do one's duty because it is one's duty. Author also claims Kant wants a possible world to be promoted where everyone has a good will. (However we shall see later that this end-to-be-promoted does not place any additional obligation on anyone other than having a good will.) Finally, the ultimate end-to-be-promoted (for Kant) is a world everyone receives happiness in proportion to the goodness of their will. So the steps of the ends-to-be-promoted are: (pg240)
1. Have a good will
2. Live in a world where everybody has a good will
3. Live in a world where we're all appropriately compensated for our good wills
Author goes on to claim that for Kant rationality is an an end-to-be-promoted rather than an end-in-itself. Things that have value as ends-in-themselves have 'dignity', which are of a value incomparable to those that have 'price'. But if rationality had dignity its price would be infinitely higher than other ends-to-be-promoted, like the avoidance of pain. Author claims this view is crazy, so Kant must not hold it. (pg241-2) Instead, author makes a distinction between rationality and humanity. Humanity is the capacity for morality, while rationality is "our other rational capacities and abilities" (pg242) Rationality is an end-to-be-promoted, e.g. worked on, while humanity i.e. the capacity for morality is the end-in-itself and has dignity.

Because we're talking about value and not goodness, every rational being, despite their goodness (or badness) has the value of rationality and therefore deserves respect. (pg240-1) Author suggests that Kant did not hold some common views about the relation between goodness and value (pg243), but that Kant does believe that a good will, the world where all have good will, and where all get their just desserts-- is both valuable and good. (pg244) Author describes Kant's views on the greatest goodness (to-be-promoted) in the "Formula of the Greatest Good" (pg245). Author reads Kant as giving a values-based end-to-be-promoted, similar to a consequentialist.

Author moves next into discussing consequentialism, which is a value-based theory of good action, but the terms to change to "the good" and "ought". (pg246) Most consequentialism uses the good to define the ought. This is distinct from Kant because Kant takes the good and ought to be distinct and one concept not more fundamental than the other (pg247-8). Author contrasts between Moore's tautological formulation of the good and the ought with Kant's (pg248-9). Author then explores how Kant's Formula of the Greatest Good (the world of good will and just dessert) relates to his other formulas (pg250), with the conclusion that if everyone did their duty, this is the best way to promote Kant's Greatest Good. (pg251)

The next line of discussion is about the possibility of connecting act-consequentialism with rule-consequentialism. In this pursuit, author claims we must appeal "to some view about how we ought to assess the effects of our acts." (pg252). Author considers three:
-Marginalist View
-Share of the Total View
-Whole Scheme View
These views are tested against a thought experiment "Rescue", in which four people are needed to save the lives of miners, but five people are unnecessary. (pg253) The Marginalist view suggests that the fifth person joining the mission makes all the actors inconsequential, which is absurd unless you add to it the Share of the Total View. Author casts both Hume and Kant as committed to the Whole Scheme View, since for Kant the achievement of the Greatest Good is by each person doing their duty. In this sense, Kant is a rule-consequentialist (pg255-6). However, author rejects the Whole Scheme View of both Hume and Kant-- the strict rule-following-- in favor of the Martinalist/Total View (pg256). This view, however, implies that Rule- and Act-consequentialism cannot be reconciled.