2016/08/26
The Philosophical Quarterly, No 229 Vol 57 October 2007
This paper seeks to describe Kant's views on race clearly and argues that they changed as the full force of his ethical theory unfolded. It starts with the highlights of Kant's essay from 1788 in which he advances a climate-based racial theory. The basic concept is that when races move from different climates, particularly warmer to colder, they lose industriousness and motivation to produce (pg573-4). Author argues that Kant changed his mind some time after 1792, to better accord with his moral theory.
The second section addresses Kant's history of racism and his review of other works that argued against using physical demarcations to determine race (pg576-7). In an essay written around the same time as his Groundwork (1785), Kant again re-affirms his racism as springing from the physical differences between humans (pg578) but curiously does not talk about any differences in moral capacity between the races. In a private letter he seems to suggest that the physical demarcations of races was separable from any possible moral one (579-80), and yet he re-asserts an intellectual hierarchy later on in 1788. Author describes some of the reactions to Kant's 1785 paper (pg580-1), specifically from Metzger, a professor of medicine, and Forster, a proto-anthropologist. It is to Forster that Kant replies in his 1788 essay, which re-introduces the heretofore 'detachable' deficiencies in intellect, reasoning, or agency capabilities associated with climate-based race.
The next section (III) is a summary of the hermeneutics between Kant's racism and his moral theory. Some author argue that the moral theory is paramount and that Kant had regrettable but minor unprincipled and empirical views on race (pg582-3). Others deny this tactic and instead argue that Kant's purported universalist theory is for "whites only", in other words, inegalitarian (pg583). Author criticizes this view because Kant argues that personhood follows from rationality, which all humanity possesses (pg583-4). This would make Kant an inconsistent universalist, rather than a consistent inegalitarian. But Kant's racism isn't a minor bug in his philosophy, it is a contradiction. More importantly, once this is admitted, his moral theory should not be 're-cast' as inegalitarian, but investigated to see in what ways (if any) his racism influenced his moral theory (pg584-5). A peek into the fruits of this investigation is Kant's introduction of a "cosmopolitan right" (pg585) later in the 1790s, after he dropped his hierarchical view of the races.
The final section discusses how Kant had "second thoughts" on his racism in the 1790s. Kant gives non-whites "juridical status" under the "cosmopolitan right" (pg586-7), claiming that contractual law should govern places where colonialism had instead been the rule. The idea here is that Europeans who seek to colonize must treat the natives as equals in a contractual setting, not as 'savages' to be civilized. He also came to reject chattel slavery (pg587-8). Furthermore, Kant came to reject climate-based racism and its implications for the inadvisability of intercontinental migration (for any race other than white). Instead, he argued that 'Nature' adapted humans so that they could live anywhere on earth, and that eventually it would allow for a super-structure of laws amongst the regions of the world (pg589). Finally, Kant drops his hierarchical rankings of the races and restricts his concept of race to be purely physical characteristics, explicitly saying that such characteristics have no bearing on human agency (pg589-91). Author discusses when this change might have occurred, perhaps between 1792 and 1795, as evidenced by his manuscripts changing for his 1795 work "Toward Perpetual Peace".
6/10/16
Lycan, William - Giving Dualism Its Due
2016/06/10
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 87, No 4, December 2009
This paper is a serious but largely brisk jaunt through the anti-dualist arguments (relating to the mind-body problem) and how they generally fail to refute the strong Cartesian 'substance' dualism. Author is a staunch materialist, so this is a bit of a confessional, in that he is concerned that his considered beliefs aren't just a product of mainstream philosophy culture but rational and scientific thought. Author first starts with a review of the major arguments in favor of materialism. The first major proponents of the view gave precious few arguments in its favor, instead mostly assuming it or 'inveighing against Cartesian dogma'(pg552). The first bona-fide argument author discusses is from Smart, a rather elementary identity theory for mind-body correspondence and then reduction using parsimony. And here author introduces the first main point of the paper: that the use of the concept of parsimony in evaluating competing theories is only available once all other facets of the competing theories have been considered, and "many, nearly all, other things must be equal" before parsimony can be used. Because dualists and materialists are still arguing over a body of evidence (qualia, intension, meaning, etc.) and how it is to be interpreted (or even whether it should be so), "the parsimony argument does not even come in the door until it is agreed we can find nothing to distinguish mental states from neurophysiological ones" (pg553).
The first argument that had a formal structure that was logically valid and left open the question of the actual substance that would occupy a functional-, or causal-, role, was from Armstrong & Lewis (c-fibers firing). Author's first objection is that the first premise, namely that (a priori) [mental state] occupies a causal role in the behavior, tendencies, and dispositions, of a creature is a "culpably good premise for materialists"(pg554). The dualist, according to author, would not accept this at the very outset: a [mental state] is what presents itself to consciousness, the attendant causal roles it plays are a posteriori. The main point for the dualist is that "we know the mind primarily through introspection" (pg554), not through behavior. The second premise, author claims, begs the question by claiming that [mental state] is exhausted by its causal role. In other words, it denies that there could be overdetermination of the causal role by both something physical and something mental. While many may scoff at overdetermination, author then claims that using parsimony to adjudicate is premature (see above). The strategy to hold off parsimony and allow for overdetermination, epiphenomenalism, and other causally-inert dualist theories is repeated often by author (pg555-6). This concluded the dispatching of arguments in favor of materialism.
Most of the rest of the paper then deals with replies to objections to dualism.
1. The "Interaction problem": how can non-matter interact with matter in any way?
Author: Just because there is no good model doesn't mean the objection is fatal. Causality itself is a tough concept to get right, as is determinism. Also, amend dualism to be spatial: it's right behind the eyes, in each brain. This takes away the non-spatial weirdness of dualism.
2. "Excrescencehood": mind-stuff seem to follow no laws and be extraneous to known facts.
Author: this is just a fundamental dualist/materialist disagreement about what's prior in accounting for mental life: is it prediction and behavior or the phenomena and feels? Clearly the dualist will claim the feels are what are important to capture in accounts of the mental. Besides, according to Wilkes, mental ascriptions are used for more than just explanations and prediction.
3. "Laws of Physics": conservation of matter and energy prohibits mental stuff from getting involved.
Author: Weak-form conservation is still compatible with dualism. Strong-form isn't required by physicists. Also, since we allow that the mental is spatial (but not material), the physical conception of space-time isn't violated.
4. "Evolutionary Theory": How could the mental have evolved as adaptive?
Author: nobody believes that all traits must be adaptive. And Churchland's claim that all traits must be physical and evolved from a physical process is question-begging.
5. "Explanatory Impotence": dualism explains little (if anything), while neuroscience explains a "great deal"(pg560).
Author: This is a bad comparison. Dualism competes with materialism, not neuroscience. But of course materialism does underwrite why neuro-facts are relevant to mental-facts. Author claims the dualist both use these facts through using a "transducer" but also capitalize on the neuro-facts being content-poor with respect to mental properties.
6. "Neural Dependence": mental life is dependent on a working neural one.
Author: Use the transducer argument. "Mind-brain interaction may be constant and very intimate" (pg561).
7. "Epistemology of other minds": How could we know about other minds, especially non-spatial ones?
Author: Again, we fixed that part of dualism by making it spatial. So after that fix is applied, this is a perceptual and epistemological problem, not a mind-body one.
8. "Unity and Individuation": How could the mental and the physical both be attached to one brain?
Author: Well, because dualism is interactionist and each mind has causal connections to a particular body. How is this unique relation explained? Well, look to some evolutionary story (aka, hand waive).
9. "The Pairing Problem": How can each mind be paired with each body?
Author: well, by making the mental spatial. Causal explanations may just be "brute" facts, not requiring further analysis (pg562).
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 87, No 4, December 2009
This paper is a serious but largely brisk jaunt through the anti-dualist arguments (relating to the mind-body problem) and how they generally fail to refute the strong Cartesian 'substance' dualism. Author is a staunch materialist, so this is a bit of a confessional, in that he is concerned that his considered beliefs aren't just a product of mainstream philosophy culture but rational and scientific thought. Author first starts with a review of the major arguments in favor of materialism. The first major proponents of the view gave precious few arguments in its favor, instead mostly assuming it or 'inveighing against Cartesian dogma'(pg552). The first bona-fide argument author discusses is from Smart, a rather elementary identity theory for mind-body correspondence and then reduction using parsimony. And here author introduces the first main point of the paper: that the use of the concept of parsimony in evaluating competing theories is only available once all other facets of the competing theories have been considered, and "many, nearly all, other things must be equal" before parsimony can be used. Because dualists and materialists are still arguing over a body of evidence (qualia, intension, meaning, etc.) and how it is to be interpreted (or even whether it should be so), "the parsimony argument does not even come in the door until it is agreed we can find nothing to distinguish mental states from neurophysiological ones" (pg553).
The first argument that had a formal structure that was logically valid and left open the question of the actual substance that would occupy a functional-, or causal-, role, was from Armstrong & Lewis (c-fibers firing). Author's first objection is that the first premise, namely that (a priori) [mental state] occupies a causal role in the behavior, tendencies, and dispositions, of a creature is a "culpably good premise for materialists"(pg554). The dualist, according to author, would not accept this at the very outset: a [mental state] is what presents itself to consciousness, the attendant causal roles it plays are a posteriori. The main point for the dualist is that "we know the mind primarily through introspection" (pg554), not through behavior. The second premise, author claims, begs the question by claiming that [mental state] is exhausted by its causal role. In other words, it denies that there could be overdetermination of the causal role by both something physical and something mental. While many may scoff at overdetermination, author then claims that using parsimony to adjudicate is premature (see above). The strategy to hold off parsimony and allow for overdetermination, epiphenomenalism, and other causally-inert dualist theories is repeated often by author (pg555-6). This concluded the dispatching of arguments in favor of materialism.
Most of the rest of the paper then deals with replies to objections to dualism.
1. The "Interaction problem": how can non-matter interact with matter in any way?
Author: Just because there is no good model doesn't mean the objection is fatal. Causality itself is a tough concept to get right, as is determinism. Also, amend dualism to be spatial: it's right behind the eyes, in each brain. This takes away the non-spatial weirdness of dualism.
2. "Excrescencehood": mind-stuff seem to follow no laws and be extraneous to known facts.
Author: this is just a fundamental dualist/materialist disagreement about what's prior in accounting for mental life: is it prediction and behavior or the phenomena and feels? Clearly the dualist will claim the feels are what are important to capture in accounts of the mental. Besides, according to Wilkes, mental ascriptions are used for more than just explanations and prediction.
3. "Laws of Physics": conservation of matter and energy prohibits mental stuff from getting involved.
Author: Weak-form conservation is still compatible with dualism. Strong-form isn't required by physicists. Also, since we allow that the mental is spatial (but not material), the physical conception of space-time isn't violated.
4. "Evolutionary Theory": How could the mental have evolved as adaptive?
Author: nobody believes that all traits must be adaptive. And Churchland's claim that all traits must be physical and evolved from a physical process is question-begging.
5. "Explanatory Impotence": dualism explains little (if anything), while neuroscience explains a "great deal"(pg560).
Author: This is a bad comparison. Dualism competes with materialism, not neuroscience. But of course materialism does underwrite why neuro-facts are relevant to mental-facts. Author claims the dualist both use these facts through using a "transducer" but also capitalize on the neuro-facts being content-poor with respect to mental properties.
6. "Neural Dependence": mental life is dependent on a working neural one.
Author: Use the transducer argument. "Mind-brain interaction may be constant and very intimate" (pg561).
7. "Epistemology of other minds": How could we know about other minds, especially non-spatial ones?
Author: Again, we fixed that part of dualism by making it spatial. So after that fix is applied, this is a perceptual and epistemological problem, not a mind-body one.
8. "Unity and Individuation": How could the mental and the physical both be attached to one brain?
Author: Well, because dualism is interactionist and each mind has causal connections to a particular body. How is this unique relation explained? Well, look to some evolutionary story (aka, hand waive).
9. "The Pairing Problem": How can each mind be paired with each body?
Author: well, by making the mental spatial. Causal explanations may just be "brute" facts, not requiring further analysis (pg562).
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