Parfit, Derek - Ch 4 Further Arguments

04/20/2012

On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 4, Oxford University Press 2011

Subjectivists are committed, according to author, to claim that someone is rational in pursuing a future period of agony, if that is what their ideally informed desires are. This is Case Two (pg83) and is an argument against subjectivism due to the absurdity. A subjectivist cannot argue that this is inconceivable because "we can want what we know will be bad for us." (pg84). Refinement to this by the subjectivist could go as follows:
-There must be a reason people have to hold a desire. Like: B wants to avoid some future agony.

Author replies by framing an example that someone wouldn't want to avoid some agony for instrumental reasons (pg85). A subjectivist might further argue that it is possible to act in accordance with a desire by having a second-order desire to have a first order desire (which one does not currently have) (pg85). Author argues this will not always do for wanting to avoid future agony either, because it might be unavoidable and just thinking about it induces anxiety, which B wants to avoid (pg86).

Author then considers cases where B could avoid the future agony. This would mean that B could have a "desire-based reason" to have the desire to avoid some future agony. This leads to a "rationally self-justifying" fulfill-able desires, which author claims are clearly false (pg87). Author claims that without having reasons to backstop desires, there is "no reason" to desire to avoid agony, or have future periods of happiness (pg87). Author concludes that the notion of reasons underwriting desires ("desire-based reasons") is a contradiction (and infinite regress) to the subjectivist approach (pg88).

Author continues to argue against subjectivism using Case Two, that there is no reason to avoid a future agony, if B desires that future agony (pg89). Author rejects subjectivists who claim an asymmetry between desires to avoid agony and no desires to avoid agony (pg89). This is the All or None Argument: that the subjectivist doesn't get to pick or choose which desires are reason-giving: either they all are or none of them are.

Author claims the only times subjectivist theories seem ok is when they overlap with objective theories of value. Author compares epistemic cases to normative ones (pg92-3). Author rejects that subjectivists even want to know all the facts relevant to their situation, since they would be sneaking in reason-giving facts into deliberation about desires (pg93-4). Author proceeds to claim that wanting being fully informed about desires is incoherent to the subjectivist view (pg95). This is the Incoherence Argument. The idea is that more information would only shed light on the intrinsic features of what is desired, in other words, what facts are truly reason-giving. Since that is an objectivist claim and not a subjectivist one, the subjectivist cannot appeal to it. "Most of us want to have better informed desires or aims because we believe what objective theories claim" (pg96).

Author believes that facts only are reason-giving for value, not for informing us as to the efficacy of our aims or for playing a part in desire creation. Or, rather, author does not admit that there can be any facts that can play a part in desire creation that isn't part of an objectivist account. (pg96). Author discusses a supposed subjectivist (Harry Frankfurt) who he believes is either a covert objectivist or incoherent (pg97-100). Author argues Frankfurt is not a nihilist about objective ends, but a pluralist (pg100).

Author goes back to clarifying the terms used with "best possible" and "better" and "best-for-someone", and so on (pg101-2). According to author, subjectivists can't use "best-for-someone" in any reason-implying sense, since that implies an objective way someone's life will go. Accordingly, subjectivists have no "self-interested" or "moral" reasons (just desires that give reasons). Author considers other ways to use "best-for-someone", using Rawls' thin theory of the good as a lens (pg103). Author considers other ways of evaluating whether one's life will be "best-for-[someone]" (pg105). People can mean:
-greatest sum of happiness minus suffering
-the possible life where all desires are fulfilled (or most are)
Author believes these claims are either tautological (pg105) or does not really help out the subjectivist. The subjectivist is still pegged to the conclusion that B can rationally pursue a fully-informed desire for agony, even if it is not best for B. (pg106)

Author considers versions of the "ought implies can" defense of subjectivism, which says that you cannot be compelled to do something if you are not motivated to do it (pg107-8). In other words, the only way we do anything is through desires, not reason-giving facts. Author does not believe this because it confuses normative reasons with motivating ones.

Lastly, author mentions the Metaphysical Naturalists, who claim that reasons are irreducibly normative, not fact-based, because all facts are scientific. (pg109) Again author believes this conflates motivating reasons with normative ones. Author also claims that this kind of naturalism applies to epistemic reasoning too, thus naturalism's own claims are not "true" in an objective-descriptive manner (pg110).