Parfit, Derek - Ch 9 Merely as a Means

1/6/2012

On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 9, Oxford University Press 2011

This chapter is an examination of Kant's contention, under the Humanity Principle, that it is wrong to treat persons "merely as a means". On the face of it, it is ok to treat someone 'as a means', but perhaps not 'merely' as such. Author suggests as well that there is a distinction between 'doing something to someone to achieve some aim' and 'treating a person as a means'. (pg213) [This distinction is baffling to me.]

The problem with the prohibition against acting in a way that treats someone 'merely as a means' is that it is either too weak or too strong. Author first talks about how it can be too weak: a slave-owner might let his slaves rest during the hottest part of the day, thereby attending to some degree to their well-being or acting according to some weak (but present) moral principle. Thus, his slaves are not treated 'merely' as a means. (pg213) This is not strong enough, so author suggests it is a matter of degree: you can "come close" to treating some 'merely as a means' (MAAM). (pg214)

Author then introduces two new exceptions to the (treating someone) MAAM prohibition: (pg214)
1) treatment of another is guided by a relevant moral standard in a 'sufficiently important' way
2) you would bear a great burden for this other person
Author is not clear what these conditions amount to, and moves on from them to discuss the differences between acting toward someone MAAM, and regarding someone MAAM. (pg215-6) The trouble with a prohibition against acting toward someone MAAM, is that you can keep your promise by saving a child's life, for the sake of keeping the promise. Thus, you act toward the child MAAM of keeping your promise. If acting MAAM was impermissible, you could not save the child's life. Thus it might be necessary to add:
3) you do not act MAAM if your acts will not harm the other person
Author argues that this will not stop some acts MAAM because of the use of expedient solutions. Perhaps Green would want to act toward Gold in a harmful way, but decides the most expedient is to be kind. This act might still be wrong because Green treats Gold MAAM, but it abides by 3). (pg217) [This may mean that 3) should be thrown away.]

Author tries to revise the principle again, suggesting the provision about avoiding harm is built into the MAAM prohibition: It is wrong to treat someone MAAM (or do so by degree) if the act harms that person. (pg217) Author then considers the usual kill-one-to-save-five trolley problems: (pg218)
Lifeboat (one lifeboat, save either 5 people or 1)
Tunnel (divert a train from hitting 5 and instead it hits 1)
Bridge (operate a trap door to let 1 person fall in front of the train, saving 5)

In all of these cases, someone is harmed in the process of saving 5. However, only in Bridge could the case really be made that one acted MAAM. (pg219) Author tries to figure out whether the prohibition against MAAM would/should stop the operation of the trap door in Bridge. Author argues that because in all cases it is rational for the 1 to consent to saving the 5, including giving up his own life, then the MAAM prohibition is superseded by the Consent Principle, thus making all cases morally permissible. (pg220) Curiously, author argues that the Consent Principle overrides the MAAM prohibition, if someone gives consent. (pg220-1)

The above outcome seems to make the MAAM prohibition very weak. Author considers the "Standard View" of the MAAM prohibition: (pg221)
Harm a person, without her consent, as a means of achieving some aim: this is prohibited as treating someone MAAM.
Author argues that this is wrong in three ways:
a: you may not be treating a person MAAM (instead treating their bodies?)
b: you may be treating them as a means, but not merely
c: even if so, this act might not be impermissible

Author explores the case of injuring someone in self-defense, making it thereby impossible for her to continue to pursue you (breaking Brown's leg when she is running after you intending to kill you). This is an illustration of (a). (pg222)

Author then discusses a complex example where you could save your child's life (from an earthquake) by crushing Black's toe. Crush another of Black's toes and you can save your own life too. However, you believe it is wrong to save your own life this way. Thus, you act according to some moral principle (1), and you endure great harm for Black's sake (2) (see above for these provisos) Thus you treat Black as a means, but not MAAM. This is an illustration of (b). Author considers further refinement to the MAAM prohibition but argues it will not do the trick to bolster the "Standard View" or make Bridge wrong. (pg223-4)

Author considers the case that deception is wrong because it violates the MAAM prohibition, but offers a counter-example to it (pg225)-- deception is wrong for other reasons, not for the MAAM prohibition. Author then discusses whether Kant uses the MAAM language in some special way, so that we are using lay terms for philosophically technical terms-- author finds this unconvincing. (pg226-7)

Though it may be wrong to regard someone MAAM, it is not wrong to act in a way that treats someone MAAM. This was shown in the egoist/promise-keeper-saves-a-child case. The Standard View needs revision that stipulates that it is ok to harm someone as a means for achieving some end, as long as that harm is not too great, and there is no other way to do it (pg229) (Because without this revision, you can't crush Black's toe to save your child).

When considering this harm, author argues that the factors for the decision might include whether someone is treated as a means. But adding 'merely' does not factor into the decision about making the act wrong. (pg230) And furthermore, author cannot find good enough reason to consider an act wrong when adding that someone is being used as a means. We know it is wrong to regard someone as a means, and wrong to regard someone as a mere thing (not a person) (pg226), but that does not prohibit acts that treat people as means, and adding 'merely' does not change the situation.