05/04/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 6, Oxford University Press 2011
Author is firmly in the objective reasons theory now, comparing different kinds. Author starts with a discussion of Rational Egoism and Rational Impartialism being combined into Sidgwick's dualism, which states that it is rational to be either impartial or egoistic in any circumstance (pg131). Author believes that for Sidgwick it is the incomparability of egoistic and impartial reasons that means either are rational. This is rooted (for Sidgwick) in the separateness of persons and the duality of standpoints (pg133). Author believes that some reasons, even across kinds, are comparable (pg132) and uses an example of trying to build a building and account for both aesthetics and economics. Author then takes on Sidgwick's reasoning by enumerating it (pg134) and then rejecting portions of it.
Sidgwick:
(A) There are two standpoints which both give reasons for act, personal and impartial.
(B-C) From both perspectives, different reasons are supreme
(D) Comparison between kinds of reasons requires a third point-of-view
(E) There is no such point of view
Conclusion: Both personal and impartial views are rational
Author first rejects (A), then (D), then (B) by giving the example of saving yourself the pain of the prick of a pin versus the death of 1M people (pg135). Next author attacks the solely first-personal basis for personal action, by using the claim that the close ties we have with others give us personal reasons to care about the well-being of others. This is underwritten not by our personal identity, but by our "various psychological relations between ourselves as we are now and our future selves [and psychological relations with others]" (pg136). Author also argues we have impartial reasons to care about everyone's well-being.
Author partially agrees with Sidgwick in that different kinds of reasons are not fully comparable, though they are imprecisely so. Author unveils the Wide Value-Based Objective View here (pg137). Author argues we all have an impartial reason to alleviate suffering, wherever we can, though our relationship to our pain is different from our relationship to a stranger's pain (pg138-9).
One problem is the imprecise comparability of person-neutral and person-relative reasons. Can person-neutral reasons override person-relative ones only when hugely magnified? Author is inclined to disagree, saying that even a one-to-one swap of life (First Shipwreck) would be rational. The result is Wide Dualism, where we can be permitted to act in accord with our own well-being, or be permitted to be impartial; either reasoning is rational. (pg140)
Author next considers "the profoundest problem", where self-interested reasons and impartial reasons (the obligation to do one's duty) conflict. In short, a conflict between Moral Rationalism and Rational Egoism. Sidgwick tried to encompass the dualism by claiming that in cases of conflict, reason gives no guidance (pg142-3). This is really two problems (at least), according to author. First is the moralist's problem: in cases of conflict, people have good reason to act wrongly (in self-interest rather than morally). The other is the rationalist's problem: reason should give us guidance in these cases, or else reason is not our only (or ultimate) guide. (pg143-4)
Author discusses norms and different kinds of rules, lumping morality in with other kinds of norms. The problem is when multiple rules give conflicting guides. The solution is to find an impartial criterion for judgment, which author takes to be reason (pg146). Reason, according to author, "is wider, and more fundamental" (pg147). However, it isn't the case simply that reason is more important in the reason-implying sense (that would be circular). Instead, reason is the end of justification. (pg148)
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