11/30/2007
The Philosophical Review, Vol 110 No 1 Jan 2001
This is largely a work of interpretation and explanation of Leibniz's position on the mind as compared to Descartes. Author observes that many lump Leibniz together with Descartes-- both rationalists claiming the soul is immaterial and immortal, etc. However, Leibniz takes the view that perception is primary to the mind, while Descartes is of the view that consciousness is. While this might seem trivial, it isn't; much of the distinctions Leibniz has can, in some ways, be linked to our more modern pictures of the mind, while Descartes is often the whipping boy of the wrong approaches.
Author juxtaposes the two thinkers as Descartes and his followers vs Leibniz. Often when Descartes is unclear on exactly his position, author uses many of his 'followers' like Louis de la Forge, Nicolas Malenbranche, Antoine Arnauld. As far as theory of mind goes, the Cartesian picture is that it is a thinking, i.e. conscious, thing. Nothing in the mind without being conscious-- or else how could it be in the mind? This leaves thinkers open to questions about memories, unconscious sensations, etc. Cartesians claim that these are just unremembered, not unconscious. The conscious aspect of the mind isn't a second-order perceptual ability-- it is intrinsic to the mind itself. The Cartesians do have a concept of 'reflective' consciousness, which is the consideration of a sensation, but still there is 'phenomenal consciousness', which is pervasive in the mind. (pg 36-7)
A second issue author discusses about Descartes is how much ideas/thoughts/conscious episodes are representational. Author claims Descartes is unclear and his followers are divided-- some claiming that it is always representational, others that ideas are modifications of the mind of the thinker, therefore not necessarily representational. (pg 37-9). Either way, it is consciousness, not representation, that is essential to the mind. For the Cartesian, author claims, sensations are: (pg 46-7)
1) Simple
2) Conscious
3) Ineffable or inexplicable
4) Stirred up by motions in bodies but
5) Do not resemble any bodily motions and
6) Do not represent anything bodily
This 6) is included because what we have in the mind doesn't seem to correspond to what is external, though sometimes Descartes and his followers say instead that they are 'confused' representations. (pg 48-50) Author points out some of the difficulty as traceable to missing a distinction between something 'presentationally representing' and 'referentially representing', the later needing to be transparent while the former does not.
The Leibnitzian picture is that perceptual representation (unclear, indistinct sensations) is intrinsic to the mind, not consciousness. Of course, for Leibniz consciousness is a second-order apparatus brought to bear on mental activities-- this is a different picture from the Cartesians. (pg 53-5) If perception is essential, then how does consciousness come into the picture? Author claims that once perceptions become more 'distinct' and are honed into 'sensations', they arise to our 'notice' and we become conscious of them. (pg 56-7) At work here is one of Leibniz's metaphysical commitments of continuity of change-- that nothing has big changes without smaller ones underlying it (pg 45).
Further discussion is about whether sensations are complex or simple. Author interprets Leibniz as saying that sensations are complexes of 'smaller perceptions'-- 'petites perceptions' that appear (confusedly or con-fusedly) as simple.(pg 61-66)
Some may say that Leibniz is saddled with placing the mind-body problem into the mind, instead of solving it. Instead, author claims, there are many good outcomes of this that avoid the mind-far-away-from-body that the Cartesians have. (pg 70)
11/30/07
11/16/07
Moller, Dan - Love And Death
11/16/2007
The Journal of Philosophy, June 2007
This is a relatively quick paper that discusses recent findings in psychology that people tend to recover relatively quickly after the death of their spouse. There are a number that don't, but in general there is remarkable 'resiliency' in the face of losing a loved one (the discussion is mostly about romantic love). This contradicts the conventional wisdom/folk psychology about grieving. Author considers this ability to have a brief grieving period and then relatively quick return to regular emotive states the 'Adaptive Theory' (pg 304). The Adaptive Theory:
The rationality of activity is evaluated according to whatever propensity that activity has toward promoting a person's interests.
One major concern about these findings is a lack of care for another(carelessness). Another concern is a lack of importance to or valuing of others (shallowness). Author wants to show these two as distinct. Both commonly use conditionals or counterfactuals, but author claims that it is clear we care for others because of the enormously costly things we will do for them while they are alive.(pg 307-8) Author discusses instead that these findings threaten the concept of importance, perhaps because the concept includes something like 'I am not replaceable'. (pg 308-10)
Another concern about these findings is that we may not be able to 'properly' grieve, or somehow not be able to 'digest' our loss. This is because the resilience factor goes to work before, perhaps, we are able to fully figure out what we have gone through. There is some evidence that we need emotions in order to complete our cognition of fraught experiences. (pg 311-2)
Author finishes paper (section III) by arguing that this is some sort of 'middle way' between complete shallowness and unending grief.
Note: In this paper there is an interesting summary of our errors in 'affective forecasting' and how readily we return to an affective 'baseline' within 3 months (approx) after good or bad events occur. (pg 305-7)
The Journal of Philosophy, June 2007
This is a relatively quick paper that discusses recent findings in psychology that people tend to recover relatively quickly after the death of their spouse. There are a number that don't, but in general there is remarkable 'resiliency' in the face of losing a loved one (the discussion is mostly about romantic love). This contradicts the conventional wisdom/folk psychology about grieving. Author considers this ability to have a brief grieving period and then relatively quick return to regular emotive states the 'Adaptive Theory' (pg 304). The Adaptive Theory:
The rationality of activity is evaluated according to whatever propensity that activity has toward promoting a person's interests.
One major concern about these findings is a lack of care for another(carelessness). Another concern is a lack of importance to or valuing of others (shallowness). Author wants to show these two as distinct. Both commonly use conditionals or counterfactuals, but author claims that it is clear we care for others because of the enormously costly things we will do for them while they are alive.(pg 307-8) Author discusses instead that these findings threaten the concept of importance, perhaps because the concept includes something like 'I am not replaceable'. (pg 308-10)
Another concern about these findings is that we may not be able to 'properly' grieve, or somehow not be able to 'digest' our loss. This is because the resilience factor goes to work before, perhaps, we are able to fully figure out what we have gone through. There is some evidence that we need emotions in order to complete our cognition of fraught experiences. (pg 311-2)
Author finishes paper (section III) by arguing that this is some sort of 'middle way' between complete shallowness and unending grief.
Note: In this paper there is an interesting summary of our errors in 'affective forecasting' and how readily we return to an affective 'baseline' within 3 months (approx) after good or bad events occur. (pg 305-7)
11/9/07
MacAllen, Susan - 'Muslim Immigrants--a Quandary'
11/09/2007
FaithFreedom.org July 25, 2007
This is a very short paper discussing the problems Denmark has faced with its muslim population. Denmark has traditionally had a 'cradle-to-grave' welfare system and a very generous immigrant welfare system designed to give immigrants many benefits and encourage 'multiculturalism' and 'inclusiveness'. This has been very ineffectual with the growing muslim immigrant population, and instead they have taken social services and been very hostile toward Danish culture.
Denmark has seen upticks in crime, murder, etc., mostly due to the muslim population. This, coupled with large welfare spending on a relatively small muslim immigrant population, has led to the election of a very conservative government that has placed exceedingly high bars for immigrants to become citizens.
FaithFreedom.org July 25, 2007
This is a very short paper discussing the problems Denmark has faced with its muslim population. Denmark has traditionally had a 'cradle-to-grave' welfare system and a very generous immigrant welfare system designed to give immigrants many benefits and encourage 'multiculturalism' and 'inclusiveness'. This has been very ineffectual with the growing muslim immigrant population, and instead they have taken social services and been very hostile toward Danish culture.
Denmark has seen upticks in crime, murder, etc., mostly due to the muslim population. This, coupled with large welfare spending on a relatively small muslim immigrant population, has led to the election of a very conservative government that has placed exceedingly high bars for immigrants to become citizens.
11/2/07
Chadha, Monima - No Speech, Never Mind!
11/02/2007
Philosophical Psychology Vol 20 No 5 October 2007
The primary goal of this paper is to refute Donald Davidson's old claim that only language users have beliefs. In the early part of the paper, author rehearses Davidson's discussion from 1982 onward, culminating in a summary of Davidson's main argument: (pg 644)
Premise 1 (P1): Only interpreters can have the concept of belief
Premise 2 (P2): Only creatures who have the concept of belief can have beliefs
Conclusion: Only interpreters can have beliefs
For Davidson, interpretation is necessary for the concept of belief because a belief is distinct from an incorrigible representation, and an interpreter needs to know this. Interpretation functions because it charitably assumes that the speaker means something true, but still may be wrong (or lying). To have the concept of belief, one must grasp the subjective/objective distinction. But how does one grasp such a thing if one isn't involved in the 'social activity of interpreting the utterances of others'? (pg 645). Davidson claims that other sorts of behavior modification are insufficient to show subjective/objective distinction-- it can only be done with language users in a social context-- only be done by interpreters. This is the argument for showing with P1 is necessary.
Author points out that Davidson's argument for P2 actually shows that P2 is sufficient for belief, not that it is necessary. Davidson admits this, but then challenges interlocutors to come up with another way that one can discover the subjective/objective distinction without having the concept of belief. Since none so far have answered the challenge, Davidson concludes it is necessary too. (pg 646)
Interlude: Davidson suggested in "Thought and Talk" that he had another argument for P1, using the opacity of substitution for beliefs. The rational explanation for the teleology of a belief is fine grained, using language only to get the distinctions. Non-linguistic creatures will fail to get these fine-grained intentional states into their systems of interpretation, so they will be rather un-belief-like. This has been challenged by other writers as being too rational-teleological and not functional-teleological. (pg 646-7)
Author will consider a different strategy: she will attempt to provide another way that non-linguistic creatures can have the subjective/objective distinction without having the concept of belief. This is primarily established using case studies of other primates. Author does the work to establish another kind of mental state, 'metacognition'. Metacognition differs from higher-order intentional states because it doesn't go upward in the intentional. This sort of metacognition monitors other mental states or processes and takes part in their modification, but does not have higher-order accessibility ('the concept of belief') (pg 649). The key here for the author is to position this metacognitive function in terms of monitoring and controlling information flow from perception and instincts or, roughly, desires. Author shows that chimpanzees and bonobos often will interpret the behavior of their conspecifics, putting them into the category of interpreters. (pg 650-1) Often primates will also engage in deception, which goes a significant way to showing they are making use of the subjective/objective distinction. So a non-linguistic animal might not have the concept of truth or falsity but still have metacognitive normative mechanism that amends false beliefs and affirms true ones, at least within certain contexts (they aren't context-free, like we think our rationality is!). (pg 653).
Author main point is that the interpretive capacities of some non-linguistic animals gives license to ascribe to them mental states, and they don't need the concept of belief to be interpreters. They need instead to have a context-dependent normative metacognitive ability to monitor and control their belief nets.
Philosophical Psychology Vol 20 No 5 October 2007
The primary goal of this paper is to refute Donald Davidson's old claim that only language users have beliefs. In the early part of the paper, author rehearses Davidson's discussion from 1982 onward, culminating in a summary of Davidson's main argument: (pg 644)
Premise 1 (P1): Only interpreters can have the concept of belief
Premise 2 (P2): Only creatures who have the concept of belief can have beliefs
Conclusion: Only interpreters can have beliefs
For Davidson, interpretation is necessary for the concept of belief because a belief is distinct from an incorrigible representation, and an interpreter needs to know this. Interpretation functions because it charitably assumes that the speaker means something true, but still may be wrong (or lying). To have the concept of belief, one must grasp the subjective/objective distinction. But how does one grasp such a thing if one isn't involved in the 'social activity of interpreting the utterances of others'? (pg 645). Davidson claims that other sorts of behavior modification are insufficient to show subjective/objective distinction-- it can only be done with language users in a social context-- only be done by interpreters. This is the argument for showing with P1 is necessary.
Author points out that Davidson's argument for P2 actually shows that P2 is sufficient for belief, not that it is necessary. Davidson admits this, but then challenges interlocutors to come up with another way that one can discover the subjective/objective distinction without having the concept of belief. Since none so far have answered the challenge, Davidson concludes it is necessary too. (pg 646)
Interlude: Davidson suggested in "Thought and Talk" that he had another argument for P1, using the opacity of substitution for beliefs. The rational explanation for the teleology of a belief is fine grained, using language only to get the distinctions. Non-linguistic creatures will fail to get these fine-grained intentional states into their systems of interpretation, so they will be rather un-belief-like. This has been challenged by other writers as being too rational-teleological and not functional-teleological. (pg 646-7)
Author will consider a different strategy: she will attempt to provide another way that non-linguistic creatures can have the subjective/objective distinction without having the concept of belief. This is primarily established using case studies of other primates. Author does the work to establish another kind of mental state, 'metacognition'. Metacognition differs from higher-order intentional states because it doesn't go upward in the intentional. This sort of metacognition monitors other mental states or processes and takes part in their modification, but does not have higher-order accessibility ('the concept of belief') (pg 649). The key here for the author is to position this metacognitive function in terms of monitoring and controlling information flow from perception and instincts or, roughly, desires. Author shows that chimpanzees and bonobos often will interpret the behavior of their conspecifics, putting them into the category of interpreters. (pg 650-1) Often primates will also engage in deception, which goes a significant way to showing they are making use of the subjective/objective distinction. So a non-linguistic animal might not have the concept of truth or falsity but still have metacognitive normative mechanism that amends false beliefs and affirms true ones, at least within certain contexts (they aren't context-free, like we think our rationality is!). (pg 653).
Author main point is that the interpretive capacities of some non-linguistic animals gives license to ascribe to them mental states, and they don't need the concept of belief to be interpreters. They need instead to have a context-dependent normative metacognitive ability to monitor and control their belief nets.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
