06/25/2010
The Journal of Philosophy, November 2009
This clearly written article takes on an old problem in philosophy: the trouble with perversity and human will. Author starts with a discussion of Kant's conception that it wasn't possible for a human to have a wicked will, that is, something that has a 'clear-eyed opposition' to moral law. Yet this is countered by St Augustine, who claims to have stolen pears from a tree for no sake other than the sake of being wicked, that is, not for profit, vengeance, or other reasons. The real trouble here is metaphysical-- human subjects take their actions to be intentional in that they aim at what they consider to be a 'good', not a 'bad'. (pg614) (Yet it is important to remember that "the good" is widely viewed to be different according to different perspectives.) This is considered by the author to be the 'Classical View', which considers intentional action essentially rational, a joining of beliefs and desires.
Author makes a case of perverse actions as an actual category of action, not just a case that can be finessed by the Classical View. (pg616-7) The thought here is that pure malice, spite, callousness and so on are intelligible to us, yet given the Classical View they should be more foreign than they are. But they are not, they are not insane actions but sensible-- but not according to the Classical View. Author's thesis is this: the Classical View must be reformed to be true broadly speaking but not necessarily true of any one particular action. (617-8)
Author review the Davidsonian conception of intentional actions, that they are a special joining of Beliefs and Desires such that there is a a rational connection between the desire and the set of beliefs that enable its fulfillment. (pg618) The problem for Davidson is that there can be a causal relationship that has all the right beliefs and desires but somehow fail to be intentional action. Take the case of the climber who, unnerved by the thought of releasing himself of his companion, releases his companion, though he does so unintentionally.
Author tries to mend this by suggesting that what is missing is an overall goal, a kind of guidance according to a concern. This overall guidance toward a final destination is considered invaluable when entering into the feedback loop of making actions in the world and adjusting to the effects such actions produce-- the guidance is required to make adjustments in the belief and desire framework that underwrites the overall end. Interestingly, author suggests we have immediate true knowledge about our intentions since they are action-oriented rather than introspective knowledge (pg619). "The distinctively intentional character of an action depends on the way its performance is informed by a sensitivity to the world construed in terms of some distinctive array of resources and dangers, relative to which our action may be done in a better or worse manner." (pg620) Author also considers this requirement one that allows the actor to consider herself as accomplishing the 'same thing' even as her route to it changes according to changing circumstances.
The addition to intentional action author offers is that it must have a 'point' or 'guiding concern' that 'orients' the actor in an 'open-ended way'. Author then reviews the case for perverse action, taking on (in opposition) Joseph Raz's attempts to subsume perversity under the standard CV. Raz offers a high bar for cases of genuine perversity: the actor must justify it without any reference to evaluative judgments. (Interpreting all evaluative judgments as aiming toward a 'good' rather than a 'bad'.) Author denies this high bar, instead suggesting that it is possible to take a 'rich-textured', 'structured' approach to a perverse activity like eating excrement. (pg624) Notice however that this is under the author's newly reformed CV, which includes an overall concern or goal that reacts to changing environmental conditions to effectively complete the project of excrement eating. (pg623-4)
The requirement of overall concerns or basic pointedness in one intentional action can, presumably, accommodate cases of genuine perversity. However, author argues that once such values become the standard norm for an actor, it seems the actor has subsumed perversity for her own particular understanding of the 'good'. (pg626) The trouble for the perverse here is one of justification-- the lack of justification that can be provided in a social, or linguistic context. Author scaffolds a claim that the pointedness or guidance in intentional action should be 'two-dimensional', that is, have the responsiveness both to physical challenges but also to social challenges (for justification, assistance, etc) as well. The perverse cannot justify their concerns socially, in that their actions cannot be well-formulated into a 'long-term resolve'. And if it lacks justification, then the actor who wants to be perverse as a general norm will soon lose sight of her own goals. (pg627). This fatal flaw to perversity as a general principle upholds the reformed Classical View, though it admits to singularities.
6/18/10
Dworkin, Ronald - A Decision That Threatens Democracy
06/18/2010
The New York Review, May 13 2010
This is a relatively scholarly article written by a well-known constitutional democracy philosopher regarding the Citizens United v Federal Election Commission case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States by a 5-4 decision in January 2010. The decision in the case generally reversed a longstanding tradition of restricting or barring non-media corporate entities (and other non-natural persons like unions) from most forms of campaigning during an election. Author gives some background for the case in part 1. Most importantly, the majority opinion considered this a free speech issue, using the First Amendment of the US Constitution as the basis for granting corporations and unions the right to directly advertise their opinions prior to an election.
In part 2, author uses his familiar argument about the language in the US Constitution: it tries to capture abstract concepts in political morality, and as such the principles behind the language-- the concepts of appropriate political morality-- are the ultimate appeal that judges should rely on. Thus there should be a theory, or number of different theories, that give reasons to underwrite the First Amendment. Author considers them:
1-The need for an informed electorate
2-The desire to 'protect the status, dignity, and moral development of individual citizens as equal partners in the political process'.
3-The desire to maintain honesty and transparency in government, e.g. not allowing the government to restrict speech
In each case, author considers the Citizens decision not only to fail to satisfy these desidirata, but to work in opposition to them.
In the case of 1, the need for an informed electorate, the idea here might be that we would hope that including corporations in the political process will uncover new ideas. Except that author declares that corporations can't think. Instead, it will be the ideas of the managers of the corporations, who can contribute to PACs on their own and therefore will just be adding to the volume of ideas, not new ones. It could also lead to a kind of double counting, or at least the impression of greater support for an idea than there is, due to the flow of money that corporations could level into the marketplace of ideas. (pg63) More importantly, at the root of campaign finance reform isn't the idea of "equality" in elections for their own sake. Instead, equality is encouraged for the sake of creating a marketplace of ideas where many can be heard. This is important to protect the "integrity of political debate"; author likens it to having a debate where time speaking is auctioned to the highest bidder. (pg64)
In the case of 2, the desire to respect the dignity and moral development of citizens-- the idea of protecting self-expression-- author claims there isn't a way the Citizens decision could support this since corporations aren't the kinds of things that have dignity or moral development.
In the case of 3, the desire to limit tyranny or corruption in government, author believes there aren't any positives to the Citizens decision, and it opens the door for more corruption, not less. For instance, it allows corporations whose interests are threatened by legislation to in turn threaten legislators by suggesting a flood of negative campaigning at the next election cycle. (pg64)
In section 3, author discusses the previous cases that had supposedly built a precedent for restricting corporate speech, Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and McConnell v Federal Election Commission, specifically taking apart the argument from the majority opinion's author, Anthony Kennedy. Kennedy had used two other cases to argue there was conflicting precedent, for instance in Buckley v Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti.
In section 4, author suggests some legislative fixes that might be within the scope of the Citizens decision, for instance by restricting corporations that are foreign-owned (or foreign-owned subsidiaries), or recipients of TARP monies. [What about corporations that receive any government contracts?]
The New York Review, May 13 2010
This is a relatively scholarly article written by a well-known constitutional democracy philosopher regarding the Citizens United v Federal Election Commission case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States by a 5-4 decision in January 2010. The decision in the case generally reversed a longstanding tradition of restricting or barring non-media corporate entities (and other non-natural persons like unions) from most forms of campaigning during an election. Author gives some background for the case in part 1. Most importantly, the majority opinion considered this a free speech issue, using the First Amendment of the US Constitution as the basis for granting corporations and unions the right to directly advertise their opinions prior to an election.
In part 2, author uses his familiar argument about the language in the US Constitution: it tries to capture abstract concepts in political morality, and as such the principles behind the language-- the concepts of appropriate political morality-- are the ultimate appeal that judges should rely on. Thus there should be a theory, or number of different theories, that give reasons to underwrite the First Amendment. Author considers them:
1-The need for an informed electorate
2-The desire to 'protect the status, dignity, and moral development of individual citizens as equal partners in the political process'.
3-The desire to maintain honesty and transparency in government, e.g. not allowing the government to restrict speech
In each case, author considers the Citizens decision not only to fail to satisfy these desidirata, but to work in opposition to them.
In the case of 1, the need for an informed electorate, the idea here might be that we would hope that including corporations in the political process will uncover new ideas. Except that author declares that corporations can't think. Instead, it will be the ideas of the managers of the corporations, who can contribute to PACs on their own and therefore will just be adding to the volume of ideas, not new ones. It could also lead to a kind of double counting, or at least the impression of greater support for an idea than there is, due to the flow of money that corporations could level into the marketplace of ideas. (pg63) More importantly, at the root of campaign finance reform isn't the idea of "equality" in elections for their own sake. Instead, equality is encouraged for the sake of creating a marketplace of ideas where many can be heard. This is important to protect the "integrity of political debate"; author likens it to having a debate where time speaking is auctioned to the highest bidder. (pg64)
In the case of 2, the desire to respect the dignity and moral development of citizens-- the idea of protecting self-expression-- author claims there isn't a way the Citizens decision could support this since corporations aren't the kinds of things that have dignity or moral development.
In the case of 3, the desire to limit tyranny or corruption in government, author believes there aren't any positives to the Citizens decision, and it opens the door for more corruption, not less. For instance, it allows corporations whose interests are threatened by legislation to in turn threaten legislators by suggesting a flood of negative campaigning at the next election cycle. (pg64)
In section 3, author discusses the previous cases that had supposedly built a precedent for restricting corporate speech, Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and McConnell v Federal Election Commission, specifically taking apart the argument from the majority opinion's author, Anthony Kennedy. Kennedy had used two other cases to argue there was conflicting precedent, for instance in Buckley v Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti.
In section 4, author suggests some legislative fixes that might be within the scope of the Citizens decision, for instance by restricting corporations that are foreign-owned (or foreign-owned subsidiaries), or recipients of TARP monies. [What about corporations that receive any government contracts?]
6/11/10
Toulmin, Stephen - The Tyranny of Principles
06/11/2010
The Hastings Center Report, Vol 11, No 6 Dec 1981
This article may be dated but is still relevant today. It discusses the phenomenon of mistrust for the government, or specifically for administration and for benefit dispensaries, and also focuses on the traditional divide between equality and equity, which author argues people have begun to see as the same social concept.
Author begins by decrying the level of debate that takes place on matters of public policy, especially the use of hard-lined 'principles' in an effort to combat profligate relativism. Author claims that for many difficult questions, there is a need for case-by-case discussion and a weighing of relative merits. Author especially targets as a problem the 'revival of tyrannical absolutism' (pg31) and tries to trace the social origins of our current legal system. Author believes that they underlie the problems that large, unrelated modern societies face regarding the law as a system of rules. Author first draws on three observations:
1) Author took part in a US Congress task force for determining the ethical treatment of human test subjects in medical research, along with scientists and other moral leaders. He was struck with how much agreement they could reach, yet when asked about the principles that underwrote their conclusions, each member gave different reasons. Conclusion: principles have to do with non-moral commitments.
2) Author notices the abortion debate is usually portrayed in the public sphere as a fight between pro-choice and pro-life principles, without the more 'temperate' approach that these are tough issues which may require compromises and weighing.
3) Author noticed the distribution of social benefits, in this case ones for the poor and needy, have become increasingly bureaucratic and allow for little variation on a case-by-case basis. What seems to be worse is the poor understanding by the public about the alternative to this problem-- the solution suggested by the TV reporter is to create an even deeper system of rules, rather than the (perhaps forgotten?) alternative of allowing for more discretion and judgment in the dispensation. (pg31-2)
Author goes back to the cradle of the rule of law, the Roman civil society. In Rome's first 300 years or so, disputes were handled by pontiffs in an arbitration manner, not administrators in a rule-application manner. This was possible due mostly to the shared culture, tradition, and small-scale aspects of the society. As Rome grew so did the disputes, which was taxing on the pontiffs-- they hired junior ones and charged them with more rule-like guidance. Further conquest and governance of peoples with different traditions and concepts of fairness meant the need to create more rule-like laws. Author considers this the beginning of the separation between equitable results, which may have been reached through pontification, consideration, wisdom and taking the particulars of a case into account, and equal results, which relied on the (semi) uniform application of rules and legal procedures. (pg33)
Author brings out a distinction in settling disputes:
-An Equitable outcome: often done with care and under the assumption of a continuing relationship that should be preserved. Tolstoy (author uses examples from Anna Karenina) considered this the only system of ethics worth having.
-An Equal outcome: used to support the rights of 'strangers' (pg34-5), and exemplified by our current level of rules and regulations in administration. Author also points to the legal concept of the adversarial system, used in procedural justice to come to a fair outcome but can be so psychologically traumatic that afterwards neither party wants to engage the other, and has 'no stake in one another's future' (pg35).
Author does acknowledge the potential for abuse in the 'equitable' system, and also takes some time considering the merits of the large-scale nationalizing of charitable causes like welfare, that used to be instituted primarily by parochial institutions.
Author's theory is that 'a system of law consisting wholly of rules would treat all parties coming before it in the ways appropriate to strangers. By contrast, in legal issues that arise between parties who wish to continue as close associates on an intimate or familiar level, the demands of equality and rule conformity lose their central place.' (pg36)
The Hastings Center Report, Vol 11, No 6 Dec 1981
This article may be dated but is still relevant today. It discusses the phenomenon of mistrust for the government, or specifically for administration and for benefit dispensaries, and also focuses on the traditional divide between equality and equity, which author argues people have begun to see as the same social concept.
Author begins by decrying the level of debate that takes place on matters of public policy, especially the use of hard-lined 'principles' in an effort to combat profligate relativism. Author claims that for many difficult questions, there is a need for case-by-case discussion and a weighing of relative merits. Author especially targets as a problem the 'revival of tyrannical absolutism' (pg31) and tries to trace the social origins of our current legal system. Author believes that they underlie the problems that large, unrelated modern societies face regarding the law as a system of rules. Author first draws on three observations:
1) Author took part in a US Congress task force for determining the ethical treatment of human test subjects in medical research, along with scientists and other moral leaders. He was struck with how much agreement they could reach, yet when asked about the principles that underwrote their conclusions, each member gave different reasons. Conclusion: principles have to do with non-moral commitments.
2) Author notices the abortion debate is usually portrayed in the public sphere as a fight between pro-choice and pro-life principles, without the more 'temperate' approach that these are tough issues which may require compromises and weighing.
3) Author noticed the distribution of social benefits, in this case ones for the poor and needy, have become increasingly bureaucratic and allow for little variation on a case-by-case basis. What seems to be worse is the poor understanding by the public about the alternative to this problem-- the solution suggested by the TV reporter is to create an even deeper system of rules, rather than the (perhaps forgotten?) alternative of allowing for more discretion and judgment in the dispensation. (pg31-2)
Author goes back to the cradle of the rule of law, the Roman civil society. In Rome's first 300 years or so, disputes were handled by pontiffs in an arbitration manner, not administrators in a rule-application manner. This was possible due mostly to the shared culture, tradition, and small-scale aspects of the society. As Rome grew so did the disputes, which was taxing on the pontiffs-- they hired junior ones and charged them with more rule-like guidance. Further conquest and governance of peoples with different traditions and concepts of fairness meant the need to create more rule-like laws. Author considers this the beginning of the separation between equitable results, which may have been reached through pontification, consideration, wisdom and taking the particulars of a case into account, and equal results, which relied on the (semi) uniform application of rules and legal procedures. (pg33)
Author brings out a distinction in settling disputes:
-An Equitable outcome: often done with care and under the assumption of a continuing relationship that should be preserved. Tolstoy (author uses examples from Anna Karenina) considered this the only system of ethics worth having.
-An Equal outcome: used to support the rights of 'strangers' (pg34-5), and exemplified by our current level of rules and regulations in administration. Author also points to the legal concept of the adversarial system, used in procedural justice to come to a fair outcome but can be so psychologically traumatic that afterwards neither party wants to engage the other, and has 'no stake in one another's future' (pg35).
Author does acknowledge the potential for abuse in the 'equitable' system, and also takes some time considering the merits of the large-scale nationalizing of charitable causes like welfare, that used to be instituted primarily by parochial institutions.
Author's theory is that 'a system of law consisting wholly of rules would treat all parties coming before it in the ways appropriate to strangers. By contrast, in legal issues that arise between parties who wish to continue as close associates on an intimate or familiar level, the demands of equality and rule conformity lose their central place.' (pg36)
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