Parfit, Derek - Ch 11 Free Will and Desert

01/27/2012

On What Matters, Vol 1Ch 11, Oxford University Press 2011

In this chapter author goes about showing that Kant's conception of determinism is too strict to allow for free choice, or rather choices made based on reasons. For Kant, morality is possible only if free will is, and free will is not within the world of space-time, because that is the world where determinism reigns (pg258-9). The most valuable premise for Kant here is the 'ought implies can' premise, where a presupposition of what one ought to do is what one can do. If determinism makes it so one cannot do anything other than what she is, through causal forces, fated to do, then 'ought' is destroyed because 'can' is. (pg259-60) This is the incompatibilist view.

Author argues that there is a compatibilist way of understanding 'can', not in a 'categorical' sense (the actual world could have been different), but in a 'hypothetical' sense (this world could have been slightly different, thus a different outcome). (pg260) This compatibilist view gives space for agents to have acted differently, based on decision making and evaluating past actions (pg261). The reason Kant does not see this is because, according to author, he conflates fatalism with determinism. (pg261-2) Author claims that the compatibilist view of freedom is all that is necessary to underwrite morality (pg263).

The next discussion is an extension of the previous one, because Kant believes that part of morality is the desert of suffering because of to moral turpitude. Kant says that if all actions are 'merely events in space-time', then we could not deserve to suffer for wrongdoing. Author twists his premise to affirm the antecedent and also affirm the consequent. (pg264) Author wants to keep compatibilism about choice but reject compatibilism about desert. (pg265) Author interestingly talks about the search for reasons for action, eventually ending in an ultimate reason (pg266).

One of Kant's arguments for being an incompatibilist about desert is that how we are depends on our actions and decisions in prior versions of ourselves, which were determined by prior decisions, and so on, back to our very creation, for which we were not responsible. (pg267-8) Author affirms this, but denies Kant's later claim that since we do deserve to suffer for bad acts, that acts aren't solely space-time determined. Author argues against the graspable incomprehensibility of the noumenal world, arguing that determinism and choice from another realm is irreconcilable (pg269).

Author ties the whole thing together: (pg 270)
-We can have freedom of choice with actions that are solely space-time
-Thus we can reject Kant's conclusion that our actions cannot be within space-time
-Since Kant's argument is valid, we must reject a premise too
-Reject that we deserve to suffer from our poor choices
Author ends with talking about what we as agents do and don't deserve, and punishment (in the form of suffering) for wrongdoing is not one of them.