05/30/2008
The Innate Mind Vol 3, ch 2 Oxford Press 2007 Carruthers, Laurence, Stich, eds.
This is an extended reply to an objection, leveled recently about the concept of innateness, that it is hopelessly confused, confounding, and that it should be jettisoned in the realm of cognitive science (Griffiths). Author replies that this argument is inconclusive and proposes conditions for innateness that author claims avoids these objections. First, the objection:
The challenge is to the concept of innate, what the author labels 'INNATE'. The challenge is that INNATE confounds many independent properties into one concept. These independent properties are 'empirically dissociable' (pg19), but the concept INNATE confounds these properties together, thereby confusing the concept itself. (pg19) The different 'i-properties' are, e.g., as follows: (pg18-9)
1. Having an adaptive evolutionary explanation
2. Being insensitive to external variation
3. Being present at birth/inborn
4. Being universal, either pancultural or monomorphic (same trait accross cultures)
5. Not being acquired by learning
Author doesn't deny that these i-properties, or at least many of them, are commonly associated with INNATE, that they are empirically dissociable, and that much discussion these days is confused. Author first distinguishes between a confused concept and word ambiguity (pg20). Word ambiguity is just people using a word in different contexts and referring to different things. Concept confusion is that disparate things are grouped together into one. (pg21) Further, author argues that the confusion found in INNATE must be constitutive of the concept, not simply that it's associated with this or that property. (pg21-2) Author suggests (but does not endorse) a possible response to Griffiths: INNATE is a natural kind that is the causal origin of many of the properties associated with it. It isn't necessary that all the properties come out in all cases-- we should just expect a 'cluster of symptoms' (pg23-4
Author gives his analysis of INNATE as a 'Psychological Primitive', something that:
a) is posited by some correct psychological theory
b) is given to no correct psychological explanation of it's acquisition (in principle, not just currently)
c) is acquired by the normal course of development of the organism in question
(pg25)
With this analysis, author discusses the virtues of this as the basis for the concept INNATE. (pg27-8)
1) It is wholly consistent with the 'Interactionist Thesis', roughly, that development comes from both nature and nurture, while some of the i-properties imply that they come just from nature
2) It makes clearer much of the discussion in cognitive science today
3) It gives cognitive science something useful to do with the concept INNATE
Author then reviews the various i-properties and how most of them, with the exception of the property of being unlearned, are neither necessary nor sufficient for innateness. However, many of them bear a positive evidentiary relation (raise the probability of something being innate) to innateness. (pg28-31)
The last section deals with why, in cognitive science today, debates on innateness seems to be so confused. Author blames ambiguity, fallacious argumentation, and incomplete science (failure of convergence). Another peril is folk-psychology, the 'sink-hole' that it is easy even for scientists to fall into. (pg34-5) Lastly, author discusses a problem with his analysis of INNATE. The problem is that different frameworks of learning/acquisition may show different behaviors/traits to be innate. This is because of the void-filling nature of the concept. Thus author argues that we must simultaneously pursue the two questions:
-What innate structures are there?- and -what is the best theory of cognition?-
5/23/08
Cresswell, Max - Abstract Entities in the Causal Order
05/23/2008
This is a paper discussing some attempts to argue against the existence, or at least our knowledge of, abstract entities. Author unlocks a short logical argument and shows that it has concealed metaphysical premises that need further argumentation. The argument in question goes as follows:
(1) We can only have knowledge of things which are part of the causal order
(2) Abstract entities are not part of the causal order
(3) We cannot have knowledge of abstract entities
The first section of the paper discusses the proposition as an abstract entity. The knowledge relation holds between a person and a proposition due, some platonist might say, it's part in the causal order. But the existence of a proposition isn't in the causal order-- it's truth or falsity is. Hence there is some equivocation in 'part of the causal order' in (2) (pg2).
To counter this, you might want to make explicit a metaphysical assumption (6): No entity whose existence is logically necessary (a proposition) can stand to any other entity in any contingent (e.g. true or false) relation. (pg3). Author reveals this as a metaphysical premise that needs argumentation. Perhaps, instead of arguing for (6), we'd care to reduce the abstract object 'a proposition' to concrete facts, which would mean we'd have to claim that when such a reduction is possible, propositions don't exist. The problem here is that there can be mutual reduction-- propositions in terms of facts, facts in terms of propositions. This leads to a discussion of possible world theories (pg3-4) where Lewis (concrete objects making abstract objects true) is compared to Plantinga, who uses abstract entities (haecceities) to make concrete facts true.
The second part of the paper discusses abstract propositional knowledge like 'p or ~p'. Here you don't have to know anything about the causal order to know that this is true (pg5). Author explores how to incorporate numbers (abstract entities) into propositions that are quasi-mathematical (pg6-7), or to work with mathematical statements with no empirical content. Author wants to separate our ability to 'access a special class of entities which are not part of the causal order' from empistemological problems of how we are able to do math in the first place. (pg9)
This is a paper discussing some attempts to argue against the existence, or at least our knowledge of, abstract entities. Author unlocks a short logical argument and shows that it has concealed metaphysical premises that need further argumentation. The argument in question goes as follows:
(1) We can only have knowledge of things which are part of the causal order
(2) Abstract entities are not part of the causal order
(3) We cannot have knowledge of abstract entities
The first section of the paper discusses the proposition as an abstract entity. The knowledge relation holds between a person and a proposition due, some platonist might say, it's part in the causal order. But the existence of a proposition isn't in the causal order-- it's truth or falsity is. Hence there is some equivocation in 'part of the causal order' in (2) (pg2).
To counter this, you might want to make explicit a metaphysical assumption (6): No entity whose existence is logically necessary (a proposition) can stand to any other entity in any contingent (e.g. true or false) relation. (pg3). Author reveals this as a metaphysical premise that needs argumentation. Perhaps, instead of arguing for (6), we'd care to reduce the abstract object 'a proposition' to concrete facts, which would mean we'd have to claim that when such a reduction is possible, propositions don't exist. The problem here is that there can be mutual reduction-- propositions in terms of facts, facts in terms of propositions. This leads to a discussion of possible world theories (pg3-4) where Lewis (concrete objects making abstract objects true) is compared to Plantinga, who uses abstract entities (haecceities) to make concrete facts true.
The second part of the paper discusses abstract propositional knowledge like 'p or ~p'. Here you don't have to know anything about the causal order to know that this is true (pg5). Author explores how to incorporate numbers (abstract entities) into propositions that are quasi-mathematical (pg6-7), or to work with mathematical statements with no empirical content. Author wants to separate our ability to 'access a special class of entities which are not part of the causal order' from empistemological problems of how we are able to do math in the first place. (pg9)
5/9/08
Taylor, Charles - The Culture of Modernity
05/09/2008
Sources of Self, Harvard Press 1989 Ch 17
In this chapter author explores the rise of the valuation of sentiment by both philosophers and the public at large in the 18th century England, France and other developing countries like Germany and America. Author first recaps what he recently finished discussing (in previous chapters?) about the rise in interest in economic productivity as a method for accruing honor or respect, as compared to the more aristocratic ideals of winning military victories.
Author first discusses the rise in the modern novel, which turned away from epic archetypes and more toward the 'portrayal of the particular'. In conjuring the particular, the story became about a particular person and their particular life, including their emotions. This captured the imagination of the public, who felt gripped by their imagination of these sentiments. (pg294-6) What also changed was what author calls 'time-consciousness' (pg287-8); because stories were more particular, this de-emphasized the archetypal, 'ontic-logos' method of story-telling, where the universe is portrayed as working in thematic ways at all times. Time was now seen to be more like space, homogenous and empty. Lastly, this shift began to portray life as a narration, not just of outer accomplishments but of inner space. (pg289)
The next shift is the growth in marriage and family life as based on affection. This starts with larger demands on the family unit, therefore a call for more voluntary entrance to such an structure. This stood in contrast to a patriarchal model. But author argues that all this was fueled by placing greater weight in the feeling of love, especially naturalizing it as a right (pg 290). This seems to be coupled with placing greater importance on children, and childhood as distinct from being an adult. As such, it follows that raising children is a special act, requiring special work- from the family. Private rooms began to be incorporated in home construction. Author argues that the entire family life began to shift into somewhere to take solace from a hard world, rather than something to have while you participate in the world. (pg292-3)
Another change was he rise of the English garden, and 'country living' in general. What was important here wasn't the appreciation of balance, reason, or simplicity in nature, but instead what sentiments were brought out in being out in 'natural' surroundings. (pg297) English gardens were designed to look unkept, or rather not organized by a human hand. Neo-classicism fought directly against this (pg299).
Lastly, author discusses how the religions began to move away from theology and more toward conviction and devotion-- sentiments.
Sources of Self, Harvard Press 1989 Ch 17
In this chapter author explores the rise of the valuation of sentiment by both philosophers and the public at large in the 18th century England, France and other developing countries like Germany and America. Author first recaps what he recently finished discussing (in previous chapters?) about the rise in interest in economic productivity as a method for accruing honor or respect, as compared to the more aristocratic ideals of winning military victories.
Author first discusses the rise in the modern novel, which turned away from epic archetypes and more toward the 'portrayal of the particular'. In conjuring the particular, the story became about a particular person and their particular life, including their emotions. This captured the imagination of the public, who felt gripped by their imagination of these sentiments. (pg294-6) What also changed was what author calls 'time-consciousness' (pg287-8); because stories were more particular, this de-emphasized the archetypal, 'ontic-logos' method of story-telling, where the universe is portrayed as working in thematic ways at all times. Time was now seen to be more like space, homogenous and empty. Lastly, this shift began to portray life as a narration, not just of outer accomplishments but of inner space. (pg289)
The next shift is the growth in marriage and family life as based on affection. This starts with larger demands on the family unit, therefore a call for more voluntary entrance to such an structure. This stood in contrast to a patriarchal model. But author argues that all this was fueled by placing greater weight in the feeling of love, especially naturalizing it as a right (pg 290). This seems to be coupled with placing greater importance on children, and childhood as distinct from being an adult. As such, it follows that raising children is a special act, requiring special work- from the family. Private rooms began to be incorporated in home construction. Author argues that the entire family life began to shift into somewhere to take solace from a hard world, rather than something to have while you participate in the world. (pg292-3)
Another change was he rise of the English garden, and 'country living' in general. What was important here wasn't the appreciation of balance, reason, or simplicity in nature, but instead what sentiments were brought out in being out in 'natural' surroundings. (pg297) English gardens were designed to look unkept, or rather not organized by a human hand. Neo-classicism fought directly against this (pg299).
Lastly, author discusses how the religions began to move away from theology and more toward conviction and devotion-- sentiments.
4/18/08
Smith, Barry - Should African-Americans Forgive White Americans?
04/18/2008
For Discussion at the Kahn Institute
Author asks the question given in the title. The first part of the essay discusses what it is to forgive: to overcome resentment. Resentment is:
'Anger and hatred toward those whom you believe have harmed you without justification or excuse.'
Author discusses the reasons that forgiveness in general is often desirable: it staves off retaliation, it frees up creative energy. But since resentment is the proper response to defend self-regard and respect, if the transgressor will repeat the offence, forgiveness shows a lack of self-respect. The best time for forgiveness is when the transgressor shows legitimate repentance and willingness to repair the damage.
Author reviews the harms done to African-Americans and submits that most of those who actually did the harm are dead, and that most alive white Americans are willing to give opportunity to African-Americans, though most will also reject the case for reparations. There is also the possibility of expanding the case for culpability to the next generation, that it can 'spill-down', yet author rejects this as unjust. Author also is skeptical about how much white Americans have benefited from slavery as compared to African-Americans. But perhaps there is still resentment; author points out this is a different kind of resentment, since it doesn't respond to an attack on African-Americans' self-regard.
Author concludes that African-Americans should try to get an apology from the government without the call for more governmental programs, and that if this is done, African-Americans should forgive currently alive white Americans.
For Discussion at the Kahn Institute
Author asks the question given in the title. The first part of the essay discusses what it is to forgive: to overcome resentment. Resentment is:
'Anger and hatred toward those whom you believe have harmed you without justification or excuse.'
Author discusses the reasons that forgiveness in general is often desirable: it staves off retaliation, it frees up creative energy. But since resentment is the proper response to defend self-regard and respect, if the transgressor will repeat the offence, forgiveness shows a lack of self-respect. The best time for forgiveness is when the transgressor shows legitimate repentance and willingness to repair the damage.
Author reviews the harms done to African-Americans and submits that most of those who actually did the harm are dead, and that most alive white Americans are willing to give opportunity to African-Americans, though most will also reject the case for reparations. There is also the possibility of expanding the case for culpability to the next generation, that it can 'spill-down', yet author rejects this as unjust. Author also is skeptical about how much white Americans have benefited from slavery as compared to African-Americans. But perhaps there is still resentment; author points out this is a different kind of resentment, since it doesn't respond to an attack on African-Americans' self-regard.
Author concludes that African-Americans should try to get an apology from the government without the call for more governmental programs, and that if this is done, African-Americans should forgive currently alive white Americans.
3/28/08
Burge, Tyler - Predication and Truth (Review of Donald Davidson book)
03/28/2008
Journal of Philosophy, November 2007
Author gives a long review of Donald Davidson's book Truth And Predication. The review is at least three parts: a discussion of Davidson's conception of truth and then a discussion of his view of predication, then a critique of Davidson's views on predication.
Davidson takes Tarski's T-sentences as the basis for his truth theory. Author agrees with Davidson that deflationist positions of truth don't capture quantification and truth is more than extensional. Author proceeds to discuss Davidson's rejection of correspondence theories as misunderstanding such theories and too narrow a view (pg581-3).
In chapter 3 Davidson gives a 'rational reconstruction' of how to arrive at a theory of meaning and belief that adds to the missing parts of Tarski's theory. Author takes this as a re-formulation of Davidson's major contributions to philosophy, yet discusses how confusing Davidson's talk can be. On one hand, it appears people have to be following a semantic rule in order to build a theory of meaning, which is countered by how people actually learn language. It is also countered by evidence of 'perceptual reference' and 'propositional inference' in non-human animals and young children. (pg285-6) On the other, he thinks people just need to behave 'as if' they are conforming to those rules, yet author thinks that such talk isn't what Davidson is committed to. (pg584-5)
The next part of the paper is dealing with Davidson's 'problem of predication', which is the regress argument if predicates are names for properties. (pg586-590) Davidson wants a theory of predication to satisfy 4 criteria: (pg586-7)
1. predication should be connected to truth
2. predication is not explained by trying to associate objects with universals, properties, etc.
3. predication is kept separate from the question of the existence of properties, universals, etc.
4. the solution must allow for predication
Davidson appears to waffle between claiming that having predication refer to properties is unnecessary for it to work, and claiming that understanding predication as reference doesn't complete the understanding of predication. When discussing the regress problem, Davidson is loose with his talk, at least according to the author, who shows ways of avoiding the regress while still referring to properties. "The regress gets started if the syntactic and semantic relations of a predicate are assimilated to those of a singular term." (pg 590)
Author defends types of regress. Regression of explanation is bad, regression (infinity) of objects isn't a theory-killer-- there is no real philosophical problem with having infinite entities. There is a philosophical problem with having an infinite explanationatory scheme (pg592).
Author argues that predication has two parts: first it indicates or refers to properties and second it attributes that it is true of the singular term used in the argument (or place) if the predicate. (pg593-594) Author spends some time defending Frege against Davidson. Author asserts that Frege was wrong to believe that predicates can't be predicated without turning them into singular terms. (pg598-601) It is because predicates play a different semantic role than singular terms do that you don't turn a predicate into a singular term when you apply another predicate to it.
Author criticizes Davidson's concept of reference and 'being-true-of'. For Davidson, these concepts are loose and should be whatever works to get true sentences to be come out as true. Here the only 'primitive' concept is truth. (pg605-6) Author argues that though reference and predication are dependent on truth, truth is 'partially explicated in terms of notions of reference and predication'. (pg607) They help explain how truth is related to truth makers.
Journal of Philosophy, November 2007
Author gives a long review of Donald Davidson's book Truth And Predication. The review is at least three parts: a discussion of Davidson's conception of truth and then a discussion of his view of predication, then a critique of Davidson's views on predication.
Davidson takes Tarski's T-sentences as the basis for his truth theory. Author agrees with Davidson that deflationist positions of truth don't capture quantification and truth is more than extensional. Author proceeds to discuss Davidson's rejection of correspondence theories as misunderstanding such theories and too narrow a view (pg581-3).
In chapter 3 Davidson gives a 'rational reconstruction' of how to arrive at a theory of meaning and belief that adds to the missing parts of Tarski's theory. Author takes this as a re-formulation of Davidson's major contributions to philosophy, yet discusses how confusing Davidson's talk can be. On one hand, it appears people have to be following a semantic rule in order to build a theory of meaning, which is countered by how people actually learn language. It is also countered by evidence of 'perceptual reference' and 'propositional inference' in non-human animals and young children. (pg285-6) On the other, he thinks people just need to behave 'as if' they are conforming to those rules, yet author thinks that such talk isn't what Davidson is committed to. (pg584-5)
The next part of the paper is dealing with Davidson's 'problem of predication', which is the regress argument if predicates are names for properties. (pg586-590) Davidson wants a theory of predication to satisfy 4 criteria: (pg586-7)
1. predication should be connected to truth
2. predication is not explained by trying to associate objects with universals, properties, etc.
3. predication is kept separate from the question of the existence of properties, universals, etc.
4. the solution must allow for predication
Davidson appears to waffle between claiming that having predication refer to properties is unnecessary for it to work, and claiming that understanding predication as reference doesn't complete the understanding of predication. When discussing the regress problem, Davidson is loose with his talk, at least according to the author, who shows ways of avoiding the regress while still referring to properties. "The regress gets started if the syntactic and semantic relations of a predicate are assimilated to those of a singular term." (pg 590)
Author defends types of regress. Regression of explanation is bad, regression (infinity) of objects isn't a theory-killer-- there is no real philosophical problem with having infinite entities. There is a philosophical problem with having an infinite explanationatory scheme (pg592).
Author argues that predication has two parts: first it indicates or refers to properties and second it attributes that it is true of the singular term used in the argument (or place) if the predicate. (pg593-594) Author spends some time defending Frege against Davidson. Author asserts that Frege was wrong to believe that predicates can't be predicated without turning them into singular terms. (pg598-601) It is because predicates play a different semantic role than singular terms do that you don't turn a predicate into a singular term when you apply another predicate to it.
Author criticizes Davidson's concept of reference and 'being-true-of'. For Davidson, these concepts are loose and should be whatever works to get true sentences to be come out as true. Here the only 'primitive' concept is truth. (pg605-6) Author argues that though reference and predication are dependent on truth, truth is 'partially explicated in terms of notions of reference and predication'. (pg607) They help explain how truth is related to truth makers.
3/14/08
Godfrey-Smith, Peter - Conditions for Evolution by Natural Selection
03/14/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 10 October 2007
A paper involving mathematically technical formulations of the components of evolution by natural selection, this paper has a modes conclusion. The paper aims to clarify the status of the various conditions given for evolution by natural selection (ENS). Some condition sets should be considered summaries, or descriptions of all the various ways change in a population can be considered ENS. Other condition sets give sufficient conditions for ENS, outlining a recipe ENS. These condition sets are idealizations, since they might not capture all of the various cases of ENS. Author's main point is to distinguish between these two and warn against not distinguishing them.
Generally, there are three main components to ENS as given in condition sets:
1. Phenotypic variation
2. Differential fitness
3. Heritability/heredity
Author brings up a number of cases that certain phrasings of ENS don't get right:
Case 1: Culling: no reproduction therefore no heredity, yet there is differential fitness because some organisms die more rapidly than others
Reply: this isn't a case of ENS, at least not yet (pg494)
Case 2: differential reproduction with no differential fitness: organisms reproduce the same amounts, but faster than others
Reply: the standard condition sets of ENS are idealized with discrete generations that don't overlap and reproduce at the same time (pg496)
Author discusses the problems with heredity and heritability mixed with fitness. It appears the two concepts should be kept separate, but differential fitness that is heritable should show up in future generations. Differential fitness itself doesn't suggest heritability-- a certain disposition needs to be present for a population to 'respond' to selection. (pg500) This is supposed to be heritability, and it is has a set of difficulties.
Case 3: 'Biased Inheritance': a heritable trait that improves fitness sometimes is heritable, sometimes not. Overall fitness remains unchanged after a new generation.
Case 4: A heritable trait that also improves fitness doesn't come from parent to child in the right way (pg502)
Replies: tie together fitness with heritability in the recipes of evolution, unfortunately connecting two concepts that we wanted to keep separate.
Author discusses arcane equations that are meant to separate heritability from fitness. (pg506-509) [If anyone thinks I'm going to commit the hours need to understand this, forget it.]
The final problems author brings up is heritability by accident and genetic drift. (pg510) These can be fixed by saying that genuine cases of ENS has a causal link between the phenotypic trait's fitness value and the inheritance of that trait. The problem with 'causal link' is that it is vague and not easily expressed in an equation. Author examines an alternate equation and finds it inadequate.
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 10 October 2007
A paper involving mathematically technical formulations of the components of evolution by natural selection, this paper has a modes conclusion. The paper aims to clarify the status of the various conditions given for evolution by natural selection (ENS). Some condition sets should be considered summaries, or descriptions of all the various ways change in a population can be considered ENS. Other condition sets give sufficient conditions for ENS, outlining a recipe ENS. These condition sets are idealizations, since they might not capture all of the various cases of ENS. Author's main point is to distinguish between these two and warn against not distinguishing them.
Generally, there are three main components to ENS as given in condition sets:
1. Phenotypic variation
2. Differential fitness
3. Heritability/heredity
Author brings up a number of cases that certain phrasings of ENS don't get right:
Case 1: Culling: no reproduction therefore no heredity, yet there is differential fitness because some organisms die more rapidly than others
Reply: this isn't a case of ENS, at least not yet (pg494)
Case 2: differential reproduction with no differential fitness: organisms reproduce the same amounts, but faster than others
Reply: the standard condition sets of ENS are idealized with discrete generations that don't overlap and reproduce at the same time (pg496)
Author discusses the problems with heredity and heritability mixed with fitness. It appears the two concepts should be kept separate, but differential fitness that is heritable should show up in future generations. Differential fitness itself doesn't suggest heritability-- a certain disposition needs to be present for a population to 'respond' to selection. (pg500) This is supposed to be heritability, and it is has a set of difficulties.
Case 3: 'Biased Inheritance': a heritable trait that improves fitness sometimes is heritable, sometimes not. Overall fitness remains unchanged after a new generation.
Case 4: A heritable trait that also improves fitness doesn't come from parent to child in the right way (pg502)
Replies: tie together fitness with heritability in the recipes of evolution, unfortunately connecting two concepts that we wanted to keep separate.
Author discusses arcane equations that are meant to separate heritability from fitness. (pg506-509) [If anyone thinks I'm going to commit the hours need to understand this, forget it.]
The final problems author brings up is heritability by accident and genetic drift. (pg510) These can be fixed by saying that genuine cases of ENS has a causal link between the phenotypic trait's fitness value and the inheritance of that trait. The problem with 'causal link' is that it is vague and not easily expressed in an equation. Author examines an alternate equation and finds it inadequate.
3/7/08
Klein, Colin - An Imperative Theory of Pain
03/07/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Oct 2007
Author begins with discussing the problems with pain for intentionalism, which is the theory that the mental qualities of a thought are exhausted by its intentional content. The problem with pain is that its representational content seems to be a small part of the qualitative aspect of pain that we feel. Thus there have been theories that take pains as primitive, or those that take them as jointly (representational) intentional and also primitive. Author proposes that pains are intentional, just that the content is an imperative, not a representation.
There are some good examples of imperative sensations, or sensations with imperative content, for instance hunger, sleepiness, itching. These are usually positive-- that is, requiring that the subject do something. They also don't particularly represent the world a certain way, author claims. (pg519) Author puts forth pains as imperatives in the negative sense-- to avoid doing the thing that causes pain. He makes two 'notes': the first is that common locutions say that there are pains in places. Instead, it would be more apt to say there are pains when one does things. Secondly, pains are usually received when 'moving in the world', not being 'static and idle'. (pg521-2). Author's last claim is that the imperative account is all 'there is to say about pain'. (pg522)
Author then discusses two objections to the imperative account of pain.
Objection 1: Pain is a report of tissue damage in the body. Author calls this a myth and points out that the imperative account gives indirect evidence for tissue damage, and that is all that is necessary. Author has 3 replies:
1) Pain often comes without tissue damage (pg523)
2) Pain often is unreliable when reporting tissue damage (pg524)
3) Pain as information would fail as a protective mechanism (pg525-6) This is because information can be used and interpreted in all varieties of ways, while pain needs to be a command against all sorts of actions.
Objection 2: Morphine Pain
There are many cases of people reporting feeling pain but also 'not minding it', or quite content with it. This threatens the imperative theory because if you don't feel the imperative, you shouldn't feel the pain. Author points out that such patients are unmotivated by any imperative, not just those of pain. (pg529) Author draws a distinction:
Primary affect of pain: immediate unpleasantness of pain
Secondary affect of pain: emotional responses evoked by pain, like anxiety, concern, etc.
Author proposes that morphine eliminates the secondary affect, but not the primary, and that both have different imperatives. The secondary is more complex, while the primary is usually just avoidance of the kinds of things that cause the pain. The prediction is that morphine patients, then, would avoid those kinds of things but without the usually care and concern. Author claims that this is confirmed in observation. (pg 529-30)
Author concludes by discussing open areas of discussion: general pain not associated with action: headache, menstrual pain, etc. Also the qualitative differences in pains: sharp, dull, shooting. Another open area is psychological and emotional pain. Another is attention and pain-- the relationship and powers they have over each other.
Journal of Philosophy, Oct 2007
Author begins with discussing the problems with pain for intentionalism, which is the theory that the mental qualities of a thought are exhausted by its intentional content. The problem with pain is that its representational content seems to be a small part of the qualitative aspect of pain that we feel. Thus there have been theories that take pains as primitive, or those that take them as jointly (representational) intentional and also primitive. Author proposes that pains are intentional, just that the content is an imperative, not a representation.
There are some good examples of imperative sensations, or sensations with imperative content, for instance hunger, sleepiness, itching. These are usually positive-- that is, requiring that the subject do something. They also don't particularly represent the world a certain way, author claims. (pg519) Author puts forth pains as imperatives in the negative sense-- to avoid doing the thing that causes pain. He makes two 'notes': the first is that common locutions say that there are pains in places. Instead, it would be more apt to say there are pains when one does things. Secondly, pains are usually received when 'moving in the world', not being 'static and idle'. (pg521-2). Author's last claim is that the imperative account is all 'there is to say about pain'. (pg522)
Author then discusses two objections to the imperative account of pain.
Objection 1: Pain is a report of tissue damage in the body. Author calls this a myth and points out that the imperative account gives indirect evidence for tissue damage, and that is all that is necessary. Author has 3 replies:
1) Pain often comes without tissue damage (pg523)
2) Pain often is unreliable when reporting tissue damage (pg524)
3) Pain as information would fail as a protective mechanism (pg525-6) This is because information can be used and interpreted in all varieties of ways, while pain needs to be a command against all sorts of actions.
Objection 2: Morphine Pain
There are many cases of people reporting feeling pain but also 'not minding it', or quite content with it. This threatens the imperative theory because if you don't feel the imperative, you shouldn't feel the pain. Author points out that such patients are unmotivated by any imperative, not just those of pain. (pg529) Author draws a distinction:
Primary affect of pain: immediate unpleasantness of pain
Secondary affect of pain: emotional responses evoked by pain, like anxiety, concern, etc.
Author proposes that morphine eliminates the secondary affect, but not the primary, and that both have different imperatives. The secondary is more complex, while the primary is usually just avoidance of the kinds of things that cause the pain. The prediction is that morphine patients, then, would avoid those kinds of things but without the usually care and concern. Author claims that this is confirmed in observation. (pg 529-30)
Author concludes by discussing open areas of discussion: general pain not associated with action: headache, menstrual pain, etc. Also the qualitative differences in pains: sharp, dull, shooting. Another open area is psychological and emotional pain. Another is attention and pain-- the relationship and powers they have over each other.
2/29/08
Pinker, Steven - The Moral Instinct
02/29/2008
New York Times Magazine, January 13, 2008
This is a popular press article, so much of it is a watering-down and more loosely-concluded than a more academic article. Author first discusses how we might have a 'moralization switch', which is different from other norms. There are a few 'hallmarks' for moralization: universal reasoning, and that transgressions deserve punishment. Author talks about how some things that used to be simple lifestyle choices (smoking, vegetarianism) became moralized, and previously moralized things (divorce, homosexuality) have lost much of their moral aspect.
Next the discussion turns to how, according to new psychological and neurological evidence, we make snap, intuitive judgments about a moral case and then rationalize it. We don't reason through it, we rational-ize it. The lesson form this is that there seems to be a universal moral code already established within us-- it just might not be one that follows rational rules of harm, justice, etc. It could be law-like, but still have conflicts with a more reasoned approach (e.g. trolley problems).
Author then discusses the work of Haidt and others that places more dimensions to moralizing than just harm/care and justice/fairness. (See previous article). Author tries to explain much of our cultural moralistic differences (among the purely cultural accidental aspects of what is sacred, what is profane) as placing more emphasis on one of the five different moralizing dimensions (e.g. Islam on profanity, Japanese on authority). The next discussion is about the possible genetic usefulness of these moral judgments. Altruism and fairness is explained by a summary of the work of Trivers, discussing recriprocal altruism and cheater detection. The best way to avoid being a cheater is to be a non-cheater, or a fair-player. (Or to believe you're a fair player...)
Author then responds to worries that unmasking our moral senses will somehow cheapen them. He counters that it will give us a greater understanding of our biases and take a more rational approach to building a better moral system. The next concern: what is the status of a 'moral truth'? Author discusses two supports for morality-- the external and one of the aspects of reasoning.
External: enlightened self-interest in the modern world (the 'prevalence of non-zero-sum games) is rational and also leads to cooperation
Internal: moral reasoning is not 1st personal but 3rd personal-- adopting a non-particular viewpoint-- this core, author claims, has bolstered some of history's best moral systems.
New York Times Magazine, January 13, 2008
This is a popular press article, so much of it is a watering-down and more loosely-concluded than a more academic article. Author first discusses how we might have a 'moralization switch', which is different from other norms. There are a few 'hallmarks' for moralization: universal reasoning, and that transgressions deserve punishment. Author talks about how some things that used to be simple lifestyle choices (smoking, vegetarianism) became moralized, and previously moralized things (divorce, homosexuality) have lost much of their moral aspect.
Next the discussion turns to how, according to new psychological and neurological evidence, we make snap, intuitive judgments about a moral case and then rationalize it. We don't reason through it, we rational-ize it. The lesson form this is that there seems to be a universal moral code already established within us-- it just might not be one that follows rational rules of harm, justice, etc. It could be law-like, but still have conflicts with a more reasoned approach (e.g. trolley problems).
Author then discusses the work of Haidt and others that places more dimensions to moralizing than just harm/care and justice/fairness. (See previous article). Author tries to explain much of our cultural moralistic differences (among the purely cultural accidental aspects of what is sacred, what is profane) as placing more emphasis on one of the five different moralizing dimensions (e.g. Islam on profanity, Japanese on authority). The next discussion is about the possible genetic usefulness of these moral judgments. Altruism and fairness is explained by a summary of the work of Trivers, discussing recriprocal altruism and cheater detection. The best way to avoid being a cheater is to be a non-cheater, or a fair-player. (Or to believe you're a fair player...)
Author then responds to worries that unmasking our moral senses will somehow cheapen them. He counters that it will give us a greater understanding of our biases and take a more rational approach to building a better moral system. The next concern: what is the status of a 'moral truth'? Author discusses two supports for morality-- the external and one of the aspects of reasoning.
External: enlightened self-interest in the modern world (the 'prevalence of non-zero-sum games) is rational and also leads to cooperation
Internal: moral reasoning is not 1st personal but 3rd personal-- adopting a non-particular viewpoint-- this core, author claims, has bolstered some of history's best moral systems.
2/22/08
Haidt, Jonathan - Moral Psychology and the Misunderstanding of Religion
02/22/2008
The Edge 222, The Reality Club 09/12/2007 (Link)
Author writes a paper partially related to his book, the Happiness Hypothesis and also reflective of his work in social psychology and philosophy. Specifically, the issue is around morality, and its relation to religion. Author starts with a contrast of rational moral doctrines that are rule-following and law-like and emotional or 'disgust' reactions to morally salient situations that are then post-hoc reasoned to justify. Part of this is a change in the way we see moral development-- from the older, Kohlberg-style levels of conscious rational thought, to automatic, unconscious processes more tuned to emotions e.g. revulsion, disgust. Author puts forward what he considers the main tenets of the new psychological study of moral reasoning:
1) Intuitive primacy but not dictatorship- we make snap judgments but our reasoning can override them
2) Moral thinking is for social doing- when we mount moral arguments, they are mostly for pragmatic, political purposes
3) Morality binds and builds- shared moral decisions and public discussion on what ought to be done binds people together, serving as social cohesion. Author discusses the renewing possibility of group selection to encourage cohesion, cooperation.
4) Morality is about more than harm and fairness- the academic books, written by academics, mostly talk about harms or fairness. Gilligan convinced us that there was another dimension: 'care'. But still this falls short of capturing the moral reasoning. Through his research, author concludes there are at least three more dimensions:
1- justice/fairness
2- harm/care
+3- ingroup/loyalty
+4- authority/respect
+5- purity/sanctity
These can be considered 'learning modules' that we have evolved to pick up given our cultural surroundings. The last three serve to bind people to a group, while the first two are 'individualizing', meaning that they serve to protect individuals from each other. Author points out that he has found secular liberals give the first 2 to morality, while religious conservatives take all 5 as morality.
The next part of the paper, author takes the work of the 'new atheists' to be not scientific thinking but the kind of 'moral' thinking he discussed above. He holds these 'scientific' thinkers to the standard of science and not of the 'moral thinking' he just developed. He uses examples from the books of Dawkins, Harris, Dennett. Harris gives a 'standard liberal definition of morality': morality is about happiness and suffering. Author proposes his alternative:
"Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible."
Author claims the 'standard liberal' definition is a 'contractual approach', while his is a 'beehive approach'. The beehive approach takes religion as a key component in the development of morality, and acknowledges that it has its discontents, but also points out that religious conservatives are more likely to give to charity, time, money, and blood. They also report being happier, healthier, and they live longer. This evidence author claims Dennett denies-- again being unfair to the proper place of religious commitments. Author concludes by saying that "every longstanding ideology and way of life contains some wisdom, some insights into ways of suppressing selfishness, enhancing cooperation, and ultimately enhancing human flourishing."
Replies
David Sloan Wilson:
These four questions need to be answered by the new atheists:
1) Is there any empirical evidence for the existence of supernatural agents?
2) If not, how can we explain the universal aspect of religion in naturalistic terms?
3) What are the effects of religion, good and bad, on human welfare?
4) How can we use these understandings to advance our society?
Wilson claims that e.g. Dawkins, only focuses on the first question, which leaves a lot out.
Michael Shermer
Religion is a force for both good and bad. It kills, maims, suppresses difference. Yet it also makes people happier, healthier, and promotes a more social cohesion. The difficulty is that when we get into complex societies of large sizes, we needed to make institutions that encouraged social cohesion and also human flourishing-- the two main ones were organized religion and centralized government. We now need to try to convince the world to make new institutions in the place of the old ones.
Sam Harris
Where is the 'wisdom' in the many, many religions that, e.g., conducted human sacrifice? Haidt might want to gloss over the actual beliefs and look at what purposes they serve, but the actual beliefs do matter-- they're bogus. Harris interprets the 3 'other' dimensions of morality as just subsets of the care/harm dimension. For example-- being worried about taking the lord's name in vain (respect/authority) is just being worried you'll go to hell (harm/care). Science shouldn't care whether false religious beliefs lead to better lives-- science is about getting the empirical work right, and religions generally fail.
PZ Myers
Myers likes in general the discussion of the expansion of morality. He heavily criticizes Haidt's likening of the new atheists to religious thinkers. Meyers says that Haidt equates the new dimensions of morality with religious practice. Must (necessarily) we have religion to have this full-fledged morality? Certainly not. Myers spins the discussion of welfare and charity, saying that most charities secular liberals do not trust, and that they are also dissatisfied moreso than conservatives with the direction of the country, world, etc. Myers also says that if believing in a false thing gives me extra life, extra happiness, he doesn't want it.
Marc Hauser
Hauser talks about the possibility of group selection for religious modules. Hauser concludes it has not yet been shown and that individual or gene-centric selection has been far more explanatory. Hauser also tries to distinguish two different issues:
- the evolution of morality as a biological faculty that guides our intuitive judgments
- the ways in which cultural factors, including religion, can alter our explicit moral judgments
The target here is the evidence that religious people give more. The problem is that in some moral judgments, both religious and non-religious decide equally. Do the religious give more because they are religious, or because they are more beehive oriented and are more likely to take on religion?
Hadit has a final entry, where he discusses three main points:
1) the possibility of group selection
2) religious people really are happier and more charitable
3) binding/beehive moralities can be good for us (emphasis on 'can')
The Edge 222, The Reality Club 09/12/2007 (Link)
Author writes a paper partially related to his book, the Happiness Hypothesis and also reflective of his work in social psychology and philosophy. Specifically, the issue is around morality, and its relation to religion. Author starts with a contrast of rational moral doctrines that are rule-following and law-like and emotional or 'disgust' reactions to morally salient situations that are then post-hoc reasoned to justify. Part of this is a change in the way we see moral development-- from the older, Kohlberg-style levels of conscious rational thought, to automatic, unconscious processes more tuned to emotions e.g. revulsion, disgust. Author puts forward what he considers the main tenets of the new psychological study of moral reasoning:
1) Intuitive primacy but not dictatorship- we make snap judgments but our reasoning can override them
2) Moral thinking is for social doing- when we mount moral arguments, they are mostly for pragmatic, political purposes
3) Morality binds and builds- shared moral decisions and public discussion on what ought to be done binds people together, serving as social cohesion. Author discusses the renewing possibility of group selection to encourage cohesion, cooperation.
4) Morality is about more than harm and fairness- the academic books, written by academics, mostly talk about harms or fairness. Gilligan convinced us that there was another dimension: 'care'. But still this falls short of capturing the moral reasoning. Through his research, author concludes there are at least three more dimensions:
1- justice/fairness
2- harm/care
+3- ingroup/loyalty
+4- authority/respect
+5- purity/sanctity
These can be considered 'learning modules' that we have evolved to pick up given our cultural surroundings. The last three serve to bind people to a group, while the first two are 'individualizing', meaning that they serve to protect individuals from each other. Author points out that he has found secular liberals give the first 2 to morality, while religious conservatives take all 5 as morality.
The next part of the paper, author takes the work of the 'new atheists' to be not scientific thinking but the kind of 'moral' thinking he discussed above. He holds these 'scientific' thinkers to the standard of science and not of the 'moral thinking' he just developed. He uses examples from the books of Dawkins, Harris, Dennett. Harris gives a 'standard liberal definition of morality': morality is about happiness and suffering. Author proposes his alternative:
"Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible."
Author claims the 'standard liberal' definition is a 'contractual approach', while his is a 'beehive approach'. The beehive approach takes religion as a key component in the development of morality, and acknowledges that it has its discontents, but also points out that religious conservatives are more likely to give to charity, time, money, and blood. They also report being happier, healthier, and they live longer. This evidence author claims Dennett denies-- again being unfair to the proper place of religious commitments. Author concludes by saying that "every longstanding ideology and way of life contains some wisdom, some insights into ways of suppressing selfishness, enhancing cooperation, and ultimately enhancing human flourishing."
Replies
David Sloan Wilson:
These four questions need to be answered by the new atheists:
1) Is there any empirical evidence for the existence of supernatural agents?
2) If not, how can we explain the universal aspect of religion in naturalistic terms?
3) What are the effects of religion, good and bad, on human welfare?
4) How can we use these understandings to advance our society?
Wilson claims that e.g. Dawkins, only focuses on the first question, which leaves a lot out.
Michael Shermer
Religion is a force for both good and bad. It kills, maims, suppresses difference. Yet it also makes people happier, healthier, and promotes a more social cohesion. The difficulty is that when we get into complex societies of large sizes, we needed to make institutions that encouraged social cohesion and also human flourishing-- the two main ones were organized religion and centralized government. We now need to try to convince the world to make new institutions in the place of the old ones.
Sam Harris
Where is the 'wisdom' in the many, many religions that, e.g., conducted human sacrifice? Haidt might want to gloss over the actual beliefs and look at what purposes they serve, but the actual beliefs do matter-- they're bogus. Harris interprets the 3 'other' dimensions of morality as just subsets of the care/harm dimension. For example-- being worried about taking the lord's name in vain (respect/authority) is just being worried you'll go to hell (harm/care). Science shouldn't care whether false religious beliefs lead to better lives-- science is about getting the empirical work right, and religions generally fail.
PZ Myers
Myers likes in general the discussion of the expansion of morality. He heavily criticizes Haidt's likening of the new atheists to religious thinkers. Meyers says that Haidt equates the new dimensions of morality with religious practice. Must (necessarily) we have religion to have this full-fledged morality? Certainly not. Myers spins the discussion of welfare and charity, saying that most charities secular liberals do not trust, and that they are also dissatisfied moreso than conservatives with the direction of the country, world, etc. Myers also says that if believing in a false thing gives me extra life, extra happiness, he doesn't want it.
Marc Hauser
Hauser talks about the possibility of group selection for religious modules. Hauser concludes it has not yet been shown and that individual or gene-centric selection has been far more explanatory. Hauser also tries to distinguish two different issues:
- the evolution of morality as a biological faculty that guides our intuitive judgments
- the ways in which cultural factors, including religion, can alter our explicit moral judgments
The target here is the evidence that religious people give more. The problem is that in some moral judgments, both religious and non-religious decide equally. Do the religious give more because they are religious, or because they are more beehive oriented and are more likely to take on religion?
Hadit has a final entry, where he discusses three main points:
1) the possibility of group selection
2) religious people really are happier and more charitable
3) binding/beehive moralities can be good for us (emphasis on 'can')
2/15/08
Atran, Scott - The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism
02/15/2008
The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006
Author is both outlining his theory on the growth and motivation of suicide attacks and also responding to the work of Robert Pape in Dying to Win, 2005. Pape claims that foreign occupation is the 'root cause' of suicide attacks (SA). He compiles data from 1980-2003 and concludes that it is specific political objectives rather than religious/ideological/social reasons that indicate SA. For example, Al Qaeda was designed to get America out of the heartland of the Arab world. Under this analysis, SA come from agents of secular, educated middle-class places whose efforts to succeed are stymied by corrupt systems or are propped up by US or other foreign interests. (pg129-130)
Author criticizes Pape's approach as relying too heavily on statistical work that shows correlations, not causation. Author instead uses in-depth interviews and systematic observations (of groups that often have SA agents come from their ranks) to point to some causal factors of SA. (pg130) Author criticizes the sampling of Pape, claiming that there have been so many new SAs in 2005 that much of Pape's previous work would be statistically overwhelmed by the new SAs. Author claims Pape's conclusions are too narrow: it misses times when withdrawls are because of convential resistance and not due to SAs, or when SAs actually create larger occupations. Author claims Pape is also too broad: summing up SAs as related to one set of concerns misses an emerging aspect of the more recent SAs. Author claims Pape also misses at least one reason for SAs-- increasing a sponsoring organization's 'market share' among the possible other recruiting organizations. (pg132) Author also contests Pape's claim that SAs are only marginally related to Salafi ideology.
Author discusses a 'changing landscape' of SAs. Instead of joining a centralized organization, small-group cells form around shared interests, usually religious or ideological in nature. They receive guidance from internet sites and then undertake jihad. This is a decentralized model that relies on small-group dynamics and also usually requires a deeply-held commitment to something greater expelling foreign forces. Jihadists come from 'diaspora communities' (pg135) who are disconnected from a sense of community and deeper meanings. Forming these small-groups nurtures their desire to commit to their religious or moral principles. Jihadists are not 'nihilistic' or 'hating freedom', like our political figures paint them. (pg136) Instead, many undertake jihad more because of perceived humiliation rather than straightforward military occupation or because they hate values. Many cells no longer feel connected to the populations they are imbedded in. (pg137) Individuals swarm into small-groups to reinforce their beliefs, carry out SAs, then disperse, sometimes then joining other groups elsewhere. The efficacy of such a network is improved by seeing the fight as global, and the values supporting it more broad-based and deeper than fighting occupation (obligations to God, rather than family or country). (pg138) Not taking this kind of deeply held moral commitment seriously is folly.
Author discusses the possible ways to disrupt the rise SAs and jihad. First, don't think that a response from foreign nations is the best model. Control might have to be given to 'regional powers' (pg140). It is likely that a multi-national, or even a transnational response is required. First off, focus not on statistics but instead on the cells, which become pseudo-families.(pg141) These cells aren't formed strictly on the basis of commiting SAs, but instead on preserving deeply held moral or religious values. Refocus those values into something more constructive. Secondly, traditional methods of spying and surveillance that are centralized and heirarchical is ineffective in catching a decentralized network of possible SAs. Third, use 'soft power' rather than 'hard power' to turn the tide of public opinion in support of SAs to instead support the foreign occupier. An example is the rebuilding efforts after the tsunami in Asia-- America is seen much more favorably after it helped. (pg143)
The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006
Author is both outlining his theory on the growth and motivation of suicide attacks and also responding to the work of Robert Pape in Dying to Win, 2005. Pape claims that foreign occupation is the 'root cause' of suicide attacks (SA). He compiles data from 1980-2003 and concludes that it is specific political objectives rather than religious/ideological/social reasons that indicate SA. For example, Al Qaeda was designed to get America out of the heartland of the Arab world. Under this analysis, SA come from agents of secular, educated middle-class places whose efforts to succeed are stymied by corrupt systems or are propped up by US or other foreign interests. (pg129-130)
Author criticizes Pape's approach as relying too heavily on statistical work that shows correlations, not causation. Author instead uses in-depth interviews and systematic observations (of groups that often have SA agents come from their ranks) to point to some causal factors of SA. (pg130) Author criticizes the sampling of Pape, claiming that there have been so many new SAs in 2005 that much of Pape's previous work would be statistically overwhelmed by the new SAs. Author claims Pape's conclusions are too narrow: it misses times when withdrawls are because of convential resistance and not due to SAs, or when SAs actually create larger occupations. Author claims Pape is also too broad: summing up SAs as related to one set of concerns misses an emerging aspect of the more recent SAs. Author claims Pape also misses at least one reason for SAs-- increasing a sponsoring organization's 'market share' among the possible other recruiting organizations. (pg132) Author also contests Pape's claim that SAs are only marginally related to Salafi ideology.
Author discusses a 'changing landscape' of SAs. Instead of joining a centralized organization, small-group cells form around shared interests, usually religious or ideological in nature. They receive guidance from internet sites and then undertake jihad. This is a decentralized model that relies on small-group dynamics and also usually requires a deeply-held commitment to something greater expelling foreign forces. Jihadists come from 'diaspora communities' (pg135) who are disconnected from a sense of community and deeper meanings. Forming these small-groups nurtures their desire to commit to their religious or moral principles. Jihadists are not 'nihilistic' or 'hating freedom', like our political figures paint them. (pg136) Instead, many undertake jihad more because of perceived humiliation rather than straightforward military occupation or because they hate values. Many cells no longer feel connected to the populations they are imbedded in. (pg137) Individuals swarm into small-groups to reinforce their beliefs, carry out SAs, then disperse, sometimes then joining other groups elsewhere. The efficacy of such a network is improved by seeing the fight as global, and the values supporting it more broad-based and deeper than fighting occupation (obligations to God, rather than family or country). (pg138) Not taking this kind of deeply held moral commitment seriously is folly.
Author discusses the possible ways to disrupt the rise SAs and jihad. First, don't think that a response from foreign nations is the best model. Control might have to be given to 'regional powers' (pg140). It is likely that a multi-national, or even a transnational response is required. First off, focus not on statistics but instead on the cells, which become pseudo-families.(pg141) These cells aren't formed strictly on the basis of commiting SAs, but instead on preserving deeply held moral or religious values. Refocus those values into something more constructive. Secondly, traditional methods of spying and surveillance that are centralized and heirarchical is ineffective in catching a decentralized network of possible SAs. Third, use 'soft power' rather than 'hard power' to turn the tide of public opinion in support of SAs to instead support the foreign occupier. An example is the rebuilding efforts after the tsunami in Asia-- America is seen much more favorably after it helped. (pg143)
2/8/08
Spelman, Elizabeth - Managing Ignorance
02/08/2008
Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, Sullivan & Tuana, eds. State University of NY, 2007
This chapter in a book has two main sections. The first section talks about the doxastic attitude that Baldwin claims whites have about the condition of blacks, or 'the grievances of blacks'. It isn't that whites believe such grievances are false, nor do they believe they are true. Instead, whites manage to be ignorant of the grievances of blacks, effectively maintaining the status quo. It is because whites want to believe the grievances are false, but are too afraid to actually investigave whether they are, in fact, false, because then they might discover (to their horror) that the grievances are true. Unwilling to take the risk that they are true, whites instead ignore the truth-value of the grievances of blacks, and manage to be ignorant.
Such management is dificult, and Baldwin considers that it is rooted in a deep fear that has crippled whites so that they cannot climb out of this willful ignorance without the help of blacks. (pg 122). Author then points out that this is not necessarily a claim of racism by Baldwin, but instead a claim of ignorance. Yet it is a kind of passive or 'cowardly' racism, set somewhere between white supremecists (who wilfully believe that black grievances are false) and those who believe the grievances are true. Thus it is injustice by 'spinelessness' (pg 124). This is an effective way to indict whites who don't consider themselves blatant racists or white supremecists.
The second section of the chapter talks about what kinds of efforts whites took to create the doxastic attitude they now enjoy. Author looks at the history of the reconstruction, both immediately following the Civil War and also as many as 5 centuries later, with a speech by Woodrow Wilson. In the cases author examines, all discussion of the moral aspects of the war, that it was over the treatment of blacks/slaves, are censored from explicit reference. Instead, reconcilliation is achieved among the whites by talking about how both sides fought bravely, and suffered, and so on. In order to mend the republic of whites, the reasons the war was fought are covered over. But this also covered over the grievances of blacks, effectively creating a screen for whites to enjoy. (pg 126-130)
Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, Sullivan & Tuana, eds. State University of NY, 2007
This chapter in a book has two main sections. The first section talks about the doxastic attitude that Baldwin claims whites have about the condition of blacks, or 'the grievances of blacks'. It isn't that whites believe such grievances are false, nor do they believe they are true. Instead, whites manage to be ignorant of the grievances of blacks, effectively maintaining the status quo. It is because whites want to believe the grievances are false, but are too afraid to actually investigave whether they are, in fact, false, because then they might discover (to their horror) that the grievances are true. Unwilling to take the risk that they are true, whites instead ignore the truth-value of the grievances of blacks, and manage to be ignorant.
Such management is dificult, and Baldwin considers that it is rooted in a deep fear that has crippled whites so that they cannot climb out of this willful ignorance without the help of blacks. (pg 122). Author then points out that this is not necessarily a claim of racism by Baldwin, but instead a claim of ignorance. Yet it is a kind of passive or 'cowardly' racism, set somewhere between white supremecists (who wilfully believe that black grievances are false) and those who believe the grievances are true. Thus it is injustice by 'spinelessness' (pg 124). This is an effective way to indict whites who don't consider themselves blatant racists or white supremecists.
The second section of the chapter talks about what kinds of efforts whites took to create the doxastic attitude they now enjoy. Author looks at the history of the reconstruction, both immediately following the Civil War and also as many as 5 centuries later, with a speech by Woodrow Wilson. In the cases author examines, all discussion of the moral aspects of the war, that it was over the treatment of blacks/slaves, are censored from explicit reference. Instead, reconcilliation is achieved among the whites by talking about how both sides fought bravely, and suffered, and so on. In order to mend the republic of whites, the reasons the war was fought are covered over. But this also covered over the grievances of blacks, effectively creating a screen for whites to enjoy. (pg 126-130)
2/1/08
Mosley, Albert - Modern Racism: A Defense
02/01/2008
Unpublished Paper
This is a paper that attempts to unmask a more 'scientific' form of racism. Instead of arguing for essentialism of the races, the new terminology is the 'relative frequency of traits'. One such writer is Michael Levin, who considers the genetic differences between the races to be ones not of essential difference but of relative occurence. However, he also takes on some form of genetic determinism, strongly downplaying environmental or social factors, or arguing more that it was a matter of choice, or stupidity, that maintains the environmental disparities that could be used as alternate explanations to genetic differences. Author picks apart these arguments and shows how they are a dressed up form of old-fashioned racism.
Author argues that the claim that different races have different distribution of intellectual ability dovetails with Stephen Kershnar's conclusion that races with lower intelligence have lower moral agency, and are less capable of self-rule, or obeying laws, leading to a higher level of criminality.
Author discusses the problems with retaining any talk of races, since it can be used by more modern racists to veil their racism in biologically sanctioned categories.
1/25/08
Mosley, Albert - Race in Contemporary Philosophy
01/25/2008
Unpublished manuscript
Mostly a summary and review of the two strands of thought in philosophy regarding race, this paper takes a reasonable and moderate view of treating race as both biologically based and also socially/culturally maintained or constructed.
Author notes that much of the discussion about race is tainted, or overshadowed, by the essentialist racism that was pervasive for much of our history. Such racism sought to distinguish races by traits that aren't just superficial but deeper and more uniform. The liberal reaction to such biological claims was to point out that there is more difference between intra-racial people than between races, making racial categories 'social constructs'. The prevalence of this argument, coupled with uncovering the genealogy of the use of the concept 'race', has led to the stance that the use of 'race' is not grounded in biology at all but entirely socially constructed.
Author points out that while differences between individuals might be no greater between races than within them, there are differences in occurrence of gene frequencies, much of which is explained by examining geographical (and in some cases, cultural) origin of a 'sub-species'. An example are cases of Sickle Cell Anemia, 97% of occur among African-Americans. The relative gene frequency within certain sub-populations is a biological fact that could serve as a basis for the introduction of the concept of 'race' in a biological context. It is important to remember that we are talking about origins and population patterns, not about essential characteristics due to physical features. Also important is that even those philosophers (Andreasen, Cavalli-Sforza) who talk about such an approach, disagree about whether the usage of 'race' is still valid, some saying there has been enough interbreeding of previously separated populations, others saying that there is still enough difference to sketch out origins.
The disagreement with these thinkers have come from a weird direction. Zack and Glasgow claim that this type of 'cladistic' historical-geographical analysis of human populations in terms of intra-breeding and using gene frequencies might yield genetically recognizable patterns, but those patterns don't correspond to what a 'race' is. The common man's definition is more simplistic, thus science misses at reduction. Author points out that this is equivalent to showing that salt isn't NaCl, since the common man thinks anything that tastes a certain way is 'salt'.
Author finishes by concluding that the new concept of race doesn't justify racism, and that perhaps now 'race' is maintained more so by culture and social practices (segregation, class divides, language barriers) than by geography. Nevertheless, it is important to keep this concept in use, not only for possibly medical expediencies but also for self-identity.
Unpublished manuscript
Mostly a summary and review of the two strands of thought in philosophy regarding race, this paper takes a reasonable and moderate view of treating race as both biologically based and also socially/culturally maintained or constructed.
Author notes that much of the discussion about race is tainted, or overshadowed, by the essentialist racism that was pervasive for much of our history. Such racism sought to distinguish races by traits that aren't just superficial but deeper and more uniform. The liberal reaction to such biological claims was to point out that there is more difference between intra-racial people than between races, making racial categories 'social constructs'. The prevalence of this argument, coupled with uncovering the genealogy of the use of the concept 'race', has led to the stance that the use of 'race' is not grounded in biology at all but entirely socially constructed.
Author points out that while differences between individuals might be no greater between races than within them, there are differences in occurrence of gene frequencies, much of which is explained by examining geographical (and in some cases, cultural) origin of a 'sub-species'. An example are cases of Sickle Cell Anemia, 97% of occur among African-Americans. The relative gene frequency within certain sub-populations is a biological fact that could serve as a basis for the introduction of the concept of 'race' in a biological context. It is important to remember that we are talking about origins and population patterns, not about essential characteristics due to physical features. Also important is that even those philosophers (Andreasen, Cavalli-Sforza) who talk about such an approach, disagree about whether the usage of 'race' is still valid, some saying there has been enough interbreeding of previously separated populations, others saying that there is still enough difference to sketch out origins.
The disagreement with these thinkers have come from a weird direction. Zack and Glasgow claim that this type of 'cladistic' historical-geographical analysis of human populations in terms of intra-breeding and using gene frequencies might yield genetically recognizable patterns, but those patterns don't correspond to what a 'race' is. The common man's definition is more simplistic, thus science misses at reduction. Author points out that this is equivalent to showing that salt isn't NaCl, since the common man thinks anything that tastes a certain way is 'salt'.
Author finishes by concluding that the new concept of race doesn't justify racism, and that perhaps now 'race' is maintained more so by culture and social practices (segregation, class divides, language barriers) than by geography. Nevertheless, it is important to keep this concept in use, not only for possibly medical expediencies but also for self-identity.
1/18/08
Hacking, Ian - Why Race Still Matters
01/18/2008
Daedalus, Winter 2005
This article was written in Nov 2004 and looks at why racial categories persist from a variety of perspectives. Author examines the question from the 'natural kind' perspective, an historical 'genealogical' perspective, a cognitive science and social/political theory perspective.
First is the natural kind approach. This involves a discussion of JS Mill, who was one example of a 'sensible' naturalist. Mill discussed superficial kinds and real kinds of things. A superficial kind is something that shares few similarities and we group mostly by convention e.g. green things, things in my house. Natural kinds share innumerable similarities (and do so not by virtue of our prior sorting of them). Mill points out that it is surely possible-- and an empirical issue-- whether races correspond to a natural kind or are just superficial, sharing only pigmentation and a few other physical features. Though Mill is dubious, he leaves it as an open question. (pg 103-4) In general, science has found no deeper mechanism that could distinguish people enough to call 'race' a natural kind. However, this ignores a more prevalent aspect of science that is practiced these days-- rates of difference. Mill asked for a uniform difference in order to sort into true kinds. These days science instead looks for statistically significant differences. Author defines three types of possible positive outcomes when looking at statistics: (pg 105)
1) Significance: a statistic is significant if 'its distribution in one population is significantly different from that in a comparable population'.
2) Meaningful: a statistic is meaningful if we can explain the origin or cause that makes its occurrence. Note that what is determined to be meaningful is not technical.
3) Useful: a statistic is useful when it can be used in a practical application of some concern-- and the use of that statistic will do good (more than harm, and more than not using it). (pg 105)
Author claims that these three aspects of statistics make the analysis of race not just 'real kind'/'superficial kind' but more complex. Author compares Rushton, who has races as real kinds, to Hernstein & Murray (The Bell Curve), who argue instead that 'races are statistically significant classes' that are meaningful when it comes to IQ. (pg 106) Author discusses how statistically significant classes (that might roughly correspond to races) are useful in medical situations like Tay-Sachs, and 'race-targeted' heart medication. (pg 106-9)
Author next discusses the genealogy of racial classification, highlighting Cornell West's work as an example. Author recounts the story of the first recorded systematic approach to categorizing races, by Francois Bernier in 1684. (pg 110-111) The point is that 'classification and judgment are rarely separable'. (pg 109)
Author moves on to the cognitive science approach and claims it is largely inconclusive. Maybe we have innate categorizing modules, or maybe we learn very quickly from our surroundings that people are meant to be categorized. (pg 111-112)
Author then suggests one link that keeps racial categories active: the nature of having an empire. An empire is a governing or powerful body that ranges over a large swath of people/places/units. Empires conquer. Empires display their conquests in chunks (e.g. racial categories). Empires document what they have conquered in order to tax, properly govern, etc. 'Classification, as an imperial imperative, invites stereotyping.' (pg 113)
Author ties discussion of empire in with the self-other dichotomy and the presumably universal need to distinguish between groups. 'Groups need internal bonds to keep them together, as well as external boundaries for group identity.' (pg 114) One common way of doing this is to have 'pollution rules'. Meaning: this thing x that this out-group does will pollute you, your integrity, your identity. Author claims that every stable group has pollution rules (pg 114 top right). Author discusses how pollution rules have historically applied to race: e.g. one drop of negro blood makes you a negro, no matter how white you look.
Daedalus, Winter 2005
This article was written in Nov 2004 and looks at why racial categories persist from a variety of perspectives. Author examines the question from the 'natural kind' perspective, an historical 'genealogical' perspective, a cognitive science and social/political theory perspective.
First is the natural kind approach. This involves a discussion of JS Mill, who was one example of a 'sensible' naturalist. Mill discussed superficial kinds and real kinds of things. A superficial kind is something that shares few similarities and we group mostly by convention e.g. green things, things in my house. Natural kinds share innumerable similarities (and do so not by virtue of our prior sorting of them). Mill points out that it is surely possible-- and an empirical issue-- whether races correspond to a natural kind or are just superficial, sharing only pigmentation and a few other physical features. Though Mill is dubious, he leaves it as an open question. (pg 103-4) In general, science has found no deeper mechanism that could distinguish people enough to call 'race' a natural kind. However, this ignores a more prevalent aspect of science that is practiced these days-- rates of difference. Mill asked for a uniform difference in order to sort into true kinds. These days science instead looks for statistically significant differences. Author defines three types of possible positive outcomes when looking at statistics: (pg 105)
1) Significance: a statistic is significant if 'its distribution in one population is significantly different from that in a comparable population'.
2) Meaningful: a statistic is meaningful if we can explain the origin or cause that makes its occurrence. Note that what is determined to be meaningful is not technical.
3) Useful: a statistic is useful when it can be used in a practical application of some concern-- and the use of that statistic will do good (more than harm, and more than not using it). (pg 105)
Author claims that these three aspects of statistics make the analysis of race not just 'real kind'/'superficial kind' but more complex. Author compares Rushton, who has races as real kinds, to Hernstein & Murray (The Bell Curve), who argue instead that 'races are statistically significant classes' that are meaningful when it comes to IQ. (pg 106) Author discusses how statistically significant classes (that might roughly correspond to races) are useful in medical situations like Tay-Sachs, and 'race-targeted' heart medication. (pg 106-9)
Author next discusses the genealogy of racial classification, highlighting Cornell West's work as an example. Author recounts the story of the first recorded systematic approach to categorizing races, by Francois Bernier in 1684. (pg 110-111) The point is that 'classification and judgment are rarely separable'. (pg 109)
Author moves on to the cognitive science approach and claims it is largely inconclusive. Maybe we have innate categorizing modules, or maybe we learn very quickly from our surroundings that people are meant to be categorized. (pg 111-112)
Author then suggests one link that keeps racial categories active: the nature of having an empire. An empire is a governing or powerful body that ranges over a large swath of people/places/units. Empires conquer. Empires display their conquests in chunks (e.g. racial categories). Empires document what they have conquered in order to tax, properly govern, etc. 'Classification, as an imperial imperative, invites stereotyping.' (pg 113)
Author ties discussion of empire in with the self-other dichotomy and the presumably universal need to distinguish between groups. 'Groups need internal bonds to keep them together, as well as external boundaries for group identity.' (pg 114) One common way of doing this is to have 'pollution rules'. Meaning: this thing x that this out-group does will pollute you, your integrity, your identity. Author claims that every stable group has pollution rules (pg 114 top right). Author discusses how pollution rules have historically applied to race: e.g. one drop of negro blood makes you a negro, no matter how white you look.
1/11/08
Kitcher, Philip - Does 'Race' Have A Future?
01/11/2008
Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol 35 No 4
This paper fits into a group that deals with the issue of race as possibly a legitimate classification, but denies the standard essentialist support for 'race' and also the accompanying stereotyping. Author takes us through a walk that starts with rejecting an essentialist view of race, instead using a modified 'realist' conception of natural kinds to redefine racial categories, and then ultimately to a pragmatist account of natural kinds, which specifies that inquiries into racial conceptions should have a reasonable motivation.
Author starts by dismissing the standard 'essentialist' notion of distinctive genes or biological markers that distinguish races in Homo Sapiens. Author points out that while this is true, it isn't on point as a retort to using the 'biological species concept', which tries to identify species as populations that would freely interbreed in the wild but for reproductive isolation. (pg 295) Developing this biological concept further, if there is a degree of infra-species inbreeding, due to subtle differences, cultural factors, geography or whatever, this is a biological basis for defining a 'cluster' or race. (pg 296-7) Author points out this could be for pernicious social factors, at least in the case of humans (pg 297). If so, then race could be 'both biologically real and socially constructed'. (pg 298)
Author then takes back some of this discussion's grounding, since it relies on a 'realist' view of natural kinds. He thinks instead that there is no 'natural' way to cut up the world, even though there is just one world to describe. Instead, different categories will emerge given our different interests, a 'pragmatist' approach (pg 299-301) Once one takes the pragmatist approach, it becomes important to indicate the practical importance of using infraspecies breeding patters to define a cluster of inbred populations. Author points out this is useful for such purposes as determining migration patters in human history. But the point here is that the purposes of such an analysis needs to be defended. (pg 301-2) Author points out some other reasons why it might be important as well-- e.g. modern medicine (pg 302-3).
Author discusses statistical genomic analysis that 'clusters' the species by degrees of genetic similarity, but also cautions against using this as a way to revive essential difference talk (pg 306). Author points out that with a pragmatist perspective, it is a legitimate question of whether such research should be done, given that we know there will be some misunderstanding of it and possibly a revival of old 'ogre naturalist' categories. He also points out that much of this analysis will run into the cultural and prejudicial errors of the past, which will seriously muddy such an analysis.
Author finishes piece by pointing out that while not distinctive traits pick out races, trait frequency is different in different inbred clusters. As such, for e.g. bone marrow transplant donors the usage of racial preference seems justifiable but only as an expedient to get a favored group of donors. (pg 312-4)
Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol 35 No 4
This paper fits into a group that deals with the issue of race as possibly a legitimate classification, but denies the standard essentialist support for 'race' and also the accompanying stereotyping. Author takes us through a walk that starts with rejecting an essentialist view of race, instead using a modified 'realist' conception of natural kinds to redefine racial categories, and then ultimately to a pragmatist account of natural kinds, which specifies that inquiries into racial conceptions should have a reasonable motivation.
Author starts by dismissing the standard 'essentialist' notion of distinctive genes or biological markers that distinguish races in Homo Sapiens. Author points out that while this is true, it isn't on point as a retort to using the 'biological species concept', which tries to identify species as populations that would freely interbreed in the wild but for reproductive isolation. (pg 295) Developing this biological concept further, if there is a degree of infra-species inbreeding, due to subtle differences, cultural factors, geography or whatever, this is a biological basis for defining a 'cluster' or race. (pg 296-7) Author points out this could be for pernicious social factors, at least in the case of humans (pg 297). If so, then race could be 'both biologically real and socially constructed'. (pg 298)
Author then takes back some of this discussion's grounding, since it relies on a 'realist' view of natural kinds. He thinks instead that there is no 'natural' way to cut up the world, even though there is just one world to describe. Instead, different categories will emerge given our different interests, a 'pragmatist' approach (pg 299-301) Once one takes the pragmatist approach, it becomes important to indicate the practical importance of using infraspecies breeding patters to define a cluster of inbred populations. Author points out this is useful for such purposes as determining migration patters in human history. But the point here is that the purposes of such an analysis needs to be defended. (pg 301-2) Author points out some other reasons why it might be important as well-- e.g. modern medicine (pg 302-3).
Author discusses statistical genomic analysis that 'clusters' the species by degrees of genetic similarity, but also cautions against using this as a way to revive essential difference talk (pg 306). Author points out that with a pragmatist perspective, it is a legitimate question of whether such research should be done, given that we know there will be some misunderstanding of it and possibly a revival of old 'ogre naturalist' categories. He also points out that much of this analysis will run into the cultural and prejudicial errors of the past, which will seriously muddy such an analysis.
Author finishes piece by pointing out that while not distinctive traits pick out races, trait frequency is different in different inbred clusters. As such, for e.g. bone marrow transplant donors the usage of racial preference seems justifiable but only as an expedient to get a favored group of donors. (pg 312-4)
12/21/07
Kershnar, Stephen - For Interrogational Torture
12/21/2007
International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol 12 No 2 2005
This is a relatively quick and semi-technical piece that considers 'interrogational torture' of an 'attacker' from a a consequentialist and deontological position. The author first has to define the term 'interrogational torture':
Interrogational torture: the imposition of great suffering in a short amount of time that is neither willingly accepted or validly consented to, in order to gain information, usually from the person tortured. (IT)
The next definition is that of an 'attacker':
Attacker: a person who performs a gross injustice and is morally responsible for doing so.
With these two matters cleared up, author first quickly considers cases where, from a consequentialist perspective, IT is permissible. (pg 225). Author then moves to the deontological perspective, and argues that IT of an attacker doesn't violate any right of the attacker, either. Also, it is unclear or a toss-up about whether IT of an attacker is a 'free-floating' wrong (i.e. a wrong that doesn't attach to a particular person). Thus because it isn't a wrong to a person and isn't a free-floating wrong, it isn't wrong. The argument goes as follows:
P1 The only wrong to a person is one that infringes on her moral right
P2 moral rights are either natural rights or non-natural rights
C1 Torture must either wrong a natural right or a non-natural right
P3 IT doesn't infringe on a natural right
P4 IT doesn't infringe on a non-natural right
C2 IT doesn't wrong a person
Author first wants to cast moral rights as powers, in a way that provides support for P1. (pg 225-8) Author discusses three wrongs that might be done to an attacker: 1- infringing of rights, 2- exploitation, 3- contemptuous treatment. Author calls 1 object-centered, 2 subject-centered, and 3 falls either into the object-centered or the subject-centered. Author argues that the object-centered account is the best to go with since it makes the respect for others due to powers they have. Author argues that this properly captures what rights are. (226)
The next major move in the paper involves saying that an attacker has given up her rights against IT when she became an attacker. Author construes this as a case of self-defense. (pg 228-31) The objections are as follows:
Objection 1: Waiving a right against extreme suffering is invalid-- you can't waive such a right. Author's reply: the attacker is actually consenting to IT, though involuntarily, since the attacker lacks alternatives-- but this is not the fault of the torturer. (pg 232)
Objection 2: Autonomy-based rights can't be waived. Author: nonsense: we don't want maximal autonomy but narrative autonomy. What is important in autonomy is 'reflexive autonomy', which is something like [I guess]: 'all things considered, how much autonomy do I want in the upcoming events in my life?' (pg 233)
Objection 3: the reply to objection 2 is insufficient-- you shouldn't be allowed to take away someone's narrative autonomy. Author: remember, this is self-defense!
Objection 4: IT will most likely be imposed using an unreliable procedure, and is therefore unjustified. Author: though it might be 'wrong', it isn't 'morally wrong' in the sense of infringing on anyone's rights. This is a reply to Nozick. (233-4)
The next major discussion is author arguing that IT isn't a free-floating wrong. There are three free-floating wrongs: 1- exploitation, 2- indecency, 3- a failure to satisfy a consequentialist duty (pg 235)
1- Author claims it isn't clear that the attacker is being exploited by IT "It is not clear that the attacker receives an unfair share of the transactional surplus. This depends on the relative magnitude of the two parties' gains..." [what?!]
2- Author claims a reasonable person would find this self-defense not indecent.
3- Is IT optimizing good consequences? Author claims this is a tough empirical question that is most likely to be a toss-up.
So, since it isn't conclusive that IT is a free-floating wrong, and since it doesn't infringe on an attacker's rights, it isn't morally wrong.
International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol 12 No 2 2005
This is a relatively quick and semi-technical piece that considers 'interrogational torture' of an 'attacker' from a a consequentialist and deontological position. The author first has to define the term 'interrogational torture':
Interrogational torture: the imposition of great suffering in a short amount of time that is neither willingly accepted or validly consented to, in order to gain information, usually from the person tortured. (IT)
The next definition is that of an 'attacker':
Attacker: a person who performs a gross injustice and is morally responsible for doing so.
With these two matters cleared up, author first quickly considers cases where, from a consequentialist perspective, IT is permissible. (pg 225). Author then moves to the deontological perspective, and argues that IT of an attacker doesn't violate any right of the attacker, either. Also, it is unclear or a toss-up about whether IT of an attacker is a 'free-floating' wrong (i.e. a wrong that doesn't attach to a particular person). Thus because it isn't a wrong to a person and isn't a free-floating wrong, it isn't wrong. The argument goes as follows:
P1 The only wrong to a person is one that infringes on her moral right
P2 moral rights are either natural rights or non-natural rights
C1 Torture must either wrong a natural right or a non-natural right
P3 IT doesn't infringe on a natural right
P4 IT doesn't infringe on a non-natural right
C2 IT doesn't wrong a person
Author first wants to cast moral rights as powers, in a way that provides support for P1. (pg 225-8) Author discusses three wrongs that might be done to an attacker: 1- infringing of rights, 2- exploitation, 3- contemptuous treatment. Author calls 1 object-centered, 2 subject-centered, and 3 falls either into the object-centered or the subject-centered. Author argues that the object-centered account is the best to go with since it makes the respect for others due to powers they have. Author argues that this properly captures what rights are. (226)
The next major move in the paper involves saying that an attacker has given up her rights against IT when she became an attacker. Author construes this as a case of self-defense. (pg 228-31) The objections are as follows:
Objection 1: Waiving a right against extreme suffering is invalid-- you can't waive such a right. Author's reply: the attacker is actually consenting to IT, though involuntarily, since the attacker lacks alternatives-- but this is not the fault of the torturer. (pg 232)
Objection 2: Autonomy-based rights can't be waived. Author: nonsense: we don't want maximal autonomy but narrative autonomy. What is important in autonomy is 'reflexive autonomy', which is something like [I guess]: 'all things considered, how much autonomy do I want in the upcoming events in my life?' (pg 233)
Objection 3: the reply to objection 2 is insufficient-- you shouldn't be allowed to take away someone's narrative autonomy. Author: remember, this is self-defense!
Objection 4: IT will most likely be imposed using an unreliable procedure, and is therefore unjustified. Author: though it might be 'wrong', it isn't 'morally wrong' in the sense of infringing on anyone's rights. This is a reply to Nozick. (233-4)
The next major discussion is author arguing that IT isn't a free-floating wrong. There are three free-floating wrongs: 1- exploitation, 2- indecency, 3- a failure to satisfy a consequentialist duty (pg 235)
1- Author claims it isn't clear that the attacker is being exploited by IT "It is not clear that the attacker receives an unfair share of the transactional surplus. This depends on the relative magnitude of the two parties' gains..." [what?!]
2- Author claims a reasonable person would find this self-defense not indecent.
3- Is IT optimizing good consequences? Author claims this is a tough empirical question that is most likely to be a toss-up.
So, since it isn't conclusive that IT is a free-floating wrong, and since it doesn't infringe on an attacker's rights, it isn't morally wrong.
12/14/07
Burgess-Jackson, Keith - The Logic of Torture
12/14/2007
Wall Street Journal, Dec 5 2007
This is a rather short piece that lays out some of the issues in moral philosophy: how there are rule and act consequentialists and absolute and moderate deontologists. Author also lays out types of questions around any moral issue (torture not unique in this regard)-- factual questions, conceptual questions, evaluative questions.
Author's position is that it is only conceptual questions that philosophers can help with-- clarifying ideas and correcting conceptual errors only. No one should look to philosophers for evaluative expertise, author claims. "Philosophers, as such, have neither factual nor evaluative expertise. (I would argue that nobody has evaluative expertise.)"
Author also distinguishes between what is permissible by law and what is permissible morally-- how the two are different, specifically that the law has to be practical and apply in a rule-like manner.
Wall Street Journal, Dec 5 2007
This is a rather short piece that lays out some of the issues in moral philosophy: how there are rule and act consequentialists and absolute and moderate deontologists. Author also lays out types of questions around any moral issue (torture not unique in this regard)-- factual questions, conceptual questions, evaluative questions.
Author's position is that it is only conceptual questions that philosophers can help with-- clarifying ideas and correcting conceptual errors only. No one should look to philosophers for evaluative expertise, author claims. "Philosophers, as such, have neither factual nor evaluative expertise. (I would argue that nobody has evaluative expertise.)"
Author also distinguishes between what is permissible by law and what is permissible morally-- how the two are different, specifically that the law has to be practical and apply in a rule-like manner.
12/7/07
Lurz, Robert - In Defense of Wordless Thoughts About Thoughts
12/07/2007
Mind & Language Vol 22 No 3 June 2007
This is a paper almost exclusively aimed at refuting Bermudez's theory of nonlinguistic creatures and their capabilities. On Bermudez's account, nonlinguistic creatures can think about the world and have 'protocausal' reasoning, but cannot think thoughts about thoughts, that is, understand that their thoughts stand in relation to themselves-- that is, have 'higher-order propositional attitudes' or higher-order PAs. Author wants to deny this a priori theory.
First, author attacks the a priori aspect of Bermudez's theory by pointing to some empirical work that underlies the position that nonlinguistic animals can entertain higher-order PAs. (pg 272-3) Important to note that Bermudez does not deny that nonlinguistic animals can have thoughts about mental states, just not PAs. (pg 273)
Author quotes Bermudez and describes his theory:
P1) Ascribing PAs involves higher-order thinking (intentional ascent)
P2) Higher-order thinking (intentional ascent) can only be done by using words for the thoughts-- by using public-language sentences. Intentional ascent involves semantic ascent.
Conclusion: PA ascriptions involve public language. (pg 275)
higher-order thinking is considered by Bermudez to be 'consciously considering thoughts and how they relate to each other', which he names 'second-order cognitive dynamics' (pg 276). A point of interest is that this cannot be a sub-personal representation, since then it would conflict with the language of thought hypothesis. Author denies that ascribing PAs need to be done consciously, since there are many studies that seem to show that when children over 4 ascribe PAs to others, they aren't doing it in an acessible manner. (pg 277-9) Author offers a way out for Bermudez by saying that nonlinguistic animals can't explicitly engage in PA ascriptions, but author considers this a much weaker conclusion (pg 280-2).
Author considers an interpretation of Bermudez's theory: call 'first-order cognitive dynamics' the ability to explicitly, reflectively reason about states of affairs (not thoughts). It seems that Bermudez is committed to nonlinguistic animals doing some form of reasoning, but is it 'first-order cognitive dynamics'? If Bermudez says 'yes', then author tries to trap him into admitting that 'first-order' requires language just as much as 'second-order' does. If Bermudez says 'no': 'this happens on the subpersonal level', why wouldn't this happen for 'second-order' as well? (pg 282-4)
Author considers a possible story that suggests that nonlinguistic animals could reason about PAs. (pg 286-7) The story is about a nonlinguistic animal 'tricking' or letting another have a false belief in order to secure a means of amusement for itself. If the story is possible, then it seems that language isn't required to have reasoning about PAs. This goes directly against Bermudez, who thinks that for a PA to be thought about, it must first be represented, and thus requires a 'vehicle' at the 'personal level' (not sub-personal). If they weren't conscious (personal), then we wouldn't be able to 'regulate and police' our thoughts and what we're entitled to believe. The only viable systems available for all of this is analogue representative models (maps, images, models) and language. But Bermudez says that analogue is out (pg 288) so language is the only contender left standing.
Author denies that these two options are the only way to go, and furthermore that Bermudez is confused. He confuses what is a conscious consideration 'the thought' with whatever does the representative work 'the vehicle'. What is at the personal level are thoughts, the vehicles that represent could easily be at the subpersonal. (pg 288-9) Bermudez's apparent reply is that this seems unlikely since whenever you go and check your thoughts, you get words. (pg 289 bottom) Author denies this: there are thoughts that don't come in words, even though you can put them into words (pg 290-1).
Author concludes that it is an empirical issue, not a conceptual one, whether nonlinguistic animals can ascribe PAs.
Mind & Language Vol 22 No 3 June 2007
This is a paper almost exclusively aimed at refuting Bermudez's theory of nonlinguistic creatures and their capabilities. On Bermudez's account, nonlinguistic creatures can think about the world and have 'protocausal' reasoning, but cannot think thoughts about thoughts, that is, understand that their thoughts stand in relation to themselves-- that is, have 'higher-order propositional attitudes' or higher-order PAs. Author wants to deny this a priori theory.
First, author attacks the a priori aspect of Bermudez's theory by pointing to some empirical work that underlies the position that nonlinguistic animals can entertain higher-order PAs. (pg 272-3) Important to note that Bermudez does not deny that nonlinguistic animals can have thoughts about mental states, just not PAs. (pg 273)
Author quotes Bermudez and describes his theory:
P1) Ascribing PAs involves higher-order thinking (intentional ascent)
P2) Higher-order thinking (intentional ascent) can only be done by using words for the thoughts-- by using public-language sentences. Intentional ascent involves semantic ascent.
Conclusion: PA ascriptions involve public language. (pg 275)
higher-order thinking is considered by Bermudez to be 'consciously considering thoughts and how they relate to each other', which he names 'second-order cognitive dynamics' (pg 276). A point of interest is that this cannot be a sub-personal representation, since then it would conflict with the language of thought hypothesis. Author denies that ascribing PAs need to be done consciously, since there are many studies that seem to show that when children over 4 ascribe PAs to others, they aren't doing it in an acessible manner. (pg 277-9) Author offers a way out for Bermudez by saying that nonlinguistic animals can't explicitly engage in PA ascriptions, but author considers this a much weaker conclusion (pg 280-2).
Author considers an interpretation of Bermudez's theory: call 'first-order cognitive dynamics' the ability to explicitly, reflectively reason about states of affairs (not thoughts). It seems that Bermudez is committed to nonlinguistic animals doing some form of reasoning, but is it 'first-order cognitive dynamics'? If Bermudez says 'yes', then author tries to trap him into admitting that 'first-order' requires language just as much as 'second-order' does. If Bermudez says 'no': 'this happens on the subpersonal level', why wouldn't this happen for 'second-order' as well? (pg 282-4)
Author considers a possible story that suggests that nonlinguistic animals could reason about PAs. (pg 286-7) The story is about a nonlinguistic animal 'tricking' or letting another have a false belief in order to secure a means of amusement for itself. If the story is possible, then it seems that language isn't required to have reasoning about PAs. This goes directly against Bermudez, who thinks that for a PA to be thought about, it must first be represented, and thus requires a 'vehicle' at the 'personal level' (not sub-personal). If they weren't conscious (personal), then we wouldn't be able to 'regulate and police' our thoughts and what we're entitled to believe. The only viable systems available for all of this is analogue representative models (maps, images, models) and language. But Bermudez says that analogue is out (pg 288) so language is the only contender left standing.
Author denies that these two options are the only way to go, and furthermore that Bermudez is confused. He confuses what is a conscious consideration 'the thought' with whatever does the representative work 'the vehicle'. What is at the personal level are thoughts, the vehicles that represent could easily be at the subpersonal. (pg 288-9) Bermudez's apparent reply is that this seems unlikely since whenever you go and check your thoughts, you get words. (pg 289 bottom) Author denies this: there are thoughts that don't come in words, even though you can put them into words (pg 290-1).
Author concludes that it is an empirical issue, not a conceptual one, whether nonlinguistic animals can ascribe PAs.
11/30/07
Simmons, Alison - Changing the Cartesian Mind: Leibniz on Sensation, Representation and Consciousness
11/30/2007
The Philosophical Review, Vol 110 No 1 Jan 2001
This is largely a work of interpretation and explanation of Leibniz's position on the mind as compared to Descartes. Author observes that many lump Leibniz together with Descartes-- both rationalists claiming the soul is immaterial and immortal, etc. However, Leibniz takes the view that perception is primary to the mind, while Descartes is of the view that consciousness is. While this might seem trivial, it isn't; much of the distinctions Leibniz has can, in some ways, be linked to our more modern pictures of the mind, while Descartes is often the whipping boy of the wrong approaches.
Author juxtaposes the two thinkers as Descartes and his followers vs Leibniz. Often when Descartes is unclear on exactly his position, author uses many of his 'followers' like Louis de la Forge, Nicolas Malenbranche, Antoine Arnauld. As far as theory of mind goes, the Cartesian picture is that it is a thinking, i.e. conscious, thing. Nothing in the mind without being conscious-- or else how could it be in the mind? This leaves thinkers open to questions about memories, unconscious sensations, etc. Cartesians claim that these are just unremembered, not unconscious. The conscious aspect of the mind isn't a second-order perceptual ability-- it is intrinsic to the mind itself. The Cartesians do have a concept of 'reflective' consciousness, which is the consideration of a sensation, but still there is 'phenomenal consciousness', which is pervasive in the mind. (pg 36-7)
A second issue author discusses about Descartes is how much ideas/thoughts/conscious episodes are representational. Author claims Descartes is unclear and his followers are divided-- some claiming that it is always representational, others that ideas are modifications of the mind of the thinker, therefore not necessarily representational. (pg 37-9). Either way, it is consciousness, not representation, that is essential to the mind. For the Cartesian, author claims, sensations are: (pg 46-7)
1) Simple
2) Conscious
3) Ineffable or inexplicable
4) Stirred up by motions in bodies but
5) Do not resemble any bodily motions and
6) Do not represent anything bodily
This 6) is included because what we have in the mind doesn't seem to correspond to what is external, though sometimes Descartes and his followers say instead that they are 'confused' representations. (pg 48-50) Author points out some of the difficulty as traceable to missing a distinction between something 'presentationally representing' and 'referentially representing', the later needing to be transparent while the former does not.
The Leibnitzian picture is that perceptual representation (unclear, indistinct sensations) is intrinsic to the mind, not consciousness. Of course, for Leibniz consciousness is a second-order apparatus brought to bear on mental activities-- this is a different picture from the Cartesians. (pg 53-5) If perception is essential, then how does consciousness come into the picture? Author claims that once perceptions become more 'distinct' and are honed into 'sensations', they arise to our 'notice' and we become conscious of them. (pg 56-7) At work here is one of Leibniz's metaphysical commitments of continuity of change-- that nothing has big changes without smaller ones underlying it (pg 45).
Further discussion is about whether sensations are complex or simple. Author interprets Leibniz as saying that sensations are complexes of 'smaller perceptions'-- 'petites perceptions' that appear (confusedly or con-fusedly) as simple.(pg 61-66)
Some may say that Leibniz is saddled with placing the mind-body problem into the mind, instead of solving it. Instead, author claims, there are many good outcomes of this that avoid the mind-far-away-from-body that the Cartesians have. (pg 70)
The Philosophical Review, Vol 110 No 1 Jan 2001
This is largely a work of interpretation and explanation of Leibniz's position on the mind as compared to Descartes. Author observes that many lump Leibniz together with Descartes-- both rationalists claiming the soul is immaterial and immortal, etc. However, Leibniz takes the view that perception is primary to the mind, while Descartes is of the view that consciousness is. While this might seem trivial, it isn't; much of the distinctions Leibniz has can, in some ways, be linked to our more modern pictures of the mind, while Descartes is often the whipping boy of the wrong approaches.
Author juxtaposes the two thinkers as Descartes and his followers vs Leibniz. Often when Descartes is unclear on exactly his position, author uses many of his 'followers' like Louis de la Forge, Nicolas Malenbranche, Antoine Arnauld. As far as theory of mind goes, the Cartesian picture is that it is a thinking, i.e. conscious, thing. Nothing in the mind without being conscious-- or else how could it be in the mind? This leaves thinkers open to questions about memories, unconscious sensations, etc. Cartesians claim that these are just unremembered, not unconscious. The conscious aspect of the mind isn't a second-order perceptual ability-- it is intrinsic to the mind itself. The Cartesians do have a concept of 'reflective' consciousness, which is the consideration of a sensation, but still there is 'phenomenal consciousness', which is pervasive in the mind. (pg 36-7)
A second issue author discusses about Descartes is how much ideas/thoughts/conscious episodes are representational. Author claims Descartes is unclear and his followers are divided-- some claiming that it is always representational, others that ideas are modifications of the mind of the thinker, therefore not necessarily representational. (pg 37-9). Either way, it is consciousness, not representation, that is essential to the mind. For the Cartesian, author claims, sensations are: (pg 46-7)
1) Simple
2) Conscious
3) Ineffable or inexplicable
4) Stirred up by motions in bodies but
5) Do not resemble any bodily motions and
6) Do not represent anything bodily
This 6) is included because what we have in the mind doesn't seem to correspond to what is external, though sometimes Descartes and his followers say instead that they are 'confused' representations. (pg 48-50) Author points out some of the difficulty as traceable to missing a distinction between something 'presentationally representing' and 'referentially representing', the later needing to be transparent while the former does not.
The Leibnitzian picture is that perceptual representation (unclear, indistinct sensations) is intrinsic to the mind, not consciousness. Of course, for Leibniz consciousness is a second-order apparatus brought to bear on mental activities-- this is a different picture from the Cartesians. (pg 53-5) If perception is essential, then how does consciousness come into the picture? Author claims that once perceptions become more 'distinct' and are honed into 'sensations', they arise to our 'notice' and we become conscious of them. (pg 56-7) At work here is one of Leibniz's metaphysical commitments of continuity of change-- that nothing has big changes without smaller ones underlying it (pg 45).
Further discussion is about whether sensations are complex or simple. Author interprets Leibniz as saying that sensations are complexes of 'smaller perceptions'-- 'petites perceptions' that appear (confusedly or con-fusedly) as simple.(pg 61-66)
Some may say that Leibniz is saddled with placing the mind-body problem into the mind, instead of solving it. Instead, author claims, there are many good outcomes of this that avoid the mind-far-away-from-body that the Cartesians have. (pg 70)
11/16/07
Moller, Dan - Love And Death
11/16/2007
The Journal of Philosophy, June 2007
This is a relatively quick paper that discusses recent findings in psychology that people tend to recover relatively quickly after the death of their spouse. There are a number that don't, but in general there is remarkable 'resiliency' in the face of losing a loved one (the discussion is mostly about romantic love). This contradicts the conventional wisdom/folk psychology about grieving. Author considers this ability to have a brief grieving period and then relatively quick return to regular emotive states the 'Adaptive Theory' (pg 304). The Adaptive Theory:
The rationality of activity is evaluated according to whatever propensity that activity has toward promoting a person's interests.
One major concern about these findings is a lack of care for another(carelessness). Another concern is a lack of importance to or valuing of others (shallowness). Author wants to show these two as distinct. Both commonly use conditionals or counterfactuals, but author claims that it is clear we care for others because of the enormously costly things we will do for them while they are alive.(pg 307-8) Author discusses instead that these findings threaten the concept of importance, perhaps because the concept includes something like 'I am not replaceable'. (pg 308-10)
Another concern about these findings is that we may not be able to 'properly' grieve, or somehow not be able to 'digest' our loss. This is because the resilience factor goes to work before, perhaps, we are able to fully figure out what we have gone through. There is some evidence that we need emotions in order to complete our cognition of fraught experiences. (pg 311-2)
Author finishes paper (section III) by arguing that this is some sort of 'middle way' between complete shallowness and unending grief.
Note: In this paper there is an interesting summary of our errors in 'affective forecasting' and how readily we return to an affective 'baseline' within 3 months (approx) after good or bad events occur. (pg 305-7)
The Journal of Philosophy, June 2007
This is a relatively quick paper that discusses recent findings in psychology that people tend to recover relatively quickly after the death of their spouse. There are a number that don't, but in general there is remarkable 'resiliency' in the face of losing a loved one (the discussion is mostly about romantic love). This contradicts the conventional wisdom/folk psychology about grieving. Author considers this ability to have a brief grieving period and then relatively quick return to regular emotive states the 'Adaptive Theory' (pg 304). The Adaptive Theory:
The rationality of activity is evaluated according to whatever propensity that activity has toward promoting a person's interests.
One major concern about these findings is a lack of care for another(carelessness). Another concern is a lack of importance to or valuing of others (shallowness). Author wants to show these two as distinct. Both commonly use conditionals or counterfactuals, but author claims that it is clear we care for others because of the enormously costly things we will do for them while they are alive.(pg 307-8) Author discusses instead that these findings threaten the concept of importance, perhaps because the concept includes something like 'I am not replaceable'. (pg 308-10)
Another concern about these findings is that we may not be able to 'properly' grieve, or somehow not be able to 'digest' our loss. This is because the resilience factor goes to work before, perhaps, we are able to fully figure out what we have gone through. There is some evidence that we need emotions in order to complete our cognition of fraught experiences. (pg 311-2)
Author finishes paper (section III) by arguing that this is some sort of 'middle way' between complete shallowness and unending grief.
Note: In this paper there is an interesting summary of our errors in 'affective forecasting' and how readily we return to an affective 'baseline' within 3 months (approx) after good or bad events occur. (pg 305-7)
11/9/07
MacAllen, Susan - 'Muslim Immigrants--a Quandary'
11/09/2007
FaithFreedom.org July 25, 2007
This is a very short paper discussing the problems Denmark has faced with its muslim population. Denmark has traditionally had a 'cradle-to-grave' welfare system and a very generous immigrant welfare system designed to give immigrants many benefits and encourage 'multiculturalism' and 'inclusiveness'. This has been very ineffectual with the growing muslim immigrant population, and instead they have taken social services and been very hostile toward Danish culture.
Denmark has seen upticks in crime, murder, etc., mostly due to the muslim population. This, coupled with large welfare spending on a relatively small muslim immigrant population, has led to the election of a very conservative government that has placed exceedingly high bars for immigrants to become citizens.
FaithFreedom.org July 25, 2007
This is a very short paper discussing the problems Denmark has faced with its muslim population. Denmark has traditionally had a 'cradle-to-grave' welfare system and a very generous immigrant welfare system designed to give immigrants many benefits and encourage 'multiculturalism' and 'inclusiveness'. This has been very ineffectual with the growing muslim immigrant population, and instead they have taken social services and been very hostile toward Danish culture.
Denmark has seen upticks in crime, murder, etc., mostly due to the muslim population. This, coupled with large welfare spending on a relatively small muslim immigrant population, has led to the election of a very conservative government that has placed exceedingly high bars for immigrants to become citizens.
11/2/07
Chadha, Monima - No Speech, Never Mind!
11/02/2007
Philosophical Psychology Vol 20 No 5 October 2007
The primary goal of this paper is to refute Donald Davidson's old claim that only language users have beliefs. In the early part of the paper, author rehearses Davidson's discussion from 1982 onward, culminating in a summary of Davidson's main argument: (pg 644)
Premise 1 (P1): Only interpreters can have the concept of belief
Premise 2 (P2): Only creatures who have the concept of belief can have beliefs
Conclusion: Only interpreters can have beliefs
For Davidson, interpretation is necessary for the concept of belief because a belief is distinct from an incorrigible representation, and an interpreter needs to know this. Interpretation functions because it charitably assumes that the speaker means something true, but still may be wrong (or lying). To have the concept of belief, one must grasp the subjective/objective distinction. But how does one grasp such a thing if one isn't involved in the 'social activity of interpreting the utterances of others'? (pg 645). Davidson claims that other sorts of behavior modification are insufficient to show subjective/objective distinction-- it can only be done with language users in a social context-- only be done by interpreters. This is the argument for showing with P1 is necessary.
Author points out that Davidson's argument for P2 actually shows that P2 is sufficient for belief, not that it is necessary. Davidson admits this, but then challenges interlocutors to come up with another way that one can discover the subjective/objective distinction without having the concept of belief. Since none so far have answered the challenge, Davidson concludes it is necessary too. (pg 646)
Interlude: Davidson suggested in "Thought and Talk" that he had another argument for P1, using the opacity of substitution for beliefs. The rational explanation for the teleology of a belief is fine grained, using language only to get the distinctions. Non-linguistic creatures will fail to get these fine-grained intentional states into their systems of interpretation, so they will be rather un-belief-like. This has been challenged by other writers as being too rational-teleological and not functional-teleological. (pg 646-7)
Author will consider a different strategy: she will attempt to provide another way that non-linguistic creatures can have the subjective/objective distinction without having the concept of belief. This is primarily established using case studies of other primates. Author does the work to establish another kind of mental state, 'metacognition'. Metacognition differs from higher-order intentional states because it doesn't go upward in the intentional. This sort of metacognition monitors other mental states or processes and takes part in their modification, but does not have higher-order accessibility ('the concept of belief') (pg 649). The key here for the author is to position this metacognitive function in terms of monitoring and controlling information flow from perception and instincts or, roughly, desires. Author shows that chimpanzees and bonobos often will interpret the behavior of their conspecifics, putting them into the category of interpreters. (pg 650-1) Often primates will also engage in deception, which goes a significant way to showing they are making use of the subjective/objective distinction. So a non-linguistic animal might not have the concept of truth or falsity but still have metacognitive normative mechanism that amends false beliefs and affirms true ones, at least within certain contexts (they aren't context-free, like we think our rationality is!). (pg 653).
Author main point is that the interpretive capacities of some non-linguistic animals gives license to ascribe to them mental states, and they don't need the concept of belief to be interpreters. They need instead to have a context-dependent normative metacognitive ability to monitor and control their belief nets.
Philosophical Psychology Vol 20 No 5 October 2007
The primary goal of this paper is to refute Donald Davidson's old claim that only language users have beliefs. In the early part of the paper, author rehearses Davidson's discussion from 1982 onward, culminating in a summary of Davidson's main argument: (pg 644)
Premise 1 (P1): Only interpreters can have the concept of belief
Premise 2 (P2): Only creatures who have the concept of belief can have beliefs
Conclusion: Only interpreters can have beliefs
For Davidson, interpretation is necessary for the concept of belief because a belief is distinct from an incorrigible representation, and an interpreter needs to know this. Interpretation functions because it charitably assumes that the speaker means something true, but still may be wrong (or lying). To have the concept of belief, one must grasp the subjective/objective distinction. But how does one grasp such a thing if one isn't involved in the 'social activity of interpreting the utterances of others'? (pg 645). Davidson claims that other sorts of behavior modification are insufficient to show subjective/objective distinction-- it can only be done with language users in a social context-- only be done by interpreters. This is the argument for showing with P1 is necessary.
Author points out that Davidson's argument for P2 actually shows that P2 is sufficient for belief, not that it is necessary. Davidson admits this, but then challenges interlocutors to come up with another way that one can discover the subjective/objective distinction without having the concept of belief. Since none so far have answered the challenge, Davidson concludes it is necessary too. (pg 646)
Interlude: Davidson suggested in "Thought and Talk" that he had another argument for P1, using the opacity of substitution for beliefs. The rational explanation for the teleology of a belief is fine grained, using language only to get the distinctions. Non-linguistic creatures will fail to get these fine-grained intentional states into their systems of interpretation, so they will be rather un-belief-like. This has been challenged by other writers as being too rational-teleological and not functional-teleological. (pg 646-7)
Author will consider a different strategy: she will attempt to provide another way that non-linguistic creatures can have the subjective/objective distinction without having the concept of belief. This is primarily established using case studies of other primates. Author does the work to establish another kind of mental state, 'metacognition'. Metacognition differs from higher-order intentional states because it doesn't go upward in the intentional. This sort of metacognition monitors other mental states or processes and takes part in their modification, but does not have higher-order accessibility ('the concept of belief') (pg 649). The key here for the author is to position this metacognitive function in terms of monitoring and controlling information flow from perception and instincts or, roughly, desires. Author shows that chimpanzees and bonobos often will interpret the behavior of their conspecifics, putting them into the category of interpreters. (pg 650-1) Often primates will also engage in deception, which goes a significant way to showing they are making use of the subjective/objective distinction. So a non-linguistic animal might not have the concept of truth or falsity but still have metacognitive normative mechanism that amends false beliefs and affirms true ones, at least within certain contexts (they aren't context-free, like we think our rationality is!). (pg 653).
Author main point is that the interpretive capacities of some non-linguistic animals gives license to ascribe to them mental states, and they don't need the concept of belief to be interpreters. They need instead to have a context-dependent normative metacognitive ability to monitor and control their belief nets.
10/26/07
Neween, Albert & Bartels, Andreas - Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts
10/26/2007
Philosophical Psychology Vol 20 No 3 June 2007
This quick moving paper takes a combination of empirical, intuitive and reasoned approach to giving an epistemic model of concept possession. That is to say: it tries to lay out conditions where we can ascribe the possession of concepts in non-human animals. The first step is to lay out what it means to have a concept. Here, authors borrow from Peacocke in using a psychological-functional mental-capacities approach to concepts. (pg 284) Here also some preliminary ground work is done for what a concept is, how to individuate it, and so on.
The beginning attacks prior writers (Chater & Heyes) that argued that there are three theories of what a concept is: definitional, exemplar, and prototype. The problem is that only prototype concepts can be 'formulated' nonlinguistically, so thus nonlinguistic animals can only have this type of concept. But often it is impossible to tell the difference between conditioned stimulus-response (S-R) systems and prototype concept use. Using principles of parsimony, there is no reason to think animals have concepts. Authors take this to be a challenge of determining the differences between S-R and concept use. (pg 285-6)
Authors consider various approaches, e.g. Dretske, Allen & Hauser/Allen. Dretske gives the idea that you need a flexible response to the same stimuli at a minimum (to distinguish between S-R and concept use). Allen suggests that concepts require integration of more than one source of information in order to modify behavior-- stimulus independent, or as Pylyshyn suggests, 'transcendence of particular stimuli' (pg 287). Using this we arrive at the value of 'stable representations' that are independent of particular stimuli. This constraint is only necessary (not sufficient), since it could merely give us naming abilities for objects (see collie discussion pg 288).
Authors consider the Davidson argument about belief possession, and say flat out that it is wrong because it presupposes second-order belief usage in order to have first-order beliefs. That is, you need to have a concept of a concept before you can have a concept. Authors deny this could be realistic (pg 289), but agree with Davidson that there is a normative element to concept possession. Authors instead take this more modest metacognitive criterion from Allen:
ii. An Organism is capable of detecting some of its own discrimination errors between veridical applications of concept X and veridical applications of concept X (pg 289)
The next step is to have the ability to extract classes from perceptual data-- to separate properties from objects. Authors examine the case study for Alex the parrot, that was able to successfully 85% separate objects into piles according to the categories color, shape, material. Thus showing not just that Alex could learn red, blue, etc., but also higher-level categories. (pg 292-4) Authors distinguish between three different categories of cognitive capacities: nonconceptual representations (S-R), conceptual representations and propositional representations. Here is an interesting discussion about the 'cognitive' and what it means for something to be cognitive. [Clearly, 'cognition' isn't the same as 'thinking' anymore if an ant can do it to get home!] (pg 294) Here we are homing in on conceptual representations. In order to have a first-order perceptual concept (e.g. RED):
C1: The system has a stable representation of the property across a range of objects
C2: The system must be able to represent not only property X but also other properties of the same object
C3: The system has a distinguishing capacity that picks out particular properties of an object that is independent of the stimulus of the property itself (e.g. the system can, on its own, pick out the relevant property without its making itself salient somehow)
C4: The system has a minimal semantic net where the first-order concept fits into a proper dimension (e.g. RED fits into COLOR rather than STOPS or DANGER-WARNINGS).
There is extended discussion on these necessary conditions. (pg 296-7). Authors give their suggestions for what propositional representations are-- the combination of two concepts that are strongly stimulus-independent. Authors then look at the empirical evidence to see how non-human animals fit into the criteria. (pg 298-300) Authors reply to a few objections and summarize their claims. (pg 303-305)
Philosophical Psychology Vol 20 No 3 June 2007
This quick moving paper takes a combination of empirical, intuitive and reasoned approach to giving an epistemic model of concept possession. That is to say: it tries to lay out conditions where we can ascribe the possession of concepts in non-human animals. The first step is to lay out what it means to have a concept. Here, authors borrow from Peacocke in using a psychological-functional mental-capacities approach to concepts. (pg 284) Here also some preliminary ground work is done for what a concept is, how to individuate it, and so on.
The beginning attacks prior writers (Chater & Heyes) that argued that there are three theories of what a concept is: definitional, exemplar, and prototype. The problem is that only prototype concepts can be 'formulated' nonlinguistically, so thus nonlinguistic animals can only have this type of concept. But often it is impossible to tell the difference between conditioned stimulus-response (S-R) systems and prototype concept use. Using principles of parsimony, there is no reason to think animals have concepts. Authors take this to be a challenge of determining the differences between S-R and concept use. (pg 285-6)
Authors consider various approaches, e.g. Dretske, Allen & Hauser/Allen. Dretske gives the idea that you need a flexible response to the same stimuli at a minimum (to distinguish between S-R and concept use). Allen suggests that concepts require integration of more than one source of information in order to modify behavior-- stimulus independent, or as Pylyshyn suggests, 'transcendence of particular stimuli' (pg 287). Using this we arrive at the value of 'stable representations' that are independent of particular stimuli. This constraint is only necessary (not sufficient), since it could merely give us naming abilities for objects (see collie discussion pg 288).
Authors consider the Davidson argument about belief possession, and say flat out that it is wrong because it presupposes second-order belief usage in order to have first-order beliefs. That is, you need to have a concept of a concept before you can have a concept. Authors deny this could be realistic (pg 289), but agree with Davidson that there is a normative element to concept possession. Authors instead take this more modest metacognitive criterion from Allen:
ii. An Organism is capable of detecting some of its own discrimination errors between veridical applications of concept X and veridical applications of concept X (pg 289)
The next step is to have the ability to extract classes from perceptual data-- to separate properties from objects. Authors examine the case study for Alex the parrot, that was able to successfully 85% separate objects into piles according to the categories color, shape, material. Thus showing not just that Alex could learn red, blue, etc., but also higher-level categories. (pg 292-4) Authors distinguish between three different categories of cognitive capacities: nonconceptual representations (S-R), conceptual representations and propositional representations. Here is an interesting discussion about the 'cognitive' and what it means for something to be cognitive. [Clearly, 'cognition' isn't the same as 'thinking' anymore if an ant can do it to get home!] (pg 294) Here we are homing in on conceptual representations. In order to have a first-order perceptual concept (e.g. RED):
C1: The system has a stable representation of the property across a range of objects
C2: The system must be able to represent not only property X but also other properties of the same object
C3: The system has a distinguishing capacity that picks out particular properties of an object that is independent of the stimulus of the property itself (e.g. the system can, on its own, pick out the relevant property without its making itself salient somehow)
C4: The system has a minimal semantic net where the first-order concept fits into a proper dimension (e.g. RED fits into COLOR rather than STOPS or DANGER-WARNINGS).
There is extended discussion on these necessary conditions. (pg 296-7). Authors give their suggestions for what propositional representations are-- the combination of two concepts that are strongly stimulus-independent. Authors then look at the empirical evidence to see how non-human animals fit into the criteria. (pg 298-300) Authors reply to a few objections and summarize their claims. (pg 303-305)
10/18/07
Aizawa, Kenneth - Understanding the Embodiment of Perception
10/19/2007
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 1 January 2007
This is an essay regarding the different views of the embodiment of perception, which author beings by acknowledging is obviously embodied. There are two contending views, the COH and the CAH. The COH is opposed by author, which is the view that
COH: Perceptual experience is constituted in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills
This contrasts with
CAH: Perceptual experience is caused in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills
Author claims this is an important discussion because the COH gives grist for the extended mind hypothesis, while the CAH does not particularly do so. The main target in this paper is a book by Noe Action in Perception. Noe calls the COH the enactive approach. 'Perception is not a process in the brain but a kind of skillful activity on the part of the animal as a whole' (pg 9). Author first makes some preliminary comments:
1) Perceptual experience is not the same as mere peripheral stimulation of sense organs-- something more than sensation. (pg 9-10)
2) This debate is an empirical one, or settled by interpretations of empirical evidence-- e.g. not a priori or analytic. Thus, we need a definition or analysis of perception that leaves it open whether COH or CAH is right.
3) Sensorimotor skills are practical knowledge, not just (or maybe not at all) theoretical knowledge. This is complicated by Noe's apparent belief that sensorimotor skills also involve a level of theoretical knowledge.
Author reviews various empirical cases where COH (or CAH) is supposed to be supported: cases of removing congenital cataracts, cases of wearing distorting lenses, cases of images that fade from sight upon fixation. In each case, author gives alternatives to the COH analysis and supposes that COH fails to be established.
In the first case (of removing congenital cataracts), Noe claims that these are cases of 'experiential blindness', meaning that they cannot integrate sensations with patterns of movement and thought. Author claims 'it appears to be possible that some humans might perceive things, only without these perceptions being integrated into patterns of personal movement and thought.' (pg 15) Further, even if it were correct that these patients have 'experiential blindness', this would still fail to establish COH, since CAH can offer the alternative explanation that these patients' sensorimotor skills aren't yet connected (causally) to their sensory apparatus in the proper way. (pg 16)
The second example involves wearing distorting lenses and possible being 'experientially blind' in some manner or other. Author instead claims that since the subject is able to recognize these distorted objects, the subject really is perceiving. (pg 17) Further, all distorting lenses will really prove is a weaker version of COH, namely that the ability to exercises one kind of sensorimotor skill constitutes one kind of perception. Author claims this is weaker and doesn't establish COH. (pg 18)
Author also offers empirical evidence against COH, in the case of paralysis. Here is seems there is no exercise of sensorimotor skills, yet preception takes place. (pg 20-23)
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 1 January 2007
This is an essay regarding the different views of the embodiment of perception, which author beings by acknowledging is obviously embodied. There are two contending views, the COH and the CAH. The COH is opposed by author, which is the view that
COH: Perceptual experience is constituted in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills
This contrasts with
CAH: Perceptual experience is caused in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills
Author claims this is an important discussion because the COH gives grist for the extended mind hypothesis, while the CAH does not particularly do so. The main target in this paper is a book by Noe Action in Perception. Noe calls the COH the enactive approach. 'Perception is not a process in the brain but a kind of skillful activity on the part of the animal as a whole' (pg 9). Author first makes some preliminary comments:
1) Perceptual experience is not the same as mere peripheral stimulation of sense organs-- something more than sensation. (pg 9-10)
2) This debate is an empirical one, or settled by interpretations of empirical evidence-- e.g. not a priori or analytic. Thus, we need a definition or analysis of perception that leaves it open whether COH or CAH is right.
3) Sensorimotor skills are practical knowledge, not just (or maybe not at all) theoretical knowledge. This is complicated by Noe's apparent belief that sensorimotor skills also involve a level of theoretical knowledge.
Author reviews various empirical cases where COH (or CAH) is supposed to be supported: cases of removing congenital cataracts, cases of wearing distorting lenses, cases of images that fade from sight upon fixation. In each case, author gives alternatives to the COH analysis and supposes that COH fails to be established.
In the first case (of removing congenital cataracts), Noe claims that these are cases of 'experiential blindness', meaning that they cannot integrate sensations with patterns of movement and thought. Author claims 'it appears to be possible that some humans might perceive things, only without these perceptions being integrated into patterns of personal movement and thought.' (pg 15) Further, even if it were correct that these patients have 'experiential blindness', this would still fail to establish COH, since CAH can offer the alternative explanation that these patients' sensorimotor skills aren't yet connected (causally) to their sensory apparatus in the proper way. (pg 16)
The second example involves wearing distorting lenses and possible being 'experientially blind' in some manner or other. Author instead claims that since the subject is able to recognize these distorted objects, the subject really is perceiving. (pg 17) Further, all distorting lenses will really prove is a weaker version of COH, namely that the ability to exercises one kind of sensorimotor skill constitutes one kind of perception. Author claims this is weaker and doesn't establish COH. (pg 18)
Author also offers empirical evidence against COH, in the case of paralysis. Here is seems there is no exercise of sensorimotor skills, yet preception takes place. (pg 20-23)
10/12/07
Davidson, Donald - Problems in the Explanation of Action
10/12/2007
Metaphysics and Morality; Essays in honour of JJC Smart, Petit, Sylvan & Norman eds. Blackwell, 1987
Author starts with discussing his views on intentional actions and actions explained by reference to intentions. Specifically, author investigates the question posed by Wittgenstein: 'What must be added to my arm going up to make it my raising my arm?' Author claims that there is nothing that must be added; first is a discussion that if a raising of an arm is an effect of a previous act of the agent, it seems that previous act must also have a previous act, ad infinitum. The case is simple in the case of the arm raising the arm that is raised. However, what if a rope is tied to a pulley that raises a paralyzed arm (I pull the rope with the other arm)? It seems here there is the pulling of the lever and the raising of the arm-- 2 events. Author rejects this (pg 37), saying the 'two events' are identical. In a sense, the rising of my arm is not part of my raising my arm.
The next difficulty has to do with possible objections raised to this 'identity' thesis that show a disjunct between cause and effect, or at least a period of time and/or space that separates the two, thereby plausibly questioning the identity of the two 'actions'. (e.g. my sending a thank you message and the recipient not getting it until later) (pg 38). Author replies that often causal verbs actually have two (or more) parts where x causes y, then y causes z. This can fix certain space/time problems.
Author moves to a concern for giving explanations for actions. Often the explanation takes the form of describing the intention for the consequence. Author takes back a previous claim he had made in "Actions, Reasons and Causes" where he claimed that 'there were no such states as intending, there were just intentional actions.' Author claims that 'it is not enough to ensure that an action was performed with a certain intention that it was caused by that intention' (pg 39) and gives examples of deviant causal chains, which leads author to conclude that 'concepts of event, cause and intention are inadequate to account for intentional action'.
Forming an intention requires a belief and a 'pro-attitude' or desire. Desires aren't the same as intentions, since, according to the author, a desire is a conditional, dispositional state that can be countermanded, while an intention is 'sandwiched between cause and effect' (pg 41). The complaint now is that it seems that only an explanation of which desires and beliefs formed the intention that is a reason for the action (plays the part of a cause). The problem here is that it seems that the explanation for the cause is dependent on how the events are described and can be considered fragile in this way compared to the hard sciences. Perhaps what is desirable are psycho-laws that, once you specify the belief&desire, lawfully cause the action. Since these haven't been found, author claims this is not a reason to say reasons don't cause actions, rather that Author attempts to fix this problem by saying that causal powers may be mentioned in different explanatory contexts, but in principle instantiate laws (pg 42, bottom). This has come under criticism.
Author considers various attempts to specify reason-explanation laws, that are mostly inadequate (pg 43-4). His conclusion is that 'laws relating the mental and the physical are not like the laws of physics, therefore are not reducible to them' (pg 45) The big complaint (that is relevant to our recent previous readings) is that events causes each other by virtue of the lawlike behavior of properties, but the only real properties are physical. Thus there can't be mental-physical causation. Author then says that there are all sorts of kinds of laws, and with that different kinds of explanatory schemes that will apply according to our interests. This will make different properties causally efficacious. In the physical universe only (free of our interests), all properties cause the effect. (pg 45-6)
Author finishes by saying that there is a further distinction between physics, the special sciences (which may theoretically be ultimately reducible to physics) and reason-explanation in the explanation of action. The distinction between any scientific explanation and reason-explanations, is the normative. Here author identifies the semantic content as vital to explanation, and semantic content is subject to our interests in consistency, correctness, etc. Author ends by arguing against a behavioral system of 'black box' psychology.
Metaphysics and Morality; Essays in honour of JJC Smart, Petit, Sylvan & Norman eds. Blackwell, 1987
Author starts with discussing his views on intentional actions and actions explained by reference to intentions. Specifically, author investigates the question posed by Wittgenstein: 'What must be added to my arm going up to make it my raising my arm?' Author claims that there is nothing that must be added; first is a discussion that if a raising of an arm is an effect of a previous act of the agent, it seems that previous act must also have a previous act, ad infinitum. The case is simple in the case of the arm raising the arm that is raised. However, what if a rope is tied to a pulley that raises a paralyzed arm (I pull the rope with the other arm)? It seems here there is the pulling of the lever and the raising of the arm-- 2 events. Author rejects this (pg 37), saying the 'two events' are identical. In a sense, the rising of my arm is not part of my raising my arm.
The next difficulty has to do with possible objections raised to this 'identity' thesis that show a disjunct between cause and effect, or at least a period of time and/or space that separates the two, thereby plausibly questioning the identity of the two 'actions'. (e.g. my sending a thank you message and the recipient not getting it until later) (pg 38). Author replies that often causal verbs actually have two (or more) parts where x causes y, then y causes z. This can fix certain space/time problems.
Author moves to a concern for giving explanations for actions. Often the explanation takes the form of describing the intention for the consequence. Author takes back a previous claim he had made in "Actions, Reasons and Causes" where he claimed that 'there were no such states as intending, there were just intentional actions.' Author claims that 'it is not enough to ensure that an action was performed with a certain intention that it was caused by that intention' (pg 39) and gives examples of deviant causal chains, which leads author to conclude that 'concepts of event, cause and intention are inadequate to account for intentional action'.
Forming an intention requires a belief and a 'pro-attitude' or desire. Desires aren't the same as intentions, since, according to the author, a desire is a conditional, dispositional state that can be countermanded, while an intention is 'sandwiched between cause and effect' (pg 41). The complaint now is that it seems that only an explanation of which desires and beliefs formed the intention that is a reason for the action (plays the part of a cause). The problem here is that it seems that the explanation for the cause is dependent on how the events are described and can be considered fragile in this way compared to the hard sciences. Perhaps what is desirable are psycho-laws that, once you specify the belief&desire, lawfully cause the action. Since these haven't been found, author claims this is not a reason to say reasons don't cause actions, rather that Author attempts to fix this problem by saying that causal powers may be mentioned in different explanatory contexts, but in principle instantiate laws (pg 42, bottom). This has come under criticism.
Author considers various attempts to specify reason-explanation laws, that are mostly inadequate (pg 43-4). His conclusion is that 'laws relating the mental and the physical are not like the laws of physics, therefore are not reducible to them' (pg 45) The big complaint (that is relevant to our recent previous readings) is that events causes each other by virtue of the lawlike behavior of properties, but the only real properties are physical. Thus there can't be mental-physical causation. Author then says that there are all sorts of kinds of laws, and with that different kinds of explanatory schemes that will apply according to our interests. This will make different properties causally efficacious. In the physical universe only (free of our interests), all properties cause the effect. (pg 45-6)
Author finishes by saying that there is a further distinction between physics, the special sciences (which may theoretically be ultimately reducible to physics) and reason-explanation in the explanation of action. The distinction between any scientific explanation and reason-explanations, is the normative. Here author identifies the semantic content as vital to explanation, and semantic content is subject to our interests in consistency, correctness, etc. Author ends by arguing against a behavioral system of 'black box' psychology.
10/5/07
Polger, Thomas - Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind
10/05/2007
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 85 No 2 June 2007
Author's main target is Gillett's account of Realization and Reduction. Author has numerous objections to the family of realization accounts (Kim, Shoemaker, Gillett), as well as Gillett's specifically, which is called the 'dimensional' view. Author claims that these accounts of realization will destroy the distinction between Realization Physicalism (RP) and the original account (the account that RP was supposed to be an alternative to), identity theories. Author does not want to defend RP, but instead make sense of Realization so that RP can be properly evaluated.
Realization is not the same as 'instantiation'. Author gives multiple examples of use of the term 'realization' (pg 235), and suggests that the paradigm 'textbook' case is something like:
My computer currently realizes Microsoft Word; or
Memory fixation is realized in humans by long term potentiation of neurons.
"Certain electrical states of the device realize computational states such as, say, storing the contents of the last copy operation. The electrical activity of the device is not identical to any program state of Microsoft Word, but it implements or realizes such program states" (pg 236)
Author takes the view of Gillett et al to be that causal powers of properties of objects individuate the realization of the function in question. Author considers this the 'causal view' of Realization. Gillett's view differs from Kim & Shoemaker's in that their view is of a 'flat' causal theory where realizer and realized properties are in the same object, at the same level, in virtue simply of causal powers. Gillett's view is that the realizer properties can take place at a lower level, or a horizontal one, or as part of the structure of the object (or at the object level). This is considered the 'dimensional' causal view. (pg 238)
Author's major reply to the entire causal view is that it fails to capture objects that realize abstract processes, like machines that realize 'addition' or 'Microsoft Word'(pg 240). The claim is that an abstract function like addition is a formal and not a causal relation, and so you can't use causal powers to individuate them. Thus the causal approach fails to capture textbook cases of abstract, formal, or algorithm realization, since these things get realized but the objects/properties that realize them are not doing so causally but in form instead. Author extends this to intentional and etiological (historical) realized properties too (e.g. A US dollar is whatever the US Gov't says is a dollar). Author predicts there will be numerous objections to his attack, which he considers: (pg 243-6)
1) The computational/functional model of cognition (RP) is over
Author: so? We should still try to get the Realization relation right
2) The project of abstract realization in general is defunct
Author: wrong! 'We cannot dismiss abstract realization out of hand' (pg 245) [important!]
3) Ok, maybe a machine can't cause 'addition', but it can cause 'adding things', and that's all you need for Realization. Thus the causal view is saved.
Author: A) there are other realization relations that I hope that doesn't work for B) We can still say that an 'adder' that 'adds things' stands in a particular relation to addition, and thus name that Realization. (pg 246) [this makes no sense]
4) Realization of abstract functions is not Realization proper.
Author: But then we have no room for the special sciences, or for functionalism.
Author turns to the specific criticism of Gillett's dimensional causal view. Author claims (pg 248-50) it essentially destroys Realization and makes it into an identity theory. Author then proposes his own theory of Realization:
'to realize a property or state is to have a function'. (e.g. 'something realizes the property of being a heart iff it has the function of pumping blood') (pg 251)
Author leaves open what kinds of functions will be realized.
Author then considers a final attack on Gillett. This is a discussion about Multiple Realization (MR). Gillett thinks that before we have an idea of MR we need an account of R. But author denies this. Author says that MR is an argument for R, so we can't have R figuring in the explanation of MR-- that would beg the question. Author claims that MR is a theory about explanation and explanatory kinds, whereas R is a metaphysical theory about properties. (pg 255) This leads to a 'paradox' where something might be MR across species/objects/etc. but not actually realized (R) in the special, irreducible sense, since the multiple species/objects' properties are the same across those species/objects/items. Author puts forth that we must first use MR for kinds as an explanation, then investigate the relation between the properties realized (e.g. an eye) and the physical objects doing the explaining (e.g. retina, cornea). If the relation isn't one of identity across the MRs, then maybe we have the Realization relation instead.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 85 No 2 June 2007
Author's main target is Gillett's account of Realization and Reduction. Author has numerous objections to the family of realization accounts (Kim, Shoemaker, Gillett), as well as Gillett's specifically, which is called the 'dimensional' view. Author claims that these accounts of realization will destroy the distinction between Realization Physicalism (RP) and the original account (the account that RP was supposed to be an alternative to), identity theories. Author does not want to defend RP, but instead make sense of Realization so that RP can be properly evaluated.
Realization is not the same as 'instantiation'. Author gives multiple examples of use of the term 'realization' (pg 235), and suggests that the paradigm 'textbook' case is something like:
My computer currently realizes Microsoft Word; or
Memory fixation is realized in humans by long term potentiation of neurons.
"Certain electrical states of the device realize computational states such as, say, storing the contents of the last copy operation. The electrical activity of the device is not identical to any program state of Microsoft Word, but it implements or realizes such program states" (pg 236)
Author takes the view of Gillett et al to be that causal powers of properties of objects individuate the realization of the function in question. Author considers this the 'causal view' of Realization. Gillett's view differs from Kim & Shoemaker's in that their view is of a 'flat' causal theory where realizer and realized properties are in the same object, at the same level, in virtue simply of causal powers. Gillett's view is that the realizer properties can take place at a lower level, or a horizontal one, or as part of the structure of the object (or at the object level). This is considered the 'dimensional' causal view. (pg 238)
Author's major reply to the entire causal view is that it fails to capture objects that realize abstract processes, like machines that realize 'addition' or 'Microsoft Word'(pg 240). The claim is that an abstract function like addition is a formal and not a causal relation, and so you can't use causal powers to individuate them. Thus the causal approach fails to capture textbook cases of abstract, formal, or algorithm realization, since these things get realized but the objects/properties that realize them are not doing so causally but in form instead. Author extends this to intentional and etiological (historical) realized properties too (e.g. A US dollar is whatever the US Gov't says is a dollar). Author predicts there will be numerous objections to his attack, which he considers: (pg 243-6)
1) The computational/functional model of cognition (RP) is over
Author: so? We should still try to get the Realization relation right
2) The project of abstract realization in general is defunct
Author: wrong! 'We cannot dismiss abstract realization out of hand' (pg 245) [important!]
3) Ok, maybe a machine can't cause 'addition', but it can cause 'adding things', and that's all you need for Realization. Thus the causal view is saved.
Author: A) there are other realization relations that I hope that doesn't work for B) We can still say that an 'adder' that 'adds things' stands in a particular relation to addition, and thus name that Realization. (pg 246) [this makes no sense]
4) Realization of abstract functions is not Realization proper.
Author: But then we have no room for the special sciences, or for functionalism.
Author turns to the specific criticism of Gillett's dimensional causal view. Author claims (pg 248-50) it essentially destroys Realization and makes it into an identity theory. Author then proposes his own theory of Realization:
'to realize a property or state is to have a function'. (e.g. 'something realizes the property of being a heart iff it has the function of pumping blood') (pg 251)
Author leaves open what kinds of functions will be realized.
Author then considers a final attack on Gillett. This is a discussion about Multiple Realization (MR). Gillett thinks that before we have an idea of MR we need an account of R. But author denies this. Author says that MR is an argument for R, so we can't have R figuring in the explanation of MR-- that would beg the question. Author claims that MR is a theory about explanation and explanatory kinds, whereas R is a metaphysical theory about properties. (pg 255) This leads to a 'paradox' where something might be MR across species/objects/etc. but not actually realized (R) in the special, irreducible sense, since the multiple species/objects' properties are the same across those species/objects/items. Author puts forth that we must first use MR for kinds as an explanation, then investigate the relation between the properties realized (e.g. an eye) and the physical objects doing the explaining (e.g. retina, cornea). If the relation isn't one of identity across the MRs, then maybe we have the Realization relation instead.
9/28/07
Kim, Jaegwon - Physicalism, or Something Near Enough
09/28/2007
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Ch 6 Princeton University Press, 2005
This book chapter isn't too different from the other recent papers by author. The major claim is that physicalism is mostly true, being able to account for everything but the non-functional aspects of qualia. Author uses the term 'ontological physicalism' as the view that material things in space-time are all there is. The first part of the chapter argues for accepting this view.
Why accept ontological physicalism?
Causal Closure:
The first point was that causation [at least how we understand it] requires a 'space-like structure' with objects that are identified within that space. Causation takes place in the physical realm-- we can't figure out how it could be otherwise. So if we are to have mental causation at all (that is things in the mind causing things in the world), then we need to believe that those things in the mind are physical. An objection to this comes from our desire to make us special, or to claim that mental properties 'emerge' from physical ones. All of this has failed, author claims (pg 152).
Causal Exclusion:
The second argument author uses is in reply to a dualist claiming that structuring causation as only physical is question-begging. So author instead gives us an explanation of what causes a finger to twitch while in pain, using only physical processes. Only now we also have mental properties-- both of which should cause the finger to twitch? This sounds like overdetermination with two distinct causes! Author claims that property dualists haven't been able to resolve this problem.
One alternative to ontological physicalism might be Davidson's anomalous monism or Putnam-Fodor and their functionalism, non-reductive materialism and emergentism. The only upshot to these claims is that: either the mental can't be causal or the mental is irrelevant. Since we want to save the causal efficacy of the mental, we need to reduce it to the physical. This is an if-then:
If the mental has causal efficacy, then it needs to reduce to the physical.
Reductionism: author lays out what he considers the principles of reduction. Reduction takes place when previously named 'concepts' or functional place-holders that describe causal entities/properties are shown to have mechanisms that underlie their functions/causal powers. Of course this allows for multiple realizations-- author denies this is a problem for physicalism (pg 164).
Reduction is a three step process: (pg 164)
1) Identify/name a concept that has a function or plays a causal role
2) Begin the scientific work to find the 'realizers' of this functional property
3) Develop an explanation of how the lower-level mechanisms perform the specified causal work
Author then claims that once we have discovered step 1, we can assume that the concept/property is reducible (pg 164). Now, what parts of the mind are reducible, and what parts aren't? Psychological states like beliefs, desires, thoughts, etc. are. Qualia aren't, at least to the extent of their qualitative character. That we can tell the difference between pink and light red is a discriminatory capacity that can be reduced, but the "look of red" is just mental residue. Author's suggestion: live with the residue and we have mostly, ontological physicalism with mental residue. Note: during this paper it seems author is skeptical that total zombies could exist (pg 169).
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Ch 6 Princeton University Press, 2005
This book chapter isn't too different from the other recent papers by author. The major claim is that physicalism is mostly true, being able to account for everything but the non-functional aspects of qualia. Author uses the term 'ontological physicalism' as the view that material things in space-time are all there is. The first part of the chapter argues for accepting this view.
Why accept ontological physicalism?
Causal Closure:
The first point was that causation [at least how we understand it] requires a 'space-like structure' with objects that are identified within that space. Causation takes place in the physical realm-- we can't figure out how it could be otherwise. So if we are to have mental causation at all (that is things in the mind causing things in the world), then we need to believe that those things in the mind are physical. An objection to this comes from our desire to make us special, or to claim that mental properties 'emerge' from physical ones. All of this has failed, author claims (pg 152).
Causal Exclusion:
The second argument author uses is in reply to a dualist claiming that structuring causation as only physical is question-begging. So author instead gives us an explanation of what causes a finger to twitch while in pain, using only physical processes. Only now we also have mental properties-- both of which should cause the finger to twitch? This sounds like overdetermination with two distinct causes! Author claims that property dualists haven't been able to resolve this problem.
One alternative to ontological physicalism might be Davidson's anomalous monism or Putnam-Fodor and their functionalism, non-reductive materialism and emergentism. The only upshot to these claims is that: either the mental can't be causal or the mental is irrelevant. Since we want to save the causal efficacy of the mental, we need to reduce it to the physical. This is an if-then:
If the mental has causal efficacy, then it needs to reduce to the physical.
Reductionism: author lays out what he considers the principles of reduction. Reduction takes place when previously named 'concepts' or functional place-holders that describe causal entities/properties are shown to have mechanisms that underlie their functions/causal powers. Of course this allows for multiple realizations-- author denies this is a problem for physicalism (pg 164).
Reduction is a three step process: (pg 164)
1) Identify/name a concept that has a function or plays a causal role
2) Begin the scientific work to find the 'realizers' of this functional property
3) Develop an explanation of how the lower-level mechanisms perform the specified causal work
Author then claims that once we have discovered step 1, we can assume that the concept/property is reducible (pg 164). Now, what parts of the mind are reducible, and what parts aren't? Psychological states like beliefs, desires, thoughts, etc. are. Qualia aren't, at least to the extent of their qualitative character. That we can tell the difference between pink and light red is a discriminatory capacity that can be reduced, but the "look of red" is just mental residue. Author's suggestion: live with the residue and we have mostly, ontological physicalism with mental residue. Note: during this paper it seems author is skeptical that total zombies could exist (pg 169).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
