Simmons, Alison - Changing the Cartesian Mind: Leibniz on Sensation, Representation and Consciousness

11/30/2007

The Philosophical Review, Vol 110 No 1 Jan 2001

This is largely a work of interpretation and explanation of Leibniz's position on the mind as compared to Descartes. Author observes that many lump Leibniz together with Descartes-- both rationalists claiming the soul is immaterial and immortal, etc. However, Leibniz takes the view that perception is primary to the mind, while Descartes is of the view that consciousness is. While this might seem trivial, it isn't; much of the distinctions Leibniz has can, in some ways, be linked to our more modern pictures of the mind, while Descartes is often the whipping boy of the wrong approaches.

Author juxtaposes the two thinkers as Descartes and his followers vs Leibniz. Often when Descartes is unclear on exactly his position, author uses many of his 'followers' like Louis de la Forge, Nicolas Malenbranche, Antoine Arnauld. As far as theory of mind goes, the Cartesian picture is that it is a thinking, i.e. conscious, thing. Nothing in the mind without being conscious-- or else how could it be in the mind? This leaves thinkers open to questions about memories, unconscious sensations, etc. Cartesians claim that these are just unremembered, not unconscious. The conscious aspect of the mind isn't a second-order perceptual ability-- it is intrinsic to the mind itself. The Cartesians do have a concept of 'reflective' consciousness, which is the consideration of a sensation, but still there is 'phenomenal consciousness', which is pervasive in the mind. (pg 36-7)

A second issue author discusses about Descartes is how much ideas/thoughts/conscious episodes are representational. Author claims Descartes is unclear and his followers are divided-- some claiming that it is always representational, others that ideas are modifications of the mind of the thinker, therefore not necessarily representational. (pg 37-9). Either way, it is consciousness, not representation, that is essential to the mind. For the Cartesian, author claims, sensations are: (pg 46-7)
1) Simple
2) Conscious
3) Ineffable or inexplicable
4) Stirred up by motions in bodies but
5) Do not resemble any bodily motions and
6) Do not represent anything bodily
This 6) is included because what we have in the mind doesn't seem to correspond to what is external, though sometimes Descartes and his followers say instead that they are 'confused' representations. (pg 48-50) Author points out some of the difficulty as traceable to missing a distinction between something 'presentationally representing' and 'referentially representing', the later needing to be transparent while the former does not.

The Leibnitzian picture is that perceptual representation (unclear, indistinct sensations) is intrinsic to the mind, not consciousness. Of course, for Leibniz consciousness is a second-order apparatus brought to bear on mental activities-- this is a different picture from the Cartesians. (pg 53-5) If perception is essential, then how does consciousness come into the picture? Author claims that once perceptions become more 'distinct' and are honed into 'sensations', they arise to our 'notice' and we become conscious of them. (pg 56-7) At work here is one of Leibniz's metaphysical commitments of continuity of change-- that nothing has big changes without smaller ones underlying it (pg 45).

Further discussion is about whether sensations are complex or simple. Author interprets Leibniz as saying that sensations are complexes of 'smaller perceptions'-- 'petites perceptions' that appear (confusedly or con-fusedly) as simple.(pg 61-66)

Some may say that Leibniz is saddled with placing the mind-body problem into the mind, instead of solving it. Instead, author claims, there are many good outcomes of this that avoid the mind-far-away-from-body that the Cartesians have. (pg 70)