Atran, Scott - The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism

02/15/2008

The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006

Author is both outlining his theory on the growth and motivation of suicide attacks and also responding to the work of Robert Pape in Dying to Win, 2005. Pape claims that foreign occupation is the 'root cause' of suicide attacks (SA). He compiles data from 1980-2003 and concludes that it is specific political objectives rather than religious/ideological/social reasons that indicate SA. For example, Al Qaeda was designed to get America out of the heartland of the Arab world. Under this analysis, SA come from agents of secular, educated middle-class places whose efforts to succeed are stymied by corrupt systems or are propped up by US or other foreign interests. (pg129-130)

Author criticizes Pape's approach as relying too heavily on statistical work that shows correlations, not causation. Author instead uses in-depth interviews and systematic observations (of groups that often have SA agents come from their ranks) to point to some causal factors of SA. (pg130) Author criticizes the sampling of Pape, claiming that there have been so many new SAs in 2005 that much of Pape's previous work would be statistically overwhelmed by the new SAs. Author claims Pape's conclusions are too narrow: it misses times when withdrawls are because of convential resistance and not due to SAs, or when SAs actually create larger occupations. Author claims Pape is also too broad: summing up SAs as related to one set of concerns misses an emerging aspect of the more recent SAs. Author claims Pape also misses at least one reason for SAs-- increasing a sponsoring organization's 'market share' among the possible other recruiting organizations. (pg132) Author also contests Pape's claim that SAs are only marginally related to Salafi ideology.

Author discusses a 'changing landscape' of SAs. Instead of joining a centralized organization, small-group cells form around shared interests, usually religious or ideological in nature. They receive guidance from internet sites and then undertake jihad. This is a decentralized model that relies on small-group dynamics and also usually requires a deeply-held commitment to something greater expelling foreign forces. Jihadists come from 'diaspora communities' (pg135) who are disconnected from a sense of community and deeper meanings. Forming these small-groups nurtures their desire to commit to their religious or moral principles. Jihadists are not 'nihilistic' or 'hating freedom', like our political figures paint them. (pg136) Instead, many undertake jihad more because of perceived humiliation rather than straightforward military occupation or because they hate values. Many cells no longer feel connected to the populations they are imbedded in. (pg137) Individuals swarm into small-groups to reinforce their beliefs, carry out SAs, then disperse, sometimes then joining other groups elsewhere. The efficacy of such a network is improved by seeing the fight as global, and the values supporting it more broad-based and deeper than fighting occupation (obligations to God, rather than family or country). (pg138) Not taking this kind of deeply held moral commitment seriously is folly.

Author discusses the possible ways to disrupt the rise SAs and jihad. First, don't think that a response from foreign nations is the best model. Control might have to be given to 'regional powers' (pg140). It is likely that a multi-national, or even a transnational response is required. First off, focus not on statistics but instead on the cells, which become pseudo-families.(pg141) These cells aren't formed strictly on the basis of commiting SAs, but instead on preserving deeply held moral or religious values. Refocus those values into something more constructive. Secondly, traditional methods of spying and surveillance that are centralized and heirarchical is ineffective in catching a decentralized network of possible SAs. Third, use 'soft power' rather than 'hard power' to turn the tide of public opinion in support of SAs to instead support the foreign occupier. An example is the rebuilding efforts after the tsunami in Asia-- America is seen much more favorably after it helped. (pg143)