Kitcher, Philip - Does 'Race' Have A Future?

01/11/2008

Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol 35 No 4

This paper fits into a group that deals with the issue of race as possibly a legitimate classification, but denies the standard essentialist support for 'race' and also the accompanying stereotyping. Author takes us through a walk that starts with rejecting an essentialist view of race, instead using a modified 'realist' conception of natural kinds to redefine racial categories, and then ultimately to a pragmatist account of natural kinds, which specifies that inquiries into racial conceptions should have a reasonable motivation.

Author starts by dismissing the standard 'essentialist' notion of distinctive genes or biological markers that distinguish races in Homo Sapiens. Author points out that while this is true, it isn't on point as a retort to using the 'biological species concept', which tries to identify species as populations that would freely interbreed in the wild but for reproductive isolation. (pg 295) Developing this biological concept further, if there is a degree of infra-species inbreeding, due to subtle differences, cultural factors, geography or whatever, this is a biological basis for defining a 'cluster' or race. (pg 296-7) Author points out this could be for pernicious social factors, at least in the case of humans (pg 297). If so, then race could be 'both biologically real and socially constructed'. (pg 298)

Author then takes back some of this discussion's grounding, since it relies on a 'realist' view of natural kinds. He thinks instead that there is no 'natural' way to cut up the world, even though there is just one world to describe. Instead, different categories will emerge given our different interests, a 'pragmatist' approach (pg 299-301) Once one takes the pragmatist approach, it becomes important to indicate the practical importance of using infraspecies breeding patters to define a cluster of inbred populations. Author points out this is useful for such purposes as determining migration patters in human history. But the point here is that the purposes of such an analysis needs to be defended. (pg 301-2) Author points out some other reasons why it might be important as well-- e.g. modern medicine (pg 302-3).

Author discusses statistical genomic analysis that 'clusters' the species by degrees of genetic similarity, but also cautions against using this as a way to revive essential difference talk (pg 306). Author points out that with a pragmatist perspective, it is a legitimate question of whether such research should be done, given that we know there will be some misunderstanding of it and possibly a revival of old 'ogre naturalist' categories. He also points out that much of this analysis will run into the cultural and prejudicial errors of the past, which will seriously muddy such an analysis.

Author finishes piece by pointing out that while not distinctive traits pick out races, trait frequency is different in different inbred clusters. As such, for e.g. bone marrow transplant donors the usage of racial preference seems justifiable but only as an expedient to get a favored group of donors. (pg 312-4)