Clifford, William - The Ethics of Belief

06/05/2009

Lectures and Essays, 2nd edition, Macmillan & Co 1886

This paper inveighs against belief with insufficient evidence, calling it wrong in the moral/ethical sense, not just the epistemological. Author starts with a lengthy example of a shipowner who has some reason to believe his ship isn't seaworthy but nevertheless convinces himself to let her sail; on the seas she does down and the passengers die. Author takes a deonotological view of the morals of belief, arguing that it is morally wrong to believe on insufficient evidence no matter what the consequences were (pg340). After presenting another example relating to public defamation, author also argues that it is morally wrong to believe even a true proposition on insufficient evidence. (pg341)

Author entertains an objection: that what is morally wrong is the action taken that was based on the (epistemically) wrong belief, not the wrong belief itself. While author agrees that there are additional obligations that extend to action, he also argues that 'it is not possible to sever the belief from the action it suggests as to condemn the one without condemning the other'.(pg342) Here the argument is that if you already believe that p is true, you're not going to do a thorough investigation of whether you should act as though p is false. Furthermore, author claims that if p really is to count as a belief and not just some fantasy, it takes some role, somewhere or other, in action. (pg342) Finally, author argues that 'no one man's belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone', arguing that our common culture on which we all depend (and have all inherited) is strengthened by the successes of our ancestors-- an 'heirloom' into which everything we've said and done will be woven and passed down to succeeding generations-- thus an obligation to pass on only evidentially supported beliefs. (pg342-3)

Author discusses how withholding belief in cases where there isn't enough evidence can be unsettling (pg344), but the alternative of giving belief without the evidence is far worse for your own moral character ('weaken our powers of self-control') and for the society at large. Society at large is threatened by a credulous character in the same way as it is by thievery. To steal is wrong enough, but the real problem is that society can become a 'den of thieves'; in the same way being credulous is bad enough, but if it is a permanent character trait among the people, society might 'sink back into savagery'. (pg345)

II. The next matter author takes up is how to go about believing something for which you have no personal experience-- how to rely on authority. (Author also mentions in passing that it is permissible to act upon probability if there is not enough evidence to fully justify belief and action must be taken. pg347) In the case of accepting the word of another, we must be concerned with her truthfulness and her knowledge. (pg348-350) Author seems to put forth some version of a verification principle; if the evidence for a belief isn't capable of being retrieved by humans, then you should not believe it. (pg353-4)

Author uses the case of Mohammed, who spoke honestly but author doubts his ability to know-- his divine knowledge. Even though his precepts are adopted by thousands and they live happily only shows, according to author, that the belief system is 'comfortable' and 'pleasant to the soul', not that it is true. What may be confirmed instead is that the prophet had 'knowledge of human nature', not that he had divine inspiration or celestial knowledge. (pg351) Author supposes that there is a 'celestial visitor' who makes prophesies, some of which are verified. This still would give no grounds for believing those prophesies yet untested (or currently untestable). (pg350) Author also attacks beliefs passed down through traditions, and takes as an example the modern liberal belief that it is good to give to beggars. Instead, it is good to give them work, not to encourage idleness. (pg356)

III.Further along the lines of what to believe and when, author discusses the limits of inference. Author first points out that whenever we direct our thinking toward the future (or toward actions), we go beyond our experience and infer the continuity and uniformity of nature-- that the past is similar to the future. (pg360) Author argues that in cases where we are required to infer things about, e.g. the sun, based on our observations on the earth, all we need to use is the assumption of the uniformity of nature. (pg361)