Hollinger, David - James, Clifford, and the scientific conscience

05/29/2009

The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 4, RA Putnam ed, 1997

Though mostly an overview, this paper argues that the WK Clifford quoted in James' Will to Believe was largely misrepresented by James, in particular regarding the willingness of someone who guides her beliefs only with sufficient evidence to act without enough of it. James seems to cast Clifford as staunchly opposed to it, when author claims instead that Clifford was more reasoned and sophisticated. Clifford wrote The Ethics of Belief, which (according to author) took as the root concern the 'structure of plausibility' (pg70)-- meaning what those with intellectual (scientific) mindsets would consider acceptable additions to their worldview prior to receiving the evidence.

Most of the paper explores the arguments given by Clifford and James and gives their context. James suggests in Will to Believe that in the two scientific passions-- the desire to find truth and avoid error-- the desire to avoid error will paralyze you in times where action is required (forced choice) but there isn't sufficient evidence to fix a belief. James quotes Clifford as an example of the passion to avoid error: a reasonable conclusion is that Clifford would advocate withholding action. But Clifford understood this problem well and suggested instead that we act on probabilities in such cases. (pg71) Other misrepresentations occurred with James' discussion of the uniformity of nature. (pg72-3) Author grants that in some respects the impression James left was fair: Clifford was more hostile to religion and more positive about the previous advancements of scientific knowledge than James was (pg73, 75).

The Jamesian program was to give an essentially personal defense of a theistic religious commitment, though particular pillars of such a belief were largely unexplored (pg74-5). The break with Clifford was that Clifford put religious belief in the same sphere as all other beliefs-- there wasn't a special realm for religious ones. One of Clifford's main tenets was that beliefs had actional and therefore (probably) social consequences, making it a general moral concern that you avoid errors in your beliefs. Clifford used an example of a ship-owner who uncritically believed (falsely) that his ship was sea-worthy, sent it out and it sunk, killing the passengers. (pg76) While James did also emphasize the behavioristic consequences of belief, he leaves religious belief personal and isolated, and does not discuss what actional results it would take; author calls this 'obscurantist'. (pg77) James made a distinction between questions that could be settled 'on intellectual grounds' and those that 'by nature' could not; this was a distinction that allowed for the freedom of belief, and one Clifford did not abide. (pg79) Author takes this divide to be at odds with Peirce, and eventually the later James in his work Pragmatism.

This paper also gives attention to the context and concerns of the writers. Clifford wrote in England and perceived a milieu of wary skepticism about the abilities and worth of science, while James wrote in America and echoed a concern that science was intimidating the laymen.(pg78, 80-1)