Rivera-Lopez, Eduardo - Are Mental State Welfarism and Our Concern for Non-Experiential Goals Incompatible?

09/05/2008

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly #88 (2007)

This paper tries to show that a version of Mental State Welfarism can account for the thesis that we have legitimate non-experiential goals. Author calls this Compatibility, and because a form of MSW (Mental State Welfarism) includes desires for objective accomplishments, it does not follow that if this form of MSW is true that we would plug into the experience machine. Thus the experience machine can be rejected even for a form of MSW.

Author begins discussion with a discussion of MSW: the subjective satisfaction of desires is the only intrinsically valuable thing. (pg74-5) Note that this is an agent-neutral definition: it doesn't say what is valuable from the agent's perspective, just what is valuable for the agent from an objective perspective (pg84).

The most common objection to MSW is the experience machine, which posits a device that would make you believe you had satisfied your desires: e.g. gave you the subjective satisfaction (that is the only intrinsically valuable thing). The lesson from the experience machine is that we have desires about what really (objectively) happens, not just what we experience: the non-experiential goals thesis. Author treats this thesis as legitimate for value ethics. (pg76) Author points out that a sophisticated hedonist (pg77) who argues that objective goals are just instrumental isn't an effective reply to the experience machine.

Author defends any version of MSW by appealing to the intuition that 'nothing can have intrinsic value if it does not affect someone' (pg78) and gives some examples (pg78-9). Then author launches into an Objector and Defender (of Compatibility) in the form of a dialogue. (pg79-84)
The argument goes as follows:

1) Desire-Satisfaction MSW is the only account of intrinsic value

2) D-S MSWelfarists still have reality-centered desires

3) Removing reality-centered desires from Desire-Satisfaction MSW will remove the 'Desire' part from the D-S MSW.

4) Giving up reality-centered desires will significantly alter the content of the agent's desires, probably impoverishing them and making entrance to the experience machine conditional on significant personal-identity alteration. Furthermore, the life within the experience machine would be unappealing, since the agent would believe she is doing all the things she no longer desires to do. The D-S MSWelfarist would reject the experience machine.

Author compares Non-Experiential Goals to D-S MSW. D-S MSW is an agent-neutral, external value theory. N-E Goals is an agent-perspective value proposition. Author compares these differences to the theories of 'indirect' consequentialism, which says that agent-perspective rules like 'don't kill' must be absolute, but from the external perspective they are just instrumental ways of usually promoting valuable consequences. Yet the agent must believe these are unbreakable rules for the whole system to work! Author calls this moral schizophrenia (pg85) and argues that it seems analogous to the situation in value theory, only much less conflicted and more plausible. In moral theory, there could be two competing norms for the same action. In value theory, two norms (experience-centered desire or reality-centered desire) don't compete because we naturally have reality-centered desires. (pg86) [important]

Lastly, author rejects that this Compatible D-S MSW theory entails plugging into the experience machine. It might give a prima facie reason for plugging other people into the experience machine without their knowledge (but not plugging those people in that you have a desire to see do a particular thing in the world). (pg87-88)