09/19/2008
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 3 March 2008
This paper tries to dispose of the contentious drive for a theory of art and instead replace it with a Theory of the Arts, meaning a theory of painting, sculpture, theatre, and so on. Author offers his simple analysis:An item is a work of Art iff it is produced by a kind of activity that is an Art Form.
Author takes some time to give a history: by the 1700s various distinctions were being drawn between science and art and between aesthetic and moral goodness. (pg 110-2) The rise of 'the arts' was a new phenomenon in Western Culture. There could be 4 lessons from this: (pg112)
1) The concept of Art is historically conditioned
2) There was no art prior to the 1700s (dubious: it relies on there not being a concept of Art prior to there being a theory)
3) The concept of Art comes from a theory of Art
4) Better than 3: the concept of Art comes from a theory of the Arts Author argues that the early moderns were more concerned with a Theory of the Arts, not of Art. The avant-garde in the 1900s was taken as a challenge of Art, not of the Arts, thus an interest in a Theory of Art. (pg114)
Author discusses the two camps for Theory of Art: the functionalist and the proceduralist. The functionalist takes Art to perform a certain function (e.g. aesthetic, experiential). The proceduralist takes Art to be created a certain way (according to specific rules, recipes). (pg116) Functionalists tend to put avant-garde cases outside of Art, while proceduralists tend to include them. The fight is partially over what is included and what isn't: over intuitions, not just explanation. Author also discusses another possible theory criterion: that a Theory of Art should account for why it is so valuable, either culturally or economically. Beardsley (functionalist) does incorporate this desidriatum into his theory, while Dickie (proceduralist) does not; both claim this is a virtue.(pg118) Author claims that conflicting intuitions and conflicting theoretical criteria signal an impasse.
Author discusses how many of us feel bafflement when confronted with an avant-garde work. But what kind of bafflement? Is it conceptual or theoretical? If it is conceptual bafflement, we wouldn't be able to say whether it was Art or not. If it is theoretical bafflement, we wouldn't be able to say why it's Art (or why it isn't).(pg119) Author argues that most of us, most of the time, can tell that an object is Art because of the context it is in. (pg120) The hard part is figuring out what Art Form avant-garde pieces fall into.(pg121-2) Next is theoretical bafflement, which is the standard problem: why is it Art? But if we can settle-- prior to this question-- what Art Form the work is in, this issue is irrelevant. The question is 'why is it sculpture?' not 'why is it Art?'. (pg122-3)
Under this model, author points to four possible outcomes when confronted with the avant-garde:
1) An Art Form admits this work as one of its kind: Art!
2) No Art Form admits this work: Not Art
3) No Art Form admits this work: Yet it is Art
4) No Art Form admits this work but it creates a new Art Form (e.g. conceptual art, film)
Author argues that only in the third case do we need a Theory of Art, and none of the famous examples fit into that third category. Most of the time it is usual and customary to create a new Art Form and thus cases of 3) become 4). (pg123) Author considers searching for a Theory of Art to be a category mistake (pg 123-4)
Lastly, author answers some small objections and shows some of the upshot to accepting his analysis.
No comments:
Post a Comment