Adams, Robert Merrihew - Involuntary Sins

04/05/2013

The Philosophical Review, Vol 44, No 1 (Jan 1985)

Author has a thesis that there can be moral wrongdoing that is non-voluntary. The paradigm example is of improper or disproportionate anger, that doesn't manifest itself in voluntary action. Just the mental state itself is morally culpable or wrong.
Author first addresses the alternatives to the theory that there are "involuntary sins". The first alternative is that involuntary acts like disproportionate anger is only wrong due to tending to be displayed in voluntary actions (pg 4-6). If this were possible then the counter-example of (involuntary) self-righteousness would not be morally offensive because the voluntary actions stemming from those motivations are all exemplary. It is instead the attitude or motivation that is offensive, and author argues that such an attitude for self-righteousness is non-voluntary (pg6).

The second alternative understands mental states to be blameworthy, but re-interprets all such states to be voluntary (pg6-11). For author, this argument may possibly work if one equates operations of the will to be the same as "voluntary", but really what author is getting at is activity under the subject's control-- a subset of the will but one author finds no "simple matter" to explain (pg6-7). Author undertakes this explanation (pg 8-9) and the analysis contains as its key a "trying" or meaning to do something; in other words: you can't try to do something you don't have any control over. Of course this analysis largely excludes desires and emotions since such are commonly understood as reactive and not apt to be tried to be had (pg9-10). After this understanding, author talks about the virtues of having a soul to be ordered like the American system of government: with checks, balances, and different parts working independently but all for the benefit of the same entity.

The third alternative is that we can be blameworthy for mental states only due to the indirect control we have over them: through "self-culture" (pg11-14). Author uses an example of unconscious ingratitude toward a benefactress as being blameworthy despite no indirect control or even consciousness over the attitude (pg12-13).

Author next tries to clarify the affirmative position: it does not preclude moral approbation for striving to have the right attitudes, but it does go further to find it morally wrong to have the wrong ones-- even when they are out of a subject's control (pg14-15). Interestingly, author talks about taking responsibility for having a bad attitude, as a kind of ownership-taking, not essentially tied to voluntary action (pg15-16). The next section explores the nature of "cognitive sins": it doesn't matter if you're conscious of having them, or that you may be ignorant of your propensity or having of them (pg17-18). Author takes some time to combat Donagan's claims about negligence around moral beliefs and attitudes (pg19-20).

Author tries to confront what seems like a reasonable account from Blum, which argues that while attitudes can be morally bad/good, involuntary ones aren't blameworthy but do underwrite being thought of "poorly". In other words, the ingrate isn't blameworthy but considered poorly. (pg21- ) Author believes that the theory can accommodate some of this intuition by varying the kinds of appropriate responses to involuntary sins: they aren't punishable as voluntary ones are (pg21), but instead subject to reproach, which is a form of blaming (pg22).

Another objection comes from a kind of slippery slope argument, that asserts that if humans can be blameworthy for non-voluntary factors, why can't we also be blameworthy for things that don't seem moral: like not being athletic or musical. Author suggests that a cognition of moral relevance will partly do the work, and also proposes some general guidelines: (1) these are states of mind (2) directed at intentional object(s) (3) that have their causes within a rich-enough psychology to appreciate moral relevance, (4) and have alternatives that can be grasped by the intellect. (pg25-7). What is also part of this theory is that it is not wrong to desire something that is not inherently bad-- in other words bad only if acted upon, or due to bad consequences (pg27-8). Next, author tries to clarify his theory with determinism; the theory would fit with both compatibilism or incompatibilism with some sort of agent or "substance" causation.