Railton, Peter - That Obscure Object, Desire

03/15/2013

American Philosophical Association Proceedings, Vol 86 Issue 2 (2012)

Author starts by recounting some damaging attacks on the concept of desire. It used to be thought that desire + belief could rationalize action, but Quinn, Scanlon, and Parfit all attacked this notion, saying it was too primitive to be counted: a desire as a disposition to bring about P (if the appropriate beliefs were true), is not enough to give a reason for the action: there needs to be something more, something about the P or the subject that explains or gives reason for P (a "desirability characteristic")(pg22-3). Author aims to reply to these attacks here.

Author first considers whether a desire as merely a disposition to act is too bare, and revisits Hume's original formulation of a non-normative passion, something not subject to reasoning (pg23). Author takes a biographical interlude to discuss advertising and how it hopes to affect its viewer: "by liking an image, we could come to want what it represents" (pg24). This first formulation is the simple Humean or neo-Humean model of having a disposition toward effecting P (pg25). One upshot of this understanding of the installation of a disposition toward P (through advertising) is that, to author, desire is "creative". Not just in the instrumental sense but in the sense that thoughts, beliefs, and experiences can create new desires in the subject. Secondly, contra the behaviorists, desire is teleological (pg26-7). Thus, this first formulation is rationally intelligible. Author goes over the etymology of the words desire, want, and like (pg28). Upon revisiting the counterexample offered by Quinn, the Radio Man, who has a "desire" by having the disposition to turn on radios whenever he is near them, author seems to agree with Quinn that what is lacking is the desire (pg29). Author proceeds to the instrumental elements of desire that rhyme with an Aristotelian schema (pg30-1), calling it "appetitive intellect" or "intellectual appetition". But author also shows the two-fold character of desire: one is the "positive affective attraction" and the other is "focused appetitive striving" (pg31).

Author comes around again to the problem with the formulation of desire as a disposition toward P: it fails to capture that desire is a "pro-attitude" (pg32). It is an attitude that is like other emotions, it is regulative on our actions, and also our actions provide feedback to our emotions. Author explores this feed-back relationship through a proxy discussion of fear and confidence (pg33-5). Author incorporates the feedback related to desire into a newer formulation (pg36).

After the more inclusive focumlation, author takes a look at the empirical side of desire in a modern-day psychology course. There, the old categories of want/preference/desire and models of drives and satiation were significantly outdated (pg36-7). The inadequacy of the philosophical formulation, even the prospective/retrospective one author had come to recently, was brought out in the discussion of addiction. In addiction, the pleasure in the experience attenuates and even can become nil but the compulsion to engage in the experience persists. There was a distinction between affect and "incentive salience" (pg37), or wanting (a difference between appreciating P and wanting P). Addictive drugs operate directly on the 'wanting' system, skipping the recalibration and influence of the 'liking' system (pg37). Author goes further into the science of affect, and comes away with 2 broad conclusions: (1) Affect permeates perception and cognition, as well as decision-making (pg38), and (2) any possible distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive affect is not possible. "Cognitive appraisal" is relevant to all affective states, and affect itself is information-giving and proto-normative (pg39).

Returning to meld the psychology of desire with its updated philosophy, author first talks about a 'prospective model' of the world that (constitutionally?) involves affect (pg39-40). Another lesson brought out by talking about modeling the environment to shape expectations and affect, is that desire does not aim baldly, but "under a favorable representation" (pg41). What emerges is that desire is good at aiming at (evolutionary) goods, just like perception is good at aiming at (evolutionarily relevant) truths (pg41). Author walks through a series of disputes in the philosophy of desire and motivation using the prospective model formulated earlier, discussing Parfit, Frankfurt, Williams and finally squaring it with Hume (pg42-5).