Burge, Tyler - Self and Self-Understanding III: Self-Understanding

11/16/2012

Journal of Philosophy, June-July 2011

This final lecture gets to the epistemic warrant for self-understanding, for the privileged access to apperceptively rationally accessible points of view. An epistemic warrant is an objectively good route to truth, implying "veridicality in normal conditions" (pg339). More importantly, such a warrant must also show why such routes are prone to truth. Here a warrant is a reliable procedure to truth but can be subject to "brute error", which is an error due to accidental or non-normal conditions. However, with the warrants for self-understanding, author claims some cases are immune to brute error (pg340). The strategy is that some self-understanding is immune to brute error, but these psychological states are not essentially immune. There are some that are immune, however, and these are the ones that ground self-applicability of norms (pg341). "Immunity of the self-understanding to brute error is constitutive to having an apperceptive core self." (pg341) This is a key argument by the author: that self-understanding that is prone to error cannot give the "buck-stopping status" to the attitudes to which norms are applied (by the individual) (pg341-2). Author capitalizes "Self-Understanding" to signal when the discussion is about this kind of self-understanding that is immune to brute error for the constitutive self-application of moral and rational norms.

Section II serves to flesh out some of author's claims about immunity from brute error: it doesn't apply generally, it is not tied to any subject matter, there are other errors that could be involved, thoughts aren't self-intimating or infallibly known. Author even states that there is no necessary connection between having representational states (even propositional attitudes) and an individual knowing what those states or attitudes are (pg345). Section II also divides author's views from some notable rivals or other thinkers. Author also takes some time to argue against Peacock's view that "the subject matters of self-knowledge constitute reasons for the knowledge" (pg345-6). Another claim author disputes is that self-knowledge is structurally like being aware of one's own physical actions: like knowing that you're raising your arm (pg346-7). Author's response: while agents do act, there is a lot of self-knowledge that isn't related to actions.

Section III moves forward with author's argument, first distinguishing between warrants that are based on reasons (justifications) and those not so (entitlements): warrants for Self-Knowledge are based on the latter. The warrants about the attitudes that constitute Self-Understanding are, according to author, immune to brute error (Wibe). Author goes through three ways in which a token propositional attitude could be in error even if it is of the kind that is Wibe. (pg348)
1: the attitude is warranted in some other way (not Wibe)
2: the attitude was formed in a way where Wibe does not apply (through a different route)
3: some pathology might influence the attitude that is normally Wibe

Much of author's discussion then turns to three other kinds of entitled warrants that are psychological and de re about propositional attitudes and are immune to brute error, like deductive reasoning's logical "transitions" (pg349-352). Then in Section IV expounds on the 4 features that "ground immunity" for these cases:
1: the competencies rest on "propositional understanding" (understanding what a proposition is about)
2: having a point of view requires Wibe
3: it all ties together within itself [what?]
4: there is no other place from which veridical Self-Understanding might come from
Author ties this together with a principle on warrant (pg353) and goes on to discuss the three other kinds in light of these new features. Author then contrasts these warrants with those that are subject to brute error, namely perceptual beliefs (pg356-9).

Turning back to Self-Understanding, author wants to take much of the lessons learned about other Wibe cases and apply them. Author takes a basic meta-representational attitude like: "I believe that X" and investigates it's structure. It involves three different understandings: indication understanding, betokening understanding, and attribution understanding (pg360). Author narrows in on Self-Understanding about propositional states; author believes that the betokening understanding (which is self-predication of a particular propositional attitude, e.g. "believe"-pg360&364) is immune to brute error when it is warranted. (pg361)

Author believes that purely preservative memory is 'at the heart' of warranted Self-Understanding that is immune to brute error, thus takes some time discussing it (pg362-5). Purely preservative memory is given powers to preserve de re, and also to preserve the attitude mode (belief, disbelief, wonder if, etc.) under which the representation was acquired (pg362). Author discusses the form of the "cogito" cases ("I am currently thinking about X"), and compares them to "impure" cogito cases: "I believe that X is the case". (pg363) The individual may have a meta-representational belief that she is doing a psychological computation (believing), but she may be mistaken that she is actually doing that believing. These cases are both warranted and immune to brute error, though the second could still be in error due to a 'pathology'. Author concludes Section 5 by claiming that using preservative memory (and preservative memory being as it is) is constitutive to being a self (pg365).

The next discussion is about warrant to the betokening understanding. It seems author is intent on resting epistemic warrant that is Wibe on the reliability of purely preservative memory (PPM) (pg365-7). Author then elaborates the claim and defends it. Author claims first that purely preservative memory is "naturally reliable" (pg367) and is a condition of a "functioning representational psychology". Author claims that when PPM fails it is due to malfunctioning; thus maintains simultaneously that relying on its proper functioning creates a warrant that is immune to brute error. Author acknowledges some constructive features of memory (pg368) and seeks to separate episodic memory and PPM, but still wants to preserve immunity from brute error for even episodic memory (pg368-370).

Author talks further about PPM by clarifying that it does not represent either mode type (belief, thought, etc) or the representational content it preserves (pg370). Thus, it takes a betokening understanding to access this content and also to represent it. It is this representation that is immune to brute error (in some cases) (pg371). The key point author seeks to defend is that betokening understanding of a PPM will correctly pick up on the attitude mode (believe, think, wonder) that is supposedly stored there (pg372). Author introduces a norm of critical reason that involves preservation of reasonable beliefs: if an individual judges a psychological state as reasonable, the individual has reason to preserve that state. This norm, if it could not be applied reliably (that is, if it were subject to the proviso: 'though I may not reliably be able to do so') would undermine the "buck-stopping status" of lower-level psychological states and would undermine the critical reason of selves (pg372-3). Author takes stock of the state of the argument on page 375.

In Section 7, author tries to argue that reason-supporting claims can also be immune to brute error (e.g. X is reason for Y) (pg376-8). In Section 8, author discusses perceptions and sensations as they are betokened in the Self-Understanding. Finally, author summarizes author's claims and responds to some brief counter-examples.