Strawson, Peter - Morality and Perception

12/10/2010

Skepticism and Naturalism Ch 2, Columbia University Press, 1985

Author starts this chapter by talking about two dimensions of analysis of human behavior, the first being humans' natural inclination to talk about moral attitudes, free will, judgments, actions, and beliefs, and the other being the purely objective, morally 'skeptical', approach to the world which takes physical causes and physical behavior to the the only constituent elements. Author points our that a reasoned reply to this skepticism isn't efficacious since one can't be 'reasoned' out of either position. (pg32-3) Instead, it should be noted and agreed that it is a 'condition of our humanity' to see people as moral agents bearing freedom of choice and responsibility, and that occupancy of the other, purely physical, position, can be short-lived at best. (pg33-4) Here there is a contrast between what is natural for humans to assume about each other, and the 'naturalistic' position that can also be occupied, about the same subject matter. Hence two 'radically different' standpoints.

The answer for the author, for dealing with these two disparate positions, is not to choose between them, or even suggest that a choice must be made. In order to have the criteria to make such a choice, author suggests there must be a third, independent metaphysical place to occupy, and author believes there is no such place. Instead, admit both are accurate and habitable, though the naturalistic position less so than the 'naturalist' position of believing humans have moral attributes. While there are parallels between this move and answers to skepticism about the natural world, author argues there is a breakdown in the analogy since it is sometimes salubrious to occupy the naturalistic position, where it is not ever useful to be a physical world skeptic. (pg39-40)

Author argues better analogy is found in the debate over the reality of sensible properties like color, texture, smells. These sensibles can be reduced to surface reflectivity, chemicals in the air, and so on: purely physical properties expressed using micro-structures and causal forces. (pg42) The debate here is between the 'commonsense realist' and the 'scientific realist'. This debate does not need to have one victor; instead, we should recognize 'a certain ultimate relativity in our conception of the real' (pg44).

The trouble with this relativizing move is that it fails to appease the 'hard-line' physicalist, who feels the reductive position is compromised. (pg45) Author then takes an interlude into a discussion about the various internal relative conceptions of what is morally praiseworthy and morally blameworthy. This mild moral relativism perhaps gives the naturalistic reductionist even more grist for the mill, now claiming that the reason we lack agreement is that the entire structure is based either on illusion or on some other mutable human function. Author's answer is just to assert that the naturalist and the naturalistic views aren't incompatible, one we are simply naturally committed to, and the other is intellectually habitable though not for very long (pg49-50).