Donagan, Alan - The Concept of a Theory of Morality

07/30/2010

The Theory of Morality Ch 1 (The Concept of a Theory of Morality), University of Chicago Press, 1979

Author beings his book by tracing the history of moral principles aside from social mores, that is a separation between a societies laws (and customs) and moral principles. Author begins the discussion with the Stoics, who talked about a division between living in accordance with 'Nature', and 'Reason'-- a divine law that was above the social mores. (pg2) Author sees this tradition continuing with Judiasm and then Christianity. (pg4-5) Author consider the core agreement to be "That there is a set of rules of precepts of conduct constituting a divine law, which is binding upon all rational creatures as such, and which in principle can be ascertained by human reason." (pg6) Problem one: are there such principles? Studies of the religious traditions are confused by the fact that each religion also set down a system of religious rules that constituted piety according to that tradition, which was super-morality (that is, went beyond the call of 'common morality') The difficulty here is separating which precepts are specifically religious and which are part of the common morality(pg6-7) Another difficulty is in determining whether the moral principles passed by the traditions are the right ones.

Author takes as his first issue the problem of elucidating the principles of morality for rational agents, not just those within a specific religious tradition. Author considers the philosophers in the German tradition, specifically as they became synthesized and triumphed in Kant, to be the modern form of a rational moral theory. This theory was strongly criticized by Hegel, who considered the theory devoid of content, or at least of most content-- it was too abstract and required only 'duty', which was relatively empty. Kant's theory, according to Hegel, failed to capture what most consider to be the content of the right and wrong decisions they make since it was so abstract-- it failed to capture the 'concrete ethical life' (pg9-11), the content of social mores. Hegel charged Kant with reducing a language to its 'gramaticality', too abstract to be meaningful. (pg13) The problem for Hegel (as given by the author) was one of examining the men of principles who lived in a society whose mores were contrary. The case here taken is the Stoics who repudiated the institution of slavery. This meant, according to author, that they had another basis for moral content other than the mores of their society, in effect the 'abstract' morality had some content. (pg14) The risk of there being no good alternative to a society's mores is brought out when author describes the case of an Austrian who piously subscribed to the Catholic Just War theory and therefore rejected service to the Nazis during WWII. He consulted his priest and bishop, who tried to dissuade him but failed to do so-- and was beheaded. Author considered this the scandalous degeneration of a moral tradition that had fallen to the social mores of the time. (pg14-16)

Author then surveys the English-speaking moral theories, specifically a brand called Intuitionism. Intuitionism is the study of the principles of morality from which moral precepts proceed on a deductive basis. The core of the system are intuitions, which cannot be doubted by those who encounter them, and, supposedly, spring from the nature of reason. (pg17-8) Author discusses this model as being one for mathematical and scientific truths as well, but fell under attack from utilitarianism, and strongly from Sidgwick. Sidgwick criticized intuitionism because it lacked the precision of its principles, and yet as precision was pursued, it would fail to be undoubtable by those studying it. Sidgwick laid out four conditions on intuitionism's precepts: (pg20)
1)That it is clearly and precisely formulated
2) That its self-evidence is ascertained by careful reflection
3) That it is consistent with other propositions received as intuitively evident
4) That experts in the subject do not dissent from it
As 1-3 seemed to emerge, precepts failed on 4.

Author claims that Sidgwick's attack on intuitionism misses the mark, especially on Sidgwick's claim that the experts in the field of intuitionism should agree upon a well-formulated moral precept. Author instead claims that "Intuitionism was a method to be followed, but no more than any other could it assure those who followed it of success. ... since their results did not diverge haphazardly and unsystematically, they could be interpreted as approximating, in different degrees, to the true system that was sought." (pg20)

Author gives more history of the intuitionist project, turning to a 'new' intuitionism advocated separately by Ross and Broad, regarding a system of prima facie intuitive moral precepts that must we compiled in a certain circumstance and then 'balanced' according not to intuition but instead using an analogy to perceptual judgment. (pg22-3) This system was rejected for being too lax, and failing to give a method of balancing or weighing. Author further discusses the breakdown of intuitionism as being, at root, the belief that because we are unable to be perfectly rational and attentive, we cannot reach the indisputable precepts. Author refutes that logic by claiming that we can reach indisputable precepts even if we do not fully know them to be so. (pg25)

Author turns to his positive approach: to examine the Hebrew-Christian traditions to find the fundamental principles of morality (and the metaphysical assumptions grounding them) that are apart from the theistic and religious requirements. (pg26) Interestingly, author does not expect that the metaphysical assumptions about the world, man, and human action will subscribed to by all cultures or all metaphysical systems. "In constructing a moral theory no more is necessary than to identify and state any controversial metaphysical presuppositions that distinguish it from its rivals" (pg28)