Stevenson, CL - Persuasive Definitions

09/18/2009

Facts & Values, Ch 3 Yale Press 1963

This paper explores the rhetorical device of 'persuasive definition', which is the act of giving a new conceptual meaning to a word without changing its 'emotive meaning'-- its connotative or affective meaning. Author contends that this is common in philosophy and that it is a misleading device. Author uses an example of "cultured", originally created from the predicates: 'well-read and familiar with the arts', but which eventually took on its own emotive meaning of esteem due to the way people often accompanied praise and good-will on those called "cultured". However, someone comes along and argues that what is truly valuable is having 'imaginative sensitivity' and argues that this should be the 'real meaning' of "cultured". Author doesn't consider this an 'analysis of a common concept' or a 'mere abbreviation'-- but instead an attempt to hijack the valued emotion of the concept for a new purpose- 'it changed interests by changing names'. (pg34) Author gives additional definitions and discusses that a persuasive definition is in the locus of changes of interest and changes of terminology. However, a persuasive definition in author's sense is one that doesn't just narrow interests with a definition of a term, but one where the speaker intends to alter our interests by employing an emotively laden word to a new conceptual definition. (pg38-9) The important point is that a persuasive definition involved the re-defining of a conceptual definition and keeping the same emotive support for the word.

Author argues that persuasive definitions have been used all over philosophy, for instance by Spinoza in re-writing "God" to mean "the one substance" but still keeping the emotively laden term "God" in place. Author suggests that Carnap utilized it when defining "meaning" narrowly and then assigning everything without meaning to be "nonsense", a strongly negative word. Author also thinks Plato used a persuasive definition in the Republic for the term "justice". (pg45)

The last part of the paper entails a description of four cases where it is important to take note of the differences between a disagreement in belief and a disagreement in interest. Author argues that once we understand that terms like "justice" carry strong emotive baggage, we may understand that not every disagreement is one about what predicates attach to a word, but instead how much value (interest) a word deserves. In cases of a disagreement about whether a particular law is "just", two men disagree in the following way:
1) Both agree that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, but one is unsure that the law leads to A & B.
2) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to B.
3) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to C.
Here, as in the others, the disagreement may be resolved empirically by showing whether the law does or does not lead to the consequences in question. But in the case of 3, the disputants are coming up against disagreements not just in concepts but in interests. (pg49-50) This leads to the next case:
4) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C, and it is well established that the law leads to A & B but not C. Here is a disagreement that cannot be resolved empirically since it is a disagreement 'in interest'. The author does offer one use for the empirical method: to show that C would lead to further consequences D, E, F that they agree are antithetical to justice.