Allen-Hermanson, Sean - Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies?

02/13/2009

Journal of Philosophy, Vol 55 No 8 August 2008

This paper attempts to show that bees are natural zombies and lay out a kind of consciousness test for animals 'lower' on the phylogenetic scale from humans. The argument turns as follows: the phenomenon of blindsight can reasonably establish beliefs or proto-belief-like cognitive schemes without consciousness. Bees share analogous similarities with blindsighted chimpanzees, thus by analogy bees can be blindsighted-- like zombies. Author uses a representationalist theory of consciousness, which claims that the subjective nature of consciousness is exhausted by it's representational content. (pg390) There are two varieties of this theory, the FOT 'First-Order Thought' and the HOT 'Higher-Order Thought' theories. The major advantage of FOT is that it allows for non-human animals to have consciousness (pg391).

Author wants to use FOT but thinks that it is faced with a dilemma where it must either admit that anything that uses concepts/thinks/has beliefs is conscious, or that things that seem to employ proto-beliefs aren't doing so. (pg391) Author thinks that he can find a middle road where FOT doesn't fall into this trap by revising it into FOT*, where phenomenally conscious states are those sensory representations poised to construct first-order thoughts specific for action rather than conceptual adjustment and manipulation-- poised, 'abstract' [fuzzy?], non-conceptual 'dorsal-style'(pg406).

Author sketches FOT: phenomenal awareness depends on tokening first-order thoughts or judgments. FOT thinkers are Dretske, Tye, Kirk. (pg392-7) Author discusses the objection to the entire representationalist program is blindsight, which appears to give weird kinds of first-order thoughts but no consciousness. (pg397-408) The goal here is to discuss the problems with blindsight and conclude that though it is a difficult objection, it isn't devastating to FOT. One interesting discussion is about the 'two-systems' reply to blindsight where there is a 'ventral' and a 'dorsal' system of seeing, the former dealing with representing objects and the latter dealing with action with respect to those objects. (pg400)

Author moves to a study of purported blindsight in a monkey, where it is supposed to touch a button when there is 'no-stimulus' in the occluded field. Monkeys get this wrong by affirming 'no-stimulus' when there is one. But, on the other hand, under certain conditions they will also reliably find the stimulus when it is present (pg408-9) The next step is to imagine that there are some animals that are just like this naturally, 'natural zombies'. The honey bee is a possibility, something that shows world-mapping capabilities (proto-beliefs?) but probably couldn't distinguish whether there is a stimulus present or there is no stimulus, thus, author argues, establishing it as blindsighted, according to a theoretical scientific experiment he is proposing (pg410-413).