07/18/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 2, Feb 2008
This paper explores the thesis of mind-independent, situation-dependent properties of external objects. First, some distinctions:
Intrinsic property- a property of an object that does not depend on the object's relations to other individuals distinct from itself (pg55-6).
Situation-dependent property- a property of an object that it has by virtue of the presentation having situational features (pg56-7).
The thesis is simple: objects are presented to human perception as situational-dependent properties that are mind-independent properties of external objects that present intrinsic properties of an object with situational features. (pg56-7)
Author gives some background on the thinking on features such as this: often they are 'conflated' into mind-dependent appearances or as a representational issue. Author discusses indirect realism and phenomenalism, which get their arguments going by discussing cases of how differing angles or distance from objects alters their appearance, though, of course, the object itself isn't altered. (pg58, pg71) Author will later claim that this type of argument won't support mind-dependent representations, since such an event can be considered situation-dependent properties.
The argument for situation-dependent properties is simple: objects have intrinsic properties but also is subject to situational features that any other perceiver, in the same spatio-temporal conditions, would also perceive. (pg60-1) Author likens this idea to Peacock's idea of a 'scene', though there are important differences (pg61-2).
It is crucial to understand that author is not re-defining the distinction between properties of an object and how an object appears. 'Appears' is a mind-dependent term; author is instead picking out a new section of the world, external properties an object has by virtue of the situation it is in relative to the perceiver. (pg62-3) Author also holds that there are mind-dependent representations (subjectivity of perception), and that representations will vary based on the perceptual abilities of the perceiver (pg64-5). Author goes on a lengthy example of two trees that we judge are intrinsically the same height, even though one is closer to us than the other. (pg65-9) The upshot to this discussion is that the 'accuracy conditions' of a given perceptual experience now include not just the intrinsic properties of the object but also the situation-dependent properties, or perhaps a description of the situational features. (pg73) Furthermore, some purported 'illusions' in the philosophical literature (stick half-submerged in a beaker of water: is it bent?) will be explained adequately given situation-dependent properties (SD properties).
Author argues that there is epistemic dependence of our knowledge of intrinsic properties on situation-dependent properties. This is because the nature of perception makes it that all objects have situational features. (pg75-6) This isn't causal dependence, and, interestingly, author claims that it isn't inferential dependence, either. (pg77) Author instead claims that knowledge of intrinsic properties is mediated by situation-dependent properties. It seems that we readily attend to intrinsic properties while ignoring SD properties, though we sometimes can recognize the SD properties as well. (pg78-80)
Author claims that the result of this argument is a way to merge some of the intuitions of direct realism and indirect realism and/or phenomenalism. (pg81-2)
7/11/08
Scalia, Antonin - District of Columbia v Heller
07/11/2008
No. 07-290, June 26, 2008
This is a supreme court decision that has been summarized far better elsewhere, I'm sure. However, it does serve to go over the main arguments in broad strokes. Author delivers the opinion of the court. At issue is a hand-gun ban in DC which, in the court's opinion, violates the 2nd Amendment:
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
Author separates the 'prefatory clause' from the 'operative clause', focusing first on 'the right of the people to keep and bear Arms'. Author argues that this is an individual right, one extended not just to members of a militia or a sub-set of the population, but to all individuals in the polity. Author engages in a long discussion of the usage and origin of the words 'keep', 'bear' and 'arms'. Author then posits that the right to own and carry weapons was for the purpose of 'confrontation' and self-defense. Author relies on other laws drafted at the time as evidence for the intent of the framers of the Amendment. Author then discusses the 'prefatory clause', which is the 'Well-regulated Militia' portion. Author talks about how the framers were worried that tyrants would disarm the people and thereby take their ability to resist away. Seen in this context, author claims that the reading of the 'operative clause' is sensible.
Author takes some time to rebut the dissent's interpretations, then discusses various contexts after the amendment was ratified where the speech supports the reading of the right as a right to bear arms in self-defense. Crucial to the rejection of Stevens' discussion of the various drafts the amendment went through is the author's claim that the 2nd Amendment codified an existing, common-law right, not fashion a new one.
Author discusses the past cases that involved 2nd Amendment protection. Author claims that in US v Miller, it was the type of weapon involved that didn't get 2nd Amendment protection, not that the individuals were using a weapon for non-military purposes. Author defends against the claim that small-arms weapons for militia use today wouldn't work against tanks and bombers-- author counters that 'the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right'
Finally, author looks at the current case and declares that handguns are popular as self-defense weapons, that trigger locks wouldn't allow for quick enough defense, and that both parts of the law are unconstitutional.
Stevens, Jon delivered the first of two dissenting opinions
Stevens agrees that the 2nd Amendment is a right of the people, but argues that does nothing to establish the scope of the right. Stevens argues that 'the people' is referring to a right of individuals who are members of a group, similarly to the right to peaceably assemble. In analysis of the text he links 'keep and bear arms' as an expression used in military contexts. Stevens claims that the most natural reading of the Amendment is that it protects the right to use and posess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia, which was also an existing right too.
Stevens discusses the history of the drafting of the 2nd Amendment and highlights how the drafts did not involve self-defense uses of arms, even though proposed drafts did so. Stevens reinterprets the post-enactment discussions that Scalia uses, notably Joseph Story's views.
Stevens then reviews the various cases that have previously dealt with the 2nd Amendment (much like Scalia), but interprets them to turn on, e.g. in the Miller case-- the non-military use of weapons, etc.
Breyer, Stephen delivers the second dissenting opinion
Breyer assumes (for the sake of argument) that the 2nd Amendment grants a personal right for self-defense. He then says that this right is not unrestricted and needs to be subject to some sort of constitutional standard, like a 'rational basis' or 'rational relationship'. In this case, Breyer advocates an 'interest balancing' approach.
Breyer discusses the briefs filed that the laws written have not reduced crime. He reviews the different evidence offered and concludes that the evidence is indecisive. Thus, the district is trying to reduce crime using a possible method (there is evidence on both sides), and Breyer sees this as a legitimate balance of interests.
No. 07-290, June 26, 2008
This is a supreme court decision that has been summarized far better elsewhere, I'm sure. However, it does serve to go over the main arguments in broad strokes. Author delivers the opinion of the court. At issue is a hand-gun ban in DC which, in the court's opinion, violates the 2nd Amendment:
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
Author separates the 'prefatory clause' from the 'operative clause', focusing first on 'the right of the people to keep and bear Arms'. Author argues that this is an individual right, one extended not just to members of a militia or a sub-set of the population, but to all individuals in the polity. Author engages in a long discussion of the usage and origin of the words 'keep', 'bear' and 'arms'. Author then posits that the right to own and carry weapons was for the purpose of 'confrontation' and self-defense. Author relies on other laws drafted at the time as evidence for the intent of the framers of the Amendment. Author then discusses the 'prefatory clause', which is the 'Well-regulated Militia' portion. Author talks about how the framers were worried that tyrants would disarm the people and thereby take their ability to resist away. Seen in this context, author claims that the reading of the 'operative clause' is sensible.
Author takes some time to rebut the dissent's interpretations, then discusses various contexts after the amendment was ratified where the speech supports the reading of the right as a right to bear arms in self-defense. Crucial to the rejection of Stevens' discussion of the various drafts the amendment went through is the author's claim that the 2nd Amendment codified an existing, common-law right, not fashion a new one.
Author discusses the past cases that involved 2nd Amendment protection. Author claims that in US v Miller, it was the type of weapon involved that didn't get 2nd Amendment protection, not that the individuals were using a weapon for non-military purposes. Author defends against the claim that small-arms weapons for militia use today wouldn't work against tanks and bombers-- author counters that 'the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right'
Finally, author looks at the current case and declares that handguns are popular as self-defense weapons, that trigger locks wouldn't allow for quick enough defense, and that both parts of the law are unconstitutional.
Stevens, Jon delivered the first of two dissenting opinions
Stevens agrees that the 2nd Amendment is a right of the people, but argues that does nothing to establish the scope of the right. Stevens argues that 'the people' is referring to a right of individuals who are members of a group, similarly to the right to peaceably assemble. In analysis of the text he links 'keep and bear arms' as an expression used in military contexts. Stevens claims that the most natural reading of the Amendment is that it protects the right to use and posess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia, which was also an existing right too.
Stevens discusses the history of the drafting of the 2nd Amendment and highlights how the drafts did not involve self-defense uses of arms, even though proposed drafts did so. Stevens reinterprets the post-enactment discussions that Scalia uses, notably Joseph Story's views.
Stevens then reviews the various cases that have previously dealt with the 2nd Amendment (much like Scalia), but interprets them to turn on, e.g. in the Miller case-- the non-military use of weapons, etc.
Breyer, Stephen delivers the second dissenting opinion
Breyer assumes (for the sake of argument) that the 2nd Amendment grants a personal right for self-defense. He then says that this right is not unrestricted and needs to be subject to some sort of constitutional standard, like a 'rational basis' or 'rational relationship'. In this case, Breyer advocates an 'interest balancing' approach.
Breyer discusses the briefs filed that the laws written have not reduced crime. He reviews the different evidence offered and concludes that the evidence is indecisive. Thus, the district is trying to reduce crime using a possible method (there is evidence on both sides), and Breyer sees this as a legitimate balance of interests.
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