Shellenberg, Susanna - The Situation-Dependency of Perception

07/18/2008

Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 2, Feb 2008

This paper explores the thesis of mind-independent, situation-dependent properties of external objects. First, some distinctions:

Intrinsic property- a property of an object that does not depend on the object's relations to other individuals distinct from itself (pg55-6).

Situation-dependent property- a property of an object that it has by virtue of the presentation having situational features (pg56-7).

The thesis is simple: objects are presented to human perception as situational-dependent properties that are mind-independent properties of external objects that present intrinsic properties of an object with situational features. (pg56-7)

Author gives some background on the thinking on features such as this: often they are 'conflated' into mind-dependent appearances or as a representational issue. Author discusses indirect realism and phenomenalism, which get their arguments going by discussing cases of how differing angles or distance from objects alters their appearance, though, of course, the object itself isn't altered. (pg58, pg71) Author will later claim that this type of argument won't support mind-dependent representations, since such an event can be considered situation-dependent properties.

The argument for situation-dependent properties is simple: objects have intrinsic properties but also is subject to situational features that any other perceiver, in the same spatio-temporal conditions, would also perceive. (pg60-1) Author likens this idea to Peacock's idea of a 'scene', though there are important differences (pg61-2).

It is crucial to understand that author is not re-defining the distinction between properties of an object and how an object appears. 'Appears' is a mind-dependent term; author is instead picking out a new section of the world, external properties an object has by virtue of the situation it is in relative to the perceiver. (pg62-3) Author also holds that there are mind-dependent representations (subjectivity of perception), and that representations will vary based on the perceptual abilities of the perceiver (pg64-5). Author goes on a lengthy example of two trees that we judge are intrinsically the same height, even though one is closer to us than the other. (pg65-9) The upshot to this discussion is that the 'accuracy conditions' of a given perceptual experience now include not just the intrinsic properties of the object but also the situation-dependent properties, or perhaps a description of the situational features. (pg73) Furthermore, some purported 'illusions' in the philosophical literature (stick half-submerged in a beaker of water: is it bent?) will be explained adequately given situation-dependent properties (SD properties).

Author argues that there is epistemic dependence of our knowledge of intrinsic properties on situation-dependent properties. This is because the nature of perception makes it that all objects have situational features. (pg75-6) This isn't causal dependence, and, interestingly, author claims that it isn't inferential dependence, either. (pg77) Author instead claims that knowledge of intrinsic properties is mediated by situation-dependent properties. It seems that we readily attend to intrinsic properties while ignoring SD properties, though we sometimes can recognize the SD properties as well. (pg78-80)

Author claims that the result of this argument is a way to merge some of the intuitions of direct realism and indirect realism and/or phenomenalism. (pg81-2)