Davidson, Donald - Actions, Reasons, and Causes

11/07/2008

Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 23 1963

An oldie where the main argument is that reasons for action are causes for action. Reasons 'rationalize' action by showing: (pg685)
a) a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind
b) believing one's actions are of this kind
These two combine to form a 'primary reason' for why an agent performed an action. (pg686) The paper then describes how to construct a primary reason, and then argues that a primary reason for an action is the action's cause.

Author discusses how, in general, primary reasons are given and how they should be given. (pg686-690) Further discussion is spent defending against some small technicalities: justifying isn't the same as giving reasons (pg691), and that re-describing reasons doesn't rule out reasons being causes. (pg691-3)

Lastly is the defense for the thesis that a primary reason for an action is its cause.
The objections:
A. Causes are events, and mental states aren't events.
Reply: there are mental events that are almost always part of primary reasons

B. Effects and Causes must be logically distinct, primary reasons aren't distinct from their actions
Reply: logically they are, even though, perhaps, they aren't always distinct grammatically (see pg687-8)

C. Causes relate to Effects by a lawlike generality, there are no such available in actions
Reply: true, but the trouble here is that you're looking for laws among the wrong kinds of things

D. Knowledge of Cause and Effect is inductive, but self-knowledge about reasons isn't
Reply: this isn't essential to causes and effects

E. Talking about causes of actions is weird, either removing the agent or involving infinite regress
Reply: not when you use reasons as causes!