Clark, Andy - Curing Cognitive Hiccups: A Defense of the Extended Mind

09/14/07

Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 4 April 2007

This is written in response to an earlier paper written by Rupert proposing an alternate hypothesis to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC), namely, the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition (HEMC). The first part of the paper replies to Rupert's two major points:
1) The external aspects of so-called cognition for HEC look dramatically different from the internal aspects, causing a dis-analogy, and making HEC look like a stretch.
2) The proper study of cognitive science depends on taking the 'stable persisting human individual' as the subject matter. If we lose sight of this, we risk losing a lot.

Author first replies to 1 as follows: much of this objection comes from taking the parity principle too seriously. What we're trying to get at is equality of opportunity for all sorts of processes. If we encountered alien neurology, would we say it isn't cognitive because it doesn't look like ours? No. Similarly, just because the fine-grained differences are significant doesn't mean hybrid processes can't play a constitutive role. (pg 167-8)

Author replies to 2: In general, there is little to worry about. Most of the time the stable, persisting human individual's brain is the sole instantiator of cognition. But sometimes there are important 'soft-assembled' resources that also serve to instantiate parts of the cognitive process. We shouldn't be worried that science can't get this right. (pg 169-70)

Author discusses an experiment that deals with programming a VCR, with subjects sometimes seeing the screen, sometimes just trying to remember it, and other times able to remove a barrier. The goal was the fastest programming. What was found was that sometimes memory was used, sometimes visual input. The study concluded that what was important was the fastest, least time-wasted method of computation, whether that was using solely internal information or using external, or a mix. This lead to the Hypothesis of Cognitive Impartiality: problem solving doesn't privilege in-the-head resources over external ones. (pg 174) The risk here is to think that there is a centralized processor that seeks the most expedient route to solve the problem (giving priority to the brain). Here, author tries to distinguish between two 'explanatory targets':
A) The 'recruitment of the extended organization itself' (here the brain plays a crucial role)
B) The 'flow of information and processing in the new soft-assembled extended device.' Author wants to focus on B with HEC/Cognitive impartiality and claims HEMC blurs these distinctions. (pg 175) This leads to the conclusion that cognition is organism centred, even if not organism-bound.

Author then goes into an elaborate, extended discussion of multiple studies and thinkers who have worked on gesturing. (pg 176-183) Gesturing, the conclusion is, not just expression that helps make an already formed point, not just partially-offloaded spatial tasks that it is easier to do in real space, not just part of a marking or crude reminder about what to think about next/remember, but instead constitutive of the act of thinking about certain things. Author wants to be sure to avoid merely treating gesture as a causal aspect that assists with our thinking, but instead as constitutive to that thinking. [Interesting problem in the experimentation see top of pg 179]

Author concedes that there is an asymmetry in that neural processes are considered cognitive always, while gesturing by itself isn't always considered cognitive. (pg 183) However, this is not to invalidate the systematic cognitive process. Take, as an alternative one single neuron-- it isn't cognitive either per se-- only when placed into the larger context is it; the same with gesture. Further, just because the gesturing causes a neural process doesn't mean that the gesture itself is dispensable or somehow not part of the cognition. Author argues that other ways of (in principle) bypassing neural processes to get the end-result brain state would also satisfy this condition, but would be considered cognitive (183-4) [not according to B, above!].

There is a real danger of falling into a 'merely causal' reply about external processing-- but author argues, this danger is the by-product of believing that everything external can only be causal! Author then elaborates by using the example of rain drops on the window: they cannot be part of cognition, even if they prompt me (cause me) to think certain thoughts about poetry, nature, etc. They 'are not part of ... any system either selected or maintained for the support of better cognizing' (pg 184) [teleological?] The 'mere backdrop' or 'merely causal' aspects of the rain contrast with constitutive, self-stimulating loops (like a turbo-engine, where the exhaust from the motor turns an air injector, which then makes the motor more powerful) that are part of the process of larger cognitive accomplishments.

Author discusses a simple mechanical robot that can instantiate 'exclusive or' just by using 'inclusive or' and 'and' and a few simple rules of behavior. (pg 185-8) The point of this description is that even a simple machine can instantiate more complex logical manipulation using less complex rules, and it can then use these more complex rules in further processing if it has some sort of self-feedback device that reports back to itself what it is instantiating; this is supposed to be analogous to humans' overt behavior as playing a part in our further cognitive tasks.

Author concludes by saying that we should not fall into thinking HEC, HEMC or some other hypothesis is true until we have done much more experimentation-- but that we shouldn't be biased against HEC for sure.