Unpublished Manuscript
Author begins chapter with a discussion of the three leading theories of properties. Properties can be considered a feature of an object, such as 'red' or 'spherical'. There are theories promoted by David Armstrong that claim that properties exist in some universal sense and that objects partake in the existence of them-- similarity exists therefore between objects with similar properties by virtue of their sharing the same property. There are 'trope' theorists like Donald Williams or Keith Campbell (and possibly Aristotle) who claim that each property is unique, but share a similarity that is more-or-less similar, depending on the context, object, etc. The final theory that author prefers is a conceptual theory (Kant, Frege), the theory that a property of an object is a concept that the object falls under.
Author has two main criticisms of the first two theories. The first theory (Armstrong's A-theory) fails because it must include the object itself that has been stripped of all its properties, thus a 'bare particular'. If that wasn't bad enough, it seems that if properties exist, they too must have properties that distinguish them, which means that properties have 'bare particulars' too.
The second theory (trope theories) fail because we need to distinguish between all the different tropes out there, which means that each trope itself is made up of further tropes, and so on (pg 132-3).
Both theories fail, author suggests, because they have an incorrect view of predication as ascribing a property to an object. Author returns to the theory of properties he likes, the Fregean F-theory. In this theory, properties 'fall under' the concept of an object. Thus an object is red because the object itself is red, not because it has the property of redness. One upshot of this theory is that the concepts of an object can be used in propositions without much mutation. What is a concept? A concept is something associated with the thing it conceptualizes, and someone has a concept when she can use at the right times and in the right places. (pg 145)
One problem for the Fregean theory is that we are unclear what the 'falling under' relation actually is. For this, author uses the Sellarsian suggestion of distributive singular terms as a way to sort objects under concepts-- a token of a type that is distributed. There are some criticisms of Distributive Singular Terms (DSTs) that author deals with:
1) Not all lions are tawny. Response: that's fine, just restrict the DSTs to typical or ideal examples
2) DSTs sometimes are true due to their distribution, not due to the properties the objects have: 'the grizzly is found in North America'-- no one grizzly is all over North America. Response: those aren't DSTs!
Author makes sure to agree with Sellars that the concept 'red' and the word 'red' are expressing the same thing too. 'The concept "red"' is used as a DST to distribute to all proper times when 'the concept red' is employed.
Author revises the Fregean version of concepts being the connectors between predicates and objects. Now, predicates directly describe objects, or directly classify objects, without 'conceptual mediation'. This would be much like demonstratives or names. The problem now is where predicates get their conceptual function? Author: by usage (pg 154-5).
The next step is dealing with propositions. Author uses a Sellarsian 'distributive' treatment for propositions: propositions are similar because they distribute to, ultimately, beliefs about their proper usage. (pg 158-9)
This is an immensely fast-paced and difficult chapter that is the bulk of the sorting out between concepts, predicates, properties and propositions.
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