03/30/2007
African Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives, L. Brown, ed., Oxford University Press, 2004
Author is concerned with the study of the paranormal, and the widespread refusal to countenance it as a legitimate fact in the world by some western philosophers. Author takes some time in enumerating the various supposed occurrences: telepathy, clairvoyance, psychokinesis, and precognition. Author points out that there is some problem in distinguishing these, given the possibility of one or the other. For example, is precognition just subconscious psychokinesis? Is telepathy the same as clairvoyance? Given different manners of describing the same phenomena, it may be possible to reduce these attributes.
The debate about whether such paranormal abilities can be a source of knowledge was taken on by Bodunrin. His claim was that this might be a way to get a belief, but certainly not a justified one. Author first says that this approach conflates being able to justify a belief and having it be justified. A 'knowing how/knowing that' distinction. Further, if you're a reliabilist, then perhaps that belief can be justified, if the relationship between the belief and the paranormal ability is of the kind that tends to produce true beliefs.
The reliabilist position is attacked by Bonjour, who offers various (4) counterexamples, all of which are designed to show that even if paranormal traits could ascertain true beliefs, nobody would be justified in believing them. But in each case, author replies, this is in a culture where nobody believes in the paranormal anyway, so it 'intuitively' seems unjustified to believe in them.
Another problem for the paranormal in the general atmosphere in the west is that most believe all claims about paranormal beliefs have been debunked 'in the laboratory'. Author gives examples of higher-than-chance occurrences that have been produced in the lab. Author also suggests that it might be more useful to study these processes 'in the field', as a field biologist would. (pg 145-6)
Horton argues that the spiritual beliefs in Africa take the place of naturalistic explanations that the west has given over to germs, molecules, and a modern scientific worldview. The rest of the paper is a survey of various different beliefs about the paranormal found in Africa.
3/30/07
3/23/07
Henig, Robin - Darwin’s God
03/23/2007
New York Times Magazine, March 4, 2007
This is an article about the two sides in the debate about the science of belief, specifically about the possible biological origin of the belief in god and other religiosity. The argument proceeds roughly that belief in spirits, supernatural forces, omnipresent, omniscient or omnipotent is a universal component of human culture. This is prima facie evidence that it has a biological component. To start off, this article misses a few major distinctions at the outset that are important: religion vs. belief in god, and old-time religion vs. modern-day theologically souped-up religions.
The big debate is between 'spandrelists' (Atran) and 'adaptationists' (Wilson). The spandrelists claim that it is a mixture of other adaptive traits that, when working in conjunction, make it very easy to believe in a god. The three main candidates are the aspects of our brains that deal with 'agent detection', 'causal reasoning' and 'theory of mind'.
'Agent Detection' the default assumption is the presence of agency (a creature with beliefs/desires) when dealing with events or things.
'Causal Reasoning' the belief that things happen because of previous causes, rather than at random.
'Theory of Mind' another term used is 'folkpsychology', but it is the intuition that other individuals have beliefs and desires similar to how we do.
The argument is that the conjunction of these adaptive biases 'primes' us to believe in god-- a causal force with agency behind the occurrences in the world. The adaptationists claim that belief in god is itself adaptive. This claim immediately finds objections, since acting religiously (when there is no basis in reality) would likely hurt an individual agent's survival prospects. Yet this view is championed by Wilson, who claims that this might be the best example of group selection. Group selection is an out-of-favor theory that claims that some adaptations can take place at the level of the group, or, perhaps more appropriately, that genetic adaptations that take place across generations of individuals will be responsive to the relative fitness of the group those genes evolved in, not the individual's fitness.
3/16/07
Graukroger, Stephen - Home Alone: Cognitive Solipsism in the Early-Modern Era
03/16/2007
APA Proceedings and Addresses, Vol. 80, No. 2, 2006
Author makes a distinction between cognitive solipsism and epistemological or skeptical solipsism. Cognitive solipsism involves not realizing that there is an external world at all, where it is true of an animal that sensations are presented to it as though they are modification/changes in it's mind. Of course we are using 'mind' loosely here-- it could be just a place were perceptions come together, the 'sensus communis', a medieval hold-over into early modern philosophy where it was assumed the five senses came together to form a full representation.
Author discusses two neurological disorders that pull apart the cognitive and the affective: Capgras syndrome and Cotard syndrome.
Capgras: patient recognizes faces but feels no affective connection, often therefore thinking they are impostors
Cotard: patient doesn't think it lives in the external world, thinking instead it is dead (thinking there is no external world?)
Author's main point is that we might be looking for answers to the skeptical arguments in the wrong place: don't just start with the epistemological, also look at the affective. Author traces this dual approach back to the early moderns, who had a dialectic about the affective aspects of cognitive solipsism.
Once the science of perception developed, thinkers began to shrug off the old aristotelean claim that perception was just taking in resemblance and realized that perception was re-presentations, or representation. But now that we know it is a re-presentation, the threat of skepticism and solipsism arises.
Descartes, claimed that in order for us to be free of cognitive solipsism, we had to have both sensation and conscious judgment, which humans have, but he claimed that animals did not have the judgment part, so they were, for the most part, cognitive solipsists. They see, he thought, 'as we do when our mind is elsewhere'. [Blindsight?] The interesting thing here is that having the judgment capacity to overcome all forms of solipsism is also the feature that gives us our moral agency and personhood. It is that self-reflective capacity that Descartes identifies that unifies our cognitive life and gives us ability to reason morally (pg 70).
Locke claimed instead that perception is just successful sensation, not sensation+judgment. The difficulty here is that personal unification cannot be tied into the perceptual capacity like Descartes did. But Locke is an empiricist-- any moral agency from humans will likely come from experience one way or another.
Diderot enters the picture and realizes that if the empiricist picture is right, then someone with impaired sensation might have impaired moral agency. This was the gist of his Letter on the Blind. Diderot began to try to create a basis for morality based on the senses (pg 72). So here is an example of cognitive solipsism (or a leaning toward it) affecting our affections and moral sensibilities. [But we have two skepticisms!? One about the external world, one about other minds!]
So one of the issues is how we can have morality and ethics once we eliminate the rationalist picture and are empiricist. The other issue is whether skeptical/empirical solipsism represents a sort of bad moral fiber, or someone who is intellectually dishonest with himself.
APA Proceedings and Addresses, Vol. 80, No. 2, 2006
Author makes a distinction between cognitive solipsism and epistemological or skeptical solipsism. Cognitive solipsism involves not realizing that there is an external world at all, where it is true of an animal that sensations are presented to it as though they are modification/changes in it's mind. Of course we are using 'mind' loosely here-- it could be just a place were perceptions come together, the 'sensus communis', a medieval hold-over into early modern philosophy where it was assumed the five senses came together to form a full representation.
Author discusses two neurological disorders that pull apart the cognitive and the affective: Capgras syndrome and Cotard syndrome.
Capgras: patient recognizes faces but feels no affective connection, often therefore thinking they are impostors
Cotard: patient doesn't think it lives in the external world, thinking instead it is dead (thinking there is no external world?)
Author's main point is that we might be looking for answers to the skeptical arguments in the wrong place: don't just start with the epistemological, also look at the affective. Author traces this dual approach back to the early moderns, who had a dialectic about the affective aspects of cognitive solipsism.
Once the science of perception developed, thinkers began to shrug off the old aristotelean claim that perception was just taking in resemblance and realized that perception was re-presentations, or representation. But now that we know it is a re-presentation, the threat of skepticism and solipsism arises.
Descartes, claimed that in order for us to be free of cognitive solipsism, we had to have both sensation and conscious judgment, which humans have, but he claimed that animals did not have the judgment part, so they were, for the most part, cognitive solipsists. They see, he thought, 'as we do when our mind is elsewhere'. [Blindsight?] The interesting thing here is that having the judgment capacity to overcome all forms of solipsism is also the feature that gives us our moral agency and personhood. It is that self-reflective capacity that Descartes identifies that unifies our cognitive life and gives us ability to reason morally (pg 70).
Locke claimed instead that perception is just successful sensation, not sensation+judgment. The difficulty here is that personal unification cannot be tied into the perceptual capacity like Descartes did. But Locke is an empiricist-- any moral agency from humans will likely come from experience one way or another.
Diderot enters the picture and realizes that if the empiricist picture is right, then someone with impaired sensation might have impaired moral agency. This was the gist of his Letter on the Blind. Diderot began to try to create a basis for morality based on the senses (pg 72). So here is an example of cognitive solipsism (or a leaning toward it) affecting our affections and moral sensibilities. [But we have two skepticisms!? One about the external world, one about other minds!]
So one of the issues is how we can have morality and ethics once we eliminate the rationalist picture and are empiricist. The other issue is whether skeptical/empirical solipsism represents a sort of bad moral fiber, or someone who is intellectually dishonest with himself.
3/9/07
Wolf-Devine, Celia - Preferential Policies Have Become Toxic
03/09/2007
Cohen and Wellman, eds., "Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics," Blackwell, 2005
Author's major struggle is against Albert Mosley and 'preferential' or 'strong' affirmative action. This can be contrasted to 'procedural' affirmative action, where members of the targeted groups are encouraged to apply and receive fair consideration for jobs. Author claims that preferential affirmative action is in play when you get a 'yes' answer to the following question: "If another black person had applied whose credentials matched those of the rejected white candidate, would that person have gotten the job over the black candidate who was in fact chosen?"
The author sets the stage about the difficulty in discussing this issue. Calling it 'politics of inclusion' is misleading because the job market is a zero-sum game-- one is included, necessarily the other is excluded. Furthermore, there is an entanglement of race and sex in these policies, author spends some discussion to try to distinguish that many of the arguments for race don't work for sex (women).
Author evaluates the various affirmative action arguments:
1) Compensatory argument
2) Corrective argument
3) Consequentialist argument
1) Compensatory: one party has harmed another, that other need to recover damages. There could be material damages, or cultural damage.
First considered is material damage. This argument is hard to apply to entry-level workers, most of whom are born in 1970-1980, and therefore missed much of the overtly racist Jim Crow and other overt racial institutions. Also, it is hard to claim in the specific instance of one white person turned down, a black person hired, whether that one white person ever had the advantages and that one black person had the disadvantages. Also, there is a difficult moral question of whether an innocent, unaware beneficiary of an unjust action is obliged to give the advantage back. Author also objects to "projecting moral intuitions that concern one-on-one interactions onto a large and complex society".
Next is cultural damage. Well, whatever the black culture is, it is tough to say that it is 'worse' than white culture. Second, if you claim that your culture makes you disabled for a certain job, why is it reasonable that you should have it?
Two final problems with the compensatory project:
Origin problem: 'you can't blame your mother', because if it weren't for her, you wouldn't have been born. If we hadn't brought you over, you would have had to immigrate.
Completion problem: 'when are we over with this'? without a good answer (which author thinks there is none) you'll have 'endless turf war'. Mosley assumes proportional representation is fair, but author denies this due to the fact that you may never have that, for cultural reasons.
2) Corrective: stop the existing bias in hiring practices. Author replies to the argument that there are existing biases against blacks in the hiring process. Author concedes there could be some shown bias and that would allow for corrective action. But when applied on a grand scale, bias is assumed, not shown.
3) Consequentialist arguments are 2:
A) Role Models: we need blacks as role models. Author: you already have them; and you don't need the 'mixed message' of affirmative action.
B) Diversity and representation: diversity is good! Author: not all diversity is good, and don't assume that more black means more diversity. About representation, author claims that people just represent themselves, not anything else, so this argument has a false premise.
Positive account
Author argues that we should instead focus on programs to elevate the poor from the cycle of poverty, and this would disproportionally help blacks, since the poor are disproportionately black. Author also claims that affirmative action has led to more black drop-outs and failed lawyer/doctor exams. Author ultimately claims that she wants racial categories eliminated, as opposed to Mosley, who wants to preserve them.
Cohen and Wellman, eds., "Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics," Blackwell, 2005
Author's major struggle is against Albert Mosley and 'preferential' or 'strong' affirmative action. This can be contrasted to 'procedural' affirmative action, where members of the targeted groups are encouraged to apply and receive fair consideration for jobs. Author claims that preferential affirmative action is in play when you get a 'yes' answer to the following question: "If another black person had applied whose credentials matched those of the rejected white candidate, would that person have gotten the job over the black candidate who was in fact chosen?"
The author sets the stage about the difficulty in discussing this issue. Calling it 'politics of inclusion' is misleading because the job market is a zero-sum game-- one is included, necessarily the other is excluded. Furthermore, there is an entanglement of race and sex in these policies, author spends some discussion to try to distinguish that many of the arguments for race don't work for sex (women).
Author evaluates the various affirmative action arguments:
1) Compensatory argument
2) Corrective argument
3) Consequentialist argument
1) Compensatory: one party has harmed another, that other need to recover damages. There could be material damages, or cultural damage.
First considered is material damage. This argument is hard to apply to entry-level workers, most of whom are born in 1970-1980, and therefore missed much of the overtly racist Jim Crow and other overt racial institutions. Also, it is hard to claim in the specific instance of one white person turned down, a black person hired, whether that one white person ever had the advantages and that one black person had the disadvantages. Also, there is a difficult moral question of whether an innocent, unaware beneficiary of an unjust action is obliged to give the advantage back. Author also objects to "projecting moral intuitions that concern one-on-one interactions onto a large and complex society".
Next is cultural damage. Well, whatever the black culture is, it is tough to say that it is 'worse' than white culture. Second, if you claim that your culture makes you disabled for a certain job, why is it reasonable that you should have it?
Two final problems with the compensatory project:
Origin problem: 'you can't blame your mother', because if it weren't for her, you wouldn't have been born. If we hadn't brought you over, you would have had to immigrate.
Completion problem: 'when are we over with this'? without a good answer (which author thinks there is none) you'll have 'endless turf war'. Mosley assumes proportional representation is fair, but author denies this due to the fact that you may never have that, for cultural reasons.
2) Corrective: stop the existing bias in hiring practices. Author replies to the argument that there are existing biases against blacks in the hiring process. Author concedes there could be some shown bias and that would allow for corrective action. But when applied on a grand scale, bias is assumed, not shown.
3) Consequentialist arguments are 2:
A) Role Models: we need blacks as role models. Author: you already have them; and you don't need the 'mixed message' of affirmative action.
B) Diversity and representation: diversity is good! Author: not all diversity is good, and don't assume that more black means more diversity. About representation, author claims that people just represent themselves, not anything else, so this argument has a false premise.
Positive account
Author argues that we should instead focus on programs to elevate the poor from the cycle of poverty, and this would disproportionally help blacks, since the poor are disproportionately black. Author also claims that affirmative action has led to more black drop-outs and failed lawyer/doctor exams. Author ultimately claims that she wants racial categories eliminated, as opposed to Mosley, who wants to preserve them.
3/2/07
Orr, Allen - A Mission To Convert (book review of The God Delusion)
03/02/2007
The New York Review of Books, Vol. 54 Num 1 January 11, 2007
Author is critiquing Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion as the most ambitious and the most public of the recent publications by biologists and philosophers in the area of the science of evolution as it relates to religion and the belief that a creator is necessary for the explanation of life.
Dawkins, author argues, has written a fantastic book in The Selfish Gene, but The God Delusion is much less. The major issue from author is that Dawkins doesn't really engage with some of the intricate reasoning from theology. Author claims Dawkins can't distinguish 'unitarians from abortion clinic bombers'.
Dawkins presents 'the ultimate argument' against creationism that is couched in non-deistic terms: Intelligent Design demands an intelligent designer, but the designer needs to be more complicated than the design. Therefore the designer needs to have been designed by an even more intelligent designer, thus an infinite regress. Of course infinite regress might be avoided by a 'brute fact' of an earlier designer. Any claim that stipulating a brute fact is unscientific should have to account for the 'brute fact' of 'matter' and 'laws of nature', author claims.
Dawkins also makes an empirical claim; that religion has made our world worse, not better. He cites crime rates, persecution, terrorism, and the closing of children's minds, etc. Most of the evidence, author claims, is anecdotal. Author replies that most of the history of the 20th century has been an experiment in institutional atheism and has shed a lot of blood. Author also argues that religion is worse compared to what. Most of our value/moral and aesthetic judgments come from a society that is deeply shaped by Judeo/Christian teachings, so this is a problem of circularity. Dawkins' ethical claim looks a lot like Mill's Harm Principle, which, author argues, wouldn't be the ideal in a traditional Confusion culture, which would suppress individualism.
Author's final argument is that Dawkins is making a big stink over a particular part of history that pitted the church against Darwinism and science. Believers might have said 'so what?' and we wouldn't see this conflict as important. Of course saying they have nothing to do with each other is over-simplistic, but Dawkins is also over-simplistic with his book.
Daniel Dennett replies to Orr in 'The God Delusion' Letter to the Editors, The New York Review of Books, Vol. 54 Num 3 March 1, 2007.
Orr replies, and Dennet replies again on a Blog.
The New York Review of Books, Vol. 54 Num 1 January 11, 2007
Author is critiquing Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion as the most ambitious and the most public of the recent publications by biologists and philosophers in the area of the science of evolution as it relates to religion and the belief that a creator is necessary for the explanation of life.
Dawkins, author argues, has written a fantastic book in The Selfish Gene, but The God Delusion is much less. The major issue from author is that Dawkins doesn't really engage with some of the intricate reasoning from theology. Author claims Dawkins can't distinguish 'unitarians from abortion clinic bombers'.
Dawkins presents 'the ultimate argument' against creationism that is couched in non-deistic terms: Intelligent Design demands an intelligent designer, but the designer needs to be more complicated than the design. Therefore the designer needs to have been designed by an even more intelligent designer, thus an infinite regress. Of course infinite regress might be avoided by a 'brute fact' of an earlier designer. Any claim that stipulating a brute fact is unscientific should have to account for the 'brute fact' of 'matter' and 'laws of nature', author claims.
Dawkins also makes an empirical claim; that religion has made our world worse, not better. He cites crime rates, persecution, terrorism, and the closing of children's minds, etc. Most of the evidence, author claims, is anecdotal. Author replies that most of the history of the 20th century has been an experiment in institutional atheism and has shed a lot of blood. Author also argues that religion is worse compared to what. Most of our value/moral and aesthetic judgments come from a society that is deeply shaped by Judeo/Christian teachings, so this is a problem of circularity. Dawkins' ethical claim looks a lot like Mill's Harm Principle, which, author argues, wouldn't be the ideal in a traditional Confusion culture, which would suppress individualism.
Author's final argument is that Dawkins is making a big stink over a particular part of history that pitted the church against Darwinism and science. Believers might have said 'so what?' and we wouldn't see this conflict as important. Of course saying they have nothing to do with each other is over-simplistic, but Dawkins is also over-simplistic with his book.
Daniel Dennett replies to Orr in 'The God Delusion' Letter to the Editors, The New York Review of Books, Vol. 54 Num 3 March 1, 2007.
Orr replies, and Dennet replies again on a Blog.
2/23/07
Hitchcock, Christopher - Conceptual Analysis Naturalized: A Metaphilosophical Case Study
02/23/2007
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 103, #9 Sep 2006
Author distinguishes between conceptual analysis that tries to find necessary and sufficient conditions of concepts, and a conceptual analysis that tries to locate the 'theoretical role' of a concept-- that is, tries identify its role 'in facilitating inferences of various kinds'. Author claims that this second task of conceptual analysis can be informed by empirical studies in psychology and elsewhere. He uses an example of causation as his 'case study' of how the studies in psychology will bear on philosophy.
Section I
Gives a survey of the theories of causation:
1. Regularity theories- causation just is constant conjunction (Hume)
2. Mechanical theories- causation is the transfer of a substance or concept (energy, momentum, etc.)
3. Manipulability theories- casual knowledge comes from our ability to affect the world
4. Counterfactual theories- if not for p, no q e.g. counterfactual dependence and so on
Section II
This section provides the basis for the usefulness of an analysis of a concept using it's theoretical role. While this kind of analysis doesn't provide us with a solid explanation of the concept, it will give a deeper understanding because it helps us understand when the concept is appropriately applied.
Section III
Psychology about causation: it appears primates/chimps have trouble with simple tasks where a robust concept of causation might be necessary, but children around the age of 3-4 don't have the same trouble. These studies seem scattered. From them, author tries to construct a 3-part theory of causal reasoning:
1) full causal understanding, where knowledge gained from watching others manipulate can be applied to regularities/machinations in the world
3) Egoistic causal understanding, where the agent can use causal forces only when it is done personally, by the agent himself-- only using manipulation
2) Social causal understanding, where the agent's understanding of causal forces may be influenced by what other creatures do, but may not be able to see the mechanistic causal factors.
The key claim here is that the different proposals for analysis of causality in section I are considered to be modes, or modalities, and chimps are seen as understanding the modality of regularity and possibly manipulation, but perhaps not of mechanical causation. The author uses the different accounts of causation to construct possible theoretical explanations for the scientific data. Thus conceptual analysis of the concept of causation is brought into the empirical realm of theory-- conceptual analysis 'naturalized'. Author also argues that psychology can help philosophy.
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 103, #9 Sep 2006
Author distinguishes between conceptual analysis that tries to find necessary and sufficient conditions of concepts, and a conceptual analysis that tries to locate the 'theoretical role' of a concept-- that is, tries identify its role 'in facilitating inferences of various kinds'. Author claims that this second task of conceptual analysis can be informed by empirical studies in psychology and elsewhere. He uses an example of causation as his 'case study' of how the studies in psychology will bear on philosophy.
Section I
Gives a survey of the theories of causation:
1. Regularity theories- causation just is constant conjunction (Hume)
2. Mechanical theories- causation is the transfer of a substance or concept (energy, momentum, etc.)
3. Manipulability theories- casual knowledge comes from our ability to affect the world
4. Counterfactual theories- if not for p, no q e.g. counterfactual dependence and so on
Section II
This section provides the basis for the usefulness of an analysis of a concept using it's theoretical role. While this kind of analysis doesn't provide us with a solid explanation of the concept, it will give a deeper understanding because it helps us understand when the concept is appropriately applied.
Section III
Psychology about causation: it appears primates/chimps have trouble with simple tasks where a robust concept of causation might be necessary, but children around the age of 3-4 don't have the same trouble. These studies seem scattered. From them, author tries to construct a 3-part theory of causal reasoning:
1) full causal understanding, where knowledge gained from watching others manipulate can be applied to regularities/machinations in the world
3) Egoistic causal understanding, where the agent can use causal forces only when it is done personally, by the agent himself-- only using manipulation
2) Social causal understanding, where the agent's understanding of causal forces may be influenced by what other creatures do, but may not be able to see the mechanistic causal factors.
The key claim here is that the different proposals for analysis of causality in section I are considered to be modes, or modalities, and chimps are seen as understanding the modality of regularity and possibly manipulation, but perhaps not of mechanical causation. The author uses the different accounts of causation to construct possible theoretical explanations for the scientific data. Thus conceptual analysis of the concept of causation is brought into the empirical realm of theory-- conceptual analysis 'naturalized'. Author also argues that psychology can help philosophy.
2/16/07
Darwall, Stephen - Motive and Obligation in Hume's Ethics
02/16/2007
Nous, Vol 27 Issue 4 (1993)
Author sets about mostly an interpretative goal: to understand what Hume's conception of justice is and how it fits with the rest of his theory. There seem to be difficulties with a straight-forward reading due to some of Hume's commitments:
1) Justice is commonly established, artificial obligations made by social agreement and practice
2) Only characteristics and motives are deserving of moral approbation/disapprobation. Actions don't qualify!
3) The Will aims at some good or the avoidance of some evil
The difficulty is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts, except that obligation comes from the Will, and the Will aims at goods, and no acts are good! (motives are good/bad, not acts).
Hume conceives of Obligation as coming from natural obligation (self-interest) and moral obligation (the sentiment of approbation).
Author explains Hume's conception of justice as mostly about property rights, promises, proper transfer agreements, etc. This is a convention/common agreement social practice, artificially created so that society can function. Hume writes in the Treatise that it is through our natural obligation of self-interest that we adopt the rules of justice, since we see that it is ultimately best for us to have our property respected, and therefore to respect others'. But Hume eventually acknowledges that you can have many particular instances where it isn't in our considered, long-term self-interest to act justly.
The problem with this acknowledgement is that now we have to look for another source for the obligation for justice. It isn't natural obligation, so it must be a moral obligation. But the moral obligations require an internally good motive to give approbation to, and what is this in the case of justice? This is a problem, since Hume's conception of justice/equity is that it is socially constructed rules.
The answer, author suggests, is to take the internally good motive to be the motive of rule-regulation itself. Therefore we praise equitable persons because of their Will to be obliged by rule-regulation.
The only problem with this interpretation is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts (not to have equitable motives). Author suggests Hume was confused in these passages.
Nous, Vol 27 Issue 4 (1993)
Author sets about mostly an interpretative goal: to understand what Hume's conception of justice is and how it fits with the rest of his theory. There seem to be difficulties with a straight-forward reading due to some of Hume's commitments:
1) Justice is commonly established, artificial obligations made by social agreement and practice
2) Only characteristics and motives are deserving of moral approbation/disapprobation. Actions don't qualify!
3) The Will aims at some good or the avoidance of some evil
The difficulty is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts, except that obligation comes from the Will, and the Will aims at goods, and no acts are good! (motives are good/bad, not acts).
Hume conceives of Obligation as coming from natural obligation (self-interest) and moral obligation (the sentiment of approbation).
Author explains Hume's conception of justice as mostly about property rights, promises, proper transfer agreements, etc. This is a convention/common agreement social practice, artificially created so that society can function. Hume writes in the Treatise that it is through our natural obligation of self-interest that we adopt the rules of justice, since we see that it is ultimately best for us to have our property respected, and therefore to respect others'. But Hume eventually acknowledges that you can have many particular instances where it isn't in our considered, long-term self-interest to act justly.
The problem with this acknowledgement is that now we have to look for another source for the obligation for justice. It isn't natural obligation, so it must be a moral obligation. But the moral obligations require an internally good motive to give approbation to, and what is this in the case of justice? This is a problem, since Hume's conception of justice/equity is that it is socially constructed rules.
The answer, author suggests, is to take the internally good motive to be the motive of rule-regulation itself. Therefore we praise equitable persons because of their Will to be obliged by rule-regulation.
The only problem with this interpretation is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts (not to have equitable motives). Author suggests Hume was confused in these passages.
2/9/07
Shriver, Adam - Minding Mammals
02/09/2007
Philosophical Psychology Vol 19 No 4 August 2006
Author mainly replies to one major objection in the ethics of humane treatment of animals. Proponents of treating animals as worthy of moral consideration often takes an 'analogy' argument: some animals are similar to us in the relevant ways, we deserve moral consideration, therefore animals do. First of all, for this to work with the prima facia badness of 'pain', we need to use a vaguely utilitarian model, not (probably) in a Kantian deontological model. The next problem is about how similar we want to get. This becomes difficult when dealing with 'pain', since there are varieties of pain-like responses that all sorts of animals display, but we don't want to give them moral consideration. (pg 435) A more sophisticaed objection is that it isn't just 'pain' that is prima facie morally bad, but pain that is attended to as unpleasantly painful. This might seem redundant but there are common psychological phenomena of dissociation between a painful feeling and an unpleasant feeling. For instance morphine users may report feeling pain but not 'minding' it. (Dennett points out how this is trouble for our folk conception of qualia)
Author uses science to reply. Recent work on pain pathways have found at least two, one 'lateral' and one 'medial'. The theory is that the lateral plays the part of reporting on a pain-like feeling (pain) and the medial, using the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), reports the unpleasantness of pain (suffering). Crudely, a distinction between pain and suffering. Data from various experiments are held to support this higher-level theory. Mammals have both pathways, therefore strengthening the argument by analogy. These two pathways are probably absent in birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish since those species lack neocortices, but there might be some sort of analogue we might discover.
The ACC also gets excited at a variety of times, example: social exclusion, human mothers hearing a baby cry, at the expectation of pain. Suffering without physical pain.
Author finally considers other skeptical arguments that animals aren't worthy of moral consideration because they don't have 'higher-order' conscisousness (Carruthers, Tye). This is not relevant.
Philosophical Psychology Vol 19 No 4 August 2006
Author mainly replies to one major objection in the ethics of humane treatment of animals. Proponents of treating animals as worthy of moral consideration often takes an 'analogy' argument: some animals are similar to us in the relevant ways, we deserve moral consideration, therefore animals do. First of all, for this to work with the prima facia badness of 'pain', we need to use a vaguely utilitarian model, not (probably) in a Kantian deontological model. The next problem is about how similar we want to get. This becomes difficult when dealing with 'pain', since there are varieties of pain-like responses that all sorts of animals display, but we don't want to give them moral consideration. (pg 435) A more sophisticaed objection is that it isn't just 'pain' that is prima facie morally bad, but pain that is attended to as unpleasantly painful. This might seem redundant but there are common psychological phenomena of dissociation between a painful feeling and an unpleasant feeling. For instance morphine users may report feeling pain but not 'minding' it. (Dennett points out how this is trouble for our folk conception of qualia)
Author uses science to reply. Recent work on pain pathways have found at least two, one 'lateral' and one 'medial'. The theory is that the lateral plays the part of reporting on a pain-like feeling (pain) and the medial, using the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), reports the unpleasantness of pain (suffering). Crudely, a distinction between pain and suffering. Data from various experiments are held to support this higher-level theory. Mammals have both pathways, therefore strengthening the argument by analogy. These two pathways are probably absent in birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish since those species lack neocortices, but there might be some sort of analogue we might discover.
The ACC also gets excited at a variety of times, example: social exclusion, human mothers hearing a baby cry, at the expectation of pain. Suffering without physical pain.
Author finally considers other skeptical arguments that animals aren't worthy of moral consideration because they don't have 'higher-order' conscisousness (Carruthers, Tye). This is not relevant.
2/2/07
White, Morton - Normative Ethics, Normative Epistemology, And Quine's Holism
02/02/2007
The Philosophy of WV Quine, Hehn & Schlipp eds, 1986
Terribly written paper. Addressed toward Quine, but not exactly-- trying to convince him of something-- but clunky.
Author's main point is that if Quine allows for normative epistemology, he should also allow for normative ethics.
Author tries to incorporate a positive account of ethics and fit it into Quine's holism. Quine's holism includes the following: if a set of theory and observation sentences lead to an expectation for observation A and you get observation not-A (recalcitrant data), it is open about which sentence to revise/scrap. This employed just scientific theories and observation sentences. Author wants to add another dimension: feelings. A scientist can get a recalcitrant feeling about accepting a hypothesis-- even if the evidence is for it. This she should adjust, since if she didn't, she wouldn't be following a normative epistemology to adjust belief to evidence and theory. But if we add 'feelings', then a moral agent needs to adjust her normative beliefs, or the facts in the situation in order to avoid a recalcitrant feeling.
Quine replies to White after the paper, saying that observation sentences should command nearly universal acceptance if true, whereas sentences of moral evaluation will not, since they depend on a lot of outside information that not all the witnesses will have.
The Philosophy of WV Quine, Hehn & Schlipp eds, 1986
Terribly written paper. Addressed toward Quine, but not exactly-- trying to convince him of something-- but clunky.
Author's main point is that if Quine allows for normative epistemology, he should also allow for normative ethics.
Author tries to incorporate a positive account of ethics and fit it into Quine's holism. Quine's holism includes the following: if a set of theory and observation sentences lead to an expectation for observation A and you get observation not-A (recalcitrant data), it is open about which sentence to revise/scrap. This employed just scientific theories and observation sentences. Author wants to add another dimension: feelings. A scientist can get a recalcitrant feeling about accepting a hypothesis-- even if the evidence is for it. This she should adjust, since if she didn't, she wouldn't be following a normative epistemology to adjust belief to evidence and theory. But if we add 'feelings', then a moral agent needs to adjust her normative beliefs, or the facts in the situation in order to avoid a recalcitrant feeling.
Quine replies to White after the paper, saying that observation sentences should command nearly universal acceptance if true, whereas sentences of moral evaluation will not, since they depend on a lot of outside information that not all the witnesses will have.
1/26/07
Quine, Willard Van Orman - On the Nature of Moral Values
01/26/2007
Values and Morals, Goldman & Kim eds 1978
Author discusses the two parts of action: belief and desire. Discusses moral training as coming to associate positive ends with positive means-- that is, 'transmutation of means into ends'.
Author cannot pinpoint actual 'moral values' but instead discusses two more easily identified ones: Altruistic values and Ceremonial values. Altruistic means being satisfied when someone else is, and Ceremonial means attaching value to the practices of one's social/societal group.
Author considers 'moral sentiment' to be based from sympathy for one's fellow man.
[Interesting paper: worth re-reading and this is a sub-standard summary]
Values and Morals, Goldman & Kim eds 1978
Author discusses the two parts of action: belief and desire. Discusses moral training as coming to associate positive ends with positive means-- that is, 'transmutation of means into ends'.
Author cannot pinpoint actual 'moral values' but instead discusses two more easily identified ones: Altruistic values and Ceremonial values. Altruistic means being satisfied when someone else is, and Ceremonial means attaching value to the practices of one's social/societal group.
Author considers 'moral sentiment' to be based from sympathy for one's fellow man.
[Interesting paper: worth re-reading and this is a sub-standard summary]
1/19/07
Frankfurt, Harry - On Truth
01/19/2007
Alfred Knopf, New York 2006
This is a short book of 100 pages, really light in philosophy with big type-face and wide margins. Author introduces by talking about his assumption in his "On Bullshit" book-- the assumption was that truth was good. Now he is backing up that truth is, well, good.
I- Author describes the inestimable practical value of true facts in the conduct of business, social, technical, medical, engineering and other matter. He briefly confronts two 'postmodern' replies, one is that there is no objective reality, or another that we only call those things as true those that are the subject to a constraint (perhaps socially constructed) we have from economic, political, etc. forces. Author rejects this as too 'glib' and obtuse and refers to engineers, architects and physicians-- there may be many different methods that will work, but many more that simply will not. Thus the opposite of falsity is needed, at least. He admits this may constrain objectivity in the social sciences, history.
II- Even if normative claims are neither true nor false, at least they must have a basis in the factual-- in what things someone did or didn't do-- in order to make the judgments in the first place. This is what being reasonable is about-- being responsive to reasons that are facts.
III- Description of Spinoza's account of loving truth, you cannot help but love it. Things that help you find yourself, discover yourself, and make you grow, expand your capabilities, etc, are what you cannot help but love.
IV- Why is truth so good? We need to cope with reality in order to make our way. We need to know some of the properties of reality so that we can adjust ourselves accordingly. We can feel at home when we are confident we know the truth about something. Ignorance leaves us in the dark, to 'mindless groping' (pg61).
V- We are rational beings-- we need truth in order for our rationality to be meaningful (pg65) because we need facts to be responsive to.
VI-VII Lying separates you from the truth, and since we all dwell in reality (the true), then you are being separated from reality, you are being isolated. We also don't like lying because, if we don't detect it, we are undercutting our confidence in find the truth after all.
VIII- Shakespeare talks of pleasant lies that make us feel better but we know to be lies in a sonnet (pg87). If you can do this, go for it.
IX- We need the truth because we wouldn't know our limitations, our abilities, or much about the world. We wouldn't be able to find ourselves!
Alfred Knopf, New York 2006
This is a short book of 100 pages, really light in philosophy with big type-face and wide margins. Author introduces by talking about his assumption in his "On Bullshit" book-- the assumption was that truth was good. Now he is backing up that truth is, well, good.
I- Author describes the inestimable practical value of true facts in the conduct of business, social, technical, medical, engineering and other matter. He briefly confronts two 'postmodern' replies, one is that there is no objective reality, or another that we only call those things as true those that are the subject to a constraint (perhaps socially constructed) we have from economic, political, etc. forces. Author rejects this as too 'glib' and obtuse and refers to engineers, architects and physicians-- there may be many different methods that will work, but many more that simply will not. Thus the opposite of falsity is needed, at least. He admits this may constrain objectivity in the social sciences, history.
II- Even if normative claims are neither true nor false, at least they must have a basis in the factual-- in what things someone did or didn't do-- in order to make the judgments in the first place. This is what being reasonable is about-- being responsive to reasons that are facts.
III- Description of Spinoza's account of loving truth, you cannot help but love it. Things that help you find yourself, discover yourself, and make you grow, expand your capabilities, etc, are what you cannot help but love.
IV- Why is truth so good? We need to cope with reality in order to make our way. We need to know some of the properties of reality so that we can adjust ourselves accordingly. We can feel at home when we are confident we know the truth about something. Ignorance leaves us in the dark, to 'mindless groping' (pg61).
V- We are rational beings-- we need truth in order for our rationality to be meaningful (pg65) because we need facts to be responsive to.
VI-VII Lying separates you from the truth, and since we all dwell in reality (the true), then you are being separated from reality, you are being isolated. We also don't like lying because, if we don't detect it, we are undercutting our confidence in find the truth after all.
VIII- Shakespeare talks of pleasant lies that make us feel better but we know to be lies in a sonnet (pg87). If you can do this, go for it.
IX- We need the truth because we wouldn't know our limitations, our abilities, or much about the world. We wouldn't be able to find ourselves!
1/12/07
Quine, Willard Van Orman - Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist
01/12/2007
Future Pasts, Floyd & Shieh eds., Oxford Univ Press
Author introduces himself as an extensionalist. He defines what coextensive means for various parts of speech:
-2 Closed Sentences: coextensive if both true or both false
-2 Predicates/General Terms/Open Sentences: coextensive if true of just the same objects or sequences of objects
-2 Singular Terms: coextensive if they designate the same object
An expression is extensional if replacing one of its parts with a coextensive part preserves truth.
Two main problems for extensionalism:
1) intentional claims about beliefs with more than one mode of presentation.
2) Using a term for fictitious objects like 'pegasus', then using 'flies if existent' and 'flies and exists', using existence as a property. The two predicates are coextensive, but one is true and the other false. Author fixes this problem by translating 'flies if existent' to 'exists, then flies', which is false too.
Author talks of the problem of Principia Mathematica was to use "Propositional Functions", which led back to properties and intentions rather than individuated extensional items. The other issue was 'material implication', which got seriously confused in Principia Mathematica by using 'p implies q' to suggest 'p entails q'. This leads to confusion because it can seem as though 'p entails q' is a necessary truth between p and q, which author refuses.
The first problem of extensionalism is intentions-- 'Tully' and 'Cicero'. If we mention, not use, the sentence 'Cicero denounced Catiline' in the sentence 'Tom believes "...". Then since the sentence 'Cicero...' is mentioned, you cannot substitute into it.
This is 'semantic ascent', which can be very useful. "The quoted sentence is the ascriber's expression of what he would be prompted to assert if he were in the state of mind in which he takes the subject to be." This has no internal component, just external 'assent', etc.
Later, in the meeting, a big complaint of semantic assent was the lack of translation (into other languages, for instance)-- you need meanings for this.
Future Pasts, Floyd & Shieh eds., Oxford Univ Press
Author introduces himself as an extensionalist. He defines what coextensive means for various parts of speech:
-2 Closed Sentences: coextensive if both true or both false
-2 Predicates/General Terms/Open Sentences: coextensive if true of just the same objects or sequences of objects
-2 Singular Terms: coextensive if they designate the same object
An expression is extensional if replacing one of its parts with a coextensive part preserves truth.
Two main problems for extensionalism:
1) intentional claims about beliefs with more than one mode of presentation.
2) Using a term for fictitious objects like 'pegasus', then using 'flies if existent' and 'flies and exists', using existence as a property. The two predicates are coextensive, but one is true and the other false. Author fixes this problem by translating 'flies if existent' to 'exists, then flies', which is false too.
Author talks of the problem of Principia Mathematica was to use "Propositional Functions", which led back to properties and intentions rather than individuated extensional items. The other issue was 'material implication', which got seriously confused in Principia Mathematica by using 'p implies q' to suggest 'p entails q'. This leads to confusion because it can seem as though 'p entails q' is a necessary truth between p and q, which author refuses.
The first problem of extensionalism is intentions-- 'Tully' and 'Cicero'. If we mention, not use, the sentence 'Cicero denounced Catiline' in the sentence 'Tom believes "...". Then since the sentence 'Cicero...' is mentioned, you cannot substitute into it.
This is 'semantic ascent', which can be very useful. "The quoted sentence is the ascriber's expression of what he would be prompted to assert if he were in the state of mind in which he takes the subject to be." This has no internal component, just external 'assent', etc.
Later, in the meeting, a big complaint of semantic assent was the lack of translation (into other languages, for instance)-- you need meanings for this.
1/5/07
Buss, Sarah - Needs (Someone Else's), Projects (My Own), and Reasons
01/05/2007
Journal of Philosophy August 2006
Note: In this paper much of the academic argument against Susan Wolf, Harry Frankfurt, Shelly Kagan, and Bernard Williams is done in the footnotes, along with much more contentious argumentation.
Author begins by noting that she could have picked an occupation that was more 'helpful'. 'Helpful' is undefined, other than something that does more to help those in need. She contrasts this on a very personal level, with her choice of philosophy. She immediately claims that any profession she chose would provide the same level of personal satisfaction, thereby dispelling any 'tradeoff' between being helpful and being happy. She concludes that there are very minor, 'messy' reasons for her choice of a 'relatively unhelpful' profession.
Author doesn't believe her only reason is to be moral, or to subsume all her needs/desires for others. But given the prima facie truth that she has good reason to help another in pressing need, doesn't she have good reason to change her commitments so that she does help others in pressing need? The main point is that she is asking for justification for her current commitments that are relatively unhelpful. [Justification calls for reason-giving and standards-holding-- what if, on this level of structuring commitments, there are no substantive reasons, only structural ones?]
Author examines other possible replies to there is a good reason to be helpful. First is that there is no strong reason to help those in pressing need, or that this strong reason is overridden easily by one's own needs, whatever they may be, because of some special status they have by virtue of being mine. This argument tends to assume there is a contrast between a 'subjective' and 'objective' reasoning, and that there should be some special bridge ('why be moral?') that one has to cross in order to go from the subjective to the objective form of reasoning, and that there is no good reason to do that. Author tries to stay away from this talk of 'subjective' and 'objective' by framing everything in the subjective.
What doesn't work 1: 'There is normative force behind our commitments because they are what we favor.' Author: this doesn't answer our question, since we are asking what we think gives us reasons to do, what interests we find reason-giving for action. And surely being helpful to those in need is reason-giving. [not if we do not rationally decide on what we favor-- what if what we favor is arbitrarily defined, then repeated, then reinforced?]
What doesn't work 2: 'Our commitments make us who we are in a substantive way. To alter them is to abandon oneself, and to question them may be unintelligible.' Author: people can radically change. Offering 'I am what I am' is a cop-out since it doesn't account for the ability to rationally question the justification of what you are. Author: I am a living thing, and then I have commitments. I have reason enough to go on living, and from there to make commitments. If I abandon my commitments, I am still a living thing (the grounds for living aren't gone), so I can form new commitments. (Weird arguments going on pgs 386-387-- this part involves a supposed 'transcendental argument' made on 387 and footnoted in footnote 30. The transcendental argument goes as follows: 'since I believe that life is worth living, I have good reason to make commitments in my life.' Contrast this to: 'It is the commitments in my life that make it worth living.'
What doesn't work 3: 'There is inherent value in variety.' (Wolf?) Author: get over yourself.
What doesn't work 4: There is no over-arching standard by which various commitments can be held up and scrutinized. Just about any commitment is ok. Author: (391) Just because there is no final, ultimate criterion doesn't give us license just to chose willy-nilly. There are reasoned choices to be made, relative weights to be measured, and some will be better than others, even though there is no final scale. Sometimes we can pick the relative merit of some commitments vs others, even if sometimes we can't. Also, the above argument now justifies evil commitments!
Author: beware the trick of our own desires. They are reason-giving, but not especially reason-giving for me just because I happen to have them. The things we rational agents need in order to start to examine our commitments is magnanimity and forgiveness (400). [This could be possibly the weirdest ending to a strong paper.]
Journal of Philosophy August 2006
Note: In this paper much of the academic argument against Susan Wolf, Harry Frankfurt, Shelly Kagan, and Bernard Williams is done in the footnotes, along with much more contentious argumentation.
Author begins by noting that she could have picked an occupation that was more 'helpful'. 'Helpful' is undefined, other than something that does more to help those in need. She contrasts this on a very personal level, with her choice of philosophy. She immediately claims that any profession she chose would provide the same level of personal satisfaction, thereby dispelling any 'tradeoff' between being helpful and being happy. She concludes that there are very minor, 'messy' reasons for her choice of a 'relatively unhelpful' profession.
Author doesn't believe her only reason is to be moral, or to subsume all her needs/desires for others. But given the prima facie truth that she has good reason to help another in pressing need, doesn't she have good reason to change her commitments so that she does help others in pressing need? The main point is that she is asking for justification for her current commitments that are relatively unhelpful. [Justification calls for reason-giving and standards-holding-- what if, on this level of structuring commitments, there are no substantive reasons, only structural ones?]
Author examines other possible replies to there is a good reason to be helpful. First is that there is no strong reason to help those in pressing need, or that this strong reason is overridden easily by one's own needs, whatever they may be, because of some special status they have by virtue of being mine. This argument tends to assume there is a contrast between a 'subjective' and 'objective' reasoning, and that there should be some special bridge ('why be moral?') that one has to cross in order to go from the subjective to the objective form of reasoning, and that there is no good reason to do that. Author tries to stay away from this talk of 'subjective' and 'objective' by framing everything in the subjective.
What doesn't work 1: 'There is normative force behind our commitments because they are what we favor.' Author: this doesn't answer our question, since we are asking what we think gives us reasons to do, what interests we find reason-giving for action. And surely being helpful to those in need is reason-giving. [not if we do not rationally decide on what we favor-- what if what we favor is arbitrarily defined, then repeated, then reinforced?]
What doesn't work 2: 'Our commitments make us who we are in a substantive way. To alter them is to abandon oneself, and to question them may be unintelligible.' Author: people can radically change. Offering 'I am what I am' is a cop-out since it doesn't account for the ability to rationally question the justification of what you are. Author: I am a living thing, and then I have commitments. I have reason enough to go on living, and from there to make commitments. If I abandon my commitments, I am still a living thing (the grounds for living aren't gone), so I can form new commitments. (Weird arguments going on pgs 386-387-- this part involves a supposed 'transcendental argument' made on 387 and footnoted in footnote 30. The transcendental argument goes as follows: 'since I believe that life is worth living, I have good reason to make commitments in my life.' Contrast this to: 'It is the commitments in my life that make it worth living.'
What doesn't work 3: 'There is inherent value in variety.' (Wolf?) Author: get over yourself.
What doesn't work 4: There is no over-arching standard by which various commitments can be held up and scrutinized. Just about any commitment is ok. Author: (391) Just because there is no final, ultimate criterion doesn't give us license just to chose willy-nilly. There are reasoned choices to be made, relative weights to be measured, and some will be better than others, even though there is no final scale. Sometimes we can pick the relative merit of some commitments vs others, even if sometimes we can't. Also, the above argument now justifies evil commitments!
Author: beware the trick of our own desires. They are reason-giving, but not especially reason-giving for me just because I happen to have them. The things we rational agents need in order to start to examine our commitments is magnanimity and forgiveness (400). [This could be possibly the weirdest ending to a strong paper.]
12/15/06
Fodor, Jerry - What is Universally Quantified and Necessary and A Posteriori and It Flies South in the Winter?
12/15/2006
Presidential Address
The Jerry Fodor Over-used Latin Glossary:
Mutatis Mutandis: 'with the necessary changes having been made'
Ipso Facto: 'by the fact itself'
A Fortiori: 'from the stronger reason'
Ceteris Paribus: 'all else being equal'
Inter Alia: 'among other things'
Author begins with a review of the 'baptismal' account of fixing the names of natural kinds terms; fixing the referents for names.
1, the word 'water' lacks descriptive content.
2, baptism occurs when the speaker has the intention to name something. The flow of explanation goes from the mental state to the linguistic expression. The way author indicates it goes is as follows: "Let's call this kind of stuff: 'water'.".
3, the name 'water' is a rigid designator for possible worlds (modality), designating the same kind of stuff in all worlds where it exists at all.
Author claims that you need the modal to get necessary a posteriori facts. The modal is underwritten by the baptismal account of naming, since this account of naming designates rigidly and doesn't seek to describe the kind it designates, just designates the kind as 'water'.
Author then claims that the baptism intention can't match up to rigid designation. There are some possibilities:
1. You need the concept of water before you baptize that stuff as 'water'. Author likes this, but nobody else does. This still falls short, because you have to let people know that you're using the concept WATER when you're baptizing water as 'water', so you have to have 'water' be in the language prior to baptizing it as 'water'. Nobody likes this outcome. But as a solution, you have to baptize a natural kind using a representation that doesn't involve a concept. See next...
2. You try to say "this kind of stuff is 'water'." This uses a demonstrative, not a concept to baptize. The new problem, author points out, is that nobody really knows what you're pointing out when you say 'this kind of stuff'. Do you mean the stuff granny uses for brushing teeth? Do you mean the kind of stuff that fills a glass? Each token refers to multiple kinds.
Author considers various 'NP-- Not-Pooh' fixes to this problem and rejects them. He closes with a 'deeper problem' in trying to secure nomological necessity with semantic necessity.
Presidential Address
The Jerry Fodor Over-used Latin Glossary:
Mutatis Mutandis: 'with the necessary changes having been made'
Ipso Facto: 'by the fact itself'
A Fortiori: 'from the stronger reason'
Ceteris Paribus: 'all else being equal'
Inter Alia: 'among other things'
Author begins with a review of the 'baptismal' account of fixing the names of natural kinds terms; fixing the referents for names.
1, the word 'water' lacks descriptive content.
2, baptism occurs when the speaker has the intention to name something. The flow of explanation goes from the mental state to the linguistic expression. The way author indicates it goes is as follows: "Let's call this kind of stuff: 'water'.".
3, the name 'water' is a rigid designator for possible worlds (modality), designating the same kind of stuff in all worlds where it exists at all.
Author claims that you need the modal to get necessary a posteriori facts. The modal is underwritten by the baptismal account of naming, since this account of naming designates rigidly and doesn't seek to describe the kind it designates, just designates the kind as 'water'.
Author then claims that the baptism intention can't match up to rigid designation. There are some possibilities:
1. You need the concept of water before you baptize that stuff as 'water'. Author likes this, but nobody else does. This still falls short, because you have to let people know that you're using the concept WATER when you're baptizing water as 'water', so you have to have 'water' be in the language prior to baptizing it as 'water'. Nobody likes this outcome. But as a solution, you have to baptize a natural kind using a representation that doesn't involve a concept. See next...
2. You try to say "this kind of stuff is 'water'." This uses a demonstrative, not a concept to baptize. The new problem, author points out, is that nobody really knows what you're pointing out when you say 'this kind of stuff'. Do you mean the stuff granny uses for brushing teeth? Do you mean the kind of stuff that fills a glass? Each token refers to multiple kinds.
Author considers various 'NP-- Not-Pooh' fixes to this problem and rejects them. He closes with a 'deeper problem' in trying to secure nomological necessity with semantic necessity.
12/8/06
Kim, Jaegwon - The Mind-Body Problem at Century's Turn
12/08/2006
The Future of Philosophy, Brian Leiter, editor. 2004
Author begins with claming that physicalism is close enough to the right answer, and better than substance dualism and property dualism.
Substance dualism: the idea that Cartesian minds of a different substance can act causally on the physical plain cannot be supported. Causation needs spatial relations, or relational properties that can be laid out in space. Space, at least, is the thing that allows us to 'pair' causes with their effects. Author argues that since cartesian minds are non-spatial, we have no possibility of pairing them with spatially allocated items. There is also way that we can think of for non-spatial objects to cause and effect each other, let alone spatial objects.
Property dualism: most famous version of 'nonreductive materialism'. Beliefs, desires, feelings and so on cannot be reduced to the physical. They play a causal role. But how, author questions? Brings same arguments to bear, since now we're wondering how beliefs and desires move our physical bodies to do anything at all.
"If mentality is to have any causal efficacy at all-- it must be physically reducible" pg 138.
Mental Residue: Inverted qualia is a genuine possibility. Author concedes that the nature of qualia might be non-reducible, but also, luckily, causally impotent. The similarities and differences between qualia ought to be causally potent, and also reducible, but the feel and nature of this or that quale cannot be explained.
The subjective is the first-personal aspect of the mind, and is currently incompatible with the reductive program. The cogito 'I exist' is not the same proposition as 'Descartes exists', or 'that man exists', and so on. The special status of this proposition [is it a proposition?] and the privileged access we have to our mentality is lost on reduction, and is different from the mind-body problem, but needs attention. Review pg 149.
The Future of Philosophy, Brian Leiter, editor. 2004
Author begins with claming that physicalism is close enough to the right answer, and better than substance dualism and property dualism.
Substance dualism: the idea that Cartesian minds of a different substance can act causally on the physical plain cannot be supported. Causation needs spatial relations, or relational properties that can be laid out in space. Space, at least, is the thing that allows us to 'pair' causes with their effects. Author argues that since cartesian minds are non-spatial, we have no possibility of pairing them with spatially allocated items. There is also way that we can think of for non-spatial objects to cause and effect each other, let alone spatial objects.
Property dualism: most famous version of 'nonreductive materialism'. Beliefs, desires, feelings and so on cannot be reduced to the physical. They play a causal role. But how, author questions? Brings same arguments to bear, since now we're wondering how beliefs and desires move our physical bodies to do anything at all.
"If mentality is to have any causal efficacy at all-- it must be physically reducible" pg 138.
Mental Residue: Inverted qualia is a genuine possibility. Author concedes that the nature of qualia might be non-reducible, but also, luckily, causally impotent. The similarities and differences between qualia ought to be causally potent, and also reducible, but the feel and nature of this or that quale cannot be explained.
The subjective is the first-personal aspect of the mind, and is currently incompatible with the reductive program. The cogito 'I exist' is not the same proposition as 'Descartes exists', or 'that man exists', and so on. The special status of this proposition [is it a proposition?] and the privileged access we have to our mentality is lost on reduction, and is different from the mind-body problem, but needs attention. Review pg 149.
12/1/06
Stump, Eleonore - Love, By All Accounts
12/01/2006
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA
Author briefly reviews the three general approaches to the nature of love. The responsiveness account, the volitional account, and the relational account. Each has faults:
Responsiveness account: the features possessed by the beloved are also possessed by others, undercutting the non-substitutivity of love. Also love may alter when the intrinsic features of the beloved alter.
Volitional account: the will to love a the beloved could be equally applied to anyone else, for no good reason one way or another. Example: I do love you, but for no good reason.
Relational account: we value a relationship, a history, a connection, ongoing and interactive-- but Dante doesn't satisfy this account, since he loved Beatrice from afar and also had a wife Gemma Donati, who lived in another town (that he made no efforts to be close to). [This 'Dante Argument' is a poor reply to the relational account.]
Author turns to Thomas Acquinas' account of love, which is two-fold:
1) the desire the objective good of the beloved
2) the desire for union with the beloved
To desire the objective good of the beloved: you don't always know what you're desiring, since it is an objective matter what the good of the beloved is. This could mean that you think you love A, but you actually don't.
'Union' isn't well defined in Acquinas, but author argues that it provides for multiple 'offices of love', because different unions are appropriate due to different relational and intrinsic aspects of the beloved and the lover. Ex: friend, lover, parent. It also makes it possible to abuse an office of love by desiring a union that is outside of the appropriate office. Ex: incest, molesting priests
Self-love means you want to be integrated (union) and that you want the best for yourself.
The claim is that this account responds to much of the difficulties earlier found. The lover can list intrinsic/relational aspects of the beloved that fit into an office of love, and the volitional account is satisfied in spirit, since at it's backbone is the desire for the good of another.
Finally, this can give an account of forgiveness as trying to find an appropriate office of love.
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA
Author briefly reviews the three general approaches to the nature of love. The responsiveness account, the volitional account, and the relational account. Each has faults:
Responsiveness account: the features possessed by the beloved are also possessed by others, undercutting the non-substitutivity of love. Also love may alter when the intrinsic features of the beloved alter.
Volitional account: the will to love a the beloved could be equally applied to anyone else, for no good reason one way or another. Example: I do love you, but for no good reason.
Relational account: we value a relationship, a history, a connection, ongoing and interactive-- but Dante doesn't satisfy this account, since he loved Beatrice from afar and also had a wife Gemma Donati, who lived in another town (that he made no efforts to be close to). [This 'Dante Argument' is a poor reply to the relational account.]
Author turns to Thomas Acquinas' account of love, which is two-fold:
1) the desire the objective good of the beloved
2) the desire for union with the beloved
To desire the objective good of the beloved: you don't always know what you're desiring, since it is an objective matter what the good of the beloved is. This could mean that you think you love A, but you actually don't.
'Union' isn't well defined in Acquinas, but author argues that it provides for multiple 'offices of love', because different unions are appropriate due to different relational and intrinsic aspects of the beloved and the lover. Ex: friend, lover, parent. It also makes it possible to abuse an office of love by desiring a union that is outside of the appropriate office. Ex: incest, molesting priests
Self-love means you want to be integrated (union) and that you want the best for yourself.
The claim is that this account responds to much of the difficulties earlier found. The lover can list intrinsic/relational aspects of the beloved that fit into an office of love, and the volitional account is satisfied in spirit, since at it's backbone is the desire for the good of another.
Finally, this can give an account of forgiveness as trying to find an appropriate office of love.
11/17/06
Wartenberg, Tom - Thinking Inside the Frame: How Films Philosophize (manuscript)
11/17/2006
Unpublished, Chapters 6-8
Chapter 6 is a discussion of the filming of philosophy in the movie The Third Man. Author argues this movie is a filming of Aristotle's discussion on the nature of friendship and what it takes to break a relationship with a friend and for what reasons. First the protagonist proves he is a friend by resisting the 'slander' of his friend by another, and he tries to solve his friend's death out of loyalty, then he is turned from being his friend by an 'up-close' and 'movie-like' viewing of the friend's bad deeds, but he remains unwilling to help the police catch him. This, author claims, mirrors the extended discussion of when to dissolve a relationship in Aristotle. Finally the protagonist turns in the former friend due to full realization of his bad deeds. This, author claims, is doing philosophy since it deals with a real example of Aristotle's hypothetical discussion on the nature of friendship.
Chapter 7 discusses two structural films, Empire and Flicker. Both, author claims, comment on the nature of film itself, and qualify as doing philosophy insofar as philosophizing about film is philosophy. Empire films the empire state building as night comes in, filming a static object and is conveying stasis. Since essentialist analyses of film said it was necessary for film to show motion, this is a counterexample, or at least adding that film is the only thing that can show stasis as well.
Flicker also adds to the philosophy of film in that it shows that objects do not need to be filmed in order to show motion and shape. Since Flicker is just blacked out film frames and white film frames in different successions, there are no objects or motions shown. Author claims that eventually the viewer sees motion, color and objects in an optical illusion effect. So the film itself does not contain motion or objects but they are seen anyway. Author claims this is chaning the philosophical analysis of film.
Chapter 8 is the summary and conclusion chapter. Author emphasizes the importance of counterexamples and thought experiments in philo and re-hashes the three objections given in the beginning of the book. Author also explains the need to have philosophy enter the public arena more than it has before, and that film might be a good way to do that.
Unpublished, Chapters 6-8
Chapter 6 is a discussion of the filming of philosophy in the movie The Third Man. Author argues this movie is a filming of Aristotle's discussion on the nature of friendship and what it takes to break a relationship with a friend and for what reasons. First the protagonist proves he is a friend by resisting the 'slander' of his friend by another, and he tries to solve his friend's death out of loyalty, then he is turned from being his friend by an 'up-close' and 'movie-like' viewing of the friend's bad deeds, but he remains unwilling to help the police catch him. This, author claims, mirrors the extended discussion of when to dissolve a relationship in Aristotle. Finally the protagonist turns in the former friend due to full realization of his bad deeds. This, author claims, is doing philosophy since it deals with a real example of Aristotle's hypothetical discussion on the nature of friendship.
Chapter 7 discusses two structural films, Empire and Flicker. Both, author claims, comment on the nature of film itself, and qualify as doing philosophy insofar as philosophizing about film is philosophy. Empire films the empire state building as night comes in, filming a static object and is conveying stasis. Since essentialist analyses of film said it was necessary for film to show motion, this is a counterexample, or at least adding that film is the only thing that can show stasis as well.
Flicker also adds to the philosophy of film in that it shows that objects do not need to be filmed in order to show motion and shape. Since Flicker is just blacked out film frames and white film frames in different successions, there are no objects or motions shown. Author claims that eventually the viewer sees motion, color and objects in an optical illusion effect. So the film itself does not contain motion or objects but they are seen anyway. Author claims this is chaning the philosophical analysis of film.
Chapter 8 is the summary and conclusion chapter. Author emphasizes the importance of counterexamples and thought experiments in philo and re-hashes the three objections given in the beginning of the book. Author also explains the need to have philosophy enter the public arena more than it has before, and that film might be a good way to do that.
11/10/06
Wartenberg, Tom - Thinking Inside the Frame: How Films Philosophize (manuscript)
11/10/2006
Unpublished, Chapters 4-5
Ch 4 is about a thought experiment in The Matrix. The thought experiment rehearses Descartes' evil demon hypothesis about the external world. But the claim is that because it also puts the viewer into the same place that a subject deceived by the evil demon would be, it is a new approach or counts as 'doing philosophy'.
Ch 5 claims to be a reply to utilitarian arguments about the good. Author explains the use of a counterexample in philosophy as challenging one of the premises in a general argument. Extended discussion about the contrast between narrative vs. broad argumentation. Counterexamples may use narrative to refute a claim that 'A is an essential feature of F' by finding one example of an A not being an F.
The claim is that Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind provides a counterexample to an argument that people will be better off if they do not have bad memories. Author denies the claim that he is using his own philo background to interpret this movie.
Unpublished, Chapters 4-5
Ch 4 is about a thought experiment in The Matrix. The thought experiment rehearses Descartes' evil demon hypothesis about the external world. But the claim is that because it also puts the viewer into the same place that a subject deceived by the evil demon would be, it is a new approach or counts as 'doing philosophy'.
Ch 5 claims to be a reply to utilitarian arguments about the good. Author explains the use of a counterexample in philosophy as challenging one of the premises in a general argument. Extended discussion about the contrast between narrative vs. broad argumentation. Counterexamples may use narrative to refute a claim that 'A is an essential feature of F' by finding one example of an A not being an F.
The claim is that Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind provides a counterexample to an argument that people will be better off if they do not have bad memories. Author denies the claim that he is using his own philo background to interpret this movie.
11/3/06
Wartenberg, Tom - Thinking Inside the Frame: How Films Philosophize (manuscript)
11/03/2006
Unpublished, Chapters 1-3
Author wants to establish a firm basis for taking film to be 'doing philosophy', or that film can be a place where philosophy is 'screened'. There are three general objections to this idea: Explicitness objection, Generality objection, Imposition objection. Author suggests that the most effective doing of philo in film is by using the counterexample.
Explicitness: philo tries to be clear and unambiguous, art tries not and is not
Author's response: Really, the objection is about implicit argumentation and explicit argumentation. And implicit argumentation isn't necessarily imprecise.
Generality: philo is about universals, or at least abstract, art is normally about particulars
Author's response: There are some academic subjects that translate well into narrative, for instance history. Really the objection is about a narrative versus argumentation. But not all philosophy uses general argumentation only! Some use thought experiments, and examples. Some of these thought experiments/examples are indispensable to the arguments. These are just like narratives.
Imposition: any philo interpreted to be in film is the philosopher's imposition, not from the art
Author's response: we must be careful not to attribute meaning to a work that was not intended by the author. Don't use an 'audience-oriented' interpretation, use instead 'creator-oriented' interpretation.
The final chapter deals with a supposed difference between film as an 'illustration' of a philosophical point, and actually making a philosophical point. Some illustrations or examples are essential to a philosophical argument, just as some illustrations are essential to other works.
Unpublished, Chapters 1-3
Author wants to establish a firm basis for taking film to be 'doing philosophy', or that film can be a place where philosophy is 'screened'. There are three general objections to this idea: Explicitness objection, Generality objection, Imposition objection. Author suggests that the most effective doing of philo in film is by using the counterexample.
Explicitness: philo tries to be clear and unambiguous, art tries not and is not
Author's response: Really, the objection is about implicit argumentation and explicit argumentation. And implicit argumentation isn't necessarily imprecise.
Generality: philo is about universals, or at least abstract, art is normally about particulars
Author's response: There are some academic subjects that translate well into narrative, for instance history. Really the objection is about a narrative versus argumentation. But not all philosophy uses general argumentation only! Some use thought experiments, and examples. Some of these thought experiments/examples are indispensable to the arguments. These are just like narratives.
Imposition: any philo interpreted to be in film is the philosopher's imposition, not from the art
Author's response: we must be careful not to attribute meaning to a work that was not intended by the author. Don't use an 'audience-oriented' interpretation, use instead 'creator-oriented' interpretation.
The final chapter deals with a supposed difference between film as an 'illustration' of a philosophical point, and actually making a philosophical point. Some illustrations or examples are essential to a philosophical argument, just as some illustrations are essential to other works.
10/27/06
Sleutels, Jan - Greek Zombies
10/27/2006
Routledge, Philosophical Psychology April 2006
Julian Jaynes writes that the Homeric Greeks might not have had some level of consciousness, or some level of concepts. This is dismissed by most, save possibly Dan Dennett, but in particular dismissed by Ned Block. Sleutels argues that this is not as obviously wrong as it first appears.
These might be 'fringe minds', but unfortunately we modern-day humans don't have the resources to think about what kind of consciousness might be in fringe minds. Jaynes gives a poor, negative example of what consciousness isn't on pg 181. He indicates two levels of consciousness, the 'mind-space' and the 'analog I'. The analog I does the introspection on concepts in the 'mind-space'. The Greeks have neither, according to Jaynes.
Block has the distinction between Phenomenal consciousness and Access consciousness, and clearly Greeks have P-con. Block doesn't take seriously that humans that are the same as we biologically not have A-con.
Author suggests the debate is over A-con. If consciousness is a social construction, this won't work to get A-con going, since A-con is the thing that considers the concepts involved in the very social construction itself. Social constructions take place in the realm of concepts, and without concepts, no social construction. Author suggests other concepts, B-concepts. These have only behavioral conditions to their identity-- they don't have 'inferential relations' cannot be introspected. This may avoid the primacy problem of concepts for social constructions.
Routledge, Philosophical Psychology April 2006
Julian Jaynes writes that the Homeric Greeks might not have had some level of consciousness, or some level of concepts. This is dismissed by most, save possibly Dan Dennett, but in particular dismissed by Ned Block. Sleutels argues that this is not as obviously wrong as it first appears.
These might be 'fringe minds', but unfortunately we modern-day humans don't have the resources to think about what kind of consciousness might be in fringe minds. Jaynes gives a poor, negative example of what consciousness isn't on pg 181. He indicates two levels of consciousness, the 'mind-space' and the 'analog I'. The analog I does the introspection on concepts in the 'mind-space'. The Greeks have neither, according to Jaynes.
Block has the distinction between Phenomenal consciousness and Access consciousness, and clearly Greeks have P-con. Block doesn't take seriously that humans that are the same as we biologically not have A-con.
Author suggests the debate is over A-con. If consciousness is a social construction, this won't work to get A-con going, since A-con is the thing that considers the concepts involved in the very social construction itself. Social constructions take place in the realm of concepts, and without concepts, no social construction. Author suggests other concepts, B-concepts. These have only behavioral conditions to their identity-- they don't have 'inferential relations' cannot be introspected. This may avoid the primacy problem of concepts for social constructions.
10/20/06
Townley, Cynthia - A Defense of Ignorance
10/20/2006
Chapter 4, rough draft for review for PATF
Argument against 'epistemophilia', the focus on increasing knowledge as the sole purpose of epistemology, or that more knowledge is the only epistemic virtue.
Seeks to place other concepts like 'trust' and 'ignorance' as epistemic virtues, or make them indispensable in the framework of epistemology. E.g. you need to trust another epistemic agent for you to actually gain new knowledge from them, and you also have to admit that you're ignorant about a particular subject.
Important to acquire knowledge in a responsible manner from other epistemic agents and treat them with respect, not just as sources for information.
The possibility of incoherence in a body of knowledge, or multiple incommensurate bodies of knowledge, possibly even about the same subject matter. For instance compare western medicine and other traditional healing practices. If true, this undercuts the idea that knowledge can be added up to form a complete singular body of work.
Discusses the copyright issues and problems when western scientific models interact with other culture's knowledge base.
Chapter 4, rough draft for review for PATF
Argument against 'epistemophilia', the focus on increasing knowledge as the sole purpose of epistemology, or that more knowledge is the only epistemic virtue.
Seeks to place other concepts like 'trust' and 'ignorance' as epistemic virtues, or make them indispensable in the framework of epistemology. E.g. you need to trust another epistemic agent for you to actually gain new knowledge from them, and you also have to admit that you're ignorant about a particular subject.
Important to acquire knowledge in a responsible manner from other epistemic agents and treat them with respect, not just as sources for information.
The possibility of incoherence in a body of knowledge, or multiple incommensurate bodies of knowledge, possibly even about the same subject matter. For instance compare western medicine and other traditional healing practices. If true, this undercuts the idea that knowledge can be added up to form a complete singular body of work.
Discusses the copyright issues and problems when western scientific models interact with other culture's knowledge base.
10/13/06
Previous Papers
10/13/2006 Rowlands, M - The Normativity of Action, Philosophical Psychology Jun 2006
10/06/2006 Sutton, J - Introduction: Memory, Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind, Philosophical Psychology Jun 2006
10/06/2006 Clark, Andy - Material Symbols, Philosophical Psychology Jun 2006
09/29/2006 Sen, Amaryta - What Do We Want From A Theory Of Justice? Journal of Philosophy May 2004
09/22/2006 Lormand, E - The Explanatory Stopgap, Philosophical Review July 2004
09/15/2006 Shoemaker, Sydney - On Projecting the Unprojectible
09/08/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Grammar of 'Believe'
09/01/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Grammar of 'Believe'
08/25/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Argument from Illusion: Objects and Objections Mind, April 1972
08/18/2006 Martin, M - Perception, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 24 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
08/11/2006 Segal, G - Intentionality, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 11 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
08/04/2006 Causation, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 19 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
07/28/2006 Vogel, Jonathan - Causation and Subjectivity
07/21/2006 Matthews, Gary - On the Very Idea of Infused Virtues
07/14/2006 Mele, Alfred - Action, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 13 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
07/07/2006 Devitt, Michael - Scientific Realism, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 26 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/30/2006 Albert, David - The Foundations of Physics, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 29 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/23/2006 Knoeldge and Scepticism, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 23 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/16/2006 Davies, M - Cognitive Science, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 14 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/09/2006 Boyer, Peter - A Church Asunder, The New Yorker 04/17/2006
06/02/2006 Jackson, Frank - Consciousness, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 12 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
05/19/2006 Sterelny, Kim - The Evolution and Evolvability of Culture, Mind & Language April 2006
05/12/2006 Marcs, G - Startling Starlings, Nature April 2006
05/12/2006 Gentner, T et al - Recursive Syntactic Pattern Learning by Songbirds, Nature April 2006
05/05/2006 McGinn, Colin - Is Wittgenstein Losing his Hold?
04/21/2006 Moore, GE - Proof of an External World
04/14/2006 Viger, C - Learning to Think: A Response to the Language of Thought Argument for Innateness, Mind & Language Jun 2005
04/07/2006 Franks, B - The Role of 'the Environment' in Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology, Philosophical Psychology Feb 2005
03/31/2006 Knobe, J - Folk Psychology: Science and Morals
03/24/2006 Kelly, S - Closing the Gap: Phenomenology and Logical Analysis, Harvard Reivew of Philosophy Vol 13 No 2
03/17/2006 Azzouni, J & Armour-Garb, B - Standing on Common Ground, Journal of Philosophy Oct 2005
03/10/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 12 & 13
03/03/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 3 & 4
02/24/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 1 & 2
02/17/2006 Nussbaum, Martha - What Does Philosophy Contribute to Public Life?
02/10/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Argument from Illusion: Objects and Objections, Mind 1972
02/03/2006 On Taking Stances: An Interview with Bas Van Frassen, Harvard Review of Philosophy Vol 13 No 2 2005
01/27/2006 Danto, Arthur - What Does Philosophy Contribute to Public Life?
01/20/2006 Nahmias, E et al - Surveying Freedom: Fold Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Philosophical Psychology Oct 2005
01/13/2006 Sosa, E - Dreams and Philosophy, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
01/06/2006 Appiah, A - The Case for Conatamination, New York Times Magazine 1/1/06
12/16/2005 Kelly, E - Against Naturalism in Ethics, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
12/09/2005 Kitcher, P - The Hall of Mirrors, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
12/02/2005 Dreyfus, H - Overcoming the Myth of the Mental, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
11/18/2005 Sizer, Laura - Good and Good for You: An Affect Theory of Happiness
11/11/2005 Davidson, Donald - Could There be a science of Rationality? Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
11/04/2005 Bhushan, Nalini - Situating Jiddu Krishnamurti within the Frame of Western Varieties of Cosmopolitanism
10/28/2005 Price, H - Naturalism without Representationalism, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/21/2005 Putnam, Hilary - The Content and Appeal of Naturalism, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/14/2005 McDowell, J - Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/07/2005 Levy, N - Imaginative Resistance and the Moral/Conventional Distinction, Philosophical Psychology April 2005
09/30/2005 Collins, J - Nativism: In Defense of a Biological Understanding, Philosophical Psychology April 2005
09/23/2005 Sen, Amaryta - Capability and Well-Being, The Quality of Life Nussbaum & Sen eds, 1993
09/16/2005 Darwall, S - Valuing Activity: Golub's Smile, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 4 2002
09/09/2005 Darwall, S - Empathy, Sympathy, Care, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 3 2002
09/02/2005 Darwall, S - Welfare and Care, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 2 2002
08/26/2005 Darwall, S - Welfare's Normativity, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 1 2002
08/12/2005 Tiberius, V - Wisdom and Perspective, Journal of Philosophy April 2005
07/29/2005 Cohen, GA - Deeper into Bullshit
07/29/2005 Frankfurt, Harry - Reply to GA Cohen, Contours of Agency 2003 Buss & Overton eds
07/22/2005 Priest, G & Read, S - Intentionality: Meinongianism and the Medievals, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
07/15/2005 Frankfurt, Harry - On Bullshit, The Importance of What We Care About
07/08/2005 Orr, HA - Devolution: Why Intelligent Design Isn't, The New Yorker May 30 2005
07/01/2005 Levy, N - The Evolution of Morality, What Makes Us Moral Ch 2
06/24/2005 Fish, Stanley - Chickens: the Ward Churchill and Larry Summers Story, The Chronicle of Higher Education, May 13 2005
06/17/2005 Tymozcko, Tom - An Anecdote about Plato and Mathematics
06/10/2005 Quine, Willard Van - Epistemology Naturalized, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
06/03/2005 - How to Read Epistemology Naturalized, Journal of Philosophy
05/13/2005 Leigh, Fiona - Thought without Attitudes: Davidson, Aristotle and Animal Minds
05/06/2005 Rini, Adriane - Introduction: A Hitchhikers Guide to Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic
04/29/2005 Greenberg, G - As Good As Dead, The New Yorker Aug 13, 2001
04/22/2005 Maiborn, Heidi - Must We Feel for Others to be Moral?
04/15/2005 Churchland, Paul - Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective, Journal of Philosophy Jan 2005
04/08/2005 Rorty, Richard - How Many Grains Make a Heap?, London Review of Books, Jan 2005
04/01/2005 Fodor, Jerry - Reply to Steven Pikner: So How Does the Mind Work?, Mind and Language Feb 2005
04/01/2005 Pinker, Steven - Reply to Jerry Fodor on how the Mind Works, Mind and Language Feb 2005
03/25/2005 Pinker, Steven - So How Does the Mind Work?, Mind and Language Feb 2005
03/18/2005 Paoli, F - Implicational Paradoxes and the Meaning of Logical Constants
03/11/2005 Atran, S - Adaptationism for Human Cognition: Strong, Spurious or Weak?, Mind and Language Feb 205
02/25/2005 Peacock, C - Moral Rationalism, Journal of Philosophy Oct 2004
02/18/2005 Nehamas, A - Art, Interpretation and the Rest of Life, APA Proceedings and Addresses Vol 78 No 3
02/11/2005 Kiteley, Murray - Sellars' Ontology of Categories, Nous May 1973
02/04/2005 Darwall, S - Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint, APA Proceedings and Addresses Vol 78 No 2
01/28/2005 Velleman, D - Love as a Moral Emotion, Ethics 109 Jan 1999
01/14/2005 Kolodny, N - Love as Valuing a Relationship, Philosophical Review April 2003
01/07/2005 Annas, J - Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2004
12/17/2004 Aune, Bruce - Wetzel on Types and Tokens
12/10/2004 Aune, Bruce - Knowing and Philosophical Analysis
12/03/2004 Carruthers, Peter - Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind, Mind & Language June 2004
11/19/2004 Sterelny, Kim - Thought in a Hostile World, Selections
11/12/2004 Sterelny, Kim - Thought in a Hostile World, Selections
11/05/2004 Connolly, John - What's the Problem with Akrasia? A Medieval Perspective
10/29/2004 Papineau et al - Critical Discussion: Kim Sterelny's Thought in a Hostile World, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
10/22/2004 Marcus, Eric - Why Zombies are Inconceivable, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
10/15/2004 Rupert, R - Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition, Journal of Philosophy Aug 2004
10/08/2004 Atkinson & Wheeler - The Grain of Domain: The Evolutionary-Psychological Case Against Domain-General Cognition, Mind & Language Vol 19 No 2 2004
10/01/2004 deVries, Bill - Unpublished Manuscript on Sellars: Ch 7 Intentionality and the Mental
09/24/2004 deVries, Bill - Unpublished Manuscript on Sellars: Ch 5 Knowledge and the Given
09/17/2004 Mayr, E - The Biology of Race and the Concept of Equality, Daedalus 2002
09/17/2004 Cavalli-Sforza, L - Genes, People, and Languages, Ch 1 2002
09/10/2004 Graves, J - The Race Myth, Chapter 1
09/03/2004 Mosley, Al - Are Racial Categories Racist?
08/27/2004 Glasgow, J - The New Biology of Race, Journal of Philosophy Sept 2003
08/20/2004 Andreasen, R - Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct?, Philosophy of Science 67 2000
08/13/2004 Hardimon, M - The Ordinary Concept of Race, Journal of Philosophy Sept 2003
07/30/2004 Levin, J - Coult Love Be Like a Heatwave: Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience, Philosophical Studies Vol 59 No 2 1986
07/23/2004 Sizer, Laura - What Feelings Can't Do
07/16/2004 Rudd, AJ - What It's Like and What's Really Wrong With Physicalism, Journal of Consciousness Studies 5, No 4 1998
07/09/2004 Horgan, P - Quantum Philosophy
07/02/2004 Rorty, Richard - Philosophical Convictions, The Nation June 14 2004
06/25/2004 Block, Ned - The Harder Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Philosophy Aug 2002
06/11/2004 Hohwy, J - Evidence, Explanation and Experience: on the Harder Problem of Consciousness
05/21/2004 Singer, P - War: Iraq, Chapter 8 The President of Good & Evil
05/21/2004 Dutton & Savoy - The Moral Case Against the Iraq War
04/16/2004 Fodor, J - Having a Concept: A Brief Refutation of the 20th Century
03/12/2004 Webster, WR - Wavelength Theory of Color Strikes Back: The Return of the Physical
10/06/2006 Sutton, J - Introduction: Memory, Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind, Philosophical Psychology Jun 2006
10/06/2006 Clark, Andy - Material Symbols, Philosophical Psychology Jun 2006
09/29/2006 Sen, Amaryta - What Do We Want From A Theory Of Justice? Journal of Philosophy May 2004
09/22/2006 Lormand, E - The Explanatory Stopgap, Philosophical Review July 2004
09/15/2006 Shoemaker, Sydney - On Projecting the Unprojectible
09/08/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Grammar of 'Believe'
09/01/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Grammar of 'Believe'
08/25/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Argument from Illusion: Objects and Objections Mind, April 1972
08/18/2006 Martin, M - Perception, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 24 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
08/11/2006 Segal, G - Intentionality, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 11 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
08/04/2006 Causation, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 19 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
07/28/2006 Vogel, Jonathan - Causation and Subjectivity
07/21/2006 Matthews, Gary - On the Very Idea of Infused Virtues
07/14/2006 Mele, Alfred - Action, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 13 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
07/07/2006 Devitt, Michael - Scientific Realism, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 26 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/30/2006 Albert, David - The Foundations of Physics, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 29 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/23/2006 Knoeldge and Scepticism, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 23 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/16/2006 Davies, M - Cognitive Science, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 14 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
06/09/2006 Boyer, Peter - A Church Asunder, The New Yorker 04/17/2006
06/02/2006 Jackson, Frank - Consciousness, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy ch 12 Jackson & Smith eds 2005
05/19/2006 Sterelny, Kim - The Evolution and Evolvability of Culture, Mind & Language April 2006
05/12/2006 Marcs, G - Startling Starlings, Nature April 2006
05/12/2006 Gentner, T et al - Recursive Syntactic Pattern Learning by Songbirds, Nature April 2006
05/05/2006 McGinn, Colin - Is Wittgenstein Losing his Hold?
04/21/2006 Moore, GE - Proof of an External World
04/14/2006 Viger, C - Learning to Think: A Response to the Language of Thought Argument for Innateness, Mind & Language Jun 2005
04/07/2006 Franks, B - The Role of 'the Environment' in Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology, Philosophical Psychology Feb 2005
03/31/2006 Knobe, J - Folk Psychology: Science and Morals
03/24/2006 Kelly, S - Closing the Gap: Phenomenology and Logical Analysis, Harvard Reivew of Philosophy Vol 13 No 2
03/17/2006 Azzouni, J & Armour-Garb, B - Standing on Common Ground, Journal of Philosophy Oct 2005
03/10/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 12 & 13
03/03/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 3 & 4
02/24/2006 Mitchell, Sam - The Archimedean Point Ch 1 & 2
02/17/2006 Nussbaum, Martha - What Does Philosophy Contribute to Public Life?
02/10/2006 Kiteley, Murray - The Argument from Illusion: Objects and Objections, Mind 1972
02/03/2006 On Taking Stances: An Interview with Bas Van Frassen, Harvard Review of Philosophy Vol 13 No 2 2005
01/27/2006 Danto, Arthur - What Does Philosophy Contribute to Public Life?
01/20/2006 Nahmias, E et al - Surveying Freedom: Fold Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Philosophical Psychology Oct 2005
01/13/2006 Sosa, E - Dreams and Philosophy, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
01/06/2006 Appiah, A - The Case for Conatamination, New York Times Magazine 1/1/06
12/16/2005 Kelly, E - Against Naturalism in Ethics, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
12/09/2005 Kitcher, P - The Hall of Mirrors, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
12/02/2005 Dreyfus, H - Overcoming the Myth of the Mental, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2005
11/18/2005 Sizer, Laura - Good and Good for You: An Affect Theory of Happiness
11/11/2005 Davidson, Donald - Could There be a science of Rationality? Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
11/04/2005 Bhushan, Nalini - Situating Jiddu Krishnamurti within the Frame of Western Varieties of Cosmopolitanism
10/28/2005 Price, H - Naturalism without Representationalism, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/21/2005 Putnam, Hilary - The Content and Appeal of Naturalism, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/14/2005 McDowell, J - Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind, Naturalism in Question De Caro & Macarthur eds 2004
10/07/2005 Levy, N - Imaginative Resistance and the Moral/Conventional Distinction, Philosophical Psychology April 2005
09/30/2005 Collins, J - Nativism: In Defense of a Biological Understanding, Philosophical Psychology April 2005
09/23/2005 Sen, Amaryta - Capability and Well-Being, The Quality of Life Nussbaum & Sen eds, 1993
09/16/2005 Darwall, S - Valuing Activity: Golub's Smile, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 4 2002
09/09/2005 Darwall, S - Empathy, Sympathy, Care, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 3 2002
09/02/2005 Darwall, S - Welfare and Care, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 2 2002
08/26/2005 Darwall, S - Welfare's Normativity, Welfare and Rational Care Ch 1 2002
08/12/2005 Tiberius, V - Wisdom and Perspective, Journal of Philosophy April 2005
07/29/2005 Cohen, GA - Deeper into Bullshit
07/29/2005 Frankfurt, Harry - Reply to GA Cohen, Contours of Agency 2003 Buss & Overton eds
07/22/2005 Priest, G & Read, S - Intentionality: Meinongianism and the Medievals, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
07/15/2005 Frankfurt, Harry - On Bullshit, The Importance of What We Care About
07/08/2005 Orr, HA - Devolution: Why Intelligent Design Isn't, The New Yorker May 30 2005
07/01/2005 Levy, N - The Evolution of Morality, What Makes Us Moral Ch 2
06/24/2005 Fish, Stanley - Chickens: the Ward Churchill and Larry Summers Story, The Chronicle of Higher Education, May 13 2005
06/17/2005 Tymozcko, Tom - An Anecdote about Plato and Mathematics
06/10/2005 Quine, Willard Van - Epistemology Naturalized, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
06/03/2005 - How to Read Epistemology Naturalized, Journal of Philosophy
05/13/2005 Leigh, Fiona - Thought without Attitudes: Davidson, Aristotle and Animal Minds
05/06/2005 Rini, Adriane - Introduction: A Hitchhikers Guide to Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic
04/29/2005 Greenberg, G - As Good As Dead, The New Yorker Aug 13, 2001
04/22/2005 Maiborn, Heidi - Must We Feel for Others to be Moral?
04/15/2005 Churchland, Paul - Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective, Journal of Philosophy Jan 2005
04/08/2005 Rorty, Richard - How Many Grains Make a Heap?, London Review of Books, Jan 2005
04/01/2005 Fodor, Jerry - Reply to Steven Pikner: So How Does the Mind Work?, Mind and Language Feb 2005
04/01/2005 Pinker, Steven - Reply to Jerry Fodor on how the Mind Works, Mind and Language Feb 2005
03/25/2005 Pinker, Steven - So How Does the Mind Work?, Mind and Language Feb 2005
03/18/2005 Paoli, F - Implicational Paradoxes and the Meaning of Logical Constants
03/11/2005 Atran, S - Adaptationism for Human Cognition: Strong, Spurious or Weak?, Mind and Language Feb 205
02/25/2005 Peacock, C - Moral Rationalism, Journal of Philosophy Oct 2004
02/18/2005 Nehamas, A - Art, Interpretation and the Rest of Life, APA Proceedings and Addresses Vol 78 No 3
02/11/2005 Kiteley, Murray - Sellars' Ontology of Categories, Nous May 1973
02/04/2005 Darwall, S - Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint, APA Proceedings and Addresses Vol 78 No 2
01/28/2005 Velleman, D - Love as a Moral Emotion, Ethics 109 Jan 1999
01/14/2005 Kolodny, N - Love as Valuing a Relationship, Philosophical Review April 2003
01/07/2005 Annas, J - Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing, APA Proceedings and Addresses Nov 2004
12/17/2004 Aune, Bruce - Wetzel on Types and Tokens
12/10/2004 Aune, Bruce - Knowing and Philosophical Analysis
12/03/2004 Carruthers, Peter - Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind, Mind & Language June 2004
11/19/2004 Sterelny, Kim - Thought in a Hostile World, Selections
11/12/2004 Sterelny, Kim - Thought in a Hostile World, Selections
11/05/2004 Connolly, John - What's the Problem with Akrasia? A Medieval Perspective
10/29/2004 Papineau et al - Critical Discussion: Kim Sterelny's Thought in a Hostile World, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
10/22/2004 Marcus, Eric - Why Zombies are Inconceivable, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Sept 2004
10/15/2004 Rupert, R - Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition, Journal of Philosophy Aug 2004
10/08/2004 Atkinson & Wheeler - The Grain of Domain: The Evolutionary-Psychological Case Against Domain-General Cognition, Mind & Language Vol 19 No 2 2004
10/01/2004 deVries, Bill - Unpublished Manuscript on Sellars: Ch 7 Intentionality and the Mental
09/24/2004 deVries, Bill - Unpublished Manuscript on Sellars: Ch 5 Knowledge and the Given
09/17/2004 Mayr, E - The Biology of Race and the Concept of Equality, Daedalus 2002
09/17/2004 Cavalli-Sforza, L - Genes, People, and Languages, Ch 1 2002
09/10/2004 Graves, J - The Race Myth, Chapter 1
09/03/2004 Mosley, Al - Are Racial Categories Racist?
08/27/2004 Glasgow, J - The New Biology of Race, Journal of Philosophy Sept 2003
08/20/2004 Andreasen, R - Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct?, Philosophy of Science 67 2000
08/13/2004 Hardimon, M - The Ordinary Concept of Race, Journal of Philosophy Sept 2003
07/30/2004 Levin, J - Coult Love Be Like a Heatwave: Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience, Philosophical Studies Vol 59 No 2 1986
07/23/2004 Sizer, Laura - What Feelings Can't Do
07/16/2004 Rudd, AJ - What It's Like and What's Really Wrong With Physicalism, Journal of Consciousness Studies 5, No 4 1998
07/09/2004 Horgan, P - Quantum Philosophy
07/02/2004 Rorty, Richard - Philosophical Convictions, The Nation June 14 2004
06/25/2004 Block, Ned - The Harder Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Philosophy Aug 2002
06/11/2004 Hohwy, J - Evidence, Explanation and Experience: on the Harder Problem of Consciousness
05/21/2004 Singer, P - War: Iraq, Chapter 8 The President of Good & Evil
05/21/2004 Dutton & Savoy - The Moral Case Against the Iraq War
04/16/2004 Fodor, J - Having a Concept: A Brief Refutation of the 20th Century
03/12/2004 Webster, WR - Wavelength Theory of Color Strikes Back: The Return of the Physical
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