02/23/2007
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 103, #9 Sep 2006
Author distinguishes between conceptual analysis that tries to find necessary and sufficient conditions of concepts, and a conceptual analysis that tries to locate the 'theoretical role' of a concept-- that is, tries identify its role 'in facilitating inferences of various kinds'. Author claims that this second task of conceptual analysis can be informed by empirical studies in psychology and elsewhere. He uses an example of causation as his 'case study' of how the studies in psychology will bear on philosophy.
Section I
Gives a survey of the theories of causation:
1. Regularity theories- causation just is constant conjunction (Hume)
2. Mechanical theories- causation is the transfer of a substance or concept (energy, momentum, etc.)
3. Manipulability theories- casual knowledge comes from our ability to affect the world
4. Counterfactual theories- if not for p, no q e.g. counterfactual dependence and so on
Section II
This section provides the basis for the usefulness of an analysis of a concept using it's theoretical role. While this kind of analysis doesn't provide us with a solid explanation of the concept, it will give a deeper understanding because it helps us understand when the concept is appropriately applied.
Section III
Psychology about causation: it appears primates/chimps have trouble with simple tasks where a robust concept of causation might be necessary, but children around the age of 3-4 don't have the same trouble. These studies seem scattered. From them, author tries to construct a 3-part theory of causal reasoning:
1) full causal understanding, where knowledge gained from watching others manipulate can be applied to regularities/machinations in the world
3) Egoistic causal understanding, where the agent can use causal forces only when it is done personally, by the agent himself-- only using manipulation
2) Social causal understanding, where the agent's understanding of causal forces may be influenced by what other creatures do, but may not be able to see the mechanistic causal factors.
The key claim here is that the different proposals for analysis of causality in section I are considered to be modes, or modalities, and chimps are seen as understanding the modality of regularity and possibly manipulation, but perhaps not of mechanical causation. The author uses the different accounts of causation to construct possible theoretical explanations for the scientific data. Thus conceptual analysis of the concept of causation is brought into the empirical realm of theory-- conceptual analysis 'naturalized'. Author also argues that psychology can help philosophy.
2/23/07
2/16/07
Darwall, Stephen - Motive and Obligation in Hume's Ethics
02/16/2007
Nous, Vol 27 Issue 4 (1993)
Author sets about mostly an interpretative goal: to understand what Hume's conception of justice is and how it fits with the rest of his theory. There seem to be difficulties with a straight-forward reading due to some of Hume's commitments:
1) Justice is commonly established, artificial obligations made by social agreement and practice
2) Only characteristics and motives are deserving of moral approbation/disapprobation. Actions don't qualify!
3) The Will aims at some good or the avoidance of some evil
The difficulty is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts, except that obligation comes from the Will, and the Will aims at goods, and no acts are good! (motives are good/bad, not acts).
Hume conceives of Obligation as coming from natural obligation (self-interest) and moral obligation (the sentiment of approbation).
Author explains Hume's conception of justice as mostly about property rights, promises, proper transfer agreements, etc. This is a convention/common agreement social practice, artificially created so that society can function. Hume writes in the Treatise that it is through our natural obligation of self-interest that we adopt the rules of justice, since we see that it is ultimately best for us to have our property respected, and therefore to respect others'. But Hume eventually acknowledges that you can have many particular instances where it isn't in our considered, long-term self-interest to act justly.
The problem with this acknowledgement is that now we have to look for another source for the obligation for justice. It isn't natural obligation, so it must be a moral obligation. But the moral obligations require an internally good motive to give approbation to, and what is this in the case of justice? This is a problem, since Hume's conception of justice/equity is that it is socially constructed rules.
The answer, author suggests, is to take the internally good motive to be the motive of rule-regulation itself. Therefore we praise equitable persons because of their Will to be obliged by rule-regulation.
The only problem with this interpretation is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts (not to have equitable motives). Author suggests Hume was confused in these passages.
Nous, Vol 27 Issue 4 (1993)
Author sets about mostly an interpretative goal: to understand what Hume's conception of justice is and how it fits with the rest of his theory. There seem to be difficulties with a straight-forward reading due to some of Hume's commitments:
1) Justice is commonly established, artificial obligations made by social agreement and practice
2) Only characteristics and motives are deserving of moral approbation/disapprobation. Actions don't qualify!
3) The Will aims at some good or the avoidance of some evil
The difficulty is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts, except that obligation comes from the Will, and the Will aims at goods, and no acts are good! (motives are good/bad, not acts).
Hume conceives of Obligation as coming from natural obligation (self-interest) and moral obligation (the sentiment of approbation).
Author explains Hume's conception of justice as mostly about property rights, promises, proper transfer agreements, etc. This is a convention/common agreement social practice, artificially created so that society can function. Hume writes in the Treatise that it is through our natural obligation of self-interest that we adopt the rules of justice, since we see that it is ultimately best for us to have our property respected, and therefore to respect others'. But Hume eventually acknowledges that you can have many particular instances where it isn't in our considered, long-term self-interest to act justly.
The problem with this acknowledgement is that now we have to look for another source for the obligation for justice. It isn't natural obligation, so it must be a moral obligation. But the moral obligations require an internally good motive to give approbation to, and what is this in the case of justice? This is a problem, since Hume's conception of justice/equity is that it is socially constructed rules.
The answer, author suggests, is to take the internally good motive to be the motive of rule-regulation itself. Therefore we praise equitable persons because of their Will to be obliged by rule-regulation.
The only problem with this interpretation is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts (not to have equitable motives). Author suggests Hume was confused in these passages.
2/9/07
Shriver, Adam - Minding Mammals
02/09/2007
Philosophical Psychology Vol 19 No 4 August 2006
Author mainly replies to one major objection in the ethics of humane treatment of animals. Proponents of treating animals as worthy of moral consideration often takes an 'analogy' argument: some animals are similar to us in the relevant ways, we deserve moral consideration, therefore animals do. First of all, for this to work with the prima facia badness of 'pain', we need to use a vaguely utilitarian model, not (probably) in a Kantian deontological model. The next problem is about how similar we want to get. This becomes difficult when dealing with 'pain', since there are varieties of pain-like responses that all sorts of animals display, but we don't want to give them moral consideration. (pg 435) A more sophisticaed objection is that it isn't just 'pain' that is prima facie morally bad, but pain that is attended to as unpleasantly painful. This might seem redundant but there are common psychological phenomena of dissociation between a painful feeling and an unpleasant feeling. For instance morphine users may report feeling pain but not 'minding' it. (Dennett points out how this is trouble for our folk conception of qualia)
Author uses science to reply. Recent work on pain pathways have found at least two, one 'lateral' and one 'medial'. The theory is that the lateral plays the part of reporting on a pain-like feeling (pain) and the medial, using the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), reports the unpleasantness of pain (suffering). Crudely, a distinction between pain and suffering. Data from various experiments are held to support this higher-level theory. Mammals have both pathways, therefore strengthening the argument by analogy. These two pathways are probably absent in birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish since those species lack neocortices, but there might be some sort of analogue we might discover.
The ACC also gets excited at a variety of times, example: social exclusion, human mothers hearing a baby cry, at the expectation of pain. Suffering without physical pain.
Author finally considers other skeptical arguments that animals aren't worthy of moral consideration because they don't have 'higher-order' conscisousness (Carruthers, Tye). This is not relevant.
Philosophical Psychology Vol 19 No 4 August 2006
Author mainly replies to one major objection in the ethics of humane treatment of animals. Proponents of treating animals as worthy of moral consideration often takes an 'analogy' argument: some animals are similar to us in the relevant ways, we deserve moral consideration, therefore animals do. First of all, for this to work with the prima facia badness of 'pain', we need to use a vaguely utilitarian model, not (probably) in a Kantian deontological model. The next problem is about how similar we want to get. This becomes difficult when dealing with 'pain', since there are varieties of pain-like responses that all sorts of animals display, but we don't want to give them moral consideration. (pg 435) A more sophisticaed objection is that it isn't just 'pain' that is prima facie morally bad, but pain that is attended to as unpleasantly painful. This might seem redundant but there are common psychological phenomena of dissociation between a painful feeling and an unpleasant feeling. For instance morphine users may report feeling pain but not 'minding' it. (Dennett points out how this is trouble for our folk conception of qualia)
Author uses science to reply. Recent work on pain pathways have found at least two, one 'lateral' and one 'medial'. The theory is that the lateral plays the part of reporting on a pain-like feeling (pain) and the medial, using the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), reports the unpleasantness of pain (suffering). Crudely, a distinction between pain and suffering. Data from various experiments are held to support this higher-level theory. Mammals have both pathways, therefore strengthening the argument by analogy. These two pathways are probably absent in birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish since those species lack neocortices, but there might be some sort of analogue we might discover.
The ACC also gets excited at a variety of times, example: social exclusion, human mothers hearing a baby cry, at the expectation of pain. Suffering without physical pain.
Author finally considers other skeptical arguments that animals aren't worthy of moral consideration because they don't have 'higher-order' conscisousness (Carruthers, Tye). This is not relevant.
2/2/07
White, Morton - Normative Ethics, Normative Epistemology, And Quine's Holism
02/02/2007
The Philosophy of WV Quine, Hehn & Schlipp eds, 1986
Terribly written paper. Addressed toward Quine, but not exactly-- trying to convince him of something-- but clunky.
Author's main point is that if Quine allows for normative epistemology, he should also allow for normative ethics.
Author tries to incorporate a positive account of ethics and fit it into Quine's holism. Quine's holism includes the following: if a set of theory and observation sentences lead to an expectation for observation A and you get observation not-A (recalcitrant data), it is open about which sentence to revise/scrap. This employed just scientific theories and observation sentences. Author wants to add another dimension: feelings. A scientist can get a recalcitrant feeling about accepting a hypothesis-- even if the evidence is for it. This she should adjust, since if she didn't, she wouldn't be following a normative epistemology to adjust belief to evidence and theory. But if we add 'feelings', then a moral agent needs to adjust her normative beliefs, or the facts in the situation in order to avoid a recalcitrant feeling.
Quine replies to White after the paper, saying that observation sentences should command nearly universal acceptance if true, whereas sentences of moral evaluation will not, since they depend on a lot of outside information that not all the witnesses will have.
The Philosophy of WV Quine, Hehn & Schlipp eds, 1986
Terribly written paper. Addressed toward Quine, but not exactly-- trying to convince him of something-- but clunky.
Author's main point is that if Quine allows for normative epistemology, he should also allow for normative ethics.
Author tries to incorporate a positive account of ethics and fit it into Quine's holism. Quine's holism includes the following: if a set of theory and observation sentences lead to an expectation for observation A and you get observation not-A (recalcitrant data), it is open about which sentence to revise/scrap. This employed just scientific theories and observation sentences. Author wants to add another dimension: feelings. A scientist can get a recalcitrant feeling about accepting a hypothesis-- even if the evidence is for it. This she should adjust, since if she didn't, she wouldn't be following a normative epistemology to adjust belief to evidence and theory. But if we add 'feelings', then a moral agent needs to adjust her normative beliefs, or the facts in the situation in order to avoid a recalcitrant feeling.
Quine replies to White after the paper, saying that observation sentences should command nearly universal acceptance if true, whereas sentences of moral evaluation will not, since they depend on a lot of outside information that not all the witnesses will have.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
