09/24/2010
The Theory of Morality ch 5, University of Chicago Press, 1979
This chapter attempts to deal with possible inconsistency in the moral system author has laid out in the previous three chapters. Author is less concerned about consistency between all the different precepts, since undoubtedly he mis-formulated some of them in a way that would generate moral conflict. The larger question is whether a system such as this in general is prone to inconsistency. Inconsistency is equated to moral perplexity-- there being a circumstance where the moral precepts give conflicting answers on what to do. Viewed in this light, author looks at Aquinas' cases of moral perplexity: perplexity on account of some prior misdeed, and essential perplexity. Perplexity due to some prior misdeed is the circumstance where a prior action or intention was impermissible or culpable and now the agent is faced with conflicting choices about how to get aright. Author back others like Kant and Aquinas in claiming that this conditional perplexity is not a threat to the system's consistency. (pg145) This still leaves moral perplexity 'simpliciter'.
The possibility of perplexity simpliciter is first given by Bishop Kirk, claiming that only a moral system with one principle could be said to contain no contradictions a priori. Any system with more than one inviolable principle may results in a conflict between the principles. Author denies this, claiming that one can easily imagine two inviolable principles ('absolute prohibitions'), such as not lying and not killing, which would never come in conflict. (pg146-7) Author also considers Peter Geach's conception of Divine law, which never conflicts due to divine providence but can appear to do so because of limits on human understanding. Author does not help himself to this because of the theological commitments it entails, and Donagan has taken a secular route. Author also does not use an ordering principle or weighting, since it is 'incompatible with the very nature of deductive systems'.(pg148) Instead, author claims that there is a structural principle that is derivable from the fundamental principle of respect for rational agents: 'It is impermissible to do evil that good may come of it'. (pg149) [his argument is on pg155] Author labels this the Pauline principle after St. Paul.
Author reviews the previous work, specifically second-order and first-order precepts. The two levels can't conflict since all manner of combinatorial schemes are possible without moral perplexity. Furthermore, author claims that second-order precepts are not independent enough from first-order ones. Thus if there is any inconsistency, it is among the first-order precepts (permissible and impermissible actions). (pg149-150) Author then reviews the different types of duties given in the first-order precepts: duties to self and duties to others within and without institutions. During this time author claims that it isn't possible that one needs to hurt oneself in order to respect others. In cases where there must be a choice between two impermissible acts (not because of perplexity simpliciter, but perplexity after a prior violation), author does not admit that there are degrees of moral impermissibility. Instead, impermissible wrongs can be more or less 'grave'. (pg152) Hence the precept: 'When you must choose between evils, choose the least.' During the review, the principle of beneficence arises as a potential source of inconsistency (pg153). Here the Pauline principle does some work, as does Kant's 'perfect' and 'imperfect' duties. Author argues that some acts are impermissible, but among the permissible ways to promote human well-being, there are many different plans of action. One must be beneficent, but it is left open exactly how. (pg154) Author also discusses Jonathan Bennett's objection to absolute systems because they do not take into account bad consequences. (pg156-7)
The next section (5.3) deals with a 'double effect', an action that is both good and bad. Author talks about the exact formulation of this idea, notably a conflict in formulation between JP Gury and Germain Grisez. (pg158) A case of double effect is killing in self-defense (if killing is wrong). Here it is permissible to defend oneself, even to the death, and yet killing is also impermissible and presumably a grave evil. (pg159) Author also takes the case of abortion: under Gury's formulation it is impermissible to kill the baby to save the mother's life. However, it would probably be permissible to extract a 'cancerous womb' to save a woman's life, even if that cancerous wound happened to contain a baby. For Gury, the principle turns on whether the evil was the means of the good effect or not.(pg159) Author rejects Gury's formulation because of author's previous work in the theory of action; both cases are agent actions voluntarily done.
Author contrasts Gury with the thinking of Germain Grisez, for whom the principle of double effect was about analyzing two factors: the unity of performance (acts) and the unity of intention. If an act cannot be divided into smaller acts which might avoid double effect, then an examination of the intention with which the act is performed is the important factor for double effect. For Grisez, an intention is licit if it is performed for the good effect and not for the bad, and the bad is out-proportioned by the good. (pg161) For instance for Grisez, an abortion may be performed in order to save the mother's life, and yet it is equally permissible to kill the mother in order to save the fetus. (pg162) The problem here is the absolute abstention from violating or coercing an aggressor. The Judeo-Christian tradition sees a fetus that happens to threaten the mother's life as an aggressor, somewhat ungrateful for its life. (pg162) For author however, the performance of an impermissible action leaves one open to coercion (or death, if necessary) because she has forfeit the right to respect. For author then, the principle of double effect is useless since the cases it was meant to cover are not problematic. (pg163) This is lucky for author, since author also objects to Grisez's treatment of intentions as the only morally relevant components of actions (see ch 4).
The final section (5.4) discusses a unique feature of the principle of beneficence, pregnancy. There is a possibility for moral perplexity here because of the possibility of the human race outstripping the available resources. If birth control is impermissible and Malthusian (overpopulation) problems are possible, it seems there could be conflict. However, author argues that contraception is permissible. (pg167) However, abortion is impermissible. (pg168-170) Author considers two arguments for the permissibility of abortion. The first is that a fetus is not a human being. Author: 'that is forced' (pg168). The second is that humans do not have the right to be respected as rational agents, only full-fledged members of a moral community have that right. Author: even if I grant that, isn't it true that a fetus will become a moral community-member if you nurture and let it? 'If respect is owed to beings because they are in a certain state, it is owed to whatever, by its very nature, develops into that state' (pg171). Author does allow for an abortion in the case of rape, since the mother cannot be subjected to labor and child-rearing without a prior voluntary action (pg169). For author, any case where the pregnancy is not the result of a voluntary action would excuse the mother removing the fetus, viable or not.
9/10/10
Donagan, Alan - Second-Order Precepts
9/10/2010
The Theory of Morality, Ch 4 University of Chicago Press, 1979
This chapter deals with intentions and culpability. Relying on the discussion from section 2.2 of chapter 2, author reminds us that one can perform an impermissible action yet be inculpable, or conversely be culpable after performing a permissible one. This is because actions are intensional, opaque to substitution of similarly referring expressions. (This is old philosophical ground.) Author goes through a prolonged discussion of human agency. An action from a human isn't necessarily representative of her agency-- it could be involuntarily like the beating of a heart. 'Acts', rather than 'actions' are 'ascribable to a man as a doer'. (pg113) Yet author reverts back to describing 'human actions' as those containing human agency (pg114). The taxonomy breaks down as follows:
-There are physical actions and physical acts, and physical acts can be voluntary or involuntary
-There are just mental acts, but some are still voluntary and some involuntary (e.g. seeing a teacup on the table is a mental occurrence but not really voluntary-- it is perceptual or sensational)
-Whenever a human acts voluntarily, aka knowingly/wittingly, this is an example of agency.
Author rejects a colloquial version of "voluntary" in favor of a strict one: an act done with agency, knowingly, is voluntary. If you are threatened with death or the performance of an act, that act, if you choose to perform it, is voluntary. (pg115)
Author engages in a prolonged discussion clarifying author's theory of human agency. First is to reject the believe-desire pair as causal for human action (acts) but rather as supplying motivations. (pg115-6) An interesting aside is made by author where he considers how someone might contemplate what profession to pursue and how 'it is quite possible that he will have no inclination to any.' (pg117) [This is a comment on my belief that humans are unable to make such macro choices.] The next discussion is about the inability to substitute predicates or objects under different descriptions when describing a person's human action (act). The idea goes as follows: that Oedipus did voluntarily kill a 'haughty stranger' at the crossroads is true. That he voluntarily killed his father is false. Yet the haughty stranger was his father. That it isn't possible to substitute descriptors and preserve truth is the mark of the intensional, rather than the extensional. Author's solution: "An act will be said to be voluntary only as falling under the descriptions which its agent is aware it falls under." (pg118-119) This leads to taxonomic trouble, since there are human actions that are now not voluntary (e.g. Oedipus killing his father). Author borrows from Davidson for his solution: all human actions are due to human agency, but they are only voluntary if falling under certain descriptions. (pg120)
So, to reiterate: human actions (acts) are a subset of actions-involving-humans, and human actions (acts) are all expressions of human agency. Human agency performs all acts, and those acts (however described) are a product of human agency. However, they are only considered voluntary if they fall under the description the human agent was aware of or did wittingly. The moral precepts of what acts are permissible and impermissible are intensional-- that is, an act must not fall into a certain description. However, there can be cases where a human action (act) violates a precept but the agent did not know it. (pg121) In such a case, it is a violation of respect due to a rational creature to hold someone responsible for acts that fall under descriptions she did not know about. "Actions are culpable only as falling under descriptions under which they are voluntary, that is, done knowingly" (pg121-2)
The next distinction (4.2) involves intentions. Intentions are a subset of voluntary actions, and are done 'according to a plan', though it doesn't have to be explicit. (pg122) Author resists thinking of human action as causal consequences of intentions (pg123-4), and also resists the thinking that someone intends all the foreseeable consequences of her actions (pg124), using the Christian/martyrdom example again. (Imagine a Christian who is threatened that he must either renounce his religion or be killed. Author wants to resist the idea that, if he refuses to renounce, he intended his own death.) However, just because one doesn't intend something she does voluntarily and knowingly, that does not remove her culpability. Thus there is the case of the creditor who knows he will ruin the debtor if he calls for payment, but doesn't intend to ruin him, just to receive his payment. He is responsible for all foreseeable consequences, not just the intended ones (pg125). Intentions, then, are morally important not because they can excuse someone from culpability, but because they can add a special dimension of culpability. This dimension is one of intending to perform an impermissible human action (act) but the act fails to come about for whatever reason; it is impermissible to intend what it is impermissible to do. (pg125) Author seems to think there is some difficulty here since occasionally one may willingly commit violence against another with the sole intention of committing violence against that other, but knowing that she does so justly because e.g. it is defending a third party from the unjust aggression of the other. Because of the possibility of doing the right thing but with the wrong intentions, author adds the precept 'it is impermissible to do what it is impermissible to intend'. (pg127)
Author then moves on to ignorance, and how it may reduce (or not) culpability. Since voluntary actions are knowing actions, an action from ignorance can be involuntary, therefore, inculpable. However, there are kinds of ignorance, and not all kinds are the right sort to eliminate culpability. Author distinguishes between two kinds to start: ignorance of the non-moral facts (that the 'haughty stranger' = your father), or ignorance of moral facts (that you shouldn't kill your father). Author sides with traditional practice in not excusing ignorance of moral facts, at least for a fully rational agent. (pg128) So perhaps ignorance of the non-moral facts could reduce culpability; author then introduces two more distinctions: acts done because of ignorance, and acts done in ignorance. Further distinctions immediately follow: two kinds of acts done in ignorance: acts that aren't complete human actions due to some impairment; and acts that are done without knowing particular non-moral facts, but even if they had been known, they wouldn't have affected the outcome.
So the taxonomy of ignorance is as follows:
-ignorance of moral facts = culpable
-ignorance of non-moral facts: two kinds: acts because of ignorance vs acts in ignorance
-acts because of ignorance: in these circumstances, one must examine the intentions
-acts in ignorance: two kinds: impaired or non-caring
In the case of acts because of ignorance, author argues that one can be inculpable only if, once informed, an agent would have acted permissibly, that is, the agents intentions were good. (pg130)
In the first case of 'in ignorance', the agent is inculpable unless she could have prevented her impairment, in which case being impaired is similar to having affected ignorance-- a spurious excuse and culpable. In the second case, where the agent does not care what the non-moral facts are, author pronounces her culpable. (pg129) Another close relative to this is recklessness. Ultimately author wants to find the precept that ignorance is culpable iff it springs from negligence-- from want of due care.
The final discussion of the chapter involves the conscience. Author argues that the conscience is largely influenced by cultural norms and expectations, using the example of Huckleberry Finn's bad conscience about letting Miss Watson's property, a slave named Jim, run off. The right thing was to help this slave escape, but it was contrary to Finn's conscience. (pg131-2) Author examines the historical place of conscience-- as a faculty or a disposition (pg132-3). The trouble with a conscience is that it can produce honest cases of disagreement. Since this is contrary to a deontological theory of morality, author is committed to consciences being error prone. However, one becomes culpable if one disobeys the judgment of her conscience, even if her conscience is in error. (pg135-6) Author then aims to clarify the confusion some philosophers have over the distinctions between conscience and second-order precepts and first-order precepts, using Prichard's "Duty and Ignorance of Fact" and Ross' "The Foundations of Ethics" as targets. Since conscience can err, those in the right may force people to act permissibly against their conscience, e.g. force conscription or, perhaps, to force fundamentalist Muslims to allow women to go to school.
Lastly (4.5), author discusses a moral hazard: the corruption of one's consciousness and downfall of her conscience. The explanation is that a human agent can choose what to focus on, what to pay attention to-- how to direct one's attention to particular facts (and not to others). It becomes a "sham" when one fixes her consciousness on just one particular fact to the exclusion of other pertinent ones. Yet it can allow for denial of the relevant moral considerations that might lead to the right conclusion about what to do. This is a short theory of human mental life that accounts for how the conscience of one agent, or even a whole society, can become corrupted.
The Theory of Morality, Ch 4 University of Chicago Press, 1979
This chapter deals with intentions and culpability. Relying on the discussion from section 2.2 of chapter 2, author reminds us that one can perform an impermissible action yet be inculpable, or conversely be culpable after performing a permissible one. This is because actions are intensional, opaque to substitution of similarly referring expressions. (This is old philosophical ground.) Author goes through a prolonged discussion of human agency. An action from a human isn't necessarily representative of her agency-- it could be involuntarily like the beating of a heart. 'Acts', rather than 'actions' are 'ascribable to a man as a doer'. (pg113) Yet author reverts back to describing 'human actions' as those containing human agency (pg114). The taxonomy breaks down as follows:
-There are physical actions and physical acts, and physical acts can be voluntary or involuntary
-There are just mental acts, but some are still voluntary and some involuntary (e.g. seeing a teacup on the table is a mental occurrence but not really voluntary-- it is perceptual or sensational)
-Whenever a human acts voluntarily, aka knowingly/wittingly, this is an example of agency.
Author rejects a colloquial version of "voluntary" in favor of a strict one: an act done with agency, knowingly, is voluntary. If you are threatened with death or the performance of an act, that act, if you choose to perform it, is voluntary. (pg115)
Author engages in a prolonged discussion clarifying author's theory of human agency. First is to reject the believe-desire pair as causal for human action (acts) but rather as supplying motivations. (pg115-6) An interesting aside is made by author where he considers how someone might contemplate what profession to pursue and how 'it is quite possible that he will have no inclination to any.' (pg117) [This is a comment on my belief that humans are unable to make such macro choices.] The next discussion is about the inability to substitute predicates or objects under different descriptions when describing a person's human action (act). The idea goes as follows: that Oedipus did voluntarily kill a 'haughty stranger' at the crossroads is true. That he voluntarily killed his father is false. Yet the haughty stranger was his father. That it isn't possible to substitute descriptors and preserve truth is the mark of the intensional, rather than the extensional. Author's solution: "An act will be said to be voluntary only as falling under the descriptions which its agent is aware it falls under." (pg118-119) This leads to taxonomic trouble, since there are human actions that are now not voluntary (e.g. Oedipus killing his father). Author borrows from Davidson for his solution: all human actions are due to human agency, but they are only voluntary if falling under certain descriptions. (pg120)
So, to reiterate: human actions (acts) are a subset of actions-involving-humans, and human actions (acts) are all expressions of human agency. Human agency performs all acts, and those acts (however described) are a product of human agency. However, they are only considered voluntary if they fall under the description the human agent was aware of or did wittingly. The moral precepts of what acts are permissible and impermissible are intensional-- that is, an act must not fall into a certain description. However, there can be cases where a human action (act) violates a precept but the agent did not know it. (pg121) In such a case, it is a violation of respect due to a rational creature to hold someone responsible for acts that fall under descriptions she did not know about. "Actions are culpable only as falling under descriptions under which they are voluntary, that is, done knowingly" (pg121-2)
The next distinction (4.2) involves intentions. Intentions are a subset of voluntary actions, and are done 'according to a plan', though it doesn't have to be explicit. (pg122) Author resists thinking of human action as causal consequences of intentions (pg123-4), and also resists the thinking that someone intends all the foreseeable consequences of her actions (pg124), using the Christian/martyrdom example again. (Imagine a Christian who is threatened that he must either renounce his religion or be killed. Author wants to resist the idea that, if he refuses to renounce, he intended his own death.) However, just because one doesn't intend something she does voluntarily and knowingly, that does not remove her culpability. Thus there is the case of the creditor who knows he will ruin the debtor if he calls for payment, but doesn't intend to ruin him, just to receive his payment. He is responsible for all foreseeable consequences, not just the intended ones (pg125). Intentions, then, are morally important not because they can excuse someone from culpability, but because they can add a special dimension of culpability. This dimension is one of intending to perform an impermissible human action (act) but the act fails to come about for whatever reason; it is impermissible to intend what it is impermissible to do. (pg125) Author seems to think there is some difficulty here since occasionally one may willingly commit violence against another with the sole intention of committing violence against that other, but knowing that she does so justly because e.g. it is defending a third party from the unjust aggression of the other. Because of the possibility of doing the right thing but with the wrong intentions, author adds the precept 'it is impermissible to do what it is impermissible to intend'. (pg127)
Author then moves on to ignorance, and how it may reduce (or not) culpability. Since voluntary actions are knowing actions, an action from ignorance can be involuntary, therefore, inculpable. However, there are kinds of ignorance, and not all kinds are the right sort to eliminate culpability. Author distinguishes between two kinds to start: ignorance of the non-moral facts (that the 'haughty stranger' = your father), or ignorance of moral facts (that you shouldn't kill your father). Author sides with traditional practice in not excusing ignorance of moral facts, at least for a fully rational agent. (pg128) So perhaps ignorance of the non-moral facts could reduce culpability; author then introduces two more distinctions: acts done because of ignorance, and acts done in ignorance. Further distinctions immediately follow: two kinds of acts done in ignorance: acts that aren't complete human actions due to some impairment; and acts that are done without knowing particular non-moral facts, but even if they had been known, they wouldn't have affected the outcome.
So the taxonomy of ignorance is as follows:
-ignorance of moral facts = culpable
-ignorance of non-moral facts: two kinds: acts because of ignorance vs acts in ignorance
-acts because of ignorance: in these circumstances, one must examine the intentions
-acts in ignorance: two kinds: impaired or non-caring
In the case of acts because of ignorance, author argues that one can be inculpable only if, once informed, an agent would have acted permissibly, that is, the agents intentions were good. (pg130)
In the first case of 'in ignorance', the agent is inculpable unless she could have prevented her impairment, in which case being impaired is similar to having affected ignorance-- a spurious excuse and culpable. In the second case, where the agent does not care what the non-moral facts are, author pronounces her culpable. (pg129) Another close relative to this is recklessness. Ultimately author wants to find the precept that ignorance is culpable iff it springs from negligence-- from want of due care.
The final discussion of the chapter involves the conscience. Author argues that the conscience is largely influenced by cultural norms and expectations, using the example of Huckleberry Finn's bad conscience about letting Miss Watson's property, a slave named Jim, run off. The right thing was to help this slave escape, but it was contrary to Finn's conscience. (pg131-2) Author examines the historical place of conscience-- as a faculty or a disposition (pg132-3). The trouble with a conscience is that it can produce honest cases of disagreement. Since this is contrary to a deontological theory of morality, author is committed to consciences being error prone. However, one becomes culpable if one disobeys the judgment of her conscience, even if her conscience is in error. (pg135-6) Author then aims to clarify the confusion some philosophers have over the distinctions between conscience and second-order precepts and first-order precepts, using Prichard's "Duty and Ignorance of Fact" and Ross' "The Foundations of Ethics" as targets. Since conscience can err, those in the right may force people to act permissibly against their conscience, e.g. force conscription or, perhaps, to force fundamentalist Muslims to allow women to go to school.
Lastly (4.5), author discusses a moral hazard: the corruption of one's consciousness and downfall of her conscience. The explanation is that a human agent can choose what to focus on, what to pay attention to-- how to direct one's attention to particular facts (and not to others). It becomes a "sham" when one fixes her consciousness on just one particular fact to the exclusion of other pertinent ones. Yet it can allow for denial of the relevant moral considerations that might lead to the right conclusion about what to do. This is a short theory of human mental life that accounts for how the conscience of one agent, or even a whole society, can become corrupted.
8/20/10
Donagan, Alan - First-Order Precepts
08/20/2010
The Theory of Morality Ch 3, University of Chicago Press, 1979
In this chapter author lays out the duties to oneself, duties to others in a non-institutional format, and finally duties to others through institutions, including both contractual and generic civil society duties. These are all precepts of the first-order, that is, regarding what it is permissible, impermissible, and required to perform. The second-order precepts are regarding intentions and are not covered in this chapter.
In section 3.2 author describes duties to oneself. The first is not to commit suicide at will: "it seems evident that if one is to respect oneself as a rational creature, one may not hold one's life cheap, as something to be taken at will."(pg76) However there are circumstances that make suicide permissible. The two cases author considers is where an individual is sick or affected such that she becomes dangerous to others (pg78), and the case where she is in an inescapable set of dehumanizing or tortuous conditions. (pg79) The extension of not killing oneself at will is not to mutilate or impair oneself at will, yet this precept author backs away from, claiming that it is not part of our traditional common morality. Becoming addicted to a drug isn't permissible, but general use that temporarily impairs judgment somehow is fine.(pg79-80) "For anybody to place any kind of drug-induced enjoyment before the full use of his capacities as a rational creature, is a plain case of failure to respect himself as the kind of being he is." For author, there is a positive duty to oneself, and that is to develop a life-plan, "a coherent plan of life according to which, by morally permissible actions, his mental and physical powers may be developed." (pg80) Author calls this the Principle of Culture. There are innumerable acceptable plans, e.g. soldier, professor, factor worker [?], provided its behavior is morally permissible. It is under this life-plan duty that an agent is required not to neglect her health, subject of course, to the risks inherent in her particular life plan.
Section 3.3 describes non-institutional duties to others. The Principle of Culture is transformed into the Principle of Beneficence, (pg85-6) where it is "impermissible not to promote the well-being of others by actions in themselves permissible, inasmuch as one can do so without proportionate inconvenience." This duty, author claims, "derives from their character as rational creatures, not from their desert."(pg85) The duty does not lay much claim from the well-developed to the well-developed, since it is each's obligation to flourish; the duty is rather more aimed at dependents, orphans, the sick, the injured, the incapacitated, the afflicted. (pg85) However, this duty also makes it impermissible to frustrate others' morally permissible projects, and to "[abstain] from actions that would foreseeably elicit responses by which others would be injured." (pg85) And of course it is impermissible to promote the morally permissible (or even praiseworthy) goals of another through impermissible actions (e.g. kidnapping the homeless for cancer research). (pg85-6) Part of the principle of beneficence is extended to combatants in war: it is impermissible to harm non-combatants in a just war (and of course an unjust war is impermissible...).(pg87) Another extension involves refraining from hurting the reputation or honor of another, or of disparaging another, even when accurate, unless it is to prevent a wrong from being committed (pg88).
Prior to the discussion of the Principle of Beneficence, author lays out one against harming or threatening to harm another at will. The justification for this is that respect for other rational beings entails "treating every normal adult as responsible for the conduct of his own affairs", and that "[interfering] by force with anybody else's conduct of his life, unless there is a special adequate reason, is not to respect him as a rational creature."(pg82) This does not immediately apply to children, the insane, and other quasi-rational (or not) agents. The rule is against "at-will" force, since presumably some force will be permissible in order to avoid greater harm to others. (pg82-3, pg85) Here author gives us a teaser about abortion. The extension of this precept of physical force is the force of will, that is a prohibition against slavery. (pg83-4) Author claims this is a fundamental principle of Judeo-Christian morality, even though both cultures lived with it for hundreds of years.(pg84)
The final non-institutional duty to others is the impermissibility of lying when one is purporting to give one's opinion. (pg88) The justification for this precept is that by lying to another "you deprive him of the opportunity of exercising his judgment on the best evidence available to him". (pg89)
Section 3.4 discusses contractual obligations, as part of an institution of giving and accepting promises and the creation of a bond from those activities. Author discusses the construction of a contract briefly and exposes it to be a fundamentally non-moral institution. Given that, author asks whether a contract can ever be a moral bond? (pg92) Author's answer is that the institution of a contract is morally legitimate, and so breaking it is akin to lying, which is already impermissible. (pg92) In extended discussion about this, author considers it permissible to break a contract if another, more pressing moral duty arises. (pg93) A last clarification involves keeping a promise made to those committing wrongs: author argues that one does not have to (e.g. pay a ransom, if promised, to secure the release of a hostage).
Section 3.5 regards the institution of property. This author considers to also be a non-moral institution, so the question is whether there are any morally impermissible (or permissible) forms of property. After a discussion on the different types of property and different types of rights (pg95), author settles on two moral precepts from Judeo-Christian morality: not to despoil the earth so that future generations cannot provide for themselves, and not to "disfigure" the earth so that it cannot be enjoyed as an object of contemplation. (pg96). Generally speaking too, the Right of Appropriation exists: things affording appropriation must be mixed with some labor to signify the intention of exclusive use, which must commence within a reasonable period of time. And finally, the appropriation of things for property mustn't leave nothing for others to similarly appropriate. (pg97-8) This final requirement (leaving "enough and as good" for others) is, author admits, almost never fully possible. Author argues that being born into a society where 'all property is already distributed' leaves the requirement to provide for the education of such a person to allow her to earn her way through society and afford to purchase the resources necessary for a 'fully human life'. (pg99-100) As an addendum to all this, author argues that civil anarchy and solitude are both 'human evils' and that if there are unjust or defective laws regarding property, one is obliged to respect them for the sake of keeping civil society in place. (pg100)
3.6 is a section on family and familial construction. Author considers a family as essentially a matter of parenthood. Thus respecting familial ties mostly related to respecting children as rational beings (or growing-into rational beings). Thus the duties in a family are to the upbringing of the children and it is "impermissible for human beings voluntarily to become parents of a child, and yet refuse to rear it to a stage of development at which it can independently take part in social life" (pg101) Adoption is considered inferior to biological parentage. (pg102) Author considers 4 forms of family life: monogamy, polyandry, polygyny, and free-love/exogamous. Author has contingent, historical problems with polyandry and polygyny (pg102) but argues that there could be a form of marriage other than monogamy that properly respected the children to be raised and yet involved marriage of more than one male to more than one female.(pg103) Author argues that marriage can be dissolved without moral objection, and, interestingly: 'since the only objection to [divorce or staying married] is the suffering it causes, neither can be condemned as failing to respect every human being as a rational creature.' (pg104)
The final topic here is the permissibility of extra-marital sexual relations, or of 'deviant' sexual acts within a marriage. Author reviews the traditional arguments e.g. from Kant and Thomas Aquinas. Author also considers the side that considers them permissible, simply because they are mere physical acts not affecting respect for rational agents. Author rejects this, claiming 'it is ... wrong to think of the sexual gratification obtained from physical acts as deriving from them solely as physical'. (pg106) "Non-significant purely physical sexuality is virtually inconceivable" (pg107) Author considers 'one's imaginative awareness' and 'emotional response' as morally significant, similar to Augustine's theft of the pears. (pg107) Author forms two morally good aspects of sexual acts: 'life-affirming' and 'non-exploitative'. Any act that is 'life-denying' in its 'imaginative significance' or is exploitative is impermissible.
The final section 3.7 has to do with civil societies. Civil societies have territorial boundaries within which there is a system of justice or jurisdiction. Author scaffolds an argument that goes as follows: most of the laws within civil society are about nonmoral institutions like contracts and property. Everybody needs civil society in order for their human potentialities to be fully cultivated. As long as 'the legal-political system does not seriously violate anybody's moral rights', everybody must obey the laws of the civil society they are a part of. (pg109) Even when there is a rights infringement, disobeying the laws should be 'passive', since the breakdown of civil society would not allow for human potentialities to be cultivated, and therefore is morally bad. Finally, in defending civil society from an internal or external threat, it may become morally justified to use violence against the aggressors as a defense. In such a circumstance, author argues that conscription is morally permissible and it is impermissible to avoid being drafted. (pg110-111)
The Theory of Morality Ch 3, University of Chicago Press, 1979
In this chapter author lays out the duties to oneself, duties to others in a non-institutional format, and finally duties to others through institutions, including both contractual and generic civil society duties. These are all precepts of the first-order, that is, regarding what it is permissible, impermissible, and required to perform. The second-order precepts are regarding intentions and are not covered in this chapter.
In section 3.2 author describes duties to oneself. The first is not to commit suicide at will: "it seems evident that if one is to respect oneself as a rational creature, one may not hold one's life cheap, as something to be taken at will."(pg76) However there are circumstances that make suicide permissible. The two cases author considers is where an individual is sick or affected such that she becomes dangerous to others (pg78), and the case where she is in an inescapable set of dehumanizing or tortuous conditions. (pg79) The extension of not killing oneself at will is not to mutilate or impair oneself at will, yet this precept author backs away from, claiming that it is not part of our traditional common morality. Becoming addicted to a drug isn't permissible, but general use that temporarily impairs judgment somehow is fine.(pg79-80) "For anybody to place any kind of drug-induced enjoyment before the full use of his capacities as a rational creature, is a plain case of failure to respect himself as the kind of being he is." For author, there is a positive duty to oneself, and that is to develop a life-plan, "a coherent plan of life according to which, by morally permissible actions, his mental and physical powers may be developed." (pg80) Author calls this the Principle of Culture. There are innumerable acceptable plans, e.g. soldier, professor, factor worker [?], provided its behavior is morally permissible. It is under this life-plan duty that an agent is required not to neglect her health, subject of course, to the risks inherent in her particular life plan.
Section 3.3 describes non-institutional duties to others. The Principle of Culture is transformed into the Principle of Beneficence, (pg85-6) where it is "impermissible not to promote the well-being of others by actions in themselves permissible, inasmuch as one can do so without proportionate inconvenience." This duty, author claims, "derives from their character as rational creatures, not from their desert."(pg85) The duty does not lay much claim from the well-developed to the well-developed, since it is each's obligation to flourish; the duty is rather more aimed at dependents, orphans, the sick, the injured, the incapacitated, the afflicted. (pg85) However, this duty also makes it impermissible to frustrate others' morally permissible projects, and to "[abstain] from actions that would foreseeably elicit responses by which others would be injured." (pg85) And of course it is impermissible to promote the morally permissible (or even praiseworthy) goals of another through impermissible actions (e.g. kidnapping the homeless for cancer research). (pg85-6) Part of the principle of beneficence is extended to combatants in war: it is impermissible to harm non-combatants in a just war (and of course an unjust war is impermissible...).(pg87) Another extension involves refraining from hurting the reputation or honor of another, or of disparaging another, even when accurate, unless it is to prevent a wrong from being committed (pg88).
Prior to the discussion of the Principle of Beneficence, author lays out one against harming or threatening to harm another at will. The justification for this is that respect for other rational beings entails "treating every normal adult as responsible for the conduct of his own affairs", and that "[interfering] by force with anybody else's conduct of his life, unless there is a special adequate reason, is not to respect him as a rational creature."(pg82) This does not immediately apply to children, the insane, and other quasi-rational (or not) agents. The rule is against "at-will" force, since presumably some force will be permissible in order to avoid greater harm to others. (pg82-3, pg85) Here author gives us a teaser about abortion. The extension of this precept of physical force is the force of will, that is a prohibition against slavery. (pg83-4) Author claims this is a fundamental principle of Judeo-Christian morality, even though both cultures lived with it for hundreds of years.(pg84)
The final non-institutional duty to others is the impermissibility of lying when one is purporting to give one's opinion. (pg88) The justification for this precept is that by lying to another "you deprive him of the opportunity of exercising his judgment on the best evidence available to him". (pg89)
Section 3.4 discusses contractual obligations, as part of an institution of giving and accepting promises and the creation of a bond from those activities. Author discusses the construction of a contract briefly and exposes it to be a fundamentally non-moral institution. Given that, author asks whether a contract can ever be a moral bond? (pg92) Author's answer is that the institution of a contract is morally legitimate, and so breaking it is akin to lying, which is already impermissible. (pg92) In extended discussion about this, author considers it permissible to break a contract if another, more pressing moral duty arises. (pg93) A last clarification involves keeping a promise made to those committing wrongs: author argues that one does not have to (e.g. pay a ransom, if promised, to secure the release of a hostage).
Section 3.5 regards the institution of property. This author considers to also be a non-moral institution, so the question is whether there are any morally impermissible (or permissible) forms of property. After a discussion on the different types of property and different types of rights (pg95), author settles on two moral precepts from Judeo-Christian morality: not to despoil the earth so that future generations cannot provide for themselves, and not to "disfigure" the earth so that it cannot be enjoyed as an object of contemplation. (pg96). Generally speaking too, the Right of Appropriation exists: things affording appropriation must be mixed with some labor to signify the intention of exclusive use, which must commence within a reasonable period of time. And finally, the appropriation of things for property mustn't leave nothing for others to similarly appropriate. (pg97-8) This final requirement (leaving "enough and as good" for others) is, author admits, almost never fully possible. Author argues that being born into a society where 'all property is already distributed' leaves the requirement to provide for the education of such a person to allow her to earn her way through society and afford to purchase the resources necessary for a 'fully human life'. (pg99-100) As an addendum to all this, author argues that civil anarchy and solitude are both 'human evils' and that if there are unjust or defective laws regarding property, one is obliged to respect them for the sake of keeping civil society in place. (pg100)
3.6 is a section on family and familial construction. Author considers a family as essentially a matter of parenthood. Thus respecting familial ties mostly related to respecting children as rational beings (or growing-into rational beings). Thus the duties in a family are to the upbringing of the children and it is "impermissible for human beings voluntarily to become parents of a child, and yet refuse to rear it to a stage of development at which it can independently take part in social life" (pg101) Adoption is considered inferior to biological parentage. (pg102) Author considers 4 forms of family life: monogamy, polyandry, polygyny, and free-love/exogamous. Author has contingent, historical problems with polyandry and polygyny (pg102) but argues that there could be a form of marriage other than monogamy that properly respected the children to be raised and yet involved marriage of more than one male to more than one female.(pg103) Author argues that marriage can be dissolved without moral objection, and, interestingly: 'since the only objection to [divorce or staying married] is the suffering it causes, neither can be condemned as failing to respect every human being as a rational creature.' (pg104)
The final topic here is the permissibility of extra-marital sexual relations, or of 'deviant' sexual acts within a marriage. Author reviews the traditional arguments e.g. from Kant and Thomas Aquinas. Author also considers the side that considers them permissible, simply because they are mere physical acts not affecting respect for rational agents. Author rejects this, claiming 'it is ... wrong to think of the sexual gratification obtained from physical acts as deriving from them solely as physical'. (pg106) "Non-significant purely physical sexuality is virtually inconceivable" (pg107) Author considers 'one's imaginative awareness' and 'emotional response' as morally significant, similar to Augustine's theft of the pears. (pg107) Author forms two morally good aspects of sexual acts: 'life-affirming' and 'non-exploitative'. Any act that is 'life-denying' in its 'imaginative significance' or is exploitative is impermissible.
The final section 3.7 has to do with civil societies. Civil societies have territorial boundaries within which there is a system of justice or jurisdiction. Author scaffolds an argument that goes as follows: most of the laws within civil society are about nonmoral institutions like contracts and property. Everybody needs civil society in order for their human potentialities to be fully cultivated. As long as 'the legal-political system does not seriously violate anybody's moral rights', everybody must obey the laws of the civil society they are a part of. (pg109) Even when there is a rights infringement, disobeying the laws should be 'passive', since the breakdown of civil society would not allow for human potentialities to be cultivated, and therefore is morally bad. Finally, in defending civil society from an internal or external threat, it may become morally justified to use violence against the aggressors as a defense. In such a circumstance, author argues that conscription is morally permissible and it is impermissible to avoid being drafted. (pg110-111)
8/6/10
Donagan, Alan - Presuppositions and Principles
08/06/2010
The Theory of Morality Ch 2, University of Chicago Press 1979
This chapter promises to lay bare the presuppositions of Judeo-Christian conceptions of the world and of human agency. Author starts with discounting exotic thought-experiment contrasts, e.g. how would human morality work in a world with very different metaphysics, or if humans had different powers (like mind-reading) (pg32,36). What can be gained from comparison is to reveal our own presuppositions that are so fundamental that we hardly recognize them as open to variation. For this, author looks at the Hindu conception of human existence and agency. According to author:
-Hindus do not have much (if anything) for general (that is, extra-caste) obligations. E.g. a Hindu is obliged to obey the precepts her caste puts forward for her, but not the precepts of any other caste, and not much else other than what is her duty as given by her caste. (pg33) In other words, there is no general obligation to each other as humans or as bearers of rights.
-Hindus believe that human essence is a soul that is reincarnated from previous lives and has accumulated good- or bad-fortune, or 'karma'. Bad karma can only be reduced by undergoing suffering or purifying your soul through particular actions. With this conception, there doesn't appear to be any unnecessary suffering-- just the appearance of such. (pg34) And as such, there is no prescription to reduce the suffering of another unless required to do so by the duties set forth in one's caste's prescriptions or 'dharma'.
Author then formulates two principles of the Judeo-Christian tradition that stand in contrast to the Hindu tradition:
(1) Man, considered as amoral agent, is a rational animal.
(2) The world man inhabits is a system of nature, in which events occur according to morally neutral laws.
These two metaphysical concepts underpin the moral agency of humans and humans alone. (pg35) That is, the 'world' doesn't conspire to punish us or to reward us-- the natural laws (and therefore natural events that are un-mixed with agency) are morally neutral.
The next section (2.2) is a prolonged discussion of event-causation and lays out a basic theory of human action. The first distinction author makes is between human actions considered objectively, and those considered subjectively. Objectivity considers the deeds done and assigns permissibility, subjectivity considers the doings of the agents and assigns culpability (pg37). Author talks about the theory of action from (mostly) the objective perspective. Here is a rough summary:
-Events cause other events in the world.
-Events can fall under different kinds of description. (Event-Descriptions and Action-Descriptions) (pg38-41)
-Events are caused by either other events or agents. (Actions are only caused by agents)
-Events cannot cause agent-actions.
On this last principle author spends much time. The jumping off point is the discussion of a new action intervening, or 'novus actus interveniens' (pg42-44). Consider the case of the careless cigarette that might or might not ignite a forest fire. Once a second agent pours gasoline onto the ash, the original smoker's actions do not 'reach through' the chain of events leading to a forest fire. (pg42) This is the case even though you can construct a reasonable 'but for' sentence that includes the first agent: 'but for her throwing the cigarette on the bracken, the forest fire wouldn't have occurred' might be true, but because there was the informed, free and deliberate intervention of a second agent pouring gasoline on the fire, the first agent's causal chain is broken there. (pg44)
Even with these basic principles there is a bifurcation in the approaches to their defense. For it must be admitted that humans are part of the natural world, they are animals, even if rational ones, and that the attempt to separate them from the rest of the world by giving only them autonomous action is problematic. One response is to admit humans are part of the natural world but still assign moral blame even though there is no ontological/metaphysical responsibility through the chain of events. (pg44) The second response seems to be the author's preference: there is a difference between the events caused by humans and the events caused by the natural world. This is Aristotle's distinction between "event-causation" and "action-causation" (pg45). [Is this question-begging?]
The next discussion regarding this distinction relates to the unwitting accomplice(s), for instance a cook who unwittingly serves food previously poisoned by an assassin. Here the cook took an action, but author analyzes this as the cook being the unwitting agent of the assassin. "He does not cease to be the doer of what he does; but because he acts as the agent of the other, that other is also held to be an agent in his action, and the principal agent" (pg47)
Author then spends some time responding to an objection to the concept of autonomous agent/action-causation, leveled by Feinberg and augmented by Bennett. In effect, they wish to object to novus actus interveniens; in the Feinberg case, an agent announces widely his conditional intentions: 'stop or I'll shoot', and when another conducts the antecedent, the promised consequent commences. Feinberg wants to pump intuitions to see the second agent as causing the first agent. (pg49) Bennett formulates a notion of agent action for causing consequences by trying to restrict how one describes 'causal consequences in action descriptions' (pg49), claiming three guidelines for understanding the effects of agency:
i) the more confident the agent was that the consequence would ensue
ii) the more certain or inevitable it was that the consequence would ensue
iii) the higher the degree of immediacy there was between the action and its consequence
Author responds to this with an argument to absurdity: if threatened with either death or committing some abhorrent act, by refusing to commit the abhorrent act, you could be the cause of your own suicide. (pg49-50) Author sees this as conflating the term 'consequences' with the concept of causation-- consequences are sometimes used to indicate alternate states of affairs that aren't causally related but are nevertheless consequents. (pg51-2)
Author moves on to the principle underpinning Judeo-Christian morality, but first discusses the form it will take-- it will rely on there being principles of practical reason that are unconditionally inviolable. (pg53) Author defines a "precept" as "any universal proposition of common morality with respect to the permissibility of any kind of human action considered objectively." (pg54) As such, precepts of common morality specify either: (1) what kind of action is morally permissible, (2) what kind of action is morally impermissible, (3) what kind of action is permissible and obligatory given the appropriate circumstance. (pg54) Author then takes care to make a distinction between 'first-order' moral questions and 'second-order' ones, since much of the Judeo-Christian tradition has to do with the spirit with which actions are performed, the intentions and will of the agent. Since author is more concerned now with the permissibility of the deed (to be) done, objectively considered, that is 'first-order'; the culpability of the agent is considered 'second-order'. (pg55) This is much like author's earlier discussion of agent causation and agent responsibility. Author also briefly denies that there are two additional sets of moral considerations: those for supererogatory actions and those for morally permissible actions that are somehow demeritorious, e.g. in poor taste or some other consideration. (pg56-7)
Author finally commits to the underlying principle of Judeo-Christian common morality:
"Do not do to your fellow what you hate to have done to you" (pg57). Author gives considerable discussion about the different formulations of the golden rule, from the first books of the bible and into the new Testament. Author rejects Thomas Aquinas' version in favor of Kant's since Kant's takes humans themselves as the ultimate entities to respect (rather than the Thomistic version that takes fundamental human goods as the ultimate ends).(pg63-5) The distinction here is the culmination of a clarifying discussion of what Kant meant when he wrote that humans were to be treated as ends, not means.(pg63-4) As an aside, author demeans one of the protestant alternatives to the golden rule which author designates as: 'Love, and do what you will' (pg62-3) The formulation of the common morality that Donagan uses:
"It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature."
In the next section 2.5, author launches into a prolonged discussion of how to setup 'specificatory premises', that is, premises that fill-in what action kinds are permissible, impermissible, and obligatory. [This seems to be an arcane problem, even for a philosopher.] The trouble (as I can see it), is about a question of refinement. Should the fundamental principle be refined, or even scrapped, as tough cases arise? Or should the principle remain unchanged and the precepts be followed even in awkward cases? The analogue to law is a tricky one, since typically case law involves extracting principles from legislation, then applying the principles to a tough case, and possibly slightly altering the principles to get the case to come out right. (pg68-9) This is an example of the 'circular motion' of common law. The insight the author adds is that moral precepts are different from legislation-- legislation is often ends-based, that is, focusing on how to write rules that will promote specific ends. The moral precepts author has in mind are about principles of action-- in other words-- it is deontological. (pg73)
The Theory of Morality Ch 2, University of Chicago Press 1979
This chapter promises to lay bare the presuppositions of Judeo-Christian conceptions of the world and of human agency. Author starts with discounting exotic thought-experiment contrasts, e.g. how would human morality work in a world with very different metaphysics, or if humans had different powers (like mind-reading) (pg32,36). What can be gained from comparison is to reveal our own presuppositions that are so fundamental that we hardly recognize them as open to variation. For this, author looks at the Hindu conception of human existence and agency. According to author:
-Hindus do not have much (if anything) for general (that is, extra-caste) obligations. E.g. a Hindu is obliged to obey the precepts her caste puts forward for her, but not the precepts of any other caste, and not much else other than what is her duty as given by her caste. (pg33) In other words, there is no general obligation to each other as humans or as bearers of rights.
-Hindus believe that human essence is a soul that is reincarnated from previous lives and has accumulated good- or bad-fortune, or 'karma'. Bad karma can only be reduced by undergoing suffering or purifying your soul through particular actions. With this conception, there doesn't appear to be any unnecessary suffering-- just the appearance of such. (pg34) And as such, there is no prescription to reduce the suffering of another unless required to do so by the duties set forth in one's caste's prescriptions or 'dharma'.
Author then formulates two principles of the Judeo-Christian tradition that stand in contrast to the Hindu tradition:
(1) Man, considered as amoral agent, is a rational animal.
(2) The world man inhabits is a system of nature, in which events occur according to morally neutral laws.
These two metaphysical concepts underpin the moral agency of humans and humans alone. (pg35) That is, the 'world' doesn't conspire to punish us or to reward us-- the natural laws (and therefore natural events that are un-mixed with agency) are morally neutral.
The next section (2.2) is a prolonged discussion of event-causation and lays out a basic theory of human action. The first distinction author makes is between human actions considered objectively, and those considered subjectively. Objectivity considers the deeds done and assigns permissibility, subjectivity considers the doings of the agents and assigns culpability (pg37). Author talks about the theory of action from (mostly) the objective perspective. Here is a rough summary:
-Events cause other events in the world.
-Events can fall under different kinds of description. (Event-Descriptions and Action-Descriptions) (pg38-41)
-Events are caused by either other events or agents. (Actions are only caused by agents)
-Events cannot cause agent-actions.
On this last principle author spends much time. The jumping off point is the discussion of a new action intervening, or 'novus actus interveniens' (pg42-44). Consider the case of the careless cigarette that might or might not ignite a forest fire. Once a second agent pours gasoline onto the ash, the original smoker's actions do not 'reach through' the chain of events leading to a forest fire. (pg42) This is the case even though you can construct a reasonable 'but for' sentence that includes the first agent: 'but for her throwing the cigarette on the bracken, the forest fire wouldn't have occurred' might be true, but because there was the informed, free and deliberate intervention of a second agent pouring gasoline on the fire, the first agent's causal chain is broken there. (pg44)
Even with these basic principles there is a bifurcation in the approaches to their defense. For it must be admitted that humans are part of the natural world, they are animals, even if rational ones, and that the attempt to separate them from the rest of the world by giving only them autonomous action is problematic. One response is to admit humans are part of the natural world but still assign moral blame even though there is no ontological/metaphysical responsibility through the chain of events. (pg44) The second response seems to be the author's preference: there is a difference between the events caused by humans and the events caused by the natural world. This is Aristotle's distinction between "event-causation" and "action-causation" (pg45). [Is this question-begging?]
The next discussion regarding this distinction relates to the unwitting accomplice(s), for instance a cook who unwittingly serves food previously poisoned by an assassin. Here the cook took an action, but author analyzes this as the cook being the unwitting agent of the assassin. "He does not cease to be the doer of what he does; but because he acts as the agent of the other, that other is also held to be an agent in his action, and the principal agent" (pg47)
Author then spends some time responding to an objection to the concept of autonomous agent/action-causation, leveled by Feinberg and augmented by Bennett. In effect, they wish to object to novus actus interveniens; in the Feinberg case, an agent announces widely his conditional intentions: 'stop or I'll shoot', and when another conducts the antecedent, the promised consequent commences. Feinberg wants to pump intuitions to see the second agent as causing the first agent. (pg49) Bennett formulates a notion of agent action for causing consequences by trying to restrict how one describes 'causal consequences in action descriptions' (pg49), claiming three guidelines for understanding the effects of agency:
i) the more confident the agent was that the consequence would ensue
ii) the more certain or inevitable it was that the consequence would ensue
iii) the higher the degree of immediacy there was between the action and its consequence
Author responds to this with an argument to absurdity: if threatened with either death or committing some abhorrent act, by refusing to commit the abhorrent act, you could be the cause of your own suicide. (pg49-50) Author sees this as conflating the term 'consequences' with the concept of causation-- consequences are sometimes used to indicate alternate states of affairs that aren't causally related but are nevertheless consequents. (pg51-2)
Author moves on to the principle underpinning Judeo-Christian morality, but first discusses the form it will take-- it will rely on there being principles of practical reason that are unconditionally inviolable. (pg53) Author defines a "precept" as "any universal proposition of common morality with respect to the permissibility of any kind of human action considered objectively." (pg54) As such, precepts of common morality specify either: (1) what kind of action is morally permissible, (2) what kind of action is morally impermissible, (3) what kind of action is permissible and obligatory given the appropriate circumstance. (pg54) Author then takes care to make a distinction between 'first-order' moral questions and 'second-order' ones, since much of the Judeo-Christian tradition has to do with the spirit with which actions are performed, the intentions and will of the agent. Since author is more concerned now with the permissibility of the deed (to be) done, objectively considered, that is 'first-order'; the culpability of the agent is considered 'second-order'. (pg55) This is much like author's earlier discussion of agent causation and agent responsibility. Author also briefly denies that there are two additional sets of moral considerations: those for supererogatory actions and those for morally permissible actions that are somehow demeritorious, e.g. in poor taste or some other consideration. (pg56-7)
Author finally commits to the underlying principle of Judeo-Christian common morality:
"Do not do to your fellow what you hate to have done to you" (pg57). Author gives considerable discussion about the different formulations of the golden rule, from the first books of the bible and into the new Testament. Author rejects Thomas Aquinas' version in favor of Kant's since Kant's takes humans themselves as the ultimate entities to respect (rather than the Thomistic version that takes fundamental human goods as the ultimate ends).(pg63-5) The distinction here is the culmination of a clarifying discussion of what Kant meant when he wrote that humans were to be treated as ends, not means.(pg63-4) As an aside, author demeans one of the protestant alternatives to the golden rule which author designates as: 'Love, and do what you will' (pg62-3) The formulation of the common morality that Donagan uses:
"It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature."
In the next section 2.5, author launches into a prolonged discussion of how to setup 'specificatory premises', that is, premises that fill-in what action kinds are permissible, impermissible, and obligatory. [This seems to be an arcane problem, even for a philosopher.] The trouble (as I can see it), is about a question of refinement. Should the fundamental principle be refined, or even scrapped, as tough cases arise? Or should the principle remain unchanged and the precepts be followed even in awkward cases? The analogue to law is a tricky one, since typically case law involves extracting principles from legislation, then applying the principles to a tough case, and possibly slightly altering the principles to get the case to come out right. (pg68-9) This is an example of the 'circular motion' of common law. The insight the author adds is that moral precepts are different from legislation-- legislation is often ends-based, that is, focusing on how to write rules that will promote specific ends. The moral precepts author has in mind are about principles of action-- in other words-- it is deontological. (pg73)
7/30/10
Donagan, Alan - The Concept of a Theory of Morality
07/30/2010
The Theory of Morality Ch 1 (The Concept of a Theory of Morality), University of Chicago Press, 1979
Author beings his book by tracing the history of moral principles aside from social mores, that is a separation between a societies laws (and customs) and moral principles. Author begins the discussion with the Stoics, who talked about a division between living in accordance with 'Nature', and 'Reason'-- a divine law that was above the social mores. (pg2) Author sees this tradition continuing with Judiasm and then Christianity. (pg4-5) Author consider the core agreement to be "That there is a set of rules of precepts of conduct constituting a divine law, which is binding upon all rational creatures as such, and which in principle can be ascertained by human reason." (pg6) Problem one: are there such principles? Studies of the religious traditions are confused by the fact that each religion also set down a system of religious rules that constituted piety according to that tradition, which was super-morality (that is, went beyond the call of 'common morality') The difficulty here is separating which precepts are specifically religious and which are part of the common morality(pg6-7) Another difficulty is in determining whether the moral principles passed by the traditions are the right ones.
Author takes as his first issue the problem of elucidating the principles of morality for rational agents, not just those within a specific religious tradition. Author considers the philosophers in the German tradition, specifically as they became synthesized and triumphed in Kant, to be the modern form of a rational moral theory. This theory was strongly criticized by Hegel, who considered the theory devoid of content, or at least of most content-- it was too abstract and required only 'duty', which was relatively empty. Kant's theory, according to Hegel, failed to capture what most consider to be the content of the right and wrong decisions they make since it was so abstract-- it failed to capture the 'concrete ethical life' (pg9-11), the content of social mores. Hegel charged Kant with reducing a language to its 'gramaticality', too abstract to be meaningful. (pg13) The problem for Hegel (as given by the author) was one of examining the men of principles who lived in a society whose mores were contrary. The case here taken is the Stoics who repudiated the institution of slavery. This meant, according to author, that they had another basis for moral content other than the mores of their society, in effect the 'abstract' morality had some content. (pg14) The risk of there being no good alternative to a society's mores is brought out when author describes the case of an Austrian who piously subscribed to the Catholic Just War theory and therefore rejected service to the Nazis during WWII. He consulted his priest and bishop, who tried to dissuade him but failed to do so-- and was beheaded. Author considered this the scandalous degeneration of a moral tradition that had fallen to the social mores of the time. (pg14-16)
Author then surveys the English-speaking moral theories, specifically a brand called Intuitionism. Intuitionism is the study of the principles of morality from which moral precepts proceed on a deductive basis. The core of the system are intuitions, which cannot be doubted by those who encounter them, and, supposedly, spring from the nature of reason. (pg17-8) Author discusses this model as being one for mathematical and scientific truths as well, but fell under attack from utilitarianism, and strongly from Sidgwick. Sidgwick criticized intuitionism because it lacked the precision of its principles, and yet as precision was pursued, it would fail to be undoubtable by those studying it. Sidgwick laid out four conditions on intuitionism's precepts: (pg20)
1)That it is clearly and precisely formulated
2) That its self-evidence is ascertained by careful reflection
3) That it is consistent with other propositions received as intuitively evident
4) That experts in the subject do not dissent from it
As 1-3 seemed to emerge, precepts failed on 4.
Author claims that Sidgwick's attack on intuitionism misses the mark, especially on Sidgwick's claim that the experts in the field of intuitionism should agree upon a well-formulated moral precept. Author instead claims that "Intuitionism was a method to be followed, but no more than any other could it assure those who followed it of success. ... since their results did not diverge haphazardly and unsystematically, they could be interpreted as approximating, in different degrees, to the true system that was sought." (pg20)
Author gives more history of the intuitionist project, turning to a 'new' intuitionism advocated separately by Ross and Broad, regarding a system of prima facie intuitive moral precepts that must we compiled in a certain circumstance and then 'balanced' according not to intuition but instead using an analogy to perceptual judgment. (pg22-3) This system was rejected for being too lax, and failing to give a method of balancing or weighing. Author further discusses the breakdown of intuitionism as being, at root, the belief that because we are unable to be perfectly rational and attentive, we cannot reach the indisputable precepts. Author refutes that logic by claiming that we can reach indisputable precepts even if we do not fully know them to be so. (pg25)
Author turns to his positive approach: to examine the Hebrew-Christian traditions to find the fundamental principles of morality (and the metaphysical assumptions grounding them) that are apart from the theistic and religious requirements. (pg26) Interestingly, author does not expect that the metaphysical assumptions about the world, man, and human action will subscribed to by all cultures or all metaphysical systems. "In constructing a moral theory no more is necessary than to identify and state any controversial metaphysical presuppositions that distinguish it from its rivals" (pg28)
The Theory of Morality Ch 1 (The Concept of a Theory of Morality), University of Chicago Press, 1979
Author beings his book by tracing the history of moral principles aside from social mores, that is a separation between a societies laws (and customs) and moral principles. Author begins the discussion with the Stoics, who talked about a division between living in accordance with 'Nature', and 'Reason'-- a divine law that was above the social mores. (pg2) Author sees this tradition continuing with Judiasm and then Christianity. (pg4-5) Author consider the core agreement to be "That there is a set of rules of precepts of conduct constituting a divine law, which is binding upon all rational creatures as such, and which in principle can be ascertained by human reason." (pg6) Problem one: are there such principles? Studies of the religious traditions are confused by the fact that each religion also set down a system of religious rules that constituted piety according to that tradition, which was super-morality (that is, went beyond the call of 'common morality') The difficulty here is separating which precepts are specifically religious and which are part of the common morality(pg6-7) Another difficulty is in determining whether the moral principles passed by the traditions are the right ones.
Author takes as his first issue the problem of elucidating the principles of morality for rational agents, not just those within a specific religious tradition. Author considers the philosophers in the German tradition, specifically as they became synthesized and triumphed in Kant, to be the modern form of a rational moral theory. This theory was strongly criticized by Hegel, who considered the theory devoid of content, or at least of most content-- it was too abstract and required only 'duty', which was relatively empty. Kant's theory, according to Hegel, failed to capture what most consider to be the content of the right and wrong decisions they make since it was so abstract-- it failed to capture the 'concrete ethical life' (pg9-11), the content of social mores. Hegel charged Kant with reducing a language to its 'gramaticality', too abstract to be meaningful. (pg13) The problem for Hegel (as given by the author) was one of examining the men of principles who lived in a society whose mores were contrary. The case here taken is the Stoics who repudiated the institution of slavery. This meant, according to author, that they had another basis for moral content other than the mores of their society, in effect the 'abstract' morality had some content. (pg14) The risk of there being no good alternative to a society's mores is brought out when author describes the case of an Austrian who piously subscribed to the Catholic Just War theory and therefore rejected service to the Nazis during WWII. He consulted his priest and bishop, who tried to dissuade him but failed to do so-- and was beheaded. Author considered this the scandalous degeneration of a moral tradition that had fallen to the social mores of the time. (pg14-16)
Author then surveys the English-speaking moral theories, specifically a brand called Intuitionism. Intuitionism is the study of the principles of morality from which moral precepts proceed on a deductive basis. The core of the system are intuitions, which cannot be doubted by those who encounter them, and, supposedly, spring from the nature of reason. (pg17-8) Author discusses this model as being one for mathematical and scientific truths as well, but fell under attack from utilitarianism, and strongly from Sidgwick. Sidgwick criticized intuitionism because it lacked the precision of its principles, and yet as precision was pursued, it would fail to be undoubtable by those studying it. Sidgwick laid out four conditions on intuitionism's precepts: (pg20)
1)That it is clearly and precisely formulated
2) That its self-evidence is ascertained by careful reflection
3) That it is consistent with other propositions received as intuitively evident
4) That experts in the subject do not dissent from it
As 1-3 seemed to emerge, precepts failed on 4.
Author claims that Sidgwick's attack on intuitionism misses the mark, especially on Sidgwick's claim that the experts in the field of intuitionism should agree upon a well-formulated moral precept. Author instead claims that "Intuitionism was a method to be followed, but no more than any other could it assure those who followed it of success. ... since their results did not diverge haphazardly and unsystematically, they could be interpreted as approximating, in different degrees, to the true system that was sought." (pg20)
Author gives more history of the intuitionist project, turning to a 'new' intuitionism advocated separately by Ross and Broad, regarding a system of prima facie intuitive moral precepts that must we compiled in a certain circumstance and then 'balanced' according not to intuition but instead using an analogy to perceptual judgment. (pg22-3) This system was rejected for being too lax, and failing to give a method of balancing or weighing. Author further discusses the breakdown of intuitionism as being, at root, the belief that because we are unable to be perfectly rational and attentive, we cannot reach the indisputable precepts. Author refutes that logic by claiming that we can reach indisputable precepts even if we do not fully know them to be so. (pg25)
Author turns to his positive approach: to examine the Hebrew-Christian traditions to find the fundamental principles of morality (and the metaphysical assumptions grounding them) that are apart from the theistic and religious requirements. (pg26) Interestingly, author does not expect that the metaphysical assumptions about the world, man, and human action will subscribed to by all cultures or all metaphysical systems. "In constructing a moral theory no more is necessary than to identify and state any controversial metaphysical presuppositions that distinguish it from its rivals" (pg28)
7/9/10
Krugman, Paul - Building a Green Economy
07/09/2010
The New York Times Magazine, April 6 2010
This popular article discusses the basics of environmental economics and the major approaches to legislation for the environment. Author focuses on the threat of global warming, coal burning and carbon emissions in examples of how legislation might work. Author first reviews the core of environmental economics, which is another factor in the basics of economics. The basics of economics involves the mutual benefit from transactions between agents. The problem is when the byproducts of those transactions create costs that aren't factored in, called "negative externalities".
One solution is a restriction on that kind of transaction, or a very high price assessed to the agents for it. This is considered like a ban or strict limit, like for instance emissions standards on cars; those intended for sale in the US cannot go above a certain level of emissions. A major problem with outright bans or high standards is with having to retrofit, or in general the levels of compliance that the status quo (doesn't) enjoy. Author turns to Arthur Pigou's 1920s book The Economics of Welfare (Pigovian tax). The analysis here was that a 'market based' approach that limited production of a certain negative effect, perhaps carbon emissions or sulfur from coal burning on the whole, would allow the polluters to "buy" pollution from the non-polluters, all staying below the legislated cap. This kind of cap & trade system worked for sulfur dioxide into the air from coal producers in the 1990s, author claims.
A number of times, author discusses the state of the debate on climate change and tries to clarify it. While there is uncertainty with how the climate change will take place, and at what level, the vast consensus is that our current levels of carbon production will change the planet over the next 100 years. However, for author, the justification for action is that there is a non-negligible chance that there will be a calamitous result. Thus most uncertainty about the numbers isn't as much of a concern as the real possibility (non-negligible) of 'apocalyptic' conditions.
Author lays out how the cap and trade system might work, and what the (likely) overestimated constraints on economic growth would be, roughly 0.03-0.09 of GDP per annum, and perhaps at a cost of 1-3% of the world's gross product. Author also criticizes the critics of a cap and trade plan as disingenuous, simultaneously arguing that the magic of private innovation can do wonders for efficiency, but that private enterprise would be unable to cope with a cap and trade system. (Author also favors some outright bans or limits on coal burning, acknowledging that much of our pollution comes from that source.)
Author reviews two ways-- carrots and sticks-- of coaxing developing nations (read: China) into a similar system. The carrot is by incorporating them into the global emissions-rights-sales system that would allow China to sell the US (and other developed world) permits to pollute, effectively taking advantage of the fact they are still developing. The stick could be a tariff on imports that takes into account the carbon emissions used to produce it.
Author discusses two possible ways to enact this kind of legislation: the ramp up, or the 'big-bang'. The ramp up suggests that the costs of emissions rise slowly over the next century, the 'big-bang' is much more aggressive about legislating caps upfront. Author is more partial to the 'big-bang', since the ramp-up method seems to place bets that large limits late in the game will have the same effect that good limits now would. What if the game is already lost by the third quarter?
The last discussion is the possible way legislation like this could wind its way through Congress. Good luck.
The New York Times Magazine, April 6 2010
This popular article discusses the basics of environmental economics and the major approaches to legislation for the environment. Author focuses on the threat of global warming, coal burning and carbon emissions in examples of how legislation might work. Author first reviews the core of environmental economics, which is another factor in the basics of economics. The basics of economics involves the mutual benefit from transactions between agents. The problem is when the byproducts of those transactions create costs that aren't factored in, called "negative externalities".
One solution is a restriction on that kind of transaction, or a very high price assessed to the agents for it. This is considered like a ban or strict limit, like for instance emissions standards on cars; those intended for sale in the US cannot go above a certain level of emissions. A major problem with outright bans or high standards is with having to retrofit, or in general the levels of compliance that the status quo (doesn't) enjoy. Author turns to Arthur Pigou's 1920s book The Economics of Welfare (Pigovian tax). The analysis here was that a 'market based' approach that limited production of a certain negative effect, perhaps carbon emissions or sulfur from coal burning on the whole, would allow the polluters to "buy" pollution from the non-polluters, all staying below the legislated cap. This kind of cap & trade system worked for sulfur dioxide into the air from coal producers in the 1990s, author claims.
A number of times, author discusses the state of the debate on climate change and tries to clarify it. While there is uncertainty with how the climate change will take place, and at what level, the vast consensus is that our current levels of carbon production will change the planet over the next 100 years. However, for author, the justification for action is that there is a non-negligible chance that there will be a calamitous result. Thus most uncertainty about the numbers isn't as much of a concern as the real possibility (non-negligible) of 'apocalyptic' conditions.
Author lays out how the cap and trade system might work, and what the (likely) overestimated constraints on economic growth would be, roughly 0.03-0.09 of GDP per annum, and perhaps at a cost of 1-3% of the world's gross product. Author also criticizes the critics of a cap and trade plan as disingenuous, simultaneously arguing that the magic of private innovation can do wonders for efficiency, but that private enterprise would be unable to cope with a cap and trade system. (Author also favors some outright bans or limits on coal burning, acknowledging that much of our pollution comes from that source.)
Author reviews two ways-- carrots and sticks-- of coaxing developing nations (read: China) into a similar system. The carrot is by incorporating them into the global emissions-rights-sales system that would allow China to sell the US (and other developed world) permits to pollute, effectively taking advantage of the fact they are still developing. The stick could be a tariff on imports that takes into account the carbon emissions used to produce it.
Author discusses two possible ways to enact this kind of legislation: the ramp up, or the 'big-bang'. The ramp up suggests that the costs of emissions rise slowly over the next century, the 'big-bang' is much more aggressive about legislating caps upfront. Author is more partial to the 'big-bang', since the ramp-up method seems to place bets that large limits late in the game will have the same effect that good limits now would. What if the game is already lost by the third quarter?
The last discussion is the possible way legislation like this could wind its way through Congress. Good luck.
6/25/10
Sussman, David - For Badness' Sake
06/25/2010
The Journal of Philosophy, November 2009
This clearly written article takes on an old problem in philosophy: the trouble with perversity and human will. Author starts with a discussion of Kant's conception that it wasn't possible for a human to have a wicked will, that is, something that has a 'clear-eyed opposition' to moral law. Yet this is countered by St Augustine, who claims to have stolen pears from a tree for no sake other than the sake of being wicked, that is, not for profit, vengeance, or other reasons. The real trouble here is metaphysical-- human subjects take their actions to be intentional in that they aim at what they consider to be a 'good', not a 'bad'. (pg614) (Yet it is important to remember that "the good" is widely viewed to be different according to different perspectives.) This is considered by the author to be the 'Classical View', which considers intentional action essentially rational, a joining of beliefs and desires.
Author makes a case of perverse actions as an actual category of action, not just a case that can be finessed by the Classical View. (pg616-7) The thought here is that pure malice, spite, callousness and so on are intelligible to us, yet given the Classical View they should be more foreign than they are. But they are not, they are not insane actions but sensible-- but not according to the Classical View. Author's thesis is this: the Classical View must be reformed to be true broadly speaking but not necessarily true of any one particular action. (617-8)
Author review the Davidsonian conception of intentional actions, that they are a special joining of Beliefs and Desires such that there is a a rational connection between the desire and the set of beliefs that enable its fulfillment. (pg618) The problem for Davidson is that there can be a causal relationship that has all the right beliefs and desires but somehow fail to be intentional action. Take the case of the climber who, unnerved by the thought of releasing himself of his companion, releases his companion, though he does so unintentionally.
Author tries to mend this by suggesting that what is missing is an overall goal, a kind of guidance according to a concern. This overall guidance toward a final destination is considered invaluable when entering into the feedback loop of making actions in the world and adjusting to the effects such actions produce-- the guidance is required to make adjustments in the belief and desire framework that underwrites the overall end. Interestingly, author suggests we have immediate true knowledge about our intentions since they are action-oriented rather than introspective knowledge (pg619). "The distinctively intentional character of an action depends on the way its performance is informed by a sensitivity to the world construed in terms of some distinctive array of resources and dangers, relative to which our action may be done in a better or worse manner." (pg620) Author also considers this requirement one that allows the actor to consider herself as accomplishing the 'same thing' even as her route to it changes according to changing circumstances.
The addition to intentional action author offers is that it must have a 'point' or 'guiding concern' that 'orients' the actor in an 'open-ended way'. Author then reviews the case for perverse action, taking on (in opposition) Joseph Raz's attempts to subsume perversity under the standard CV. Raz offers a high bar for cases of genuine perversity: the actor must justify it without any reference to evaluative judgments. (Interpreting all evaluative judgments as aiming toward a 'good' rather than a 'bad'.) Author denies this high bar, instead suggesting that it is possible to take a 'rich-textured', 'structured' approach to a perverse activity like eating excrement. (pg624) Notice however that this is under the author's newly reformed CV, which includes an overall concern or goal that reacts to changing environmental conditions to effectively complete the project of excrement eating. (pg623-4)
The requirement of overall concerns or basic pointedness in one intentional action can, presumably, accommodate cases of genuine perversity. However, author argues that once such values become the standard norm for an actor, it seems the actor has subsumed perversity for her own particular understanding of the 'good'. (pg626) The trouble for the perverse here is one of justification-- the lack of justification that can be provided in a social, or linguistic context. Author scaffolds a claim that the pointedness or guidance in intentional action should be 'two-dimensional', that is, have the responsiveness both to physical challenges but also to social challenges (for justification, assistance, etc) as well. The perverse cannot justify their concerns socially, in that their actions cannot be well-formulated into a 'long-term resolve'. And if it lacks justification, then the actor who wants to be perverse as a general norm will soon lose sight of her own goals. (pg627). This fatal flaw to perversity as a general principle upholds the reformed Classical View, though it admits to singularities.
The Journal of Philosophy, November 2009
This clearly written article takes on an old problem in philosophy: the trouble with perversity and human will. Author starts with a discussion of Kant's conception that it wasn't possible for a human to have a wicked will, that is, something that has a 'clear-eyed opposition' to moral law. Yet this is countered by St Augustine, who claims to have stolen pears from a tree for no sake other than the sake of being wicked, that is, not for profit, vengeance, or other reasons. The real trouble here is metaphysical-- human subjects take their actions to be intentional in that they aim at what they consider to be a 'good', not a 'bad'. (pg614) (Yet it is important to remember that "the good" is widely viewed to be different according to different perspectives.) This is considered by the author to be the 'Classical View', which considers intentional action essentially rational, a joining of beliefs and desires.
Author makes a case of perverse actions as an actual category of action, not just a case that can be finessed by the Classical View. (pg616-7) The thought here is that pure malice, spite, callousness and so on are intelligible to us, yet given the Classical View they should be more foreign than they are. But they are not, they are not insane actions but sensible-- but not according to the Classical View. Author's thesis is this: the Classical View must be reformed to be true broadly speaking but not necessarily true of any one particular action. (617-8)
Author review the Davidsonian conception of intentional actions, that they are a special joining of Beliefs and Desires such that there is a a rational connection between the desire and the set of beliefs that enable its fulfillment. (pg618) The problem for Davidson is that there can be a causal relationship that has all the right beliefs and desires but somehow fail to be intentional action. Take the case of the climber who, unnerved by the thought of releasing himself of his companion, releases his companion, though he does so unintentionally.
Author tries to mend this by suggesting that what is missing is an overall goal, a kind of guidance according to a concern. This overall guidance toward a final destination is considered invaluable when entering into the feedback loop of making actions in the world and adjusting to the effects such actions produce-- the guidance is required to make adjustments in the belief and desire framework that underwrites the overall end. Interestingly, author suggests we have immediate true knowledge about our intentions since they are action-oriented rather than introspective knowledge (pg619). "The distinctively intentional character of an action depends on the way its performance is informed by a sensitivity to the world construed in terms of some distinctive array of resources and dangers, relative to which our action may be done in a better or worse manner." (pg620) Author also considers this requirement one that allows the actor to consider herself as accomplishing the 'same thing' even as her route to it changes according to changing circumstances.
The addition to intentional action author offers is that it must have a 'point' or 'guiding concern' that 'orients' the actor in an 'open-ended way'. Author then reviews the case for perverse action, taking on (in opposition) Joseph Raz's attempts to subsume perversity under the standard CV. Raz offers a high bar for cases of genuine perversity: the actor must justify it without any reference to evaluative judgments. (Interpreting all evaluative judgments as aiming toward a 'good' rather than a 'bad'.) Author denies this high bar, instead suggesting that it is possible to take a 'rich-textured', 'structured' approach to a perverse activity like eating excrement. (pg624) Notice however that this is under the author's newly reformed CV, which includes an overall concern or goal that reacts to changing environmental conditions to effectively complete the project of excrement eating. (pg623-4)
The requirement of overall concerns or basic pointedness in one intentional action can, presumably, accommodate cases of genuine perversity. However, author argues that once such values become the standard norm for an actor, it seems the actor has subsumed perversity for her own particular understanding of the 'good'. (pg626) The trouble for the perverse here is one of justification-- the lack of justification that can be provided in a social, or linguistic context. Author scaffolds a claim that the pointedness or guidance in intentional action should be 'two-dimensional', that is, have the responsiveness both to physical challenges but also to social challenges (for justification, assistance, etc) as well. The perverse cannot justify their concerns socially, in that their actions cannot be well-formulated into a 'long-term resolve'. And if it lacks justification, then the actor who wants to be perverse as a general norm will soon lose sight of her own goals. (pg627). This fatal flaw to perversity as a general principle upholds the reformed Classical View, though it admits to singularities.
6/18/10
Dworkin, Ronald - A Decision That Threatens Democracy
06/18/2010
The New York Review, May 13 2010
This is a relatively scholarly article written by a well-known constitutional democracy philosopher regarding the Citizens United v Federal Election Commission case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States by a 5-4 decision in January 2010. The decision in the case generally reversed a longstanding tradition of restricting or barring non-media corporate entities (and other non-natural persons like unions) from most forms of campaigning during an election. Author gives some background for the case in part 1. Most importantly, the majority opinion considered this a free speech issue, using the First Amendment of the US Constitution as the basis for granting corporations and unions the right to directly advertise their opinions prior to an election.
In part 2, author uses his familiar argument about the language in the US Constitution: it tries to capture abstract concepts in political morality, and as such the principles behind the language-- the concepts of appropriate political morality-- are the ultimate appeal that judges should rely on. Thus there should be a theory, or number of different theories, that give reasons to underwrite the First Amendment. Author considers them:
1-The need for an informed electorate
2-The desire to 'protect the status, dignity, and moral development of individual citizens as equal partners in the political process'.
3-The desire to maintain honesty and transparency in government, e.g. not allowing the government to restrict speech
In each case, author considers the Citizens decision not only to fail to satisfy these desidirata, but to work in opposition to them.
In the case of 1, the need for an informed electorate, the idea here might be that we would hope that including corporations in the political process will uncover new ideas. Except that author declares that corporations can't think. Instead, it will be the ideas of the managers of the corporations, who can contribute to PACs on their own and therefore will just be adding to the volume of ideas, not new ones. It could also lead to a kind of double counting, or at least the impression of greater support for an idea than there is, due to the flow of money that corporations could level into the marketplace of ideas. (pg63) More importantly, at the root of campaign finance reform isn't the idea of "equality" in elections for their own sake. Instead, equality is encouraged for the sake of creating a marketplace of ideas where many can be heard. This is important to protect the "integrity of political debate"; author likens it to having a debate where time speaking is auctioned to the highest bidder. (pg64)
In the case of 2, the desire to respect the dignity and moral development of citizens-- the idea of protecting self-expression-- author claims there isn't a way the Citizens decision could support this since corporations aren't the kinds of things that have dignity or moral development.
In the case of 3, the desire to limit tyranny or corruption in government, author believes there aren't any positives to the Citizens decision, and it opens the door for more corruption, not less. For instance, it allows corporations whose interests are threatened by legislation to in turn threaten legislators by suggesting a flood of negative campaigning at the next election cycle. (pg64)
In section 3, author discusses the previous cases that had supposedly built a precedent for restricting corporate speech, Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and McConnell v Federal Election Commission, specifically taking apart the argument from the majority opinion's author, Anthony Kennedy. Kennedy had used two other cases to argue there was conflicting precedent, for instance in Buckley v Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti.
In section 4, author suggests some legislative fixes that might be within the scope of the Citizens decision, for instance by restricting corporations that are foreign-owned (or foreign-owned subsidiaries), or recipients of TARP monies. [What about corporations that receive any government contracts?]
The New York Review, May 13 2010
This is a relatively scholarly article written by a well-known constitutional democracy philosopher regarding the Citizens United v Federal Election Commission case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States by a 5-4 decision in January 2010. The decision in the case generally reversed a longstanding tradition of restricting or barring non-media corporate entities (and other non-natural persons like unions) from most forms of campaigning during an election. Author gives some background for the case in part 1. Most importantly, the majority opinion considered this a free speech issue, using the First Amendment of the US Constitution as the basis for granting corporations and unions the right to directly advertise their opinions prior to an election.
In part 2, author uses his familiar argument about the language in the US Constitution: it tries to capture abstract concepts in political morality, and as such the principles behind the language-- the concepts of appropriate political morality-- are the ultimate appeal that judges should rely on. Thus there should be a theory, or number of different theories, that give reasons to underwrite the First Amendment. Author considers them:
1-The need for an informed electorate
2-The desire to 'protect the status, dignity, and moral development of individual citizens as equal partners in the political process'.
3-The desire to maintain honesty and transparency in government, e.g. not allowing the government to restrict speech
In each case, author considers the Citizens decision not only to fail to satisfy these desidirata, but to work in opposition to them.
In the case of 1, the need for an informed electorate, the idea here might be that we would hope that including corporations in the political process will uncover new ideas. Except that author declares that corporations can't think. Instead, it will be the ideas of the managers of the corporations, who can contribute to PACs on their own and therefore will just be adding to the volume of ideas, not new ones. It could also lead to a kind of double counting, or at least the impression of greater support for an idea than there is, due to the flow of money that corporations could level into the marketplace of ideas. (pg63) More importantly, at the root of campaign finance reform isn't the idea of "equality" in elections for their own sake. Instead, equality is encouraged for the sake of creating a marketplace of ideas where many can be heard. This is important to protect the "integrity of political debate"; author likens it to having a debate where time speaking is auctioned to the highest bidder. (pg64)
In the case of 2, the desire to respect the dignity and moral development of citizens-- the idea of protecting self-expression-- author claims there isn't a way the Citizens decision could support this since corporations aren't the kinds of things that have dignity or moral development.
In the case of 3, the desire to limit tyranny or corruption in government, author believes there aren't any positives to the Citizens decision, and it opens the door for more corruption, not less. For instance, it allows corporations whose interests are threatened by legislation to in turn threaten legislators by suggesting a flood of negative campaigning at the next election cycle. (pg64)
In section 3, author discusses the previous cases that had supposedly built a precedent for restricting corporate speech, Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and McConnell v Federal Election Commission, specifically taking apart the argument from the majority opinion's author, Anthony Kennedy. Kennedy had used two other cases to argue there was conflicting precedent, for instance in Buckley v Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti.
In section 4, author suggests some legislative fixes that might be within the scope of the Citizens decision, for instance by restricting corporations that are foreign-owned (or foreign-owned subsidiaries), or recipients of TARP monies. [What about corporations that receive any government contracts?]
6/11/10
Toulmin, Stephen - The Tyranny of Principles
06/11/2010
The Hastings Center Report, Vol 11, No 6 Dec 1981
This article may be dated but is still relevant today. It discusses the phenomenon of mistrust for the government, or specifically for administration and for benefit dispensaries, and also focuses on the traditional divide between equality and equity, which author argues people have begun to see as the same social concept.
Author begins by decrying the level of debate that takes place on matters of public policy, especially the use of hard-lined 'principles' in an effort to combat profligate relativism. Author claims that for many difficult questions, there is a need for case-by-case discussion and a weighing of relative merits. Author especially targets as a problem the 'revival of tyrannical absolutism' (pg31) and tries to trace the social origins of our current legal system. Author believes that they underlie the problems that large, unrelated modern societies face regarding the law as a system of rules. Author first draws on three observations:
1) Author took part in a US Congress task force for determining the ethical treatment of human test subjects in medical research, along with scientists and other moral leaders. He was struck with how much agreement they could reach, yet when asked about the principles that underwrote their conclusions, each member gave different reasons. Conclusion: principles have to do with non-moral commitments.
2) Author notices the abortion debate is usually portrayed in the public sphere as a fight between pro-choice and pro-life principles, without the more 'temperate' approach that these are tough issues which may require compromises and weighing.
3) Author noticed the distribution of social benefits, in this case ones for the poor and needy, have become increasingly bureaucratic and allow for little variation on a case-by-case basis. What seems to be worse is the poor understanding by the public about the alternative to this problem-- the solution suggested by the TV reporter is to create an even deeper system of rules, rather than the (perhaps forgotten?) alternative of allowing for more discretion and judgment in the dispensation. (pg31-2)
Author goes back to the cradle of the rule of law, the Roman civil society. In Rome's first 300 years or so, disputes were handled by pontiffs in an arbitration manner, not administrators in a rule-application manner. This was possible due mostly to the shared culture, tradition, and small-scale aspects of the society. As Rome grew so did the disputes, which was taxing on the pontiffs-- they hired junior ones and charged them with more rule-like guidance. Further conquest and governance of peoples with different traditions and concepts of fairness meant the need to create more rule-like laws. Author considers this the beginning of the separation between equitable results, which may have been reached through pontification, consideration, wisdom and taking the particulars of a case into account, and equal results, which relied on the (semi) uniform application of rules and legal procedures. (pg33)
Author brings out a distinction in settling disputes:
-An Equitable outcome: often done with care and under the assumption of a continuing relationship that should be preserved. Tolstoy (author uses examples from Anna Karenina) considered this the only system of ethics worth having.
-An Equal outcome: used to support the rights of 'strangers' (pg34-5), and exemplified by our current level of rules and regulations in administration. Author also points to the legal concept of the adversarial system, used in procedural justice to come to a fair outcome but can be so psychologically traumatic that afterwards neither party wants to engage the other, and has 'no stake in one another's future' (pg35).
Author does acknowledge the potential for abuse in the 'equitable' system, and also takes some time considering the merits of the large-scale nationalizing of charitable causes like welfare, that used to be instituted primarily by parochial institutions.
Author's theory is that 'a system of law consisting wholly of rules would treat all parties coming before it in the ways appropriate to strangers. By contrast, in legal issues that arise between parties who wish to continue as close associates on an intimate or familiar level, the demands of equality and rule conformity lose their central place.' (pg36)
The Hastings Center Report, Vol 11, No 6 Dec 1981
This article may be dated but is still relevant today. It discusses the phenomenon of mistrust for the government, or specifically for administration and for benefit dispensaries, and also focuses on the traditional divide between equality and equity, which author argues people have begun to see as the same social concept.
Author begins by decrying the level of debate that takes place on matters of public policy, especially the use of hard-lined 'principles' in an effort to combat profligate relativism. Author claims that for many difficult questions, there is a need for case-by-case discussion and a weighing of relative merits. Author especially targets as a problem the 'revival of tyrannical absolutism' (pg31) and tries to trace the social origins of our current legal system. Author believes that they underlie the problems that large, unrelated modern societies face regarding the law as a system of rules. Author first draws on three observations:
1) Author took part in a US Congress task force for determining the ethical treatment of human test subjects in medical research, along with scientists and other moral leaders. He was struck with how much agreement they could reach, yet when asked about the principles that underwrote their conclusions, each member gave different reasons. Conclusion: principles have to do with non-moral commitments.
2) Author notices the abortion debate is usually portrayed in the public sphere as a fight between pro-choice and pro-life principles, without the more 'temperate' approach that these are tough issues which may require compromises and weighing.
3) Author noticed the distribution of social benefits, in this case ones for the poor and needy, have become increasingly bureaucratic and allow for little variation on a case-by-case basis. What seems to be worse is the poor understanding by the public about the alternative to this problem-- the solution suggested by the TV reporter is to create an even deeper system of rules, rather than the (perhaps forgotten?) alternative of allowing for more discretion and judgment in the dispensation. (pg31-2)
Author goes back to the cradle of the rule of law, the Roman civil society. In Rome's first 300 years or so, disputes were handled by pontiffs in an arbitration manner, not administrators in a rule-application manner. This was possible due mostly to the shared culture, tradition, and small-scale aspects of the society. As Rome grew so did the disputes, which was taxing on the pontiffs-- they hired junior ones and charged them with more rule-like guidance. Further conquest and governance of peoples with different traditions and concepts of fairness meant the need to create more rule-like laws. Author considers this the beginning of the separation between equitable results, which may have been reached through pontification, consideration, wisdom and taking the particulars of a case into account, and equal results, which relied on the (semi) uniform application of rules and legal procedures. (pg33)
Author brings out a distinction in settling disputes:
-An Equitable outcome: often done with care and under the assumption of a continuing relationship that should be preserved. Tolstoy (author uses examples from Anna Karenina) considered this the only system of ethics worth having.
-An Equal outcome: used to support the rights of 'strangers' (pg34-5), and exemplified by our current level of rules and regulations in administration. Author also points to the legal concept of the adversarial system, used in procedural justice to come to a fair outcome but can be so psychologically traumatic that afterwards neither party wants to engage the other, and has 'no stake in one another's future' (pg35).
Author does acknowledge the potential for abuse in the 'equitable' system, and also takes some time considering the merits of the large-scale nationalizing of charitable causes like welfare, that used to be instituted primarily by parochial institutions.
Author's theory is that 'a system of law consisting wholly of rules would treat all parties coming before it in the ways appropriate to strangers. By contrast, in legal issues that arise between parties who wish to continue as close associates on an intimate or familiar level, the demands of equality and rule conformity lose their central place.' (pg36)
5/28/10
Westphal, Jonathan - Review of Roy Sorenson's Seeing Dark Things
05/28/2010
Paper delivered for panel discussion
This is a review of the Roy Sorenson book Seeing Dark Things, which is a book that espouses the causal theory of perception and the nature of shadows and silhouettes. Author takes the opportunity to discuss Sorenson's main points, but also disagrees with them and elaborates his own position in the review.
The first example author discusses is the example of "Near" and "Far", two planets that completely occlude the sun at the exact same time (from the point of view of the Earth). What happens is that the far planet "Far" occludes the sun, and, simultaneously, a closer planet, "Near" also moves into the same exact position that Far occupies in our field of vision. The closest thing to us is the near side of Near. Nevertheless, Sorenson argues that when we see the big black blot in front of the sun, we are seeing the thing that actually causally stops the sun's rays, which is the far side of Far. Author agrees-- though he explains it not as bolstering the causal theory but instead as part of a theory of shade and in describing celestial bodies in 'purely astronomical terms'. Author also worries about what this kind of example might underwrite for the causal theory, that, somehow, we can 'see' the far (obscured) sides of things.
The next discussion can be brought out by the example of a bird flying (and landing) onto the near side of a barn, but coming to rest somewhere in the barn's shadow. The light source is on the other side of the barn and when the bird flies into the shadow it disappears. From this simple case it seems there is an inconsistent triad:
1) If X causes a shadow, then some light is falling directly on X
2) X cannot cast a shadow through an opaque object
3) All shadow is shadow of something
With the bird/barn case, it seems the barn is casting a shadow through the opaque object of the bird, a violation of 2. But then it is clear that the shadow is in the shape of the barn, upholding (sort of) 3. But if we say the barn isn't casting a shadow through the bird, then 1 saddles us with the absurdity that some light is hitting the bird in order to keep the barn-shape of the shadow.
Author makes a comment on the ungrammatical aspects of 3, but first goes about denying the sense of 2 that generates the inconsistency. Author argues for a distinction between the concept of shade and that of shadow. Shade is the lack of illumination, whether partial or complete. Shadow is shade with shape. Shade can be cast through opaque objects, since 'through' isn't being used as a physical-causal term. With this distinction, author examines 3 and concludes that confusing these concepts also contributes to the inconsistency: All shadow is shadow of something: true. All shade is shade of something: true. All shade is the shadow of something: false.
The next matter of consideration is that of silhouettes. Sorenson's example is of a church steeple that is at a distance, set high in the sky against a low sun or other light source. Here all you make out is the silhouette of the steeple. Here author examines Sorenson's argument is that when you see the silhouette, you see the steeple. Author's problem is one of equivocation. Surely the outline of the shape of the steeple is 'seeing' the steeple, but the dark interior is just the shade of the far side of the steeple, which you don't see. Sorenson would argue (given his Near/Far discussion), that you do see the far side of the steeple. Here author and he part ways and it leads to the next example, this time created by the author: the wall. Author argues that a wall that casts a shadow onto the near side of a road is revealing to you a shaded near side, not a causally-efficacious far side. If, for instance, you dropped something valuable on the near side, you would look there for it, not on the other side, where you might 'see' it!
The last part of the review discusses Sorenson's odd claim that shadows can only be dark, not colored. Sorenson creates the concept of "Filtows" to represent colored light. Author is just comfortable saying that shadows can be colored. (Sorenson is worried that things like cathedrals will end up being illuminated by shadow.)
Paper delivered for panel discussion
This is a review of the Roy Sorenson book Seeing Dark Things, which is a book that espouses the causal theory of perception and the nature of shadows and silhouettes. Author takes the opportunity to discuss Sorenson's main points, but also disagrees with them and elaborates his own position in the review.
The first example author discusses is the example of "Near" and "Far", two planets that completely occlude the sun at the exact same time (from the point of view of the Earth). What happens is that the far planet "Far" occludes the sun, and, simultaneously, a closer planet, "Near" also moves into the same exact position that Far occupies in our field of vision. The closest thing to us is the near side of Near. Nevertheless, Sorenson argues that when we see the big black blot in front of the sun, we are seeing the thing that actually causally stops the sun's rays, which is the far side of Far. Author agrees-- though he explains it not as bolstering the causal theory but instead as part of a theory of shade and in describing celestial bodies in 'purely astronomical terms'. Author also worries about what this kind of example might underwrite for the causal theory, that, somehow, we can 'see' the far (obscured) sides of things.
The next discussion can be brought out by the example of a bird flying (and landing) onto the near side of a barn, but coming to rest somewhere in the barn's shadow. The light source is on the other side of the barn and when the bird flies into the shadow it disappears. From this simple case it seems there is an inconsistent triad:
1) If X causes a shadow, then some light is falling directly on X
2) X cannot cast a shadow through an opaque object
3) All shadow is shadow of something
With the bird/barn case, it seems the barn is casting a shadow through the opaque object of the bird, a violation of 2. But then it is clear that the shadow is in the shape of the barn, upholding (sort of) 3. But if we say the barn isn't casting a shadow through the bird, then 1 saddles us with the absurdity that some light is hitting the bird in order to keep the barn-shape of the shadow.
Author makes a comment on the ungrammatical aspects of 3, but first goes about denying the sense of 2 that generates the inconsistency. Author argues for a distinction between the concept of shade and that of shadow. Shade is the lack of illumination, whether partial or complete. Shadow is shade with shape. Shade can be cast through opaque objects, since 'through' isn't being used as a physical-causal term. With this distinction, author examines 3 and concludes that confusing these concepts also contributes to the inconsistency: All shadow is shadow of something: true. All shade is shade of something: true. All shade is the shadow of something: false.
The next matter of consideration is that of silhouettes. Sorenson's example is of a church steeple that is at a distance, set high in the sky against a low sun or other light source. Here all you make out is the silhouette of the steeple. Here author examines Sorenson's argument is that when you see the silhouette, you see the steeple. Author's problem is one of equivocation. Surely the outline of the shape of the steeple is 'seeing' the steeple, but the dark interior is just the shade of the far side of the steeple, which you don't see. Sorenson would argue (given his Near/Far discussion), that you do see the far side of the steeple. Here author and he part ways and it leads to the next example, this time created by the author: the wall. Author argues that a wall that casts a shadow onto the near side of a road is revealing to you a shaded near side, not a causally-efficacious far side. If, for instance, you dropped something valuable on the near side, you would look there for it, not on the other side, where you might 'see' it!
The last part of the review discusses Sorenson's odd claim that shadows can only be dark, not colored. Sorenson creates the concept of "Filtows" to represent colored light. Author is just comfortable saying that shadows can be colored. (Sorenson is worried that things like cathedrals will end up being illuminated by shadow.)
5/21/10
Wilson, Margaret - Objects, Ideas and "Minds": Comments on Spinoza's Theory of Mind
05/21/2010
Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy Ch 9, Princeton University Press
This paper attempts to show that Spinoza's theory of a human mind isn't close to what we understand a human mind to be, especially something considered in Descartes as a thing capable of conscious representation of objects, real or imaginary. Author begins by contrasting Spinoza's conception of minds with Leibniz's 'complete concept' and Descartes' 'res cognitantes' (thinking things).
The first is Leibniz, who gives metaphysical space between God's ideas of objects and the objects themselves. The complete ideas exist within God, but the objects themselves are God creatures. Further, they could be different, as God could have created a different world. So it is likely that for Leibniz, God has complete ideas of even non-existent entities. (pg127) Spinoza seems at odds with both of these positions: objects are attributes of God, and it is unclear if God has ideas of non-existent objects (of extension). (pg127-8)
Author secondly examines Descartes, acknowledging the common problems with the Cartesian picture. However, some of the intuitions are shared by most: anything that occurs in the mind is, by definition, conscious. Secondly, the mind has the ability to have ideas of many different things, whether imaginary or right-in-front-of-your-eyes (formal). Lastly, the mind is supposed to be a marker for rationality, giving mind-substance to some creatures and not to others. On most of these positions it seems Spinoza also disagrees. Spinoza doesn't exactly have an explicit account of consciousness, but for him the mind has an idea of everything-- everything-- that occurs in its body. Spinoza's mental ideas are also limited to just the things that happen in the body; finally, all extended things are also mental things-- that is there is two attributes to every mode of God's action-- even a stone has some level of mentality. (pg129-130)
Author moves on to consider a defense of Spinoza (in section III), but first levels the primary objection of her paper: Spinoza fails to give an account of human mental representation that is anything like what we consider it to be. The reason is that he is committed to minds being about the bodies whose mode they share, which explodes the concept of mental representation. It is exploded (pg131) by failing to find a sufficient condition for a subset of what is going on in the body to be represented in the mind.
Section III deals with the problem of mental representation of objects-- author believes that for Spinoza a human mind can only represent what is happening in its body. Ok, but how do the representations that we have filter up from our bodies? The rub is that it is obvious that not everything that happens in our bodies is represented in our minds. So where's the difference? Author argues there is not one to be found (pg132).
Section IV is an in-depth analysis of the various texts of Spinoza that commentators have claimed purport to show a distinction between conscious and non-conscious thought. Author argues against this interpretation.
Author concludes that without a sufficient condition for human mental representation (as opposed to representing everything in our body) and without a robust distinction between conscious and non-conscious ideas, Spinoza does not have a theory of mind that captures anything like the human mind.
Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy Ch 9, Princeton University Press
This paper attempts to show that Spinoza's theory of a human mind isn't close to what we understand a human mind to be, especially something considered in Descartes as a thing capable of conscious representation of objects, real or imaginary. Author begins by contrasting Spinoza's conception of minds with Leibniz's 'complete concept' and Descartes' 'res cognitantes' (thinking things).
The first is Leibniz, who gives metaphysical space between God's ideas of objects and the objects themselves. The complete ideas exist within God, but the objects themselves are God creatures. Further, they could be different, as God could have created a different world. So it is likely that for Leibniz, God has complete ideas of even non-existent entities. (pg127) Spinoza seems at odds with both of these positions: objects are attributes of God, and it is unclear if God has ideas of non-existent objects (of extension). (pg127-8)
Author secondly examines Descartes, acknowledging the common problems with the Cartesian picture. However, some of the intuitions are shared by most: anything that occurs in the mind is, by definition, conscious. Secondly, the mind has the ability to have ideas of many different things, whether imaginary or right-in-front-of-your-eyes (formal). Lastly, the mind is supposed to be a marker for rationality, giving mind-substance to some creatures and not to others. On most of these positions it seems Spinoza also disagrees. Spinoza doesn't exactly have an explicit account of consciousness, but for him the mind has an idea of everything-- everything-- that occurs in its body. Spinoza's mental ideas are also limited to just the things that happen in the body; finally, all extended things are also mental things-- that is there is two attributes to every mode of God's action-- even a stone has some level of mentality. (pg129-130)
Author moves on to consider a defense of Spinoza (in section III), but first levels the primary objection of her paper: Spinoza fails to give an account of human mental representation that is anything like what we consider it to be. The reason is that he is committed to minds being about the bodies whose mode they share, which explodes the concept of mental representation. It is exploded (pg131) by failing to find a sufficient condition for a subset of what is going on in the body to be represented in the mind.
Section III deals with the problem of mental representation of objects-- author believes that for Spinoza a human mind can only represent what is happening in its body. Ok, but how do the representations that we have filter up from our bodies? The rub is that it is obvious that not everything that happens in our bodies is represented in our minds. So where's the difference? Author argues there is not one to be found (pg132).
Section IV is an in-depth analysis of the various texts of Spinoza that commentators have claimed purport to show a distinction between conscious and non-conscious thought. Author argues against this interpretation.
Author concludes that without a sufficient condition for human mental representation (as opposed to representing everything in our body) and without a robust distinction between conscious and non-conscious ideas, Spinoza does not have a theory of mind that captures anything like the human mind.
5/14/10
Donagan, Alan - Spinoza's Dualism
05/14/2010
Ch 7 of The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan Vol 1 Historical Understanding and the History of Philosophy, University of Chicago Press
This paper is an attempt to show that, although Spinoza was an avowed monist, many of his positions seemed to embrace much of the dualist belief system and seem at odds with what a fully endorsed monist position might be. Author compares this odd stance with the one of Descartes relative to heliocentrism-- though Descartes avowed to be a geocentrist, many of his other positions would give fellow geocentrists little comfort and were compatible with heliocentrism.
Author believes that 'Spinoza accepted numerous positions that are distinctively dualist' (pg117). The first departure requires some explanation. The standard model for attributes and substance is that a substance has one distinct attribute, and that attribute defines its essence (pg117-8). This is inherited entirely from Descartes (the dualist). And yet Spinoza places two (at least) attributes into the God/Nature, both the attributes of extension and thought. This puzzling move seems to suggest that a substance with two attributes would have two essences. (Yet because a substance with 3 essences would be more complete than one with 2, we know that God's substance must encompass all attributes, all essences pg120). Author claims this is not in fundamental conflict with a dualist like Descartes (pg121-2), especially because it claims (with Descartes) that the two attributes are irreducible to each other.
Author takes an explanatory detour into Spinoza's dual-track attribute theory, where everything extended (in the physical world) has a corresponding mental idea or cognition. E.g. a rock tumbling down a hill also has a corresponding mental aspect. (pg123-5) This is germane because it shows the irreducibility of the one attribute into the other; indeed it seems to reinforce their complete unconnected independence.
Author argues that Spinoza could only reconcile his dualist positions with his explicit monism through the awkward (novel?) adoption of the idea that: two distinct attributes may be found together in the same substance. This awkwardness overturns much of his previous work that generally expressed the theory of one attribute=one essence=one substance.
Ch 7 of The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan Vol 1 Historical Understanding and the History of Philosophy, University of Chicago Press
This paper is an attempt to show that, although Spinoza was an avowed monist, many of his positions seemed to embrace much of the dualist belief system and seem at odds with what a fully endorsed monist position might be. Author compares this odd stance with the one of Descartes relative to heliocentrism-- though Descartes avowed to be a geocentrist, many of his other positions would give fellow geocentrists little comfort and were compatible with heliocentrism.
Author believes that 'Spinoza accepted numerous positions that are distinctively dualist' (pg117). The first departure requires some explanation. The standard model for attributes and substance is that a substance has one distinct attribute, and that attribute defines its essence (pg117-8). This is inherited entirely from Descartes (the dualist). And yet Spinoza places two (at least) attributes into the God/Nature, both the attributes of extension and thought. This puzzling move seems to suggest that a substance with two attributes would have two essences. (Yet because a substance with 3 essences would be more complete than one with 2, we know that God's substance must encompass all attributes, all essences pg120). Author claims this is not in fundamental conflict with a dualist like Descartes (pg121-2), especially because it claims (with Descartes) that the two attributes are irreducible to each other.
Author takes an explanatory detour into Spinoza's dual-track attribute theory, where everything extended (in the physical world) has a corresponding mental idea or cognition. E.g. a rock tumbling down a hill also has a corresponding mental aspect. (pg123-5) This is germane because it shows the irreducibility of the one attribute into the other; indeed it seems to reinforce their complete unconnected independence.
Author argues that Spinoza could only reconcile his dualist positions with his explicit monism through the awkward (novel?) adoption of the idea that: two distinct attributes may be found together in the same substance. This awkwardness overturns much of his previous work that generally expressed the theory of one attribute=one essence=one substance.
2/12/10
Hart, Herbert - Are There Any Natural Rights?
02/12/2010
This paper is mainly a statement that 'If there are any moral rights at all, the right of humans to be free is a natural right'. The freedom granted as a right means that others mustn't coerce or restrain s from acting so long as s's actions aren't coercing, restraining, or 'designed to injure' others. (pg77) Most of there rest of the paper is a clarification of what it is for there to be moral rights, natural rights, and other clarifications. Note that the argument is in the form of a conditional: 'If' there are any moral rights, then the right to be free is one. (Author mentions as an aside that there may be other moral systems that would include terms like right/wrong, good/bad that do not rely on rights.) (pg78)
A natural right is one that accrues to s by virtue of s's being a human chooser, e.g. someone capable of choice. It is not dependent on having taken a particular voluntary action. Rights have special characteristics, and author lays them out as he sees them as follows:
A) Moral rights are different, but related to legal ones; to secure a legal right there must be the allowance for coercion and restraint in case such a right is at risk of being violated. Yet the justification for s's restraining another isn't because of a moral right that s has vs others, it is due to the principle of legal rights distribution (pg80)
B) S's Having 'a right to x' means that s has no duty to restrain from doing x. However, there is competition for limited resources that provides an interesting contrast. All may have a right to acquire x, but no corresponding duty to let the other have it. (pg80-1)
C) Is there a corresponding right for every duty? No. Author argues we have a duty to not abuse animals, but they do not have a right against us in that regard. (pg81) Just because someone stands to gain from the performance of our duties, that someone does not have a right to that performance. Author uses as another example the contract n signs with s to provide care to s's aging mother. N's duty is to s, not the aging mother; yet the mother stands to benefit from the performance of the duty. (pg81-2)
Author takes care to distinguish between Special rights and General rights. Special rights arise out of transactions between individuals, special relationships, or special situations. These are such things as i) promises, ii) s conferring the prerogative to protect s's rights to another, iii) 'mutuality of restrictions' such as in a political process (pg85-6). (It is during this portion where author discusses the possibility of having a legal duty to refrain from doing the morally right thing, or vice versa.) iv) natural relationships like parent/child, v) s confers special liberties to another (e.g. to read s's diary).
General rights, on the other hand, accrue to s because of there being no special right inhibiting s's actions and because s has a right to be free. (pg87-88) The last section of the article involves author claiming that there is a right to interfere, restrain or coerce s when s is trying to do the same (or injure) another.
This paper is mainly a statement that 'If there are any moral rights at all, the right of humans to be free is a natural right'. The freedom granted as a right means that others mustn't coerce or restrain s from acting so long as s's actions aren't coercing, restraining, or 'designed to injure' others. (pg77) Most of there rest of the paper is a clarification of what it is for there to be moral rights, natural rights, and other clarifications. Note that the argument is in the form of a conditional: 'If' there are any moral rights, then the right to be free is one. (Author mentions as an aside that there may be other moral systems that would include terms like right/wrong, good/bad that do not rely on rights.) (pg78)
A natural right is one that accrues to s by virtue of s's being a human chooser, e.g. someone capable of choice. It is not dependent on having taken a particular voluntary action. Rights have special characteristics, and author lays them out as he sees them as follows:
A) Moral rights are different, but related to legal ones; to secure a legal right there must be the allowance for coercion and restraint in case such a right is at risk of being violated. Yet the justification for s's restraining another isn't because of a moral right that s has vs others, it is due to the principle of legal rights distribution (pg80)
B) S's Having 'a right to x' means that s has no duty to restrain from doing x. However, there is competition for limited resources that provides an interesting contrast. All may have a right to acquire x, but no corresponding duty to let the other have it. (pg80-1)
C) Is there a corresponding right for every duty? No. Author argues we have a duty to not abuse animals, but they do not have a right against us in that regard. (pg81) Just because someone stands to gain from the performance of our duties, that someone does not have a right to that performance. Author uses as another example the contract n signs with s to provide care to s's aging mother. N's duty is to s, not the aging mother; yet the mother stands to benefit from the performance of the duty. (pg81-2)
Author takes care to distinguish between Special rights and General rights. Special rights arise out of transactions between individuals, special relationships, or special situations. These are such things as i) promises, ii) s conferring the prerogative to protect s's rights to another, iii) 'mutuality of restrictions' such as in a political process (pg85-6). (It is during this portion where author discusses the possibility of having a legal duty to refrain from doing the morally right thing, or vice versa.) iv) natural relationships like parent/child, v) s confers special liberties to another (e.g. to read s's diary).
General rights, on the other hand, accrue to s because of there being no special right inhibiting s's actions and because s has a right to be free. (pg87-88) The last section of the article involves author claiming that there is a right to interfere, restrain or coerce s when s is trying to do the same (or injure) another.
2/5/10
Smith, Malcom - Does Humanity Share a Common Moral Faculty?
02/05/2010
Journal of Moral Philosophy Vol 7 (2010)
This paper seeks to establish the plausibility of the view that humanity shares a deep common moral reasoning faculty. The first observation is that philosophers often utilize moral intuitions about hypothetical examples to come up with consensus around a moral precept. Author argues that claiming this is moral knowledge also presumes there is moral truth, and that most thinkers want these settled intuitions to be relevant in creating a normative theory. (pg38) The differences in what ability or attribute constitutes this faculty (Reason, or Sentiment) is irrelevant to the discussion here: what author is trying to argue for is its reasonableness. One stop along the way is an illustration of the differences of distribution that theorists have. Some, the 'Platonic elitists' might hold the faculty to be only well-developed in the philosopher class. But author instead seeks to establish the reasonableness of 'commonalism', (pg44) the idea that 'nonphilosophers' moral beliefs are no less authoritative than philosopers' (pg41).
Commonalism is taken to be the idea that we all share a largely similar (metaphorical) mentalistic "black box" where non-moral facts can be fed into it and through some causal-inferential process a similar 'converging' moral conclusion will be output about what is appropriate. This is the convergence hypothesis. (The moral conclusion supervenes on the factual one.) (pg41-2) The objection is that we experience moral disagreement. Author tries to distinguish between so-called 'surface' disagreement and 'deep' disagreement. Of surface moral belief, author ties to explain them away as differences in the non-moral beliefs that go into the moral judgment. E.g. a racist believes (falsely) that one race is inherently inferior. Another influence for disagreement is bias: personal interest, race, gender, etc. Of deep belief, author makes sure to point out indeterminacy due to competition between two valid moral standards, like e.g. failing to keep a promise but helping someone in need. (pg44-5) Competition indeterminacy does not necessarily go against commonalism, since it reveals no profound difference between those who choose to keep the promise, or those who help the victim, author claims.
Author's major argument in favor of commonalism and the convergence hypothesis is that we fruitfully engage in moral discourse, and that we understand and engage with people across particular societies and cultures. (pg45-6) Probably the biggest possible blow to commonalism is the abortion debate, which author admits may be intractable at the deep level. However author argues that much of this may be competition indeterminacy, bias, and non-moral differences in belief. (pg47) He then defends the charge that he has an a priori answer for every objection (pg47-8). (However, there is a 'deep difficulty' with criticizing commonalism in favor of some sort of elitist model: how do you find moral judgments that are convergent yet simultaneously deny that the common-man has access to them? (pg50-1))
Author then considers the upshot of adopting commonalism: it will do away with moral nihilism and reduce the strength of moral relativism, since relativism is partially motivated by nihilism. (pg49) It also can be a backbone for natural rights theories, which many societies' laws reference. (pg52) It could also further moral understanding, since it may council patient attitudes toward moral disagreement. (pg53)
Journal of Moral Philosophy Vol 7 (2010)
This paper seeks to establish the plausibility of the view that humanity shares a deep common moral reasoning faculty. The first observation is that philosophers often utilize moral intuitions about hypothetical examples to come up with consensus around a moral precept. Author argues that claiming this is moral knowledge also presumes there is moral truth, and that most thinkers want these settled intuitions to be relevant in creating a normative theory. (pg38) The differences in what ability or attribute constitutes this faculty (Reason, or Sentiment) is irrelevant to the discussion here: what author is trying to argue for is its reasonableness. One stop along the way is an illustration of the differences of distribution that theorists have. Some, the 'Platonic elitists' might hold the faculty to be only well-developed in the philosopher class. But author instead seeks to establish the reasonableness of 'commonalism', (pg44) the idea that 'nonphilosophers' moral beliefs are no less authoritative than philosopers' (pg41).
Commonalism is taken to be the idea that we all share a largely similar (metaphorical) mentalistic "black box" where non-moral facts can be fed into it and through some causal-inferential process a similar 'converging' moral conclusion will be output about what is appropriate. This is the convergence hypothesis. (The moral conclusion supervenes on the factual one.) (pg41-2) The objection is that we experience moral disagreement. Author tries to distinguish between so-called 'surface' disagreement and 'deep' disagreement. Of surface moral belief, author ties to explain them away as differences in the non-moral beliefs that go into the moral judgment. E.g. a racist believes (falsely) that one race is inherently inferior. Another influence for disagreement is bias: personal interest, race, gender, etc. Of deep belief, author makes sure to point out indeterminacy due to competition between two valid moral standards, like e.g. failing to keep a promise but helping someone in need. (pg44-5) Competition indeterminacy does not necessarily go against commonalism, since it reveals no profound difference between those who choose to keep the promise, or those who help the victim, author claims.
Author's major argument in favor of commonalism and the convergence hypothesis is that we fruitfully engage in moral discourse, and that we understand and engage with people across particular societies and cultures. (pg45-6) Probably the biggest possible blow to commonalism is the abortion debate, which author admits may be intractable at the deep level. However author argues that much of this may be competition indeterminacy, bias, and non-moral differences in belief. (pg47) He then defends the charge that he has an a priori answer for every objection (pg47-8). (However, there is a 'deep difficulty' with criticizing commonalism in favor of some sort of elitist model: how do you find moral judgments that are convergent yet simultaneously deny that the common-man has access to them? (pg50-1))
Author then considers the upshot of adopting commonalism: it will do away with moral nihilism and reduce the strength of moral relativism, since relativism is partially motivated by nihilism. (pg49) It also can be a backbone for natural rights theories, which many societies' laws reference. (pg52) It could also further moral understanding, since it may council patient attitudes toward moral disagreement. (pg53)
1/29/10
Bandman, Bertram - A Friendly Critique of a Child's Right to an Open Future
01/29/2010
Philosophy of Education 2001, Suzanne Rice ed.
This article explores two different kinds of legal rights against the backdrop of the supreme court decision Wisconsin v Yoder, a case about a child's rights to modern education rather than an Amish one. Wisconsin v Yoder involves the case of Barbara, who is taken out of modern-day schools by her parents for 9th and 10th grade, where they intend she will attend an Amish agricultural and vocational school instead. The minority opinion led by Douglas would have enjoined this, arguing that a child denied the opportunity of a modern education would be denied the opportunity to become an engineer or doctor, to enter "into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today" (pg438). The majority was delivered by White, who downplayed the 2 years of schooling as relatively minor and evidently believed that the survival of the Amish sect trumped the child's rights to an open future. (CROF)
The article considers Joel Feinberg's position on this matter in his "A Child's Right To An Open Future" paper. Author believes that Feinberg has a poor conception of rights, which befuddles his idea of CROF. Author reviews Feinberg's idea of "rights-in-trust": "these are autonomy rights in escrow, which are saved for children when the reach adulthood." (pg439) The metaphor that Feinberg uses is of a trustee, protecting a child's rights but also safeguarding the child from herself in some cases. Author believes there is at least two more conceptions of 'rights-in-trust':
1) Rights-in-trust are autonomy rights that children will eventually exercise but can be violated in advance of becoming adults. Once violated, some options for the child will be closed off, but that is ok as long the child can still fulfill her future interests [with the options still available?]. (pg440)
2) Rights-in-trust are autonomy rights, but really they become the right 'to develop with freedom, care, nurture and enlightenment' (pg441). So instead of being a trustee, the parent would act as a guardian.
Author distinguishes between a trustee and a guardian in the amount of discretion that is allowed. Both act for the sake of the child, but a trustee is allowed much greater discretion and influence, while a guardian is limited to protecting the rights of the child without 'taking liberties' (pg441) Author believes that Feinberg is confused about which metaphor he wants to have, and this is part of the reason why he paradoxically sides with White against the child in Wisconsin v Yoder.
Author tries to explain what is going on here as a confusion between rights construed solely as proprietary, liberty interests (typically against outside interference) and a richer set of rights that involve a person's rational self-interests. The traditional concept of rights involves a sort-of property whereby any outside influence is unacceptable-- therefore someone with a right toward X is under no obligation to refrain to do X, even if X can be a bad thing for others. (pg441-2) Usually included in this concept is the caveat that if you do not exercise your rights, 'too bad for you'.(pg442) Author wants to show that this is a poor conception of rights for children, since children may lack the capacity or ability to exercise their rights (e.g. CROF). Author suggests an alternate way to look at (some) rights is as interest-based rather than will-based. The liberty-exercise conception is will-based. A nurture and care conception would be interest-based, justified if a person would (counterfactually) agree with a decision made for them if they had the proper knowledge or experience. This interest-based approach toward a child's rights-in-trust might not be the same as Feinberg's CROF, but instead a Child's Right to Develop (CRD).
Philosophy of Education 2001, Suzanne Rice ed.
This article explores two different kinds of legal rights against the backdrop of the supreme court decision Wisconsin v Yoder, a case about a child's rights to modern education rather than an Amish one. Wisconsin v Yoder involves the case of Barbara, who is taken out of modern-day schools by her parents for 9th and 10th grade, where they intend she will attend an Amish agricultural and vocational school instead. The minority opinion led by Douglas would have enjoined this, arguing that a child denied the opportunity of a modern education would be denied the opportunity to become an engineer or doctor, to enter "into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today" (pg438). The majority was delivered by White, who downplayed the 2 years of schooling as relatively minor and evidently believed that the survival of the Amish sect trumped the child's rights to an open future. (CROF)
The article considers Joel Feinberg's position on this matter in his "A Child's Right To An Open Future" paper. Author believes that Feinberg has a poor conception of rights, which befuddles his idea of CROF. Author reviews Feinberg's idea of "rights-in-trust": "these are autonomy rights in escrow, which are saved for children when the reach adulthood." (pg439) The metaphor that Feinberg uses is of a trustee, protecting a child's rights but also safeguarding the child from herself in some cases. Author believes there is at least two more conceptions of 'rights-in-trust':
1) Rights-in-trust are autonomy rights that children will eventually exercise but can be violated in advance of becoming adults. Once violated, some options for the child will be closed off, but that is ok as long the child can still fulfill her future interests [with the options still available?]. (pg440)
2) Rights-in-trust are autonomy rights, but really they become the right 'to develop with freedom, care, nurture and enlightenment' (pg441). So instead of being a trustee, the parent would act as a guardian.
Author distinguishes between a trustee and a guardian in the amount of discretion that is allowed. Both act for the sake of the child, but a trustee is allowed much greater discretion and influence, while a guardian is limited to protecting the rights of the child without 'taking liberties' (pg441) Author believes that Feinberg is confused about which metaphor he wants to have, and this is part of the reason why he paradoxically sides with White against the child in Wisconsin v Yoder.
Author tries to explain what is going on here as a confusion between rights construed solely as proprietary, liberty interests (typically against outside interference) and a richer set of rights that involve a person's rational self-interests. The traditional concept of rights involves a sort-of property whereby any outside influence is unacceptable-- therefore someone with a right toward X is under no obligation to refrain to do X, even if X can be a bad thing for others. (pg441-2) Usually included in this concept is the caveat that if you do not exercise your rights, 'too bad for you'.(pg442) Author wants to show that this is a poor conception of rights for children, since children may lack the capacity or ability to exercise their rights (e.g. CROF). Author suggests an alternate way to look at (some) rights is as interest-based rather than will-based. The liberty-exercise conception is will-based. A nurture and care conception would be interest-based, justified if a person would (counterfactually) agree with a decision made for them if they had the proper knowledge or experience. This interest-based approach toward a child's rights-in-trust might not be the same as Feinberg's CROF, but instead a Child's Right to Develop (CRD).
1/22/10
Hart, Herbert - Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority
01/22/2010
Essay 10, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford University Press 1984
In this essay originally published in 1973, author does a careful reading of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, in particular the principle that 'liberty can only be limited for the sake of liberty'. Author first outlines the fundamental parts of Rawls' argument:
The Main Idea: the principles of justice rely on rational actors being in a 'original position' behind a 'veil of ignorance', not knowing what roles they will take (or what kinds of people they will be) in the society they are agreeing to form the rules for. (pg224) From this, Rawls moves to the General Conception of justice, which is that all 'social values' will be distributed equally, unless distributing them unequally leads to everyone's advantage. Rawls' also had a special conception of justice which placed liberty as the primary social good. The special conception had the first principle:
"Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all" (pg225) This principle, Rawls argues, would be the considered outcome of rationally self-interested agents in the original position. This principle has priority over all other social values/goods.
Because liberty takes priority over all other social goods, Rawls argues that it can only be restricted for the sake of further liberty. The first problem author raises is the broadness of the term-- does it imply no such thing as private property (an obvious case of having far more liberties vs others')? (pg227) Author believes Rawls alters liberty to be liberties, a collection of them that includes private property, voting and legislative rights, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of conscience and thought, and freedom of person (pg229). Author believes that enumerating liberties has limited the scope of the liberty principle to those liberties (and possibly others-- the list is rough). Author argues this for two reasons:
1) Rawls avoids the dilemma of liberty and private property by using a distinction between liberty and the value-of-liberty. For things like personal property, the value of the liberty exercised doesn't have to be equal. It can be unequal. However, for other liberties like voting, the value of the liberty must be equal. So employing this distinction shows that Rawls is paying attention not just to vaguely defined liberty, but to specific liberties. (pg229)
2) Rawls seems willing to allow for privately owned means-of-production. Author thinks that this wouldn't comport with "the most extensive liberty" taken as a whole, and not as specific liberties. (pg230)
The bulk of the paper is devoted to understanding how to "limit liberty for the sake of liberty" (pg233). In the simple case, there can be rules of order in conducting a public debate-- where people's liberties to speak when they please is limited because of an interest in allowing people to be free from interruption (for a period of time). Even this uncontroversial case is misleading, author argues. What is being secured by rules of order is not greater liberty, but something more valuable or 'profitable', namely the right to take time to formulate a complete thought without interruption.
The trouble here is that Rawls wants to keep liberty as the priority and that restrictions on it that aren't related to furthering liberties need scrutiny or to somehow show a relation to greater liberty. But author argues that this isn't possible in many cases (pg234-8). Author argues the problem becomes greater when an elected representative must consider how to adjudicate between liberty trade-offs, and must consider it from the standpoint of 'the representative equal citizen' (pg235). Author argues that different people are going to give differing weights to liberties, therefore making the 'common good' argument inaccessible as a decision procedure where only liberties are being weighed. (pg236) Author claims it is easy to see how there can be a conflict of liberties given particular temperaments and that justice might then become indeterminate, if liberty can only be traded-off against other liberty. (It certainly might become determinate if you could use other factors-- author's main contention).
On the other side, often liberty is restricted because of other social values or benefits that accrue because of it, and that are unrelated to liberty, at least directly. For instance liberty is often restricted to prevent harm or suffering. Author argues that to claim that harm done to x is a restriction of x's liberty seems to be a stretch. (pg239) It might be possible to claim that 'natural duties' between persons would fill-in where the argument from the special conception of justice does not, but author thinks this will not do because it is too weak. (pg240) The general case the author makes is that a decision procedure based solely on liberty trade-offs (and maybe natural duties) will not be robust enough to settle a variety of cases from the original position. "...it confers on individuals the advantage of that liberty, but secondly it exposes them to whatever disadvantages the practices of that liberty by others man entail for them" (pg241-3)
The final part of the paper involves a critique of the reasons offered for the special conception of justice, whose first principle is that liberty can only be traded-off for other liberty. Author claims that Rawls' reasons are as follows: Once a society reaches a certain level of material or economic prosperity, its members will become less motivated by further material attainment and liberty will become the most prized. Author questions this, asking why people would want to put a restriction on trading their liberties for other benefits because, at some later point, they'll want those liberties back. (pg244-5)
Essay 10, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford University Press 1984
In this essay originally published in 1973, author does a careful reading of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, in particular the principle that 'liberty can only be limited for the sake of liberty'. Author first outlines the fundamental parts of Rawls' argument:
The Main Idea: the principles of justice rely on rational actors being in a 'original position' behind a 'veil of ignorance', not knowing what roles they will take (or what kinds of people they will be) in the society they are agreeing to form the rules for. (pg224) From this, Rawls moves to the General Conception of justice, which is that all 'social values' will be distributed equally, unless distributing them unequally leads to everyone's advantage. Rawls' also had a special conception of justice which placed liberty as the primary social good. The special conception had the first principle:
"Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all" (pg225) This principle, Rawls argues, would be the considered outcome of rationally self-interested agents in the original position. This principle has priority over all other social values/goods.
Because liberty takes priority over all other social goods, Rawls argues that it can only be restricted for the sake of further liberty. The first problem author raises is the broadness of the term-- does it imply no such thing as private property (an obvious case of having far more liberties vs others')? (pg227) Author believes Rawls alters liberty to be liberties, a collection of them that includes private property, voting and legislative rights, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of conscience and thought, and freedom of person (pg229). Author believes that enumerating liberties has limited the scope of the liberty principle to those liberties (and possibly others-- the list is rough). Author argues this for two reasons:
1) Rawls avoids the dilemma of liberty and private property by using a distinction between liberty and the value-of-liberty. For things like personal property, the value of the liberty exercised doesn't have to be equal. It can be unequal. However, for other liberties like voting, the value of the liberty must be equal. So employing this distinction shows that Rawls is paying attention not just to vaguely defined liberty, but to specific liberties. (pg229)
2) Rawls seems willing to allow for privately owned means-of-production. Author thinks that this wouldn't comport with "the most extensive liberty" taken as a whole, and not as specific liberties. (pg230)
The bulk of the paper is devoted to understanding how to "limit liberty for the sake of liberty" (pg233). In the simple case, there can be rules of order in conducting a public debate-- where people's liberties to speak when they please is limited because of an interest in allowing people to be free from interruption (for a period of time). Even this uncontroversial case is misleading, author argues. What is being secured by rules of order is not greater liberty, but something more valuable or 'profitable', namely the right to take time to formulate a complete thought without interruption.
The trouble here is that Rawls wants to keep liberty as the priority and that restrictions on it that aren't related to furthering liberties need scrutiny or to somehow show a relation to greater liberty. But author argues that this isn't possible in many cases (pg234-8). Author argues the problem becomes greater when an elected representative must consider how to adjudicate between liberty trade-offs, and must consider it from the standpoint of 'the representative equal citizen' (pg235). Author argues that different people are going to give differing weights to liberties, therefore making the 'common good' argument inaccessible as a decision procedure where only liberties are being weighed. (pg236) Author claims it is easy to see how there can be a conflict of liberties given particular temperaments and that justice might then become indeterminate, if liberty can only be traded-off against other liberty. (It certainly might become determinate if you could use other factors-- author's main contention).
On the other side, often liberty is restricted because of other social values or benefits that accrue because of it, and that are unrelated to liberty, at least directly. For instance liberty is often restricted to prevent harm or suffering. Author argues that to claim that harm done to x is a restriction of x's liberty seems to be a stretch. (pg239) It might be possible to claim that 'natural duties' between persons would fill-in where the argument from the special conception of justice does not, but author thinks this will not do because it is too weak. (pg240) The general case the author makes is that a decision procedure based solely on liberty trade-offs (and maybe natural duties) will not be robust enough to settle a variety of cases from the original position. "...it confers on individuals the advantage of that liberty, but secondly it exposes them to whatever disadvantages the practices of that liberty by others man entail for them" (pg241-3)
The final part of the paper involves a critique of the reasons offered for the special conception of justice, whose first principle is that liberty can only be traded-off for other liberty. Author claims that Rawls' reasons are as follows: Once a society reaches a certain level of material or economic prosperity, its members will become less motivated by further material attainment and liberty will become the most prized. Author questions this, asking why people would want to put a restriction on trading their liberties for other benefits because, at some later point, they'll want those liberties back. (pg244-5)
12/18/09
Dworkin, Ronald - Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers' Brief
12/18/2009
The New York Review of Books, Vol 44, No 5 March 27, 1997
This is a brief filed by 6 philosophers (Dworkin, Nagel, Nozick, Rawls, Scanlon, Thomson) with the US Supreme Court in support of assisted suicide, as there were two cases before the court relating to it. Dworkin wrote an introduction and in Slate Magazine there followed an exchange of letters between Michael McConnell and Dworkin, McConnell criticizing the brief's reliance on 'judicial rhetoric' and defending a reading of the due-process clause of the 14th amendment that rights are granted by the nation's 'tradition and experience' of granting them. Since the only one state has very recently allowed assisted suicide, there is no tradition and experience of granting this right therefore it is improper for the Court to grant it. Dworkin's reply is that this is a particular interpretation of the 14th amendment and isn't the only one used by the Court and certainly isn't the only defensible one.
The brief filed by the philosophers is introduced and summarized by author. Author takes the time to lay out the context of the debate: that there are two main 'slippery slopes' that the Court is worried about (or at least was worried about on oral argument): the theoretical and the practical.
The Theoretical slippery-slope says that there is no principled place to 'draw the line' about which assisted suicides are permissible and which are not. The Philosophers' response to this is to suggests a difference between firm, considered, deep convictions about life's value and impulsive decisions perhaps made out of emotional depression where the state has reason to believe that the person would be grateful later if they were prevented from dying.
The Practical slippery-slope says that if assisted-suicide were legal, states would no doubt try to regulate it; but there would be a mix of successes and failures, and the vulnerable patients, the poor or the less-cared-for, would die as an outcome of poor systematic protections. Author answers this first by suggesting that the wealthy already enjoy an informal version of this right. Author secondly suggests that this slippery-slope argument applies across the board, even with pain-management already. Building on this, if assisted suicide was legal, it would be likely legislated that all palliative measures would be legislated to be employed prior to the suicide, thereby possibly raising the level of care for the poor and needy.
Author proposes that there are three methods that the Court could use to rule against the lower courts (in favor of the right of assisted suicide) in this decision. The first would be to deny a liberty interest in assisted suicide. The second would be to grant a liberty interest in assisted suicide but claim that states can override this interest in toto. This seems to be 'a conundrum'. The final method would be postponement, which author favors as the least damaging way to reject lower courts' decisions.
The Philosophers' brief first claims that in a free society individuals have a right to determine, for themselves, their values about 'the most intimate and personal choices... central to a person's dignity and autonomy' (Casey). And offer deeply held beliefs about one's own death as falling under this category. Of particular interest is the discussion about the potential distinction between "letting die" and "killing", and a possible "common-sense" distinction between acts and omissions. The brief claims this is an error. Anything that causes death contrary to a patient's wishes, whether it is an act or an omission, is wrong for the same reason. The important interest here is the patient's wishes, and from a patient's perspective there is no difference what the doctor does if it is in line with her own wishes. From the doctor's perspective, there seems to be no difference either between less, more (or no) care if the death (or life) of the patient is what the doctor is aiming at. The final argument of the brief is that state interests are not high enough to categorically prohibit assisted suicide. The body of this argument involves responding to the Solicitor-General's arguments against assisted suicide.
The New York Review of Books, Vol 44, No 5 March 27, 1997
This is a brief filed by 6 philosophers (Dworkin, Nagel, Nozick, Rawls, Scanlon, Thomson) with the US Supreme Court in support of assisted suicide, as there were two cases before the court relating to it. Dworkin wrote an introduction and in Slate Magazine there followed an exchange of letters between Michael McConnell and Dworkin, McConnell criticizing the brief's reliance on 'judicial rhetoric' and defending a reading of the due-process clause of the 14th amendment that rights are granted by the nation's 'tradition and experience' of granting them. Since the only one state has very recently allowed assisted suicide, there is no tradition and experience of granting this right therefore it is improper for the Court to grant it. Dworkin's reply is that this is a particular interpretation of the 14th amendment and isn't the only one used by the Court and certainly isn't the only defensible one.
The brief filed by the philosophers is introduced and summarized by author. Author takes the time to lay out the context of the debate: that there are two main 'slippery slopes' that the Court is worried about (or at least was worried about on oral argument): the theoretical and the practical.
The Theoretical slippery-slope says that there is no principled place to 'draw the line' about which assisted suicides are permissible and which are not. The Philosophers' response to this is to suggests a difference between firm, considered, deep convictions about life's value and impulsive decisions perhaps made out of emotional depression where the state has reason to believe that the person would be grateful later if they were prevented from dying.
The Practical slippery-slope says that if assisted-suicide were legal, states would no doubt try to regulate it; but there would be a mix of successes and failures, and the vulnerable patients, the poor or the less-cared-for, would die as an outcome of poor systematic protections. Author answers this first by suggesting that the wealthy already enjoy an informal version of this right. Author secondly suggests that this slippery-slope argument applies across the board, even with pain-management already. Building on this, if assisted suicide was legal, it would be likely legislated that all palliative measures would be legislated to be employed prior to the suicide, thereby possibly raising the level of care for the poor and needy.
Author proposes that there are three methods that the Court could use to rule against the lower courts (in favor of the right of assisted suicide) in this decision. The first would be to deny a liberty interest in assisted suicide. The second would be to grant a liberty interest in assisted suicide but claim that states can override this interest in toto. This seems to be 'a conundrum'. The final method would be postponement, which author favors as the least damaging way to reject lower courts' decisions.
The Philosophers' brief first claims that in a free society individuals have a right to determine, for themselves, their values about 'the most intimate and personal choices... central to a person's dignity and autonomy' (Casey). And offer deeply held beliefs about one's own death as falling under this category. Of particular interest is the discussion about the potential distinction between "letting die" and "killing", and a possible "common-sense" distinction between acts and omissions. The brief claims this is an error. Anything that causes death contrary to a patient's wishes, whether it is an act or an omission, is wrong for the same reason. The important interest here is the patient's wishes, and from a patient's perspective there is no difference what the doctor does if it is in line with her own wishes. From the doctor's perspective, there seems to be no difference either between less, more (or no) care if the death (or life) of the patient is what the doctor is aiming at. The final argument of the brief is that state interests are not high enough to categorically prohibit assisted suicide. The body of this argument involves responding to the Solicitor-General's arguments against assisted suicide.
12/11/09
Dworkin, Ronald - Sex, Death, and the Courts
12/11/2009
Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, 2000, Ch 14
This is a chapter reviewing two strands of judicial interpretation of the rights enumerated in the US Constitution (and its amendments). The two topics that are used to reveal the tension between these interpretations are homosexuality and the right-to-die. Author argues that the 14th amendment is the 'most abstract source of these rights' (pg454), that is, rights not enumerated in the other amendments. Author frames these two issues as members of a larger set, that of an individual's right against the judgment of the majority about what is, by and large, an individual decision.
The 14th amendment offers two abstract and broad principles: that the state may not deprive a citizen of liberty with "due process of law" and that the state may not deny anyone "equal protection of the laws". This abstract language has both too broad and too narrow interpretations, yet the ones favored by judges seem to be two: 'historical' and 'integral'. The 'historical' interpretation is that individuals are protected with due process and equal protection on a limited number of rights that the American people historically and overwhelming have considered to be their rights. Author identifies Justice Byron White in the Bowers v Hardwick decision as a principal proponent of this interpretation. (pg454) The other interpretation, which the author calls the interpretation of 'integrity', is that the principles behind the enumerated (and common law) rights may, in some cases, rationally and logically suggest other rights that have not necessarily been considered rights previously. (pg455) Author sites Justice John Harlan as such an interpreter in a 1961 dissent of Poe v Ullman.
With these two interpretations in mind, author goes through supreme court decisions first about homosexuality in Colorado. Colorado amended its constitution to restrict any favorable discriminatory treatment to homosexuals, overturning some statutes instituted by some of the state's cities. The case of Evans v Romer was a challenge of the constitutionality of that amendment.
Using the 14th amendment's 'due process' clause, the strategy would go as follows: 1) show the law compromises a 'liberty interest'-- a constitutionally protected right, and if so, 2) show the law does not have enough legitimate state interest to pass a balancing test. (pg457)
Using the 'equal protection' clause, the strategy would be: 1) show that the law requires more than 'relaxed scrutiny', (rational basis) but instead 'strict' or 'heightened' scrutiny because it reduces the ability of a certain group to participate in the political process-- it systematically disadvantages a class. (pg58-9) This is commonly used in the case of 'suspect' classes like blacks due to this country's history of discrimination. (459-60) The strategy would be to claim that simple 'the prejudice and contempt' of a majority is sufficient to warrant 'strict' scrutiny of legislation that will affect them. (pg460-1)
When the case got to the supreme court, a separate amici curiae (friends of the court) brief was written in opposition to the law, which neglected the previous judicial frameworks: it argued instead that the law stops a class from being a class, which is a violation of equal protection. The actual supreme court decision, 6-3, was 'surprisingly bold' (pg463) because it said that the law did not even pass 'relaxed scrutiny' because it was based on nothing more "except animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests" (pg464). Author considered this a victory for the 'integrity' interpretation.
The second topic considered is the right-to-die and assisted-suicide cases. Here, a supreme court decision of 9-0 against supporting such a right might seem like a resounding victory for the historicist approach, and the majority opinion of the court seemed like a straightforward historicisit reading-- inconsistent on principle, but in-line with history. What was interesting about the case was that the majority decision didn't represent 9 justices-- only 5. The others wrote their own opinions, and many of them revealed an 'integral' interpretation, but nevertheless held with the majority in this case. Author examines the different opinions and concludes that it isn't a knock-down victory for the historicist interpretation.
Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, 2000, Ch 14
This is a chapter reviewing two strands of judicial interpretation of the rights enumerated in the US Constitution (and its amendments). The two topics that are used to reveal the tension between these interpretations are homosexuality and the right-to-die. Author argues that the 14th amendment is the 'most abstract source of these rights' (pg454), that is, rights not enumerated in the other amendments. Author frames these two issues as members of a larger set, that of an individual's right against the judgment of the majority about what is, by and large, an individual decision.
The 14th amendment offers two abstract and broad principles: that the state may not deprive a citizen of liberty with "due process of law" and that the state may not deny anyone "equal protection of the laws". This abstract language has both too broad and too narrow interpretations, yet the ones favored by judges seem to be two: 'historical' and 'integral'. The 'historical' interpretation is that individuals are protected with due process and equal protection on a limited number of rights that the American people historically and overwhelming have considered to be their rights. Author identifies Justice Byron White in the Bowers v Hardwick decision as a principal proponent of this interpretation. (pg454) The other interpretation, which the author calls the interpretation of 'integrity', is that the principles behind the enumerated (and common law) rights may, in some cases, rationally and logically suggest other rights that have not necessarily been considered rights previously. (pg455) Author sites Justice John Harlan as such an interpreter in a 1961 dissent of Poe v Ullman.
With these two interpretations in mind, author goes through supreme court decisions first about homosexuality in Colorado. Colorado amended its constitution to restrict any favorable discriminatory treatment to homosexuals, overturning some statutes instituted by some of the state's cities. The case of Evans v Romer was a challenge of the constitutionality of that amendment.
Using the 14th amendment's 'due process' clause, the strategy would go as follows: 1) show the law compromises a 'liberty interest'-- a constitutionally protected right, and if so, 2) show the law does not have enough legitimate state interest to pass a balancing test. (pg457)
Using the 'equal protection' clause, the strategy would be: 1) show that the law requires more than 'relaxed scrutiny', (rational basis) but instead 'strict' or 'heightened' scrutiny because it reduces the ability of a certain group to participate in the political process-- it systematically disadvantages a class. (pg58-9) This is commonly used in the case of 'suspect' classes like blacks due to this country's history of discrimination. (459-60) The strategy would be to claim that simple 'the prejudice and contempt' of a majority is sufficient to warrant 'strict' scrutiny of legislation that will affect them. (pg460-1)
When the case got to the supreme court, a separate amici curiae (friends of the court) brief was written in opposition to the law, which neglected the previous judicial frameworks: it argued instead that the law stops a class from being a class, which is a violation of equal protection. The actual supreme court decision, 6-3, was 'surprisingly bold' (pg463) because it said that the law did not even pass 'relaxed scrutiny' because it was based on nothing more "except animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests" (pg464). Author considered this a victory for the 'integrity' interpretation.
The second topic considered is the right-to-die and assisted-suicide cases. Here, a supreme court decision of 9-0 against supporting such a right might seem like a resounding victory for the historicist approach, and the majority opinion of the court seemed like a straightforward historicisit reading-- inconsistent on principle, but in-line with history. What was interesting about the case was that the majority decision didn't represent 9 justices-- only 5. The others wrote their own opinions, and many of them revealed an 'integral' interpretation, but nevertheless held with the majority in this case. Author examines the different opinions and concludes that it isn't a knock-down victory for the historicist interpretation.
11/20/09
Sommers, Fred - Dissonant Beliefs
11/20/2009
Analysis, Vol 69 No 2 April 2009
This article attempts to change the conception of a belief as a propositional attitude. 'Propositionalists', as author calls them, believe that believing is primarily a relation between a believer and a proposition. Author also considers Fodor a propositionalist even though he gives a three-part relation, a believer, a sentential expression, and a proposition. Author's proposal is different: believing is a relation between a believer and the world. This view author dubs the 'mondialist' view, and believes it can account for so-called 'dissonant beliefs', which are beliefs where a person seems to believe a contradiction (or an inconsistency, since 'contradiction' may imply propositions)
Author lays out the standard two kinds of belief: de re and de dicto. He wants to add a third: de mundo, which takes the world to be 'xish'. Here is how the progression might work:
-Formation of a de re belief about the ringing of a smoke alarm
-Formation of a de mundo belief: the world is smoke-alarm-ish
-Possible, but not necessary or automatic: de dicto belief: 'There is a smoke alarm ringing'.
The separation between the first two and the third gives space for non-human animals to have beliefs, de re and de mundo, but not de dicto. (pg270)
In order to make this work, 'the world' needs a bit of a specialized understanding. Author gives it: 'the world is characterized by what is and is not in it.' (pg268-9) So, our world is 'elk-ish' and not 'elf-ish' since there are elks in the world but not elves. The second understanding is that there is a context that constrains mondial beliefs-- a 'Domain under Consideration' (DC). We use this when we say things like "it's raining". It isn't raining in the whole world-- just in our DC-- in our DC the world is rain-ish.
Author believes that mundial beliefs are more primitive than propositional belief-- he loosely translates mundial beliefs as 'being aware of something'. (pg270) The two advantages of having them is that they are good fits for non-human animal beliefs and also that they can account for 'dissonant beliefs'.
Author takes dissonant beliefs to be commonplace in our world. For the well-educated, dissonant beliefs come when we believe a proposition (de dicto) like E=mc2 but have no idea what the world is like because of it, or what it would be like if it weren't true. Author thinks it is rational to keep your mundial and your de dicto beliefs in line, but it may be very difficult given the amount of arcane scientific knowledge we are exposed to. (pg272) But a more mundane example is where someone who doesn't believe in the afterlife still feels as though her dead relative is checking in on her. Here a mundial belief of 'the world is father-ish' is inconsistent with the propositional belief 'my father is dead and gone'. (pg271)
Lastly, author advocates that treating beliefs as primarily non-propositional will allow for uncomplex analyses of difficult examples. The one he uses is of a man who sees a reflection through a window of a man with his pants on fire. He believes de dicto 'there is a man with his pants on fire', but does he believe this man is himself? Propositionalists, author claim, need to do cart in the concept of a 'presenting sentence' ('my pants' or 'somebody's pants'). Author simply says that the man can have two different mundial beliefs: 'the world is my-pants-on-fire-ish' or 'the world is somebody's-pants-on-fire-ish'.
Analysis, Vol 69 No 2 April 2009
This article attempts to change the conception of a belief as a propositional attitude. 'Propositionalists', as author calls them, believe that believing is primarily a relation between a believer and a proposition. Author also considers Fodor a propositionalist even though he gives a three-part relation, a believer, a sentential expression, and a proposition. Author's proposal is different: believing is a relation between a believer and the world. This view author dubs the 'mondialist' view, and believes it can account for so-called 'dissonant beliefs', which are beliefs where a person seems to believe a contradiction (or an inconsistency, since 'contradiction' may imply propositions)
Author lays out the standard two kinds of belief: de re and de dicto. He wants to add a third: de mundo, which takes the world to be 'xish'. Here is how the progression might work:
-Formation of a de re belief about the ringing of a smoke alarm
-Formation of a de mundo belief: the world is smoke-alarm-ish
-Possible, but not necessary or automatic: de dicto belief: 'There is a smoke alarm ringing'.
The separation between the first two and the third gives space for non-human animals to have beliefs, de re and de mundo, but not de dicto. (pg270)
In order to make this work, 'the world' needs a bit of a specialized understanding. Author gives it: 'the world is characterized by what is and is not in it.' (pg268-9) So, our world is 'elk-ish' and not 'elf-ish' since there are elks in the world but not elves. The second understanding is that there is a context that constrains mondial beliefs-- a 'Domain under Consideration' (DC). We use this when we say things like "it's raining". It isn't raining in the whole world-- just in our DC-- in our DC the world is rain-ish.
Author believes that mundial beliefs are more primitive than propositional belief-- he loosely translates mundial beliefs as 'being aware of something'. (pg270) The two advantages of having them is that they are good fits for non-human animal beliefs and also that they can account for 'dissonant beliefs'.
Author takes dissonant beliefs to be commonplace in our world. For the well-educated, dissonant beliefs come when we believe a proposition (de dicto) like E=mc2 but have no idea what the world is like because of it, or what it would be like if it weren't true. Author thinks it is rational to keep your mundial and your de dicto beliefs in line, but it may be very difficult given the amount of arcane scientific knowledge we are exposed to. (pg272) But a more mundane example is where someone who doesn't believe in the afterlife still feels as though her dead relative is checking in on her. Here a mundial belief of 'the world is father-ish' is inconsistent with the propositional belief 'my father is dead and gone'. (pg271)
Lastly, author advocates that treating beliefs as primarily non-propositional will allow for uncomplex analyses of difficult examples. The one he uses is of a man who sees a reflection through a window of a man with his pants on fire. He believes de dicto 'there is a man with his pants on fire', but does he believe this man is himself? Propositionalists, author claim, need to do cart in the concept of a 'presenting sentence' ('my pants' or 'somebody's pants'). Author simply says that the man can have two different mundial beliefs: 'the world is my-pants-on-fire-ish' or 'the world is somebody's-pants-on-fire-ish'.
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