Sussman, David - For Badness' Sake

06/25/2010

The Journal of Philosophy, November 2009

This clearly written article takes on an old problem in philosophy: the trouble with perversity and human will. Author starts with a discussion of Kant's conception that it wasn't possible for a human to have a wicked will, that is, something that has a 'clear-eyed opposition' to moral law. Yet this is countered by St Augustine, who claims to have stolen pears from a tree for no sake other than the sake of being wicked, that is, not for profit, vengeance, or other reasons. The real trouble here is metaphysical-- human subjects take their actions to be intentional in that they aim at what they consider to be a 'good', not a 'bad'. (pg614) (Yet it is important to remember that "the good" is widely viewed to be different according to different perspectives.) This is considered by the author to be the 'Classical View', which considers intentional action essentially rational, a joining of beliefs and desires.

Author makes a case of perverse actions as an actual category of action, not just a case that can be finessed by the Classical View. (pg616-7) The thought here is that pure malice, spite, callousness and so on are intelligible to us, yet given the Classical View they should be more foreign than they are. But they are not, they are not insane actions but sensible-- but not according to the Classical View. Author's thesis is this: the Classical View must be reformed to be true broadly speaking but not necessarily true of any one particular action. (617-8)

Author review the Davidsonian conception of intentional actions, that they are a special joining of Beliefs and Desires such that there is a a rational connection between the desire and the set of beliefs that enable its fulfillment. (pg618) The problem for Davidson is that there can be a causal relationship that has all the right beliefs and desires but somehow fail to be intentional action. Take the case of the climber who, unnerved by the thought of releasing himself of his companion, releases his companion, though he does so unintentionally.

Author tries to mend this by suggesting that what is missing is an overall goal, a kind of guidance according to a concern. This overall guidance toward a final destination is considered invaluable when entering into the feedback loop of making actions in the world and adjusting to the effects such actions produce-- the guidance is required to make adjustments in the belief and desire framework that underwrites the overall end. Interestingly, author suggests we have immediate true knowledge about our intentions since they are action-oriented rather than introspective knowledge (pg619). "The distinctively intentional character of an action depends on the way its performance is informed by a sensitivity to the world construed in terms of some distinctive array of resources and dangers, relative to which our action may be done in a better or worse manner." (pg620) Author also considers this requirement one that allows the actor to consider herself as accomplishing the 'same thing' even as her route to it changes according to changing circumstances.

The addition to intentional action author offers is that it must have a 'point' or 'guiding concern' that 'orients' the actor in an 'open-ended way'. Author then reviews the case for perverse action, taking on (in opposition) Joseph Raz's attempts to subsume perversity under the standard CV. Raz offers a high bar for cases of genuine perversity: the actor must justify it without any reference to evaluative judgments. (Interpreting all evaluative judgments as aiming toward a 'good' rather than a 'bad'.) Author denies this high bar, instead suggesting that it is possible to take a 'rich-textured', 'structured' approach to a perverse activity like eating excrement. (pg624) Notice however that this is under the author's newly reformed CV, which includes an overall concern or goal that reacts to changing environmental conditions to effectively complete the project of excrement eating. (pg623-4)

The requirement of overall concerns or basic pointedness in one intentional action can, presumably, accommodate cases of genuine perversity. However, author argues that once such values become the standard norm for an actor, it seems the actor has subsumed perversity for her own particular understanding of the 'good'. (pg626) The trouble for the perverse here is one of justification-- the lack of justification that can be provided in a social, or linguistic context. Author scaffolds a claim that the pointedness or guidance in intentional action should be 'two-dimensional', that is, have the responsiveness both to physical challenges but also to social challenges (for justification, assistance, etc) as well. The perverse cannot justify their concerns socially, in that their actions cannot be well-formulated into a 'long-term resolve'. And if it lacks justification, then the actor who wants to be perverse as a general norm will soon lose sight of her own goals. (pg627). This fatal flaw to perversity as a general principle upholds the reformed Classical View, though it admits to singularities.