Donagan, Alan - Spinoza's Dualism

05/14/2010

Ch 7 of The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan Vol 1 Historical Understanding and the History of Philosophy, University of Chicago Press

This paper is an attempt to show that, although Spinoza was an avowed monist, many of his positions seemed to embrace much of the dualist belief system and seem at odds with what a fully endorsed monist position might be. Author compares this odd stance with the one of Descartes relative to heliocentrism-- though Descartes avowed to be a geocentrist, many of his other positions would give fellow geocentrists little comfort and were compatible with heliocentrism.

Author believes that 'Spinoza accepted numerous positions that are distinctively dualist' (pg117). The first departure requires some explanation. The standard model for attributes and substance is that a substance has one distinct attribute, and that attribute defines its essence (pg117-8). This is inherited entirely from Descartes (the dualist). And yet Spinoza places two (at least) attributes into the God/Nature, both the attributes of extension and thought. This puzzling move seems to suggest that a substance with two attributes would have two essences. (Yet because a substance with 3 essences would be more complete than one with 2, we know that God's substance must encompass all attributes, all essences pg120). Author claims this is not in fundamental conflict with a dualist like Descartes (pg121-2), especially because it claims (with Descartes) that the two attributes are irreducible to each other.

Author takes an explanatory detour into Spinoza's dual-track attribute theory, where everything extended (in the physical world) has a corresponding mental idea or cognition. E.g. a rock tumbling down a hill also has a corresponding mental aspect. (pg123-5) This is germane because it shows the irreducibility of the one attribute into the other; indeed it seems to reinforce their complete unconnected independence.

Author argues that Spinoza could only reconcile his dualist positions with his explicit monism through the awkward (novel?) adoption of the idea that: two distinct attributes may be found together in the same substance. This awkwardness overturns much of his previous work that generally expressed the theory of one attribute=one essence=one substance.