Donagan, Alan - Presuppositions and Principles

08/06/2010

The Theory of Morality Ch 2, University of Chicago Press 1979

This chapter promises to lay bare the presuppositions of Judeo-Christian conceptions of the world and of human agency. Author starts with discounting exotic thought-experiment contrasts, e.g. how would human morality work in a world with very different metaphysics, or if humans had different powers (like mind-reading) (pg32,36). What can be gained from comparison is to reveal our own presuppositions that are so fundamental that we hardly recognize them as open to variation. For this, author looks at the Hindu conception of human existence and agency. According to author:

-Hindus do not have much (if anything) for general (that is, extra-caste) obligations. E.g. a Hindu is obliged to obey the precepts her caste puts forward for her, but not the precepts of any other caste, and not much else other than what is her duty as given by her caste. (pg33) In other words, there is no general obligation to each other as humans or as bearers of rights.
-Hindus believe that human essence is a soul that is reincarnated from previous lives and has accumulated good- or bad-fortune, or 'karma'. Bad karma can only be reduced by undergoing suffering or purifying your soul through particular actions. With this conception, there doesn't appear to be any unnecessary suffering-- just the appearance of such. (pg34) And as such, there is no prescription to reduce the suffering of another unless required to do so by the duties set forth in one's caste's prescriptions or 'dharma'.

Author then formulates two principles of the Judeo-Christian tradition that stand in contrast to the Hindu tradition:
(1) Man, considered as amoral agent, is a rational animal.
(2) The world man inhabits is a system of nature, in which events occur according to morally neutral laws.

These two metaphysical concepts underpin the moral agency of humans and humans alone. (pg35) That is, the 'world' doesn't conspire to punish us or to reward us-- the natural laws (and therefore natural events that are un-mixed with agency) are morally neutral.

The next section (2.2) is a prolonged discussion of event-causation and lays out a basic theory of human action. The first distinction author makes is between human actions considered objectively, and those considered subjectively. Objectivity considers the deeds done and assigns permissibility, subjectivity considers the doings of the agents and assigns culpability (pg37). Author talks about the theory of action from (mostly) the objective perspective. Here is a rough summary:
-Events cause other events in the world.
-Events can fall under different kinds of description. (Event-Descriptions and Action-Descriptions) (pg38-41)
-Events are caused by either other events or agents. (Actions are only caused by agents)
-Events cannot cause agent-actions.
On this last principle author spends much time. The jumping off point is the discussion of a new action intervening, or 'novus actus interveniens' (pg42-44). Consider the case of the careless cigarette that might or might not ignite a forest fire. Once a second agent pours gasoline onto the ash, the original smoker's actions do not 'reach through' the chain of events leading to a forest fire. (pg42) This is the case even though you can construct a reasonable 'but for' sentence that includes the first agent: 'but for her throwing the cigarette on the bracken, the forest fire wouldn't have occurred' might be true, but because there was the informed, free and deliberate intervention of a second agent pouring gasoline on the fire, the first agent's causal chain is broken there. (pg44)

Even with these basic principles there is a bifurcation in the approaches to their defense. For it must be admitted that humans are part of the natural world, they are animals, even if rational ones, and that the attempt to separate them from the rest of the world by giving only them autonomous action is problematic. One response is to admit humans are part of the natural world but still assign moral blame even though there is no ontological/metaphysical responsibility through the chain of events. (pg44) The second response seems to be the author's preference: there is a difference between the events caused by humans and the events caused by the natural world. This is Aristotle's distinction between "event-causation" and "action-causation" (pg45). [Is this question-begging?]

The next discussion regarding this distinction relates to the unwitting accomplice(s), for instance a cook who unwittingly serves food previously poisoned by an assassin. Here the cook took an action, but author analyzes this as the cook being the unwitting agent of the assassin. "He does not cease to be the doer of what he does; but because he acts as the agent of the other, that other is also held to be an agent in his action, and the principal agent" (pg47)

Author then spends some time responding to an objection to the concept of autonomous agent/action-causation, leveled by Feinberg and augmented by Bennett. In effect, they wish to object to novus actus interveniens; in the Feinberg case, an agent announces widely his conditional intentions: 'stop or I'll shoot', and when another conducts the antecedent, the promised consequent commences. Feinberg wants to pump intuitions to see the second agent as causing the first agent. (pg49) Bennett formulates a notion of agent action for causing consequences by trying to restrict how one describes 'causal consequences in action descriptions' (pg49), claiming three guidelines for understanding the effects of agency:
i) the more confident the agent was that the consequence would ensue
ii) the more certain or inevitable it was that the consequence would ensue
iii) the higher the degree of immediacy there was between the action and its consequence
Author responds to this with an argument to absurdity: if threatened with either death or committing some abhorrent act, by refusing to commit the abhorrent act, you could be the cause of your own suicide. (pg49-50) Author sees this as conflating the term 'consequences' with the concept of causation-- consequences are sometimes used to indicate alternate states of affairs that aren't causally related but are nevertheless consequents. (pg51-2)

Author moves on to the principle underpinning Judeo-Christian morality, but first discusses the form it will take-- it will rely on there being principles of practical reason that are unconditionally inviolable. (pg53) Author defines a "precept" as "any universal proposition of common morality with respect to the permissibility of any kind of human action considered objectively." (pg54) As such, precepts of common morality specify either: (1) what kind of action is morally permissible, (2) what kind of action is morally impermissible, (3) what kind of action is permissible and obligatory given the appropriate circumstance. (pg54) Author then takes care to make a distinction between 'first-order' moral questions and 'second-order' ones, since much of the Judeo-Christian tradition has to do with the spirit with which actions are performed, the intentions and will of the agent. Since author is more concerned now with the permissibility of the deed (to be) done, objectively considered, that is 'first-order'; the culpability of the agent is considered 'second-order'. (pg55) This is much like author's earlier discussion of agent causation and agent responsibility. Author also briefly denies that there are two additional sets of moral considerations: those for supererogatory actions and those for morally permissible actions that are somehow demeritorious, e.g. in poor taste or some other consideration. (pg56-7)

Author finally commits to the underlying principle of Judeo-Christian common morality:
"Do not do to your fellow what you hate to have done to you" (pg57). Author gives considerable discussion about the different formulations of the golden rule, from the first books of the bible and into the new Testament. Author rejects Thomas Aquinas' version in favor of Kant's since Kant's takes humans themselves as the ultimate entities to respect (rather than the Thomistic version that takes fundamental human goods as the ultimate ends).(pg63-5) The distinction here is the culmination of a clarifying discussion of what Kant meant when he wrote that humans were to be treated as ends, not means.(pg63-4) As an aside, author demeans one of the protestant alternatives to the golden rule which author designates as: 'Love, and do what you will' (pg62-3) The formulation of the common morality that Donagan uses:

"It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature."

In the next section 2.5, author launches into a prolonged discussion of how to setup 'specificatory premises', that is, premises that fill-in what action kinds are permissible, impermissible, and obligatory. [This seems to be an arcane problem, even for a philosopher.] The trouble (as I can see it), is about a question of refinement. Should the fundamental principle be refined, or even scrapped, as tough cases arise? Or should the principle remain unchanged and the precepts be followed even in awkward cases? The analogue to law is a tricky one, since typically case law involves extracting principles from legislation, then applying the principles to a tough case, and possibly slightly altering the principles to get the case to come out right. (pg68-9) This is an example of the 'circular motion' of common law. The insight the author adds is that moral precepts are different from legislation-- legislation is often ends-based, that is, focusing on how to write rules that will promote specific ends. The moral precepts author has in mind are about principles of action-- in other words-- it is deontological. (pg73)