08/20/2010
The Theory of Morality Ch 3, University of Chicago Press, 1979
In this chapter author lays out the duties to oneself, duties to others in a non-institutional format, and finally duties to others through institutions, including both contractual and generic civil society duties. These are all precepts of the first-order, that is, regarding what it is permissible, impermissible, and required to perform. The second-order precepts are regarding intentions and are not covered in this chapter.
In section 3.2 author describes duties to oneself. The first is not to commit suicide at will: "it seems evident that if one is to respect oneself as a rational creature, one may not hold one's life cheap, as something to be taken at will."(pg76) However there are circumstances that make suicide permissible. The two cases author considers is where an individual is sick or affected such that she becomes dangerous to others (pg78), and the case where she is in an inescapable set of dehumanizing or tortuous conditions. (pg79) The extension of not killing oneself at will is not to mutilate or impair oneself at will, yet this precept author backs away from, claiming that it is not part of our traditional common morality. Becoming addicted to a drug isn't permissible, but general use that temporarily impairs judgment somehow is fine.(pg79-80) "For anybody to place any kind of drug-induced enjoyment before the full use of his capacities as a rational creature, is a plain case of failure to respect himself as the kind of being he is." For author, there is a positive duty to oneself, and that is to develop a life-plan, "a coherent plan of life according to which, by morally permissible actions, his mental and physical powers may be developed." (pg80) Author calls this the Principle of Culture. There are innumerable acceptable plans, e.g. soldier, professor, factor worker [?], provided its behavior is morally permissible. It is under this life-plan duty that an agent is required not to neglect her health, subject of course, to the risks inherent in her particular life plan.
Section 3.3 describes non-institutional duties to others. The Principle of Culture is transformed into the Principle of Beneficence, (pg85-6) where it is "impermissible not to promote the well-being of others by actions in themselves permissible, inasmuch as one can do so without proportionate inconvenience." This duty, author claims, "derives from their character as rational creatures, not from their desert."(pg85) The duty does not lay much claim from the well-developed to the well-developed, since it is each's obligation to flourish; the duty is rather more aimed at dependents, orphans, the sick, the injured, the incapacitated, the afflicted. (pg85) However, this duty also makes it impermissible to frustrate others' morally permissible projects, and to "[abstain] from actions that would foreseeably elicit responses by which others would be injured." (pg85) And of course it is impermissible to promote the morally permissible (or even praiseworthy) goals of another through impermissible actions (e.g. kidnapping the homeless for cancer research). (pg85-6) Part of the principle of beneficence is extended to combatants in war: it is impermissible to harm non-combatants in a just war (and of course an unjust war is impermissible...).(pg87) Another extension involves refraining from hurting the reputation or honor of another, or of disparaging another, even when accurate, unless it is to prevent a wrong from being committed (pg88).
Prior to the discussion of the Principle of Beneficence, author lays out one against harming or threatening to harm another at will. The justification for this is that respect for other rational beings entails "treating every normal adult as responsible for the conduct of his own affairs", and that "[interfering] by force with anybody else's conduct of his life, unless there is a special adequate reason, is not to respect him as a rational creature."(pg82) This does not immediately apply to children, the insane, and other quasi-rational (or not) agents. The rule is against "at-will" force, since presumably some force will be permissible in order to avoid greater harm to others. (pg82-3, pg85) Here author gives us a teaser about abortion. The extension of this precept of physical force is the force of will, that is a prohibition against slavery. (pg83-4) Author claims this is a fundamental principle of Judeo-Christian morality, even though both cultures lived with it for hundreds of years.(pg84)
The final non-institutional duty to others is the impermissibility of lying when one is purporting to give one's opinion. (pg88) The justification for this precept is that by lying to another "you deprive him of the opportunity of exercising his judgment on the best evidence available to him". (pg89)
Section 3.4 discusses contractual obligations, as part of an institution of giving and accepting promises and the creation of a bond from those activities. Author discusses the construction of a contract briefly and exposes it to be a fundamentally non-moral institution. Given that, author asks whether a contract can ever be a moral bond? (pg92) Author's answer is that the institution of a contract is morally legitimate, and so breaking it is akin to lying, which is already impermissible. (pg92) In extended discussion about this, author considers it permissible to break a contract if another, more pressing moral duty arises. (pg93) A last clarification involves keeping a promise made to those committing wrongs: author argues that one does not have to (e.g. pay a ransom, if promised, to secure the release of a hostage).
Section 3.5 regards the institution of property. This author considers to also be a non-moral institution, so the question is whether there are any morally impermissible (or permissible) forms of property. After a discussion on the different types of property and different types of rights (pg95), author settles on two moral precepts from Judeo-Christian morality: not to despoil the earth so that future generations cannot provide for themselves, and not to "disfigure" the earth so that it cannot be enjoyed as an object of contemplation. (pg96). Generally speaking too, the Right of Appropriation exists: things affording appropriation must be mixed with some labor to signify the intention of exclusive use, which must commence within a reasonable period of time. And finally, the appropriation of things for property mustn't leave nothing for others to similarly appropriate. (pg97-8) This final requirement (leaving "enough and as good" for others) is, author admits, almost never fully possible. Author argues that being born into a society where 'all property is already distributed' leaves the requirement to provide for the education of such a person to allow her to earn her way through society and afford to purchase the resources necessary for a 'fully human life'. (pg99-100) As an addendum to all this, author argues that civil anarchy and solitude are both 'human evils' and that if there are unjust or defective laws regarding property, one is obliged to respect them for the sake of keeping civil society in place. (pg100)
3.6 is a section on family and familial construction. Author considers a family as essentially a matter of parenthood. Thus respecting familial ties mostly related to respecting children as rational beings (or growing-into rational beings). Thus the duties in a family are to the upbringing of the children and it is "impermissible for human beings voluntarily to become parents of a child, and yet refuse to rear it to a stage of development at which it can independently take part in social life" (pg101) Adoption is considered inferior to biological parentage. (pg102) Author considers 4 forms of family life: monogamy, polyandry, polygyny, and free-love/exogamous. Author has contingent, historical problems with polyandry and polygyny (pg102) but argues that there could be a form of marriage other than monogamy that properly respected the children to be raised and yet involved marriage of more than one male to more than one female.(pg103) Author argues that marriage can be dissolved without moral objection, and, interestingly: 'since the only objection to [divorce or staying married] is the suffering it causes, neither can be condemned as failing to respect every human being as a rational creature.' (pg104)
The final topic here is the permissibility of extra-marital sexual relations, or of 'deviant' sexual acts within a marriage. Author reviews the traditional arguments e.g. from Kant and Thomas Aquinas. Author also considers the side that considers them permissible, simply because they are mere physical acts not affecting respect for rational agents. Author rejects this, claiming 'it is ... wrong to think of the sexual gratification obtained from physical acts as deriving from them solely as physical'. (pg106) "Non-significant purely physical sexuality is virtually inconceivable" (pg107) Author considers 'one's imaginative awareness' and 'emotional response' as morally significant, similar to Augustine's theft of the pears. (pg107) Author forms two morally good aspects of sexual acts: 'life-affirming' and 'non-exploitative'. Any act that is 'life-denying' in its 'imaginative significance' or is exploitative is impermissible.
The final section 3.7 has to do with civil societies. Civil societies have territorial boundaries within which there is a system of justice or jurisdiction. Author scaffolds an argument that goes as follows: most of the laws within civil society are about nonmoral institutions like contracts and property. Everybody needs civil society in order for their human potentialities to be fully cultivated. As long as 'the legal-political system does not seriously violate anybody's moral rights', everybody must obey the laws of the civil society they are a part of. (pg109) Even when there is a rights infringement, disobeying the laws should be 'passive', since the breakdown of civil society would not allow for human potentialities to be cultivated, and therefore is morally bad. Finally, in defending civil society from an internal or external threat, it may become morally justified to use violence against the aggressors as a defense. In such a circumstance, author argues that conscription is morally permissible and it is impermissible to avoid being drafted. (pg110-111)
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