Nagel, Thomas - Consciousness

12/21/2012

Mind And Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False, Ch 3, Oxford University Press, 2012

This is chapter 3 of author's book arguing against current versions of Darwinian reductive materialism. In this chapter, author takes phenomenal consciousness to be the major irreducible element for reductive materialists. Because this kind of materialism cannot account for such a "striking" element of life, a new theory that encompasses such a phenomenon will not be identical to neo-Darwinian materialism, thus neo-Darwinian materialism is false.

Author starts with a brief sketch of some historic attempts to solve the mind/body problem using materialism, and calls for a new theory to try to solve it (pg42). Next, author considers the failure of 'psychophysical reductionism' to be an "essential component of a broader naturalistic program, which cannot survive without it'. (pg42-3) Author's argument that the failure of psychophysical reductionism "infects" the entire naturalistic materialist understanding (pg43). Author calls for evolution to account for the appearance of not just qualia but of a 'subjective individual point of view' (pg44), a call which author believes cannot be answered by evolutionary theory as it currently stands. Evolutionary theory, of course, could show how consciousness is a "bonus" (pg47) of an organic, highly-complex, information-processing system, but this would make consciousness a 'brute fact' , which does not 'provide a significant explanation'. (pg45) Interestingly, author continues to claim that mind is a 'biological phenomenon'-- suggesting that a new conception of the biological, not a dualist conception of mind-stuff, is needed. (pg45)

The need for intelligible explanations is a fundamental component of author's argument, so author takes some time outlining the call for them. First off, there is a difference between an "immediate" cause and an explanation: the immediate cause of consciousness is brain activity but it is not an explanation. Author insists that evolutionary explanations show why conscious organisms, not just complex ones, are "likely" (pg48-50). Author also rejects epiphenomenalist accounts of consciousness (pg50) as not being a satisfactory explanation. Author does not want even to have an explanation of why a particular organism has a conscious life, or the particular conscious life it has; author also wants to know why such an organism has evolved on this planet. (pg50-1) This is a call for both an 'ahistorical account' of the constitution of consciousness, and also a 'historical account' of how such systems arose from the universe.

Author spends time considering options for the ahistorical account (pg54-8). Author discusses dualistic conceptions, a conception of consciousness where it is an emergent property of certain complex systems (author rejects this), and looks for "neutral monism" (pg57), which can also be conceived of as panpsychism.

In section 5 author looks at the historical account, offering three broad options: causal, teleological, or intentional. The causal account seems favorable to reductionism, so author focuses on that first (pg59-). Author allows for the emergence of consciousness through purely physical evolution, but does not like the theory since it utilizes the brute fact of emergence (through a causal outcome of a certain level of complexity) (pg60-1). Author also considers a panpsychic reductionism, claims it is 'form but no content' (pg62), but nevertheless applauds the form (pg62-3) and likes the ahistorical version of it (pg64). Both the emergent and the panpsychic reductive projects fail to provide a suitably explanatory historical account of the evolution of consciousness, according to author (pg65). Thus, author moves to teleological and intentional alternatives in section 6. While the intentional option is live, author talks more about a teleological natural law, one that guides change in material states to certain types of outcomes. These can be either value-free or self-fulfilling values (pg67), and author wants it to be realistically considered, though does not endorse it.

Nagel, Thomas - Anti-Reductionism and the Natural Order

12/14/2012

Mind And Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False, Ch 1-2, Oxford University Press, 2012


This is the first two chapters of author's most recent book, which disputes that 'psychophysical reductionism' is the only possible unifying naturalistic understanding of the universe. For author, the key rub is the development of life, and especially the development of reason and consciousness. If this reductionism can't account for consciousness or reasoned action, author claims it is reasonable to think of mind as a fundamental feature of the universe-- irreducibly part of it-- and thus falsifying 'naturalistic reductionism'. Author admits to not having a fledged-out alternative. This attempt is more fundamentally skeptical than propositional.

In Ch 1 author claims the "neo-Darwinian account of the origin and evolution of life" (pg6) is incredible and is only a "schema for explanation, supported by some examples". Author has two questions: the first is about how life came about from dead matter at all, and the second is how reason and consciousness could have come about from then until now. Author acknowledges that there are much fewer conclusions about the first question than the second. In the following pages author states skepticism about the explanations offered by natural selection as they bear on both these questions. (pg9-10)


Author's most provocative statements about the completeness of psychophysical reductionism are on pg8, where author claims that the remarkable success of science had to do with "excluding mind from the physical world" (pg8). This must end "in the long run" if the mind is to become part of the world, thus author is seeking a more complete view. Author wishes to keep two standards during this discussion: first: that remarkable events should be considered non-accidental, and second: that there is one unifying 'single natural order' (pg7).

Author's general frame of argument seems to be to install the irreducibility of the mental into the world but simultaneously to avoid dualism, idealism, or theism (pg14-6). Author lays out the first issue to consider: the intelligibility of the world. It is a background assumption of science that the world is intelligible to our perceptual apparatus (at least some of that apparatus at some times under some conditions) (pg16). There are two options here: one is that we have limited ability to fully understand the world and will be left with mysterious brute facts (pg17). The other option is that the world's intelligibility is a 'deep' part of the explanation of the way the world works, something like a principle of sufficient reason. Here author aligns with Plato, Schelling and Hegel.

A response to this is to have the natural reductionist encompass the intelligibility of the world to the human mind into the physicalist/reductionist picture (pg18-20). Author is clearly not satisfied with this approach because it doesn't take meaning, value, mind, and consciousness to be fundamental elements of the universe (pg20), which doesn't include 'the evident facts about ourselves'. Author pauses to claim quite explicitly that there is no room for theism in this book (pg21-6), as it neglects the unification and explanation that author seeks, instead installing a being that is supernatural. As author revisits the issue of intelligibility, the theistic picture just gives brute facts and neglects the /why/, but the naturalistic picture is not 'reassuring enough' that our capacities for understanding are reliable (pg27-8). Further, author is troubled by objective moral truths that seem to be orphaned by the naturalistic reductionist account. Because of our certainty in these facts about the world, "it seems reasonable to run the test equally in the opposite direction: namely, to evaluate hypotheses about the universe and how we have come into existence by reference to ordinary judgments in which we have very high confidence." (pg29)

Burge, Tyler - Self and Self-Understanding III: Self-Understanding

11/16/2012

Journal of Philosophy, June-July 2011

This final lecture gets to the epistemic warrant for self-understanding, for the privileged access to apperceptively rationally accessible points of view. An epistemic warrant is an objectively good route to truth, implying "veridicality in normal conditions" (pg339). More importantly, such a warrant must also show why such routes are prone to truth. Here a warrant is a reliable procedure to truth but can be subject to "brute error", which is an error due to accidental or non-normal conditions. However, with the warrants for self-understanding, author claims some cases are immune to brute error (pg340). The strategy is that some self-understanding is immune to brute error, but these psychological states are not essentially immune. There are some that are immune, however, and these are the ones that ground self-applicability of norms (pg341). "Immunity of the self-understanding to brute error is constitutive to having an apperceptive core self." (pg341) This is a key argument by the author: that self-understanding that is prone to error cannot give the "buck-stopping status" to the attitudes to which norms are applied (by the individual) (pg341-2). Author capitalizes "Self-Understanding" to signal when the discussion is about this kind of self-understanding that is immune to brute error for the constitutive self-application of moral and rational norms.

Section II serves to flesh out some of author's claims about immunity from brute error: it doesn't apply generally, it is not tied to any subject matter, there are other errors that could be involved, thoughts aren't self-intimating or infallibly known. Author even states that there is no necessary connection between having representational states (even propositional attitudes) and an individual knowing what those states or attitudes are (pg345). Section II also divides author's views from some notable rivals or other thinkers. Author also takes some time to argue against Peacock's view that "the subject matters of self-knowledge constitute reasons for the knowledge" (pg345-6). Another claim author disputes is that self-knowledge is structurally like being aware of one's own physical actions: like knowing that you're raising your arm (pg346-7). Author's response: while agents do act, there is a lot of self-knowledge that isn't related to actions.

Section III moves forward with author's argument, first distinguishing between warrants that are based on reasons (justifications) and those not so (entitlements): warrants for Self-Knowledge are based on the latter. The warrants about the attitudes that constitute Self-Understanding are, according to author, immune to brute error (Wibe). Author goes through three ways in which a token propositional attitude could be in error even if it is of the kind that is Wibe. (pg348)
1: the attitude is warranted in some other way (not Wibe)
2: the attitude was formed in a way where Wibe does not apply (through a different route)
3: some pathology might influence the attitude that is normally Wibe

Much of author's discussion then turns to three other kinds of entitled warrants that are psychological and de re about propositional attitudes and are immune to brute error, like deductive reasoning's logical "transitions" (pg349-352). Then in Section IV expounds on the 4 features that "ground immunity" for these cases:
1: the competencies rest on "propositional understanding" (understanding what a proposition is about)
2: having a point of view requires Wibe
3: it all ties together within itself [what?]
4: there is no other place from which veridical Self-Understanding might come from
Author ties this together with a principle on warrant (pg353) and goes on to discuss the three other kinds in light of these new features. Author then contrasts these warrants with those that are subject to brute error, namely perceptual beliefs (pg356-9).

Turning back to Self-Understanding, author wants to take much of the lessons learned about other Wibe cases and apply them. Author takes a basic meta-representational attitude like: "I believe that X" and investigates it's structure. It involves three different understandings: indication understanding, betokening understanding, and attribution understanding (pg360). Author narrows in on Self-Understanding about propositional states; author believes that the betokening understanding (which is self-predication of a particular propositional attitude, e.g. "believe"-pg360&364) is immune to brute error when it is warranted. (pg361)

Author believes that purely preservative memory is 'at the heart' of warranted Self-Understanding that is immune to brute error, thus takes some time discussing it (pg362-5). Purely preservative memory is given powers to preserve de re, and also to preserve the attitude mode (belief, disbelief, wonder if, etc.) under which the representation was acquired (pg362). Author discusses the form of the "cogito" cases ("I am currently thinking about X"), and compares them to "impure" cogito cases: "I believe that X is the case". (pg363) The individual may have a meta-representational belief that she is doing a psychological computation (believing), but she may be mistaken that she is actually doing that believing. These cases are both warranted and immune to brute error, though the second could still be in error due to a 'pathology'. Author concludes Section 5 by claiming that using preservative memory (and preservative memory being as it is) is constitutive to being a self (pg365).

The next discussion is about warrant to the betokening understanding. It seems author is intent on resting epistemic warrant that is Wibe on the reliability of purely preservative memory (PPM) (pg365-7). Author then elaborates the claim and defends it. Author claims first that purely preservative memory is "naturally reliable" (pg367) and is a condition of a "functioning representational psychology". Author claims that when PPM fails it is due to malfunctioning; thus maintains simultaneously that relying on its proper functioning creates a warrant that is immune to brute error. Author acknowledges some constructive features of memory (pg368) and seeks to separate episodic memory and PPM, but still wants to preserve immunity from brute error for even episodic memory (pg368-370).

Author talks further about PPM by clarifying that it does not represent either mode type (belief, thought, etc) or the representational content it preserves (pg370). Thus, it takes a betokening understanding to access this content and also to represent it. It is this representation that is immune to brute error (in some cases) (pg371). The key point author seeks to defend is that betokening understanding of a PPM will correctly pick up on the attitude mode (believe, think, wonder) that is supposedly stored there (pg372). Author introduces a norm of critical reason that involves preservation of reasonable beliefs: if an individual judges a psychological state as reasonable, the individual has reason to preserve that state. This norm, if it could not be applied reliably (that is, if it were subject to the proviso: 'though I may not reliably be able to do so') would undermine the "buck-stopping status" of lower-level psychological states and would undermine the critical reason of selves (pg372-3). Author takes stock of the state of the argument on page 375.

In Section 7, author tries to argue that reason-supporting claims can also be immune to brute error (e.g. X is reason for Y) (pg376-8). In Section 8, author discusses perceptions and sensations as they are betokened in the Self-Understanding. Finally, author summarizes author's claims and responds to some brief counter-examples.

Burge, Tyler - Self and Self-Understanding II: Self and Constitutive Norms

11/09/2012

The Journal of Philosophy, June-July 2011

In this paper author talks about norms, specifically norms of critical reason and those of morality or intentional action. The idea here, as with the previous lecture, is to show how capacities of an individual can be constitutive to creating a self and having self-understanding. For author, self-understanding is constitutive to having a self. In this paper, author focuses on the meta-psychological ability to evaluate psychological states and apply norms of critical reason and morality to them.

Author starts by defining a "norm", which is "teleological", a "standard that governs good or optimal ways of fulfilling some function" (pg316). Norms can be followed without consciousness, or even understanding, even some rational ones like inferences using propositions. Author goes further to define moral norms and norms of critical reason, and then argues that an understanding of 'having reasons' and 'moral wrongness' are constitutive to being a self (pg318). The argument is roughly:
-an individual must be able to instantiate in her psychology objects to which the norms of critical reason and morality apply
-for an individual to apply these norms, she must first (1) understand that she has relevant propositional attitudes in her psychology and (2) understand the norms themselves. (pg318-9)
-the individual must have a meta-psychological ability to apply norms to her own psychological states
-that ability requires self-understanding (pg320)

Author talks about what it means to understand a moral norm: it means the individual can evaluate "psychological motivations", since moral norms are essentially about those (pg319-320). For author, this involves an understanding of oneself "from the inside" (pg321), having proprietary "point of view" access to psychological attitudes that isn't inferential from action or behavior (pg325).

In section II author examines the application of moral norms and critical reason. Author looks into the psychological roots for understanding moral norms: motivation, intention, negligence, should-have-known-better, etc (pg321-323). Critical reason applications come next, and it is here where author divides the individual's psychology into rationally accessible and inaccessible: the areas of the unconscious, self-deception, beliefs hidden by emotion, etc. These are not subject to the application of critical reason in the individual with the same propriety; they "have a fundamentally different status" (pg323-325).

Section III discusses a baseline concept of the "rationally accessible point of view", and adds "apperceptive" to the front of it to indicate that this is first-personal access to psychological states of an individual. The "rationally accessible" excludes the Freudian unconscious, self-deception, and other states that need "extensive priming" to be recognized; in general it is all memory, representational states, psychological events, and conscious sensations, feelings, and beliefs (pg326). The contents of this point of view have a "privileged status" when it comes to applying moral and rational norms: it is here where the individual does so (pg327). This status is the "buck-stopping status" that author uses as a term: it is the end of where an individual applies norms of moral responsibility and rationality (pg327). [This is not to say that once an individual abides by all norms in this point of view that she is perfectly rational or good, but just that's where her evaluations end.] From this privileged point of view is where inferences begin, since the apperceptive rationally accessible point of view is an "immediate, non-inductively accessible" baseline (pg327).

The place where you apply norms is to the psychological antecedents of action, and author argues that accountability to norms depends on having a self-understanding of one's own psychology in a "from the inside" way (pg328-9).

Section IV is a discussion of how self-understanding in the ability to apply norms is constitutive of selves, and in particular relating (again) to memory. This time author turns to diachronic understanding of motivations and the individual's own psychology: a meta-psychological influence. The argument runs roughly as follows:
-selves must be able to make inferences about the contents of propositions (pg330-1)
-selves must be able to apply rational standards (minimally) to the contents of propositions. In effect, this means having privileged access to the contents of their psychology so that beliefs or attitudes can be evaluated and shed (pg331)
-making inferences means an individual must have the capacity to remember (autobiographically, not just storing propositions) (pg332-4)

Section V is a very useful summary of author's position thus far.

Burge, Tyler - Self & Understanding Lecture I: Some Origins of Self

11/02/2012

The Journal of Philosophy, June/July 2011

This lecture is devoted to understanding the self and its psychological functions. Author begins with some clarifying remarks: the discussion is about the psychology of the self, not its ontology (Strawson is brought up as someone who provides a useful concept but does not manage to prove that the concept "person" can only be physical). Also, author takes care to distinguish between concepts of person-hood, and self-hood, which is more about critical self-reflection. (pg290) Interestingly, author claims that a person has a self if it has it while in its mature state, even before it realizes that state. (pg290) Further, author claims that unconscious elements of psychology only are "constitutively relevant to selves" when they are conscious. (pg291-2) This comes when introducing a technical term: a "point of view": representational states and occurrences that are imputable to the individual (pg292). A self/individual realizes a multi-tiered structure of itself (self-reference) by taking objects within it's point of view as further objects to be represented. (pg292)

In section II author discusses the difference between perception and sensory systems: not all sensory systems are perceptual. Perception involves representation of objects in the world, while other sensory systems might be more or less successful at getting what the living thing needs/wants, but there is no test of veridicality. (pg292-3) For author, the "mark" of the perceptual is "perceptual constancy": that objects perceived retain their features even through shifting contexts. (pg293) Prior to self-representation is another, more primitive form of representation outlined by the term "egocentric index": a spatio-temporal representation that 'indexes' an origin as an individual's point of view; it is "immune to failure" (pg294). There are two functions (constitutive) of an egocentric index: (1) an origin/index for representations and (2) a provider of ego-relevance when it comes to the individuals own goals, needs, and perspective. (pg294-5)

Author moves into talking about developmental ontogeny for self-representation, specifically four capacities:
1. Coupling of visual representations of a body and kinesthetic movements (the mirror test), and attribution of the body as one's own. (pg296-300) Author does not believe this is self-consciousness or self-awareness since no psychological states are involved in the proprioception. Author instead states this is a version of 'double indexing', where the object seen in the mirror is indexed again as the individual's own body (pg298).
2. Copying and imitation capacities.(pg301-30) This is considered more advanced than the mirror test since it requires adjustment to activity the individual cannot control. (pg303) Further, author argues that imitation and joint attention are not psychological understandings of others but instead teleological understandings of them. This is still not yet self-representation or even theory of mind (pg304),
3. Joint Attention (pg303)
4. Memory. Author takes a long tour through a taxonomy of memory. Author is interested first in Long-Term Experiential Episodic memory, a subspecies of Long-Term Experiential memory. Episodic memory must be conscious, and is time-specific to picking out objects as they were at the time (pg306), and revisiting them is like re-living them (pg307). This is different from non-episodic experiential memory, where one has access to the content of a belief based on the past but does not have access to how the particulars were experienced. These kinds of memories locate the remember in the situation (pg308). Episodic and generic long-term memory is considered 'de re' by author (pg305-6), because it must be conscious and noninferential (pg213).  Author develops Autobiographical Experiential Memory as a kind of memory "from the inside", which preserves the perspective of the individual within the memory (pg309). The importance of this kind of memory is that it is extended over time in ways that imitation, joint attention, and the mirror test have do not. (pg310)

Author ends this discussion with looking at the Kantian and Lockean conception of selfhood through the lenses of memory author just sketched. 

Leiter, Brian & Weisberg, Michael - Do You Only Have A Brain?

10/26/2012

The Nation, 9/2012

This is a review of Thomas Nagel's newest book "Mind And Cosmos; Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False". According to authors, there are two major arguments that Nagel levels. The first is the false promise that philosophers have about theoretical reductionism, in that all material facts in the sciences can ultimately be reduced to physical facts about the fundamental elements of the universe. The second is that many scientific discoveries are contrary to "common sense" and our natural understandings about ourselves. The authors discuss the first briefly, the second more thoroughly.

To Nagel's first objection to naturalism the authors generally concede the point: no one is working very hard in the sciences to provide reduction; it is unclear if there is much practical benefit to providing such a thing; it is unclear it is fully even possible. Regarding the second of Nagel's 'broadsides', the authors push back: Nagel's understanding is limited; common sense often is in error, even about ourselves. Nagel uses the supposition that there is an objective moral, mathematical, and logical truths to drive a wedge between human mentality/behavior and the 'Neo-Darwinian' conception. Authors represent Nagel as having "simplistic evolutionary reasoning" and focus more on the logical and mathematical truths rather than the supposed moral ones.
Nagel's argument: how would we know it is valid if all our methods of knowing have nothing to do with validity and more to do with evolutionary history?
Authors: Because when we use math, things work validly.
Author's use the analogy of Neurath's Boat, that validity is built as it continues to sustain solutions that work.

The last argument from Nagel that authors consider is one where it seems (currently) impossible for science to explain how consciousness came to be from evolutionary processes. Authors claim that some explanation is possible but to ask for prediction to accompany explanation is asking too much. There need not be predictive capabilities on a one-to-one basis with explanations, authors retort.

Priest, Graham - What is Philosophy?

10/12/2012

The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2006

Author starts the paper by stating that this question is itself a philosophical question, so it is not surprising that there has been disagreement and contention since it was first asked. Author believes that there are two views about the nature of philosophy that have wide acceptance: Wittgenstein's and Derrida's. Author goes through them both en route to author's own view.

Wittgenstein's later view of philosophy is rooted in his view of language, so author takes some time summarizing Wittgenstein's approach to language found in the Philosophical Investigations. The first discussion talks about how Wittgenstein rejected his previous view of language put forth in the Tractatus, and instead offered a rules-based "language game" that is partially arbitrary and justified by use. (pg190-1) Philosophical problems are what happens when terms from the language game are removed from it and tried to be examined out of context: they are meaningless without it and so philosophical problems go from "difficult" to "meaningless". (pg191) One case author uses is the case of free will: in this case the concept of "freedom" is employed, but outside of the normal context that gives the words their accepted usage. Author concludes the summary of Wittgenstein's view that philosophy is best re-characterized as a practice to un-metaphysicalize words and concepts (pg192).

For author, Wittgenstein's view of philosophy is a "disappointing one" (pg193). Author argues that even if Wittgenstein's view of language as put forth in the Investigations is correct, it does not follow from that view that philosophy is best employed as Wittgenstein sketches. The fundamental premise that author takes to be false is that: philosophical problems only arise when a "notion is pulled out of its linguistic home-game" (pg193). Author gives examples like ethical dilemmas and discussions as to the nature of time. More fundamentally, author objects to equating the meaning of terms within a language game with their truth: the truth they are trying to get at is a further matter (pg194).

Author now discusses Derrida's view of philosophy: beginning with his view of language. For Derrida, there is no determinate meaning for language since all searches for meaning end up with more language (pg195-6). The problem: clearly language is meaningful somehow: how? For Derrida, words get their meaning from contrasts with other words ("red" contrasted with "green"), but also by using references to other words from other contexts, a kind of promissory note or deference that Derrida called "differance" (pg196). One upshot of this theory is that no text has a determinate meaning.

Since it is unknown how Derrida believed his theories of deconstruction applied to philosophy, author instead looks at Rorty, who claims that his understanding of philosophy is from Derrida (pg197). When philosophers try to "get it right" about a determinate truth of ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, they are conducting a fools errand since if language has no determinate meaning, then how does one find its determinate truth? With Rorty channeling Derrida, philosophy is just another kind of writing. Just as author did with Wittgenstein, author grants that Derrida's views on language are correct. The first point against Rorty/Derrida's view of philosophy starts as follows: this doesn't just apply to philosophy. All linguistic enterprise finds no determinate truth, including science and mathematics. And yet there are standards within each discipline that lead to better and worse outcomes ("disagree at the risk of life and limb." pg199). Once philosophy is put into this category, "things are not so bad" (pg199). The second point is that just because language has no determinate truth doesn't mean there isn't a determinate truth: some enterprises seek that truth (and fail) and others don't even try (e.g. fictive writing). Indeed if the very enterprises that Derrida and Rorty use are not supposed to be truth-seeking, they are just fictions to be ignored or they are self-refuting (pg199-200).

Author claims that both Wittgenstein's and Derrida/Rorty's approaches are both self-refuting (giving a philosophical account of philosophy that denies that philosophy can give accounts) and are also dependent on a substantive theory of meaning. Instead, author puts forth the theory that philosophy is: critical, assumption-challenging, where "anything" can be scrutinized, subversive, unsettling, and universally applicable (pg201-3). On the positive side, philosophy is also constructive and creative with new theories and conceptions, author spends time arguing this is a corollary of the critical nature of philosophy (pg204-6).

Priest, Graham - Philosophy Sans Frontieres: Analytic and Continental Philosophy - A View from the East

02/28/2012



Author begins by considering the supposed distinction between Analytic and Continental philosophy, and points out that there is little of substance between them and that from the perspective from the philosophy of the East (Asia) it is just bickering within a family. Author admits that much of what follows is broad and misses details and distinctions, but assumes that the broad strokes author presents are true in some 'gross terms'.

Author believes the divide between Analytic and Continental in the 20th century had 3 phases: constructive, destructive, and fragmentation. The rebellion against German Idealism was led by Frege and Husserl, both concerned with representation in language and thought. Frege developed logic and semantic theories about sense, reference, objects, concepts. Husserl developed phenomenology and how consciousness 'presents itself'. The tools 'took on a life of their own' and the first half of the 20th century was filled with optimism about solving old problems with the new tools. Wittgenstein and Russell, then the logical positivists on the Analytic side, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the Continental. Then the destructive phase, Kuhn (Analytic) and Foucault (Continental) and the 'specter of relativism' from without, and the internal attacks from Quine, Derrida. Author states that the novel techniques that launched the constructive phase ended up 'collapsing under their own weight'. What followed was a variety of influential philosophers, each with separate goals and arguments: a fragmentation. The core of both traditions, states author, is a concern for representation and that in the fragmentation there are many more commonalities to be appreciated.

Author moves on to consider "Asian Philosophy" and discounts it as a coherent thing; there are at least two distinct traditions: from India and from China. This is different from Western Philosophy, which author states solely originates from ancient Greece. There are three barriers to westerners studying Eastern Philosophy: language, style, and culture. Author discusses first Indian, the Chinese philosophical history. Author focuses on Buddhism cross-pollinating with T(D)aoism to create Chan/Zen Buddhism, and briefly discusses the distinctions between Indian and Chinese Buddhism.

Author argues that from the Eastern perspective, the Analytic/Continental divide looks like an 'in-house debate', while the different origins, languages, and styles of Indian/Chinese philosophy are 'definitely very different'. Author concludes with a prediction that Asia will rise as the dominant political force of the world and that philosophy will migrate its center of gravity from the US to Asia, and perhaps create a global philosophical culture which will make the Analytic/Continental divide irrelevant.

Putnam, Hilary - A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy

09/21/2012

Renewing Philosophy, ch 9, Harvard University Press 1992

Author claims that Dewey's justification of democracy as a "form of social life" is epistemological, in contrast with Bernard Williams' discussion of ethical justifications as a "medical metaphor" and focused solely on the individual. For Williams, the justification for enforcing ethical rules, prototypically around flourishing, is that there is something objectively wrong with the individual who isn't flourishing: that individual is "ill" (pg180-2). Ethics would then be moved into some branch of human psychology, one that we have yet to fully flesh out (if at all). One chief problem author raises is that Williams' conception is 'radically individualistic' (pg182), and Dewey's is for a society in general. The problem is that the medical metaphor does not translate or anologize well into a societal picture.

Author goes on to talk about the problems in modern western society with critiquing other cultures. Besides the cultural relativism argument from anthropologists, there is a persistent idea of the "noble savage", which author tries to unpack as a belief that primitive cultures are superior to modern western ones (pg183-5). The other alternative is the "golden age" myth that points to a spot in history where society was rationally superior but that age is now gone (pg185). Both alternatives want to immunize that culture from suggestions of alternative ways of life, according to author.

The approach Dewey takes is that there are "better and worse resolutions to human predicaments" (pg186), and that this is discoverable through inquiry, hypothesis, experimentation and analysis: an epistemological approach. Author claims this is distinct from, say, Williams, who must have a prior "fact of the matter" established ontologically at which these better or worse resolutions aim. Without that, the resolutions are just "local" truths, not "absolute" ones. (pg187) Dewey believed that philosophy had no specific content for itself other than what was available to common sense and science, thus freedom and information were crucial for resolving problems (pg188). Furthermore, there is no one way to live, thus a democracy is needed to be responsive to further discussion and experimentation (pg189). This does not entail just relying on experts, as Durkheim concluded.

Author argues that Dewey's shortfall is when it comes to moral dilemmas, specifically ones where experimentation and optimizing policies will not work: author gives the example from Sartre's Pierre, who has to decide between joining the resistance (in WWII) or caring for his sick mother (pg190-1). Author talks about William James' Will To Believe essay and how this kind of existential decision can be made "in advance of the evidence". (pg191-2) This line of argumentation for James was criticized since he took belief in God to be an existential choice like Pierre's. Author argues that James falls in line with Wittgenstein that religious belief is a-rational, not irrational or rational. Author gives an extended discussion of the choice of belief in theories even in science (pg192-3), and distinguishes it from religion and other existential choices, whose "rightness" cannot be publicly confirmed (pg194-5). The idea here is that consequential 'estimated utilities' is no way to live a meaningful human life (pg194). Author speculates that Dewey's problem on the individual moral decision has to do with his dualistic conception of human life: the social and the aesthetic (pg196).

The final pages are a conclusion for the entire book, which argues that philosophy is the practice that 'unsettles' prejudices and 'pet convictions' but also changes both our lives and our self-perceptions (pg198-200).

Bandman, Bertram - Ultimate Questions, Extraordinary Religious Beliefs and Ordinary Criteria: The Case Against Fideism in Wittgenstein's Later Work

08/24/2012

From: Wittgenstein: Toward a Re-Evaluation; Fourteenth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Haller & Brandl, eds 1990

A Fideism is defined by author as someone who believes that faith overrides reason. Author does not believe Wittgenstein is a fideist but instead someone who tries to apply ordinary language to inner processes. Author first gives some examples of Wittgenstein's method and statements about the non-sense found in philosophy. But in the next section (3), author gives some examples, including "God's Eye sees everything", which author abbreviates "E". This E is taken not simply as a given but as being embedded in a system of other beliefs, attitudes and expectations, "some of which are rationally examinable".

Author discusses Wittgenstein's conception of a 'Framework Belief', or a belief that is part of the riverbed of one's belief system, like: "I have forebears". Only the insane could doubt such a belief, and such doubt is taken to be hollow. Someone who doubts that 'motorcars grow from the earth' doesn't even accept our system of verification. This is more evidence author uses to claim that Wittgenstein is looking for criteria for belief; not faith. Further than that, there is the problem that expressions of religious faith do not have obvious FBs to 'secure' them.

Another facet of Wittgenstein's work author brings to bear is his adaptation of Moore's Paradigm Case Argument (PCA). Moore's PCA claims that religious beliefs can be reasoned about, and are either true or false. A Fideist might claim that religious beliefs are not intended to be T/F, but this is exactly what PCA scrutinizes. Author conducts an extended analysis of religious belief statements under the supposition that they "fit into a scheme of value statements". In a conservative but charitable understanding of value statements, they are not T/F but reasoned and open to evaluation once given criteria. But furthermore there is the problem that if religious belief is not T/F then the practices that are based on their truth are similarly undermined. (pg342)

Putnam, Hilary - Wittgenstein and Realism

08/10/2012

Philosophy in an Age of Science, Ch 22 Harvard University Press, 2012

Author starts with Wittgenstein's line from the Tractatus proposing an equivalence between solipsism and "pure realism". In figuring out what notion of solipsism Wittgenstein had in mind, author turns to an interpretation offered by Brian McGuinness, whereby Wittgenstein was trying to both contradict and reconcile Schopenhauer's 'famous dictum' that the world is "my idea". (pg340) The idea here is that language is used to express propositions about the world and how the world could be configured, and solipsistic (or realist) propositions are not changing or adding anything intelligible to the language (pg341-2).

The next discussion adds Carnap to the mix, as a representative of the Vienna Circle, which had thoroughly discussed Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Carnap considered the Tractatus to be not entirely free of metaphysics, specifically about the logical structure of propositions/the world. Author investigates what Carnap meant with the term "metaphysics", which firstly was seen as nonsense because it was opposed to verifiability, but later became nonsense because it was the pursuit of external-sentences using language-terms from an internal-language. (pg344-5) Here author claims that Quine's indictment of Carnap's position would be similar to Wittgenstein's. Later, Carnap points out a problem for Wittgenstein: if the solipsist propositions are equivalent to the realist ones, then mustn't their logical form be also equivalent? But even if the propositions can be made into having the same outcomes, their logical form can't be equivalent (author and Carnap argues), thus a tenet of the Tractatus falls (pg346-7).

Author then moves to Reichenbach and his analysis of the "choice" of either the realist language or an "egocentric language". Reichenbach justifies our use of the realist language because it helps justify a great many human actions, like buying life insurance (pg347-8). Author believes this "egocentric language" is a stand-in for Carnap's solipsistic one. Author also argues that it is unlikely this "egocentric language" is even intelligible. (pg349) This leads to an interesting approach to the private language argument in the later Wittgenstein; though author first talks about Wittgenstein's notion how a logic and grammar may be "rotated" around the real need to understand, e.g. intention (pg350-1).

Putnam, Hilary - Wittgenstein: A Reappraisal

08/03/2012

Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012

Author beings the chapter by mentioning some of the lessons author inherited from Wittgenstein that he believes are right; but the one that author takes as "quite wrong" is the notion that metaphysics is value-less, and should be cured by a type of therapy (pg483). Author first introduces the idea of what it is for things to not "make sense". For something to not make sense, author argues that it must be from the perspective of a philosophical argument or theory, not from an understanding of language or grammar (pg484). The idea here is to repudiate that the moniker "nonsense" can come about without using another (different) philosophical theory to justify its usage.

Author introduces two different interpretations of Wittgenstein, The New one embodied by Conant & Diamond, and the Orthodox, enumerated by Baker & Hacker. Both have different accounts of what a philosopher is doing when speaking nonsense, but both agree that philosophers speak nonsense most of the time, and both agree that this is a linguistic error. Author disagrees:  these philosophers are making sense, though their metaphysics might lack "full intelligibility" since it may fail to show how something may be true (pg486).

There is a brief interlude about another way to answer skepticism, without claiming that skepticism is "nonsense" because it gets the grammar of the words "to know" or "to prove" wrong. Author believes that the skeptic can be answered by constructing an argument from premises that he must accept. That the skeptic does not accept them is not a concern; the premises are reasonable and therefore a suitable answer to the skeptic (pg488-9).

Author argues that Wittgenstein himself established the sort-of middle ground of "lacking full intelligibility" when it came to religious language; author suggests that had Wittgenstein taken an equally charitable approach toward philosophy he would allow metaphysics to be sensical though not fully intelligible (pg490).  Author closes by giving a case of so-called scientists labeling a certain native tribe to be "soulless", though clearly there is no evidence for this. The question: are they making sense? Yes. But do they have a worldview that is alien (not fully intelligible) to us.

Albert, David - On the Origin of Everything

07/27/2012

New York Times, March 23, 2012
Review of A Universe From Nothing by Lawrence Krauss

Author (Albert) reviews a cosmology book by Krauss and disputes that it actually does explain why there is something rather than nothing. Apparently Krauss claims the laws of quantum physics explain why there isn't nothing. The first question author asks is where the laws of quantum mechanics come from-- what makes them true and laws of nature-- and why those laws are the way they are. Furthermore, author argues that even quantum fields need to be explained as to why they even exist too, a feat Krauss does not do.

The explanation for why Krauss thought that his cosmological explanation was superior to previous ones was that quantum fields can theoretically be arranged to reflect a "vacuum" state, in other words, be 'nothing' (in terms of particles). Thus the arrangement of quantum fields can produce no particles, which could be considered "nothing". Author points out the problem that this misses the point: the quantum fields are the elementary physical stuffs, true "nothing" would be the absence of those fields.

Finally, there is the Krauss' objection that this is changing the game or "moving the goal posts" because "nothing" as it has been traditionally understood meant "no particles", and he has explained how particles can arise from a no-particle state (of quantum fields). Author just replies that this just goes to show that we now know better that the fundamental make-up of the universe are not particles but fields. It isn't the endgame Krauss is assuming he has, and furthermore, author chides Krauss for thinking of the dialectic in cosmology as some sort of game.

Putnam, Hilary - Capabilities and Two Ethical Theories

07/13/2012

Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012

Author begins the paper by distinguishing between "Expressivist" and "Kantian" modes of thinking about ethical and normative questions. Expressivism is meant to capture the concept that ethical sentences are expressions of attitudes, not beliefs or facts. Author intends to take Simon Blackburn's theories as a reasonable expression. Kantian approach is less the actual ideas of Kant but more that ethics have a basis in reason and rational action. Blackburn claims that expressivism can fit in well with the demise of positivism and the rise of pluralistic accounts of the good, and (especially for this paper) the capabilities approach pioneered by Amartya Sen.

Author outlines Blackburn's main approach, which is to disentangle ethical terms into a descriptive notion and an attitude (pg301). The difficulty Blackburn points out now is that attitudes may be completely free of rational evaluation, which is a result of their being noncognitive. So Blackburn tries to show that indeed ethical discussion is important (pg302) and also show that discussions can be classified in terms of how they are conducted; evasion, concealment, ad hominem, etc are examples of bad argumentation, thus are not rational ways of conducting ethical discussion. Author points out these criteria are fraught with the same normative judgments Blackburn is supposed to be explaining, and that worse is that there is no independent evaluation of rational argumentation if the end-results of good process are not considered any more true than the end-results of bad process (because there is no truth of the matter). (pg303) Author claims Blackburn suffers from a "severe impoverishment of categories". (pg303) Blackburn is using a "procrustean" bed of world representation/attitude expression (pg304) that is descended from Hume.






Author contrasts Blackburn with Scanlon's view of ethics as contractual, in that an action should be avoided if it is one that others might reasonably reject. (pg303-5) Author claims that Scanlon's procedural ethics misses some of humanity's "basic interests", though we should resist the temptation to build a foundation for ethics on any one of them (pg305-6) because the bundle that holds together those interests is too thin. Author next considers 2 objections to Scanlon's view, that he perceives as age-old:
1) equality is fine within classes, or castes (the slave-holding class)
2) equality is fine for people with certain characteristics (the warriors of the society)
In the case of the second, author argues we have come to hold different interests. Those interests are "justified" from within morality, not from without it or below it. Author claims we no longer see the warrior lifestyle as the pinnacle of human excellence, and that we no longer see caste systems as a correct representation of superiority, and that we "appreciate the superiority of the ... 'democratic way of life'" (pg308).

Author talks about Habermas' conception of universal agreement and how the major objection, that it never happens in real life (when the norm is suitably broadly extending) is serious (pg309). This is not an objection to Scanlon, however, who offers a lower bar that no one can "reasonably" reject such norms. So author poses the question: when there is disagreement, how are we to decide? Author's answer is: Democracy and Fallibilism (pg310-11) In other words, bring all the stakeholders together to decide on the best course of action, and be ready to revise it, even revise the fundamental rights or approaches, as time goes on.

Putnam. Hilary - The Fact/Value Dichotomy and Its Critics

07/06/2012

Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012

Author begins this paper by revisiting an earlier book he wrote on the "fact/value distinction", where a notable economist (during the great depression) argued forcefully for reason to be relegated to means, and ends to be values that were in some sense subjective (pg283-5) This had similarities with the logical positivists, who claimed that value assertions lacked cognitive meaning.

Author introduces Charles Stevenson's Ethics and Language and Stanley Cavell's The Claim of Reason to show the emotivist and rationalist arguments about ethics. (pg285-88) Stevenson remarks about how all disagreement is either about beliefs or attitudes, but beliefs (as in science) can be revealed and tested, while attitudes cannot in anything like the same manner. Cavell points out that disagreement may still be rational even if there is no alignment of belief or attitude. (pg287) Cavell goes on to give 4 main disagreements with Stevenson (pg287).

Author asserts that Quine's demolition of the theory/description distinction also destroyed the fact/value dichotomy (pg288), though author starts with recounting the positivists account of the analytic/synthetic distinction for the sciences, and Quine's assault on it (pg289-90). Author points out that whatever failures the positivists had, it was at least after years of hard work. While Stevenson's belief/attitude distinction rested on no such hard work and is therefore even more questionable.

Author moves on to the "entanglement" of facts and values, in the two senses: (pg291)
1. factual judgments depend on epistemic values (like coherence, simplicity, elegance), and even possibly what predicates to use for induction is an epistemic value (see Goodman, new riddle)

2. Values tap into an "evaluative point of view" (pg292)
The idea here may be that there must be something that we're trying to get "right" when we discuss the difference between bravery and foolhardiness. McDowell affirms this by claiming that there is a current move by emotivists that there can be a "disentanglement" between the feature of the world that we're picking up on, and the 'special perspective' of evaluative judgment. The objection (pg 292-3) is that if this feature could be picked out, its application could be mastered independently of knowing what the evaluative judgment might mean. Author points out that for McDowell, all human life is conceptualized, since McDowell has Kantian roots. Author moves instead to Cavell and one of his quotes about morality, as being a kind-of reconciliation process that comes with disagreement (pg295).

Author ends with a conclusion about how the fact/value dichotomy is the top of a three-legged stool:
1) "the postulation of theory-free 'facts'" (fact/theory distinction)
2) the denial that evaluation is entangled in 'facts'/science
3) the claim that science proceeds roughly by a combination of induction and deduction
Each leg breaks for different reasons, from different areas of philosophy.

Putnam, Hilary - A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics (Again)

06/29/2012

Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012

Author revisits the paper, "A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics", released before Bell's "famous" paper on the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen paradox. This was an occasion to flesh out the paradox that if non-locality in quantum mechanics  was correct, Einsteinian special relativity is refuted (pg 127). Author then produces an extensive quote from his previous (1965) paper, where the "operationalist" theory of scientific method and theory is assumed to be false and his theory of scientific realism is proposed (pg128-131). Author sees a problem with the proposed version of scientific realism and quantum mechanics, and next goes on to describe what quantum mechanics posits, and the problems it raises. pg 131-3 [Summarizing author's summary of quantum physics is a misguided affair.]

The first problem considered is Schrodinger's cat, where a macro-level object (a cat) is in a superposition based on a quantum "state" (dead/alive). In effect, the probability of death/life is 50/50, but the cat is in a "superposition" based on the un-collapsed quantum state. At least, this is the interpretation given by Von Neumann, discussed next by author. With Von Neumann, the cat collapses into one particular physical state when it is "observed" (pg133-4). Author considers other interpretations to the quantum problems, including Bohm and Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW). (pg 134-5). For Bohm, particles have definite positions and momenta, but because of a "hidden-variable" that is from some sort of "velocity field". (pg135-6) The GRW theory posits that each particle has a tiny probability of collapsing, thus with macroscopic objects collapse is all but certain. (pg136-7)

Author recounts his meeting with Einstein, who said that he didn't really believe the Von Neumann "collapse" assumption (pg137), and then reviews the theory of quantum mechanics he found most plausible in his earlier paper. Author believed that there was a distinction between micro- and macro-observables, that macro- had definite positions and values at all times, but micro- did not, and that was a relationship between macro- measurement and micro-observables (pg138). Author then moves to a chart that maps four possible interpretations of QM, that is based primarily on whether there is collapse or not (pg139). Author then describes (reviews) the views in the table (pg140-1), and then argues for which theories he thinks we should discard (pg141-143).

Author has moved from the Von Neumann theory that macro-objects don't have superposition and therefore when they interact with micro-objects that do, they cause collapse (in other words, collapse is external to the system), to the idea of spontaneous collapse (like GRW). However, author does not fully support GRW because each particle may violate the law of conservation of energy (pg142). Author gives a thought experiment to make the multiple worlds/no collapse theory seem implausible (pg143-4), by showing that the probability of one outcome in a Schrodinger's cat-like experiment will be irrelevant because the actual worlds will roughly be 50/50 (dead/alive). Thus either a GRW-esque theory of collapse or a Bohm-esque theory of hidden variables are what we are left with. The next difficulty, as well, is that for either of these interpretations to work, "absolute time" must also be included (pg145-6). Author suggests the possibility that space-time is literally super-imposed onto itself, like two discrete space-times, both of which are internally Einsteinian, and then "background time" is only necessary when they are combined.


 

Putnam, Hilary - The Content and Appeal of "Naturalism"

06/22/2012

Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012

Author complains that "naturalism" is often undefined but ascribed to, and one place it is defined, in Boyd, Gasper, & Trout's Philosophy of Science glossary, is a disjunctive definition, comprised of two possibilities:
1. all phenomena are subject to natural laws
2. the methods of natural science is applicable in every area of inquiry

Author considers both using an example of a phenomenon of a usually clear writer composing a paragraph that is difficult to interpret. (pg 110-111) In the first case, the definition is trivial or absurd, and in the second it seems risible to claim that interpretation has a scientific approach like physics does, author argues. To really understand naturalism, author argues, one must inspect the alternative; it isn't "supernaturalism" or "occult", but "conceptual pluralism". Author's conceptual pluralism involves the "insistence that various sorts of statements" are as fully valid and true as the statements of empirical science. (pg112)

Author starts with the instability of the naturalist approach; that it can slip into Richard Rorty's anti-naturalism or a kind of Lewisonian Aristotelianism. Author talks about a common move in naturalism: to take a "minimalist" perspective toward one's ontology, in that anything that is real can be reduced to a description in "first grade" conceptual systems. The problem is (as usual) intentional conceptual schemes, where meaning, reference, beliefs and so on enter. Quine famously denied these were real things, most notably (according to author) by attacking reference (pg115). Quine argued that "x verbs y" is equivalent to "(cosmos minus x) verbs (cosmos minus y)." Because of the indeterminacy of reference, it does not pick anything out. (Using causation rather than correspondence is no help-pg116) Thus language is an internal system that does not extensionally connect to the world (pg116), which author points out looks a lot like Rorty's anti-realist picture. So minimalist naturalism may collapse into Rortian anti-realism. (pg117) Author pauses briefly to give a preview of his alternative picture (pg118). Author points out an alternative picture of reference, given by Lewis, in which there are "objective similarities" between objects/properties/classes. Author argues that in order to capture predicates like "is a chair", you need to add sortal elements like "affords sitting" rather than just color, shape, mass, etc. Thus there may be objective intentional objects, which author declares to be highly medieval/Aristotelian. (pg118-9)

The next (final) discussion is about the appeal of naturalism, and author discusses two arguments:
1. Argument from composition/evolution: the origin of the universe was fields and particles, until evolution, which is composed of fields and particles. (pg119-120)
2. If you can't reduce everything, something is "unexplained" (pg120)
Author spends the most time refuting 1 by first attacking how using 'mereological sums' to reduce objects will miss the similarities between objects that are slightly composed differently, and will miss modal discussions, since there is no "me" that ate a different dinner last night-- that would be a different person. (pg 120-123)
To deal with argument 2, this is simply something not to be afraid of. Author talks about how philosophers admit that an empirical inquiry like geology is legitimate but has yet to be reduced to physics, but nevertheless has acceptable terms like "true/false" "refer", etc. (pg124)

Putnam, Hilary - From Quantum Mechanics to Ethics and Back Again

06/15/2012

Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press 2012

This chapter is first autobiographical about author's interests in ethics throughout author's career. Author continues to believe that ethics is a legitimate realm of knowledge, as author wrote in 1974. But the autobiographical remarks go on to consider how author is misunderstood to be leaving behind scientific realism for "common sense realism". This kicks off an examination of the term "scientific realism". The first discussion of "internal realism", which Putnam is accused of being in his mid-career, came in 1976 under the "Realism and Reason" address to the APA (Eastern). But really author prefers to have used "scientific realism" rather than "internal" in his opening remarks back then. By the end of the 1976 paper, author had formulated a new theory called "internal realism", which was different from the quick reference author made at the outset. This led to much confusion, particularly evident in De Gaynesford's book. What this confusion brought out was a deeper understanding of the limit of scientific realism, or of internal realism, in that author advanced it as another empirical theory, but as such the anti-realist must reject at least one empirical theory. This, according to author, begs the question against anti-realism, or at least should allow one to be both an anti-realist for language but a scientific realist for empiricism (pg56).

Author attempts to show how conceptual relativity may be compatible with realism in metaphysics (pg56). The idea is that cognitive equivalence of theories and preservation of explanations do not need to preserve "ontology", or the real objects that are supposed by the theory. Author also talks about not needing mereological sums or all the particular axioms that mereology may entail, and the question about whether sums /really/ exist as a pseudo-question. (pg57-8) 

The next discussion is about why author gave up functionalism: two reasons: (1) it wouldn't allow for reference to objects in the world, it didn't allow for "world-involving abilities" and (2) not only are mental states compositionally plastic, but also computationally plastic [this somehow is a refutation...]. (pg59) With reference being a relation between people and actual objects, it is possible to avoid the layer of sensations that were part of Cartesian dualism (pg60-1).

The point of this discussion was to return to rejecting one form of metaphysical realism (that there is precisely one way to describe the world), and also still allow for other forms, compatible with conceptual relativity. Author then describes how that is possible (pg63-4): allow for independent descriptions of the same one world. This is different, according to author, from conceptual pluralism (pg64) which has non-translatable forms of the world (levels). Within the field of science, physics perhaps the most salient case, there are translatable but also separate interpretations of the physical world.

Author then turns to a few objections and sore spots his view might touch. The first is the Wittgensteinian sense that thinking about realism and anti-realism is just thinking about nonsense. Author rejects that out of hand. The second is that talk of "states of affairs" ("aspects of reality") is unclear and imprecise; this is a sort of Quinean/Davidsonian objection (pg66-7). Quine eschewed in ontology anything without precise identity and non-identity conditions, and with things like states of affairs (and many intentional states), they were not precise enough and thus were discarded in science. Author answers by claiming that the term "states of affairs" is a 'broad-spectrum notion' that is a paraphrase of more precise understandings of objects. Davidson's purpose is to remain far away from even the specter of the correspondence theory of truth. Author: use a disquotational theory of truth where nothing is added by asserting the truth of a proposition (pg68).

Author closes by considering himself in the pragmatist tradition, and specifically admiring two beliefs from them: (1) language is not just description and evaluation, two categories which must never touch. (2) Philosophy should matter to our "moral and spiritual lives". (pg71) Interestingly author says that it is a "pipe dream" that philosophy will become a "cumulative body of knowledge". 

Gilmore, James - The Good and the Good of the Soul

06/01/2012

(Unpublished)

Author discusses how just action relates to the soul, and how knowledge relates to the soul, in Plato's Socratic dialogues. There are three ways it seems knowledge is related to the soul:
1) Wisdom is a virtue, characteristic of excellence of the soul
2) Knowledge of justice and avoiding injustice will mean you will know what to do (and what to avoid), thus putting your soul aright
3) Knowledge is pleasurable

The classic interpretation is that knowledge in general, and knowledge of justice, contribute to "psychic welfare", or the goodness of one's soul. Thus "the good is one's own good". The difficulty lies in "framing" the relationship between justice and the good of the soul. Author continues to talk about problems with this the classic interpretation.

The first discussion is sparked by Sachs, who points out that the well-ordered soul has intelligence, courage, and self-control, though none of these qualities are particularly just, e.g. could be also held by an evildoer, or someone who commits injustice. Further, Sachs raises the issue of whether anything in particular is required of the just man, or if it is to simply avoid injustice. Author argues that Plato does give prescriptive actions to the just philosopher, namely the burden of ruling.

Author uses Irwin's notation for two kinds of justice, one that is just for the city, or c-justice (encompassing just actions, just behavior), and the other kind will be personal orderliness, psychic welfare, or p-justice. With these two kinds in place, Plato needs to prove that a c-just person is also p-just, and also that a p-just person will be c-just. Sachs argues that Plato does not show the connections. There is a problem between the 'thin' account of p-justice and the need for a richer account of the permissible and required acts of c-justice.

Author tries to diagnose the problem: things that are good-for-me (p-just) don't seem to be good-in-general, or c-just. However, author instead argues that things are only good-for-me if they are indeed good-in-general. This may dispel some confusion around the apparent hedonistic view Socrates dons in Republic Book 9. Instead, author takes the Philebus to be Plato's settled view on pleasure, in that it is a 'value-tracker' or pleasure is the upshot of good "processes". Second, author argues that Plato needs to talk about pleasure as a good-in-itself in the Republic since that is what Socrates' interlocutors assumed it is. The biggest advantage the c-unjust man has is pleasure, so Plato needs to argue that the c-unjust man has less pleasure than the c-just, though this leaves it open whether pleasure really is a good-in-itself.

Author moves to his discussion, first of "psychic harmony". For Plato, the human good is being a certain kind of person, the one with a well-ordered soul, or with knowledge of justice. There is a functional account of what psychic harmony is in Republic Books 5-7, and then Book 9 tells why PH is good. The functional account of PH is that reason instructs all other parts of the soul by its access to truth about "what is best". But that still leaves the content of goodness, or justice, undiscovered. Author claims it can't be that the good is just the ordering of the soul, since then the good = ordering the soul, and ordering the soul = the good. Author claims this is uninformative and does not say why goodness is worthwhile. The problem here is that not only does c-justice seem under-defined, so does p-justice.

Author continues by exploring Plato's other thoughts in the Republic Book 4 about the human good. Perhaps it's reason managing all the different desires of all the different parts, in some sort of optimal or maximal way. But this doesn't seem right since reason's desires get preferential treatment. It may be that Plato wants there to be two elements: all desire satisfaction (for all parts of the soul), and also the intrinsic value of rational agency, or of the rule of reason. But even if this is the p-justice, the only relevant part for c-justice is reason; and Plato even suggests that other desires are weighted hardly at all even for p-justice. Author reviews the arguments in Republic Book 9 for p-justice, and the value of it and compares them to the Philebus. Importantly, author points out that Plato doesn't want to consider three pleasurable things: wisdom, honor, and money. Instead, these are three kinds of pleasure, each providing its own kind of pleasure. But then a problem arises in attempts to compare these three kinds. The first argument is that the philosopher has experienced all the kinds, and therefore can judge. The second argument is that each kind of pleasure has "intrinsic features" that make them more or less "true" or 'legitimate'. The argument here is that wisdom is stronger than honor or money since wisdom partakes in something eternal, while honor or money are changeable and 'mortal'. 

Author discusses pleasure as a process, a 'filling-up' (greek: plerosis) rather than a state. Knowledge, then, would not technically be pleasurable, though learning would be. Author circles back to what is doing the filling, e.g.: wisdom (which is more eternal and truer), or food (mortal, changeable). What is more the issue, rather than the process/state distinction, is the nature of the lack, and what it needs to fulfill it. Instead of having desires fulfilled being good, it's that getting what you're missing is the good, and it is better to get wisdom than food, since wisdom is satisfying permanently, and food is only temporarily satisfying. This interpretation also has the advantage of 'ecology', being that our soul naturally lacks certain things but pursues them according to those lacks-- food being lower than wisdom, but both are constitutive lacks of the human being.

Author circles back to pleasure being either the value-maker or the value-tracker. The favored interpretation from the author is pleasure is the value-tracker. Pleasure is identified with a process, which is a becoming, not a being, and thus not a good-in-itself. [Interestingly, it is Millgram who equates conviction in belief with pleasure in an end or activity.]

Parfit, Derek - Ch 35 Nietzsche

Author introduces the Convergence Claim, which is that agreement in moral belief if everyone had the non-moral facts, used similar normative concepts, and were not affected by distorting influences. This is contrary to the Argument from Disagreement, which must involve denying moral principles due to fundamental normative disagreement. Author sees Nietzsche as a thinker who presents fundamental disagreement.

The first apparent disagreement is about suffering, and how it may be intrinsically good. Author argues that Nietzsche seems to suggest that suffering is good because of his principle that everything is good. (pg571) This could be about accepting the whole of the universe, or fate, and finding some kind of solace in it. (pg572) Author suggests this may have been a view held by Nietzsche for biographical reasons.

Further disagreement may be found in Nietzsche's view of the suffering of others, or in the value of compassion. Here author helps himself again to Nietzsche's biography, pointing out that he was deeply compassionate (pg574). Instead, author argues Nietzsche thinks rather that compassion has bad effects, specifically in weakening the healthy (pg573). This leads to a deeper discussion about the virtues Nietzsche found valuable in life, especially 'warlike virtues' which author interprets more to be about being bold, taking risks, and struggling to create great works. (pg574-6) More trouble arises when Nietzsche discusses the 'healthy aristocracy', which will be both great and also subject 'untold' humans to degradation and suffering. (pg577)

Author turns to exploring why Nietzsche had these beliefs to find their (partial) justification (pg578-9), calling attention to Nietzsche's insanity near the end of his life as partial evidence for the views he held. Author comes to claim (pg581) that often Nietzsche is not aiming at moral truth, but instead at other goals for humanity. Thus the disagreement isn't comparable. But what is happening is that Nietzsche is appealing to reasons beyond the moral; for author reason is more fundamental anyway, so the discussion moves to Nietzsche's proposed reason-giving alternatives to morality.

Author moves to discuss Nietzsche's view of moral truth, and the concepts of moral goodness and evil in general (pg582). Author first examines Nietzsche's view about moral responsibility, which he says we cannot have because we don't have the type of freedom necessary for guilt. Second, there is the Nietzschean view that morality involves a false psychology of acting from obligation or altruism, which does not exist as an intention or motivation. Author claims morality does not rest on this psychology. (pg583) Author takes a brief apparent detour into the Kantian double meaning of "sollen", a German word that can be both "shall" and "ought", one of which can be true/false, the former other cannot. (pg584-5) Schopenhauer argued against the 'shall' version of 'sollen' after it first gets admittance by reason with the sense of 'ought'. (pg585) The detour through 'sollen' and Schopenhauer comes back to Neitzsche because both believed that the concept of God underpinned morality in the 'shall' sense, and since God did not exist, morality fell too. (pg586-7) Author reasserts that there are reasons for morality even without God, and that commands should not be equated with 'oughts' (pg588). Thus author concludes that Nietzsche takes the fundamental moral relationship to be one of 'shalls' rather than 'oughts'. Thus the disagreement is not comparable to author's sequence of reason-based oughts.

The next biggest challenge involves the Nietzschean view that equal rights for all is misguided, or false-- since the creative geniuses deserve much greater consideration and can trample others. But author takes the statements that the whole of society would benefit from the works of great people to mean that Nietzsche also gave consideration to the 'mediocre'. (pg590-1) Author interprets Nietzsche to agree about the badness of suffering (pg591-2), and also to back into a kind of utilitarianism that justifies the suffering of many for the great works of the few for which such suffering may exist. (pg592-3) Author moves to the discussion of morality and happiness, or virtue and flourishing, and the strained relationship between them (pg594-5) in Nietzsche. However, author claims contradictory comments are inconclusive.

The discussion is really on the "meaning of life", or for Nietzsche whether there is such a goal or destiny. Since God is out of the picture, another possibility is that nature, or life itself, has one for humanity. But in this case, consciousness, especially of agreeable or disagreeable conditions (e.g. suffering, pleasure) are means for achieving some end (since life gave us consciousness along with all our other tools for achieving whatever end it has for us). (pg596-7) Thus suffering isn't bad in itself. Author denies that nature's goal for humans should be our goal, or that nature might even have a goal for us. Nietzsche however goes further in that life or nature may not provide the goals, instead that values are our own-- and he seeks a new value system once morality has been felled (pg599-600). Author summarizes the various claims on pg 602-3. Author chalks much of the perceived disagreement to either Nietzsche's mistaking commands for oughts, or insanity.

Parfit, Derek - Ch 7 Moral Concepts

05/11/2012

On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 7, Oxford University Press 2011

This is author's first main chapter on morality, and it starts by enumerating the various senses of "wrong"-- first the the ordinary sense, where someone has all the morally-relevant facts. The successive senses involve cases of partial ignorance:
Fact-relative: x is wrong if B had all the relevant facts
Belief-relative: x is wrong if B had true beliefs about the relevant facts
Evidence-relative: x is wrong if B had enough evidence to believe relevant facts

The reason for drawing these distinctions is to account for moral luck, where the consequences turn out right despite one's beliefs, or one's available evidence, or one's intentions. Author goes through a variety of cases. Cases one and two show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than belief-relative cases. (pg151-2) Cases three and four show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than evidence-relevant senses. (pg152-3) Cases five and six try to show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than fact-relevant senses. (pg153) Interestingly, author places epistemic incompetence, or failing to believe x when presented with relevant evidence, as not morally culpable, even if such incompetence fails to correct an unjustified belief that plays a part in deliberation in a moral situation. (pg153) Author's first reason for using all three senses is that other people use all three senses, so it is wise to keep the usage but guide the terminology (pg153-4).

The next discussion is about what the different senses of "wrong" pick out, and the importance of what is picked out. With the belief-relevant senses, if B was right about the facts, B's acts would be ordinarily wrong (trying to kill someone). So for blameworthiness, belief-relevance is crucial. Fact-relevance is less so, or at least that is an intuition shared especially by kantians. However, author discusses and rejects semi-kantians (pg156-7) who believe that fact-relevance in blameworthiness is sometimes partially a factor. Author introduces another sense of "wrong": the moral-belief-relative sense: when B believes x is wrong in the ordinary sense. This is meant to accommodate the Thomistic view, which is that: if you think you're doing something wrong, you're doing something wrong. Author agrees this might be blameworthy in the moral-belief-relative sense, even if it is not wrong in the evidence- or fact-relevant sense.

Another important question aside from blameworthiness is deliberation about what to do (pg159-. Here author hews toward evidence-relative factors and "expectablism", especially when looking for outcomes (pg160-1).

What relevance does the fact-relevant sense of "wrong" or "ought" have then? Author answers by claiming that discovering true moral principles is one reason to use the fact-relevant sense. Fact-relevant senses of ought are the most fundamental, leading most straight-forwardly to the ordinary sense of wrong and ought. (pg162) Then there are senses of what B ought-practically to do, where evidence-relevant senses come into play, as do belief-relative and "moral/normative-belief-relative" senses.

Author then moves from the ordinary sense of wrong (which took the various different senses, above) to other possible senses of the concept (pg164-5). The first major point author makes is that there is a basic sense of wrong that is indefinable. There are other senses like "blameworthiness" and "unjustifiable" that are definable (pg165-6).  Next author discusses the language of morality at the nexus of reason-implying senses of the words. (pg166-8) Most interestingly, author considers Rational Egoism an "external rival" to morality. But similarly, Act Consequentialism, the most fundamental form of Utilitarianism, is also considered an external rival (pg168-9).

Author circles back to the multiple senses of "wrong" and why author holds there are many (pg169-170). One reason writers think there is only one sense is that we believe we are in legitimate disagreement when we argue over moral cases. Author considers these weak and not plausible enough to underwrite one sense of "wrong" (pg170-1). Lastly, author discusses the reason-implying senses of "ought" and "wrong" (pg172-4).

Parfit, Derek - Ch 6 Morality

05/04/2012

On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 6, Oxford University Press 2011

Author is firmly in the objective reasons theory now, comparing different kinds. Author starts with a discussion of Rational Egoism and Rational Impartialism being combined into Sidgwick's dualism, which states that it is rational to be either impartial or egoistic in any circumstance (pg131). Author believes that for Sidgwick it is the incomparability of egoistic and impartial reasons that means either are rational. This is rooted (for Sidgwick) in the separateness of persons and the duality of standpoints (pg133). Author believes that some reasons, even across kinds, are comparable (pg132) and uses an example of trying to build a building and account for both aesthetics and economics. Author then takes on Sidgwick's reasoning by enumerating it (pg134) and then rejecting portions of it.

Sidgwick:
(A) There are two standpoints which both give reasons for act, personal and impartial.
(B-C) From both perspectives, different reasons are supreme
(D) Comparison between kinds of reasons requires a third point-of-view
(E) There is no such point of view
Conclusion: Both personal and impartial views are rational

Author first rejects (A), then (D), then (B) by giving the example of saving yourself the pain of the prick of a pin versus the death of 1M people (pg135).  Next author attacks the solely first-personal basis for personal action, by using the claim that the close ties we have with others give us personal reasons to care about the well-being of others. This is underwritten not by our personal identity, but by our "various psychological relations between ourselves as we are now and our future selves [and psychological relations with others]" (pg136). Author also argues we have impartial reasons to care about everyone's well-being.

Author partially agrees with Sidgwick in that different kinds of reasons are not fully comparable, though they are imprecisely so. Author unveils the Wide Value-Based Objective View here (pg137). Author argues we all have an impartial reason to alleviate suffering, wherever we can, though our relationship to our pain is different from our relationship to a stranger's pain (pg138-9).

One problem is the imprecise comparability of person-neutral and person-relative reasons. Can person-neutral reasons override person-relative ones only when hugely magnified? Author is inclined to disagree, saying that even a one-to-one swap of life (First Shipwreck) would be rational. The result is Wide Dualism, where we can be permitted to act in accord with our own well-being, or be permitted to be impartial; either reasoning is rational. (pg140)

Author next considers "the profoundest problem", where self-interested reasons and impartial reasons (the obligation to do one's duty) conflict. In short, a conflict between Moral Rationalism and Rational Egoism. Sidgwick tried to encompass the dualism by claiming that in cases of conflict, reason gives no guidance (pg142-3). This is really two problems (at least), according to author. First is the moralist's problem: in cases of conflict, people have good reason to act wrongly (in self-interest rather than morally). The other is the rationalist's problem: reason should give us guidance in these cases, or else reason is not our only (or ultimate) guide. (pg143-4)

Author discusses norms and different kinds of rules, lumping morality in with other kinds of norms. The problem is when multiple rules give conflicting guides. The solution is to find an impartial criterion for judgment, which author takes to be reason (pg146). Reason, according to author, "is wider, and more fundamental" (pg147). However, it isn't the case simply that reason is more important in the reason-implying sense (that would be circular). Instead, reason is the end of justification. (pg148)

Parfit, Derek - Ch 5 Rationality

04/27/2012

On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 3, Oxford University Press 2011


First two paragraphs lay out the relation between reason-giving facts and beliefs, which offer apparent reasons. When beliefs are true, then B not only has apparent reason to act, but real reason. B acts rationally when acting on apparent reasons. This is different from causal dependence, on which beliefs desires depend. Author lays out the nexus of beliefs, desires, reasons and rationality on pg112-3. Author rejects the view that it is irrational to have a desire iff it is based on an irrational belief. Author argues that it is a belief's content (pg113) that makes it rational or irrational. In other words, if the content of the belief would support the desire rationally, then the desire is rational, regardless of whether the belief is true (pg119). In some ways, a desire is rational when it is properly supported by a belief (whether that belief is rational or irrational). In other ways, not. Author works on hammering this out (pg115-7). Author concludes that there is epistemic irrationality, but that does not get transmitted over into desires, which can only have practical irrationality. A key distinction for author is that practical reasoning results in voluntary acts, but we have non-voluntary responses to epistemic reasons (pg118). 

With meta-beliefs about normativity, the same division might not work (pg119). Author considers the case of Scarlet, Crimson, and Pink (pg120). All three have "true believes about what it is like to be in agony and in slight pain, and about personal identity, time and all the other relevant non-normative facts." Scarlet prefers agony on any Tuesday vs pain on any other day of the week, Crimson prefers agony tomorrow vs any shorter pain today, and Pink prefers pain tomorrow over slightly smaller pain today. Author argues that Scarlet and Crimson are irrational, though practically rational by matching their preferences up to their beliefs (pg121). Pink is also irrational because his recognition of the irrelevance of time is correct, yet Pink still picks the pain tomorrow. However this is outweighed by having "rational beliefs about reasons" (pg122).

Next author considers the case of whether it makes any difference whether Scarlet or Crimson are subjectivists about reasons. For author, the answer is no: they are still irrational. However, it is not irrational to be a subjectivist (pg124). Author further claims that equating "rational" with "maximize expected utility" is a definitional claim, not a substantive one (pg125). Author considers other ways of using the term "rational". An interesting case is inconsistent desires. To author, they are not irrational, though acting on them both may be (pg127-8).

Parfit, Derek - Ch 4 Further Arguments

04/20/2012

On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 4, Oxford University Press 2011

Subjectivists are committed, according to author, to claim that someone is rational in pursuing a future period of agony, if that is what their ideally informed desires are. This is Case Two (pg83) and is an argument against subjectivism due to the absurdity. A subjectivist cannot argue that this is inconceivable because "we can want what we know will be bad for us." (pg84). Refinement to this by the subjectivist could go as follows:
-There must be a reason people have to hold a desire. Like: B wants to avoid some future agony.

Author replies by framing an example that someone wouldn't want to avoid some agony for instrumental reasons (pg85). A subjectivist might further argue that it is possible to act in accordance with a desire by having a second-order desire to have a first order desire (which one does not currently have) (pg85). Author argues this will not always do for wanting to avoid future agony either, because it might be unavoidable and just thinking about it induces anxiety, which B wants to avoid (pg86).

Author then considers cases where B could avoid the future agony. This would mean that B could have a "desire-based reason" to have the desire to avoid some future agony. This leads to a "rationally self-justifying" fulfill-able desires, which author claims are clearly false (pg87). Author claims that without having reasons to backstop desires, there is "no reason" to desire to avoid agony, or have future periods of happiness (pg87). Author concludes that the notion of reasons underwriting desires ("desire-based reasons") is a contradiction (and infinite regress) to the subjectivist approach (pg88).

Author continues to argue against subjectivism using Case Two, that there is no reason to avoid a future agony, if B desires that future agony (pg89). Author rejects subjectivists who claim an asymmetry between desires to avoid agony and no desires to avoid agony (pg89). This is the All or None Argument: that the subjectivist doesn't get to pick or choose which desires are reason-giving: either they all are or none of them are.

Author claims the only times subjectivist theories seem ok is when they overlap with objective theories of value. Author compares epistemic cases to normative ones (pg92-3). Author rejects that subjectivists even want to know all the facts relevant to their situation, since they would be sneaking in reason-giving facts into deliberation about desires (pg93-4). Author proceeds to claim that wanting being fully informed about desires is incoherent to the subjectivist view (pg95). This is the Incoherence Argument. The idea is that more information would only shed light on the intrinsic features of what is desired, in other words, what facts are truly reason-giving. Since that is an objectivist claim and not a subjectivist one, the subjectivist cannot appeal to it. "Most of us want to have better informed desires or aims because we believe what objective theories claim" (pg96).

Author believes that facts only are reason-giving for value, not for informing us as to the efficacy of our aims or for playing a part in desire creation. Or, rather, author does not admit that there can be any facts that can play a part in desire creation that isn't part of an objectivist account. (pg96). Author discusses a supposed subjectivist (Harry Frankfurt) who he believes is either a covert objectivist or incoherent (pg97-100). Author argues Frankfurt is not a nihilist about objective ends, but a pluralist (pg100).

Author goes back to clarifying the terms used with "best possible" and "better" and "best-for-someone", and so on (pg101-2). According to author, subjectivists can't use "best-for-someone" in any reason-implying sense, since that implies an objective way someone's life will go. Accordingly, subjectivists have no "self-interested" or "moral" reasons (just desires that give reasons). Author considers other ways to use "best-for-someone", using Rawls' thin theory of the good as a lens (pg103). Author considers other ways of evaluating whether one's life will be "best-for-[someone]" (pg105). People can mean:
-greatest sum of happiness minus suffering
-the possible life where all desires are fulfilled (or most are)
Author believes these claims are either tautological (pg105) or does not really help out the subjectivist. The subjectivist is still pegged to the conclusion that B can rationally pursue a fully-informed desire for agony, even if it is not best for B. (pg106)

Author considers versions of the "ought implies can" defense of subjectivism, which says that you cannot be compelled to do something if you are not motivated to do it (pg107-8). In other words, the only way we do anything is through desires, not reason-giving facts. Author does not believe this because it confuses normative reasons with motivating ones.

Lastly, author mentions the Metaphysical Naturalists, who claim that reasons are irreducibly normative, not fact-based, because all facts are scientific. (pg109) Again author believes this conflates motivating reasons with normative ones. Author also claims that this kind of naturalism applies to epistemic reasoning too, thus naturalism's own claims are not "true" in an objective-descriptive manner (pg110).

Parfit, Derek - Ch 3 Subjective Theories

04/13/2012

On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 3, Oxford University Press 2011

Notes:
The simplest subjectivist about reasons might claim a simple desire-based theory: B has reason to act on whatever B's present desires are. The trouble is some desires should give reasons, e.g. when you have conflicting desires, or desires based on false beliefs, or faulty means-ends reasoning. (pg58-9) A small alteration to fit these cases is to claim that only telic (ends-desired-for-their-own-sakes) desires give us reasons to act.

Author brings up the case of when telic desires rest on false beliefs. Author asserts the subjectivist should deny these give reasons too (pg60). So present telic desires are reason giving only if error-free, as another amendment. Further refinement shows that telic desires from ignorance are not reason-giving; thus desires you would have with more knowledge (but don't have right now) are (might be) reason-giving. Discussion on informed desire theories (pg61).

Other subjective theories focus on choices made once someone is informed, not the desires they have. (pg61) This is distinct from an objectivist who might claim the same thing, but as a procedure to reach the right reason, not as a justification about what reason is right. (pg62-3)

Author thinks all versions of subjectivism should be rejected. Why is subjectivism so readily accepted by so many? Author offers reasons: (pg65-68) 1- we often desire what we have good reason to do. 2- we sometimes desire what would be good. 3- some people accept desire-based theories of well-being. 4- we often appeal to our desires when asked to explain our motivation, why we acted as we did (but not normative reason why). 5- derivative or instrumental reasons can be desire-based, thus people confuse them. 6- we value other people's desires, even if they have no reason to have them, for the sake of respecting autonomy. 7- we confuse rationally acting to fulfill a desire with having a reason for acting. 8- desire-based subjectivism gets assumed in hedonic reasons for acting, since it is assumed we desire what is pleasurable. Except when we desire something that we falsely believe is pleasurable. 9- we confuse the desire to avoid pain with the dislike of a painful sensation, and assume that "hedonic reasons are desire-based". No: hedonic reasons can create the desire to end/start x; it isn't the desire that gives the reason. 10- sometimes desires create reasons for acting since the reason is causally dependent on there being a desire. But a reason that is normatively dependent on a desire is different from one that is causally dependent on a desire.

In discussion that follows, author claims that other facts ("desire-dependent"), not the desire itself, is what gives the reasons for acting. (pg68-9)

Author claims another reason people think there are subjective reasons is that they are taken by analytic claims (tautologies) that are either open or closed, but both avoid substantive claims (pg70-72). The most serious is to use the term "reason" for action as a desire-fulfillment term. This creates a tautology that is not substantive.

Author claims that subjectivism can lead to odd outcomes, like not having the desire to avoid future agony (pg73-4). Author claims attempts to fix this oddity strays from subjectivism. Using this case, author argues that the agony argument defeats subjectivism. Author then replies to possible objections (pg76-7). The most significant objection to the agony argument is that informed and rational deliberation would transmit future desire into the present. Author claims that subjectivists can only help themselves to procedural rationality (means-ends rationality?). But the problem for subjectivists is that they can't appeal to facts to make their case for rationality (like the fact that the future is the same as the present) (pg78-9). So author believes the agony argument stands and subjectivism falls. Argument goes as follows:
1. Subjectivists must accept the possibility that B can have no reason to avoid future agony because B has no fully informed desire to do so.
2. We all have reason to avoid future agony.
3. Thus, subjectivism is false.