Gilmore, James - The Good and the Good of the Soul

06/01/2012

(Unpublished)

Author discusses how just action relates to the soul, and how knowledge relates to the soul, in Plato's Socratic dialogues. There are three ways it seems knowledge is related to the soul:
1) Wisdom is a virtue, characteristic of excellence of the soul
2) Knowledge of justice and avoiding injustice will mean you will know what to do (and what to avoid), thus putting your soul aright
3) Knowledge is pleasurable

The classic interpretation is that knowledge in general, and knowledge of justice, contribute to "psychic welfare", or the goodness of one's soul. Thus "the good is one's own good". The difficulty lies in "framing" the relationship between justice and the good of the soul. Author continues to talk about problems with this the classic interpretation.

The first discussion is sparked by Sachs, who points out that the well-ordered soul has intelligence, courage, and self-control, though none of these qualities are particularly just, e.g. could be also held by an evildoer, or someone who commits injustice. Further, Sachs raises the issue of whether anything in particular is required of the just man, or if it is to simply avoid injustice. Author argues that Plato does give prescriptive actions to the just philosopher, namely the burden of ruling.

Author uses Irwin's notation for two kinds of justice, one that is just for the city, or c-justice (encompassing just actions, just behavior), and the other kind will be personal orderliness, psychic welfare, or p-justice. With these two kinds in place, Plato needs to prove that a c-just person is also p-just, and also that a p-just person will be c-just. Sachs argues that Plato does not show the connections. There is a problem between the 'thin' account of p-justice and the need for a richer account of the permissible and required acts of c-justice.

Author tries to diagnose the problem: things that are good-for-me (p-just) don't seem to be good-in-general, or c-just. However, author instead argues that things are only good-for-me if they are indeed good-in-general. This may dispel some confusion around the apparent hedonistic view Socrates dons in Republic Book 9. Instead, author takes the Philebus to be Plato's settled view on pleasure, in that it is a 'value-tracker' or pleasure is the upshot of good "processes". Second, author argues that Plato needs to talk about pleasure as a good-in-itself in the Republic since that is what Socrates' interlocutors assumed it is. The biggest advantage the c-unjust man has is pleasure, so Plato needs to argue that the c-unjust man has less pleasure than the c-just, though this leaves it open whether pleasure really is a good-in-itself.

Author moves to his discussion, first of "psychic harmony". For Plato, the human good is being a certain kind of person, the one with a well-ordered soul, or with knowledge of justice. There is a functional account of what psychic harmony is in Republic Books 5-7, and then Book 9 tells why PH is good. The functional account of PH is that reason instructs all other parts of the soul by its access to truth about "what is best". But that still leaves the content of goodness, or justice, undiscovered. Author claims it can't be that the good is just the ordering of the soul, since then the good = ordering the soul, and ordering the soul = the good. Author claims this is uninformative and does not say why goodness is worthwhile. The problem here is that not only does c-justice seem under-defined, so does p-justice.

Author continues by exploring Plato's other thoughts in the Republic Book 4 about the human good. Perhaps it's reason managing all the different desires of all the different parts, in some sort of optimal or maximal way. But this doesn't seem right since reason's desires get preferential treatment. It may be that Plato wants there to be two elements: all desire satisfaction (for all parts of the soul), and also the intrinsic value of rational agency, or of the rule of reason. But even if this is the p-justice, the only relevant part for c-justice is reason; and Plato even suggests that other desires are weighted hardly at all even for p-justice. Author reviews the arguments in Republic Book 9 for p-justice, and the value of it and compares them to the Philebus. Importantly, author points out that Plato doesn't want to consider three pleasurable things: wisdom, honor, and money. Instead, these are three kinds of pleasure, each providing its own kind of pleasure. But then a problem arises in attempts to compare these three kinds. The first argument is that the philosopher has experienced all the kinds, and therefore can judge. The second argument is that each kind of pleasure has "intrinsic features" that make them more or less "true" or 'legitimate'. The argument here is that wisdom is stronger than honor or money since wisdom partakes in something eternal, while honor or money are changeable and 'mortal'. 

Author discusses pleasure as a process, a 'filling-up' (greek: plerosis) rather than a state. Knowledge, then, would not technically be pleasurable, though learning would be. Author circles back to what is doing the filling, e.g.: wisdom (which is more eternal and truer), or food (mortal, changeable). What is more the issue, rather than the process/state distinction, is the nature of the lack, and what it needs to fulfill it. Instead of having desires fulfilled being good, it's that getting what you're missing is the good, and it is better to get wisdom than food, since wisdom is satisfying permanently, and food is only temporarily satisfying. This interpretation also has the advantage of 'ecology', being that our soul naturally lacks certain things but pursues them according to those lacks-- food being lower than wisdom, but both are constitutive lacks of the human being.

Author circles back to pleasure being either the value-maker or the value-tracker. The favored interpretation from the author is pleasure is the value-tracker. Pleasure is identified with a process, which is a becoming, not a being, and thus not a good-in-itself. [Interestingly, it is Millgram who equates conviction in belief with pleasure in an end or activity.]