Parfit, Derek - Ch 3 Subjective Theories

04/13/2012

On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 3, Oxford University Press 2011

Notes:
The simplest subjectivist about reasons might claim a simple desire-based theory: B has reason to act on whatever B's present desires are. The trouble is some desires should give reasons, e.g. when you have conflicting desires, or desires based on false beliefs, or faulty means-ends reasoning. (pg58-9) A small alteration to fit these cases is to claim that only telic (ends-desired-for-their-own-sakes) desires give us reasons to act.

Author brings up the case of when telic desires rest on false beliefs. Author asserts the subjectivist should deny these give reasons too (pg60). So present telic desires are reason giving only if error-free, as another amendment. Further refinement shows that telic desires from ignorance are not reason-giving; thus desires you would have with more knowledge (but don't have right now) are (might be) reason-giving. Discussion on informed desire theories (pg61).

Other subjective theories focus on choices made once someone is informed, not the desires they have. (pg61) This is distinct from an objectivist who might claim the same thing, but as a procedure to reach the right reason, not as a justification about what reason is right. (pg62-3)

Author thinks all versions of subjectivism should be rejected. Why is subjectivism so readily accepted by so many? Author offers reasons: (pg65-68) 1- we often desire what we have good reason to do. 2- we sometimes desire what would be good. 3- some people accept desire-based theories of well-being. 4- we often appeal to our desires when asked to explain our motivation, why we acted as we did (but not normative reason why). 5- derivative or instrumental reasons can be desire-based, thus people confuse them. 6- we value other people's desires, even if they have no reason to have them, for the sake of respecting autonomy. 7- we confuse rationally acting to fulfill a desire with having a reason for acting. 8- desire-based subjectivism gets assumed in hedonic reasons for acting, since it is assumed we desire what is pleasurable. Except when we desire something that we falsely believe is pleasurable. 9- we confuse the desire to avoid pain with the dislike of a painful sensation, and assume that "hedonic reasons are desire-based". No: hedonic reasons can create the desire to end/start x; it isn't the desire that gives the reason. 10- sometimes desires create reasons for acting since the reason is causally dependent on there being a desire. But a reason that is normatively dependent on a desire is different from one that is causally dependent on a desire.

In discussion that follows, author claims that other facts ("desire-dependent"), not the desire itself, is what gives the reasons for acting. (pg68-9)

Author claims another reason people think there are subjective reasons is that they are taken by analytic claims (tautologies) that are either open or closed, but both avoid substantive claims (pg70-72). The most serious is to use the term "reason" for action as a desire-fulfillment term. This creates a tautology that is not substantive.

Author claims that subjectivism can lead to odd outcomes, like not having the desire to avoid future agony (pg73-4). Author claims attempts to fix this oddity strays from subjectivism. Using this case, author argues that the agony argument defeats subjectivism. Author then replies to possible objections (pg76-7). The most significant objection to the agony argument is that informed and rational deliberation would transmit future desire into the present. Author claims that subjectivists can only help themselves to procedural rationality (means-ends rationality?). But the problem for subjectivists is that they can't appeal to facts to make their case for rationality (like the fact that the future is the same as the present) (pg78-9). So author believes the agony argument stands and subjectivism falls. Argument goes as follows:
1. Subjectivists must accept the possibility that B can have no reason to avoid future agony because B has no fully informed desire to do so.
2. We all have reason to avoid future agony.
3. Thus, subjectivism is false.