Putnam, Hilary - Capabilities and Two Ethical Theories

07/13/2012

Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012

Author begins the paper by distinguishing between "Expressivist" and "Kantian" modes of thinking about ethical and normative questions. Expressivism is meant to capture the concept that ethical sentences are expressions of attitudes, not beliefs or facts. Author intends to take Simon Blackburn's theories as a reasonable expression. Kantian approach is less the actual ideas of Kant but more that ethics have a basis in reason and rational action. Blackburn claims that expressivism can fit in well with the demise of positivism and the rise of pluralistic accounts of the good, and (especially for this paper) the capabilities approach pioneered by Amartya Sen.

Author outlines Blackburn's main approach, which is to disentangle ethical terms into a descriptive notion and an attitude (pg301). The difficulty Blackburn points out now is that attitudes may be completely free of rational evaluation, which is a result of their being noncognitive. So Blackburn tries to show that indeed ethical discussion is important (pg302) and also show that discussions can be classified in terms of how they are conducted; evasion, concealment, ad hominem, etc are examples of bad argumentation, thus are not rational ways of conducting ethical discussion. Author points out these criteria are fraught with the same normative judgments Blackburn is supposed to be explaining, and that worse is that there is no independent evaluation of rational argumentation if the end-results of good process are not considered any more true than the end-results of bad process (because there is no truth of the matter). (pg303) Author claims Blackburn suffers from a "severe impoverishment of categories". (pg303) Blackburn is using a "procrustean" bed of world representation/attitude expression (pg304) that is descended from Hume.






Author contrasts Blackburn with Scanlon's view of ethics as contractual, in that an action should be avoided if it is one that others might reasonably reject. (pg303-5) Author claims that Scanlon's procedural ethics misses some of humanity's "basic interests", though we should resist the temptation to build a foundation for ethics on any one of them (pg305-6) because the bundle that holds together those interests is too thin. Author next considers 2 objections to Scanlon's view, that he perceives as age-old:
1) equality is fine within classes, or castes (the slave-holding class)
2) equality is fine for people with certain characteristics (the warriors of the society)
In the case of the second, author argues we have come to hold different interests. Those interests are "justified" from within morality, not from without it or below it. Author claims we no longer see the warrior lifestyle as the pinnacle of human excellence, and that we no longer see caste systems as a correct representation of superiority, and that we "appreciate the superiority of the ... 'democratic way of life'" (pg308).

Author talks about Habermas' conception of universal agreement and how the major objection, that it never happens in real life (when the norm is suitably broadly extending) is serious (pg309). This is not an objection to Scanlon, however, who offers a lower bar that no one can "reasonably" reject such norms. So author poses the question: when there is disagreement, how are we to decide? Author's answer is: Democracy and Fallibilism (pg310-11) In other words, bring all the stakeholders together to decide on the best course of action, and be ready to revise it, even revise the fundamental rights or approaches, as time goes on.