Parfit, Derek - Ch 35 Nietzsche

Author introduces the Convergence Claim, which is that agreement in moral belief if everyone had the non-moral facts, used similar normative concepts, and were not affected by distorting influences. This is contrary to the Argument from Disagreement, which must involve denying moral principles due to fundamental normative disagreement. Author sees Nietzsche as a thinker who presents fundamental disagreement.

The first apparent disagreement is about suffering, and how it may be intrinsically good. Author argues that Nietzsche seems to suggest that suffering is good because of his principle that everything is good. (pg571) This could be about accepting the whole of the universe, or fate, and finding some kind of solace in it. (pg572) Author suggests this may have been a view held by Nietzsche for biographical reasons.

Further disagreement may be found in Nietzsche's view of the suffering of others, or in the value of compassion. Here author helps himself again to Nietzsche's biography, pointing out that he was deeply compassionate (pg574). Instead, author argues Nietzsche thinks rather that compassion has bad effects, specifically in weakening the healthy (pg573). This leads to a deeper discussion about the virtues Nietzsche found valuable in life, especially 'warlike virtues' which author interprets more to be about being bold, taking risks, and struggling to create great works. (pg574-6) More trouble arises when Nietzsche discusses the 'healthy aristocracy', which will be both great and also subject 'untold' humans to degradation and suffering. (pg577)

Author turns to exploring why Nietzsche had these beliefs to find their (partial) justification (pg578-9), calling attention to Nietzsche's insanity near the end of his life as partial evidence for the views he held. Author comes to claim (pg581) that often Nietzsche is not aiming at moral truth, but instead at other goals for humanity. Thus the disagreement isn't comparable. But what is happening is that Nietzsche is appealing to reasons beyond the moral; for author reason is more fundamental anyway, so the discussion moves to Nietzsche's proposed reason-giving alternatives to morality.

Author moves to discuss Nietzsche's view of moral truth, and the concepts of moral goodness and evil in general (pg582). Author first examines Nietzsche's view about moral responsibility, which he says we cannot have because we don't have the type of freedom necessary for guilt. Second, there is the Nietzschean view that morality involves a false psychology of acting from obligation or altruism, which does not exist as an intention or motivation. Author claims morality does not rest on this psychology. (pg583) Author takes a brief apparent detour into the Kantian double meaning of "sollen", a German word that can be both "shall" and "ought", one of which can be true/false, the former other cannot. (pg584-5) Schopenhauer argued against the 'shall' version of 'sollen' after it first gets admittance by reason with the sense of 'ought'. (pg585) The detour through 'sollen' and Schopenhauer comes back to Neitzsche because both believed that the concept of God underpinned morality in the 'shall' sense, and since God did not exist, morality fell too. (pg586-7) Author reasserts that there are reasons for morality even without God, and that commands should not be equated with 'oughts' (pg588). Thus author concludes that Nietzsche takes the fundamental moral relationship to be one of 'shalls' rather than 'oughts'. Thus the disagreement is not comparable to author's sequence of reason-based oughts.

The next biggest challenge involves the Nietzschean view that equal rights for all is misguided, or false-- since the creative geniuses deserve much greater consideration and can trample others. But author takes the statements that the whole of society would benefit from the works of great people to mean that Nietzsche also gave consideration to the 'mediocre'. (pg590-1) Author interprets Nietzsche to agree about the badness of suffering (pg591-2), and also to back into a kind of utilitarianism that justifies the suffering of many for the great works of the few for which such suffering may exist. (pg592-3) Author moves to the discussion of morality and happiness, or virtue and flourishing, and the strained relationship between them (pg594-5) in Nietzsche. However, author claims contradictory comments are inconclusive.

The discussion is really on the "meaning of life", or for Nietzsche whether there is such a goal or destiny. Since God is out of the picture, another possibility is that nature, or life itself, has one for humanity. But in this case, consciousness, especially of agreeable or disagreeable conditions (e.g. suffering, pleasure) are means for achieving some end (since life gave us consciousness along with all our other tools for achieving whatever end it has for us). (pg596-7) Thus suffering isn't bad in itself. Author denies that nature's goal for humans should be our goal, or that nature might even have a goal for us. Nietzsche however goes further in that life or nature may not provide the goals, instead that values are our own-- and he seeks a new value system once morality has been felled (pg599-600). Author summarizes the various claims on pg 602-3. Author chalks much of the perceived disagreement to either Nietzsche's mistaking commands for oughts, or insanity.