12/19/2008
Edition with Introduction by John E Smith
The selections from chapter 2 and is about the problem of the composition and identity of a community. Author first seeks to establish that there are genuine creations of a community that reflect intelligence but cannot be reduced to the creations of any of the individuals, e.g. customs, language, religion. Author claims that the appropriate unit here is that of the community, which will have psychological laws (and deserving of certain moral treatment) all of its own. In chapter 9 author lays out the objections to this view, that of the many composing the one, and specifically how there are three parts of an individual that seem un-malleable: (VII)
1) we have an intimate connection to our own feelings and not to those of others
2) we have an intimate connection to our own thoughts and not to those of others
3) our deeds are done individually, by my own will for which I am only responsible
Author believes this final feature is the one of the most moral significance and complicates it by suggesting there are times when, in the throes of a mob or collective, you do something that didn't originate from your own considered judgment but instead from group 'ethical pluralism'. Author discusses how James was forced to concede that there were times when individuals became part of a larger collective, yet author doesn't believe that James had found the appropriate identifying conditions. (VIII-IX) The aspect of a group that makes it a community is an analog to the aspect of a present human organism that makes it a self: a sense of history and self-conscious placement within that history. (X-XI) The individual interprets its history and projects its future, just as it places itself within a history that it shares with the community's history. Author calls this a 'community of memory'.
Chapter 13 deals with interpretation, starting with a 'community of interpretation' in the sciences. Before a particular scientists' work is adopted into the general consensus of knowledge, it must be accepted by the scientific community in general, specifically they must understand and interpret what data she used and how her conclusions relate to the rest of scientific knowledge. This is a 'triadic' process (II-VI) where the individual scientist relates her concepts about the world to others, who then relate their concepts to her concepts and then to the world-- a method of interpretation. Author uses the example of two men in a row boat: neither can confirm the others' peculiar perspective, so therefore the real properties real row boat is a matter of interpreting their different perceptions in a communal space about the real row boat. (V)
The second part of the chapter seeks to underwrite the how necessary is the existence of the community of interpretation. Author does this by making it requisite for the existence of the real world. There are two general theses in metaphysics, author calls them 'the idea of present experience and the idea of the goal of experience' (XII). This is a version of a becoming/being or appearance/Reality distinction. The goal of metaphysics is to interpret these thesis into a working model: to interpret. Yet interpretation takes a communal nature, especially when 'no man should be a judge in his own case' especially when there is a social, communal interest in the outcome. (III-IV) Thus the interpretation of the real world and a community of interpretation are intricately related and as sure as we are there is a real world, we also presuppose a community of interpretation.
12/12/08
Davidson, Donald - Interpretation: Hard In Theory, Easy In Practice
12/12/2008
Paper given in 1998
The paper tries to establish the mutual dependence of language and thought, more aptly conceptualization. When comparing with a form of conceptual atomism (Fodor), author distinguishes between having a concept which is 'simply to discriminate objects or properties of one sort or another' and 'plac[ing] objects in[to] a category' (pg2), the latter being the approach he prefers. To place something into a category is to 'opine that it belongs there, and opnions are prone to error, they are true or false, and they are in part identified by their relations to other judgments' (pg2)
The paper wanders through the typical problems of interpreting another's propositional content from their speech.(pg3-4) With the example of a non-human animal that is able to discriminate between colors, author want to know how we can eliminate the possiblity that it 'isn't the activation of certain rods and cones in his eyes, or the firing of certain optic nerves...' instead of color. If we can't distinguish between the various possible causes for the parrot (Alex's) response, then we can't determine the content of the answer. But if we cannot attribute content to Alex, then we can't attribute thought, since there is no thought without content. (pg4-5)
Interestingly, in this paper Davidson retracts his Swampman argument, claming that 'science fiction stories that imagine thigs that never happen provide poor testing ground for our intuitions concerning concepts like the concept of a person' (pg6)
Author tours through a brief history of the various realist and nominalist positions from Plato to Quine, then concludes that there is a difference between 'showing, by one's behavior, that one merely responds to perceptual similarities, and that one has a criterion for grouping things found perceptually similar.' (pg10) To have a concept 'is to be able to judge, that is, believe, that something falls under the concept. Having a concept is like knowing what a predicate means... in other words, no concepts without propositional contents'. (pg10-11)
So how do we attribute these to people or non-human animals? We can know that propositional attitudes like belief are also related to intentions, perceptions, memories, desires, hopes, etc (pg11), so finding any will give us reason to assume the rest (pg11). Author briefly sketches his triangulation argument, that we're given reason to attribute conceptualization when we encounter not just animals that perceive (pg12) but also ones that recognize when they make mistakes, that is, can distinguish between objective conditions and their categorizations. Not only this, but 'it seems likely that a mind cannot accpt the idea of error without some notion of how error is to be explained. We know of no way all this can be shared by creatures except through the use of language' (pg13). Language and thought become interdependent, with true conceptualization arising 'only in a social setting, and in that setting conceptualization and thought emerge accompanied by the development of language' (pg14).
Paper given in 1998
The paper tries to establish the mutual dependence of language and thought, more aptly conceptualization. When comparing with a form of conceptual atomism (Fodor), author distinguishes between having a concept which is 'simply to discriminate objects or properties of one sort or another' and 'plac[ing] objects in[to] a category' (pg2), the latter being the approach he prefers. To place something into a category is to 'opine that it belongs there, and opnions are prone to error, they are true or false, and they are in part identified by their relations to other judgments' (pg2)
The paper wanders through the typical problems of interpreting another's propositional content from their speech.(pg3-4) With the example of a non-human animal that is able to discriminate between colors, author want to know how we can eliminate the possiblity that it 'isn't the activation of certain rods and cones in his eyes, or the firing of certain optic nerves...' instead of color. If we can't distinguish between the various possible causes for the parrot (Alex's) response, then we can't determine the content of the answer. But if we cannot attribute content to Alex, then we can't attribute thought, since there is no thought without content. (pg4-5)
Interestingly, in this paper Davidson retracts his Swampman argument, claming that 'science fiction stories that imagine thigs that never happen provide poor testing ground for our intuitions concerning concepts like the concept of a person' (pg6)
Author tours through a brief history of the various realist and nominalist positions from Plato to Quine, then concludes that there is a difference between 'showing, by one's behavior, that one merely responds to perceptual similarities, and that one has a criterion for grouping things found perceptually similar.' (pg10) To have a concept 'is to be able to judge, that is, believe, that something falls under the concept. Having a concept is like knowing what a predicate means... in other words, no concepts without propositional contents'. (pg10-11)
So how do we attribute these to people or non-human animals? We can know that propositional attitudes like belief are also related to intentions, perceptions, memories, desires, hopes, etc (pg11), so finding any will give us reason to assume the rest (pg11). Author briefly sketches his triangulation argument, that we're given reason to attribute conceptualization when we encounter not just animals that perceive (pg12) but also ones that recognize when they make mistakes, that is, can distinguish between objective conditions and their categorizations. Not only this, but 'it seems likely that a mind cannot accpt the idea of error without some notion of how error is to be explained. We know of no way all this can be shared by creatures except through the use of language' (pg13). Language and thought become interdependent, with true conceptualization arising 'only in a social setting, and in that setting conceptualization and thought emerge accompanied by the development of language' (pg14).
12/5/08
Davidson, Donald - Mental Events
12/05/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 11 Clarendon Press 1980
In this essay author lays out the support for the theory of anamalous monism, which is needed because he wants to make the following triad consistent:
1) At least some mental events interact causally with physical events.
2) Where there is causality, there is a description of deterministic lawfulness.
3) There are no strict deterministic laws that predict or explain mental events.
These seem inconsistent and all plausible. The first part of the paper deals with giving a view of physicalism that is consistent with 3. Author lays out an identity theory where mental events are identical to physical ones, and events are tokens 'unrepeatable, dated individuals'. (pg209) There is some difficulty with including bona fide mental events among all the physical ones. (pg210-12) Author proposes to consider intentionality as the criterion. (pg211) The downside of this approach is that it denies there are 'strict laws connecting the mental and the physical', a kind-kind identity (pg212-13). The different kinds of of monism and dualism are described, with author taking anamalous monism and briefly describing it.
The second part of the paper defends the downside of the theory that there are no strict psychophysical laws. This seems to be a case of philosophy encroaching on science, which author wants to deny. (pg216-219) Author uses an analogy of how using behaviorism in trying to define belief has failed us, and that a more general point is that the holism in interpretation of the mental is what restricts the possibility of psychophysical laws. Author also delves into the grue / bleen problem. Author lays out a distinction between homonomic and heteronomic generalizations, heteronomic being ones that, in order to describe the lawfulness of a generalization, needs to shift between vocabularies. (pg219) Author discusses the problem of 'longer-than': it is only a problem until there are a whole 'set of axioms, laws or postulates', e.g., the idea of rigid, macroscopic objects that 'longer-than' is a part of, that underwrite lawlike statements of the physical sciences. (pg221) The ideal in the physical sciences is to have a homonomic set of descriptions, yet much of it is still heteronomic, especially all the areas that link the mental to the physical. (pg221-2) 'There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence' (pg222).
The last part of the paper proves the identity of the mental to the physical, or at least those mental events that cause physical ones and vice versa. Mental events that enter into causal relations with physical ones must be subject to physical law (of causation), thus have a physical description, hence is physical. (pg224) Note that this only works for mental events that interact with physical ones via causation.
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 11 Clarendon Press 1980
In this essay author lays out the support for the theory of anamalous monism, which is needed because he wants to make the following triad consistent:
1) At least some mental events interact causally with physical events.
2) Where there is causality, there is a description of deterministic lawfulness.
3) There are no strict deterministic laws that predict or explain mental events.
These seem inconsistent and all plausible. The first part of the paper deals with giving a view of physicalism that is consistent with 3. Author lays out an identity theory where mental events are identical to physical ones, and events are tokens 'unrepeatable, dated individuals'. (pg209) There is some difficulty with including bona fide mental events among all the physical ones. (pg210-12) Author proposes to consider intentionality as the criterion. (pg211) The downside of this approach is that it denies there are 'strict laws connecting the mental and the physical', a kind-kind identity (pg212-13). The different kinds of of monism and dualism are described, with author taking anamalous monism and briefly describing it.
The second part of the paper defends the downside of the theory that there are no strict psychophysical laws. This seems to be a case of philosophy encroaching on science, which author wants to deny. (pg216-219) Author uses an analogy of how using behaviorism in trying to define belief has failed us, and that a more general point is that the holism in interpretation of the mental is what restricts the possibility of psychophysical laws. Author also delves into the grue / bleen problem. Author lays out a distinction between homonomic and heteronomic generalizations, heteronomic being ones that, in order to describe the lawfulness of a generalization, needs to shift between vocabularies. (pg219) Author discusses the problem of 'longer-than': it is only a problem until there are a whole 'set of axioms, laws or postulates', e.g., the idea of rigid, macroscopic objects that 'longer-than' is a part of, that underwrite lawlike statements of the physical sciences. (pg221) The ideal in the physical sciences is to have a homonomic set of descriptions, yet much of it is still heteronomic, especially all the areas that link the mental to the physical. (pg221-2) 'There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence' (pg222).
The last part of the paper proves the identity of the mental to the physical, or at least those mental events that cause physical ones and vice versa. Mental events that enter into causal relations with physical ones must be subject to physical law (of causation), thus have a physical description, hence is physical. (pg224) Note that this only works for mental events that interact with physical ones via causation.
11/21/08
Davidson, Donald - Intending
11/21/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 5 Clarendon Press 1980
A landmark essay that begins with a distinction between having an intention and forming an intention. Author gives the first take on his idea of acting with an intention: you act for a reason. The difference is brought out in the following examples: (pg83-85)
1) His reason for boarding a plane marked 'London' was that he wanted to board a plane headed for London, England, and he believed the plane marked 'London' was going there.
2) His intention in boarding the plane marked 'London' was to board a plane headed for London, England.
Author comments that 1) entails 2), but not necessarily 2) entails 1). Also, the belief in 1) is opaque-- you can't substitute into it (for instance, if the plane marked 'London' was going to London, Ontario). Yet the plane in 2) is transparent. Author also suggests that the 'intention in boarding the plane marked...' is opaque. (pg85) Reasons comprised of beliefs and pro-attitude 'value judgments' (pg86) underwrite intentions, though many intentional actions aren't done by actively forming an intention. (pg85) The problem with this traditional account is intervening causation that manages to perform the action but not for the right reasons. (pg87) A more fruitful discussion of intention might be better served by looking at 'pure intending', that is, intending without accompanied by action. (pg88)
--Is pure intending an action? Not in the performative sense. (pg89-91)
--Is intending to act a belief that one will do so? This is tricky. Adding 'if I can' to an intention is superfluous, unless it is an overt speech act to reduce the probability of your intention happening. (pg92-3) Yet an intention might be formed even when you believe it will be difficult, or unlikely, that you'll complete the action. (pg95)
--Is intending to do something the same as wanting to do it? Here we have a problem from Anscombe where the desire to eat something sweet might be expressed as a law-like generalization that will make tons of variegated actions as desirable (e.g. eating candy laced with poison). 'The trouble about pure intending is that there is no action to judge simply good or desirable' (pg97) Author proposes that actions that are desirable in a certain attribute (e.g. sweet-eating) are prima facie judgments. There must be a further judgment that this attribute is enough to act on, an all-out judgment that results in 'This action is desirable' (pg98). Having specificity is very important because it picks from the class of possible actions one particular action that can be evaluated (pg96). Pure intending (an all-out judgment) for a certain action type is also possible if there are background beliefs and conditions that will avoid undesirable actions. (pg98)
Lastly, author clears up the earlier issue of 'if I can' and such: an all-out judgment about what is desirable is held 'given the rest of what I believe about the immediate future'. (pg99-100) Author also distinguishes from intentions and wishes, aside from wishes not consistent with what one believes is possible, there is little to distinguish them, except the assertion that intentions are 'not mere' wishes (pg101).
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 5 Clarendon Press 1980
A landmark essay that begins with a distinction between having an intention and forming an intention. Author gives the first take on his idea of acting with an intention: you act for a reason. The difference is brought out in the following examples: (pg83-85)
1) His reason for boarding a plane marked 'London' was that he wanted to board a plane headed for London, England, and he believed the plane marked 'London' was going there.
2) His intention in boarding the plane marked 'London' was to board a plane headed for London, England.
Author comments that 1) entails 2), but not necessarily 2) entails 1). Also, the belief in 1) is opaque-- you can't substitute into it (for instance, if the plane marked 'London' was going to London, Ontario). Yet the plane in 2) is transparent. Author also suggests that the 'intention in boarding the plane marked...' is opaque. (pg85) Reasons comprised of beliefs and pro-attitude 'value judgments' (pg86) underwrite intentions, though many intentional actions aren't done by actively forming an intention. (pg85) The problem with this traditional account is intervening causation that manages to perform the action but not for the right reasons. (pg87) A more fruitful discussion of intention might be better served by looking at 'pure intending', that is, intending without accompanied by action. (pg88)
--Is pure intending an action? Not in the performative sense. (pg89-91)
--Is intending to act a belief that one will do so? This is tricky. Adding 'if I can' to an intention is superfluous, unless it is an overt speech act to reduce the probability of your intention happening. (pg92-3) Yet an intention might be formed even when you believe it will be difficult, or unlikely, that you'll complete the action. (pg95)
--Is intending to do something the same as wanting to do it? Here we have a problem from Anscombe where the desire to eat something sweet might be expressed as a law-like generalization that will make tons of variegated actions as desirable (e.g. eating candy laced with poison). 'The trouble about pure intending is that there is no action to judge simply good or desirable' (pg97) Author proposes that actions that are desirable in a certain attribute (e.g. sweet-eating) are prima facie judgments. There must be a further judgment that this attribute is enough to act on, an all-out judgment that results in 'This action is desirable' (pg98). Having specificity is very important because it picks from the class of possible actions one particular action that can be evaluated (pg96). Pure intending (an all-out judgment) for a certain action type is also possible if there are background beliefs and conditions that will avoid undesirable actions. (pg98)
Lastly, author clears up the earlier issue of 'if I can' and such: an all-out judgment about what is desirable is held 'given the rest of what I believe about the immediate future'. (pg99-100) Author also distinguishes from intentions and wishes, aside from wishes not consistent with what one believes is possible, there is little to distinguish them, except the assertion that intentions are 'not mere' wishes (pg101).
11/14/08
Davidson, Donald - How is Weakness of the Will Possible?
11/14/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 2 Clarendon Press 1980
A reprinting of a paper where author tries to deal with the logical problem of weakness of the will in intentional actions. Davidson first decides this is the same as incontinence (pg21-2), and gives a definition: (pg22)
A acts incontinently iff: A does x intentionally; A believes that y is open to him; A judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than x.
The problem is that an intentional action seems to be one done once all things are considered. There seems to be an inconsistent triad:
P1) If A wants x more than y and can do either and acts intentionally, A will do x over y
P2) If A judges that it's better to do x than y, A will want to do x more than y
P3) There are incontinent actions
Author doesn't want to pick away at these premises, but instead largely affirm them and also claim they aren't inconsistent. (pg23-4)
I. What follows is a discussion largely about the nature of intentional action, how it's opaque to substitution (pg25), how it is independent from moralizing (pg29-30), how it doesn't argue for any particular meta-ethical theory (pg26). Author also argues strongly that we must resist the temptation to reject P2 (pg27-8).
II. Author discusses Aristotle's practical syllogism and Aquinas' account of the incontinent man. (pg31-3) This leads to a specific point: even if we get rid of the multiple sources for desire, just within, say, the desire to act morally and only morally there can be conflict. Author rejects the 'single principle' solution. (pg34) In Aristotle, Aquinas and Hare, the battle is between two forces, one wins. In Plato and Butler and perhaps Dante, there are three actors: the two forces, and then another, 'the will' or 'conscience' that decides which wins. (pg35-6)
The solution to the problem of incontinence is to hold that there is a prima facie judgment based on a set of reasons that holds x desirable, but there is another, all-things-considered judgment based on a set of reasons (that includes the earlier set) that holds y more desirable. A performs x, and there is no logical contradition between an all-things-considered (universalized) judgment and a prima facie one. (pg37-39) 'If we are to have a coherent theory of practical reason, we must give up the idea that we can detacth conclusions about what is desirable ... from the principles that lend those conclusions colour. The trouble lies in the tacit assumption that moral principles have the form of universalized conditionals; once this assumption is made, nothing we can do with a prima facie operator in the conclusion will save things' (pg37)
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 2 Clarendon Press 1980
A reprinting of a paper where author tries to deal with the logical problem of weakness of the will in intentional actions. Davidson first decides this is the same as incontinence (pg21-2), and gives a definition: (pg22)
A acts incontinently iff: A does x intentionally; A believes that y is open to him; A judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than x.
The problem is that an intentional action seems to be one done once all things are considered. There seems to be an inconsistent triad:
P1) If A wants x more than y and can do either and acts intentionally, A will do x over y
P2) If A judges that it's better to do x than y, A will want to do x more than y
P3) There are incontinent actions
Author doesn't want to pick away at these premises, but instead largely affirm them and also claim they aren't inconsistent. (pg23-4)
I. What follows is a discussion largely about the nature of intentional action, how it's opaque to substitution (pg25), how it is independent from moralizing (pg29-30), how it doesn't argue for any particular meta-ethical theory (pg26). Author also argues strongly that we must resist the temptation to reject P2 (pg27-8).
II. Author discusses Aristotle's practical syllogism and Aquinas' account of the incontinent man. (pg31-3) This leads to a specific point: even if we get rid of the multiple sources for desire, just within, say, the desire to act morally and only morally there can be conflict. Author rejects the 'single principle' solution. (pg34) In Aristotle, Aquinas and Hare, the battle is between two forces, one wins. In Plato and Butler and perhaps Dante, there are three actors: the two forces, and then another, 'the will' or 'conscience' that decides which wins. (pg35-6)
The solution to the problem of incontinence is to hold that there is a prima facie judgment based on a set of reasons that holds x desirable, but there is another, all-things-considered judgment based on a set of reasons (that includes the earlier set) that holds y more desirable. A performs x, and there is no logical contradition between an all-things-considered (universalized) judgment and a prima facie one. (pg37-39) 'If we are to have a coherent theory of practical reason, we must give up the idea that we can detacth conclusions about what is desirable ... from the principles that lend those conclusions colour. The trouble lies in the tacit assumption that moral principles have the form of universalized conditionals; once this assumption is made, nothing we can do with a prima facie operator in the conclusion will save things' (pg37)
11/7/08
Davidson, Donald - Actions, Reasons, and Causes
11/07/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 23 1963
An oldie where the main argument is that reasons for action are causes for action. Reasons 'rationalize' action by showing: (pg685)
a) a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind
b) believing one's actions are of this kind
These two combine to form a 'primary reason' for why an agent performed an action. (pg686) The paper then describes how to construct a primary reason, and then argues that a primary reason for an action is the action's cause.
Author discusses how, in general, primary reasons are given and how they should be given. (pg686-690) Further discussion is spent defending against some small technicalities: justifying isn't the same as giving reasons (pg691), and that re-describing reasons doesn't rule out reasons being causes. (pg691-3)
Lastly is the defense for the thesis that a primary reason for an action is its cause.
The objections:
A. Causes are events, and mental states aren't events.
Reply: there are mental events that are almost always part of primary reasons
B. Effects and Causes must be logically distinct, primary reasons aren't distinct from their actions
Reply: logically they are, even though, perhaps, they aren't always distinct grammatically (see pg687-8)
C. Causes relate to Effects by a lawlike generality, there are no such available in actions
Reply: true, but the trouble here is that you're looking for laws among the wrong kinds of things
D. Knowledge of Cause and Effect is inductive, but self-knowledge about reasons isn't
Reply: this isn't essential to causes and effects
E. Talking about causes of actions is weird, either removing the agent or involving infinite regress
Reply: not when you use reasons as causes!
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 23 1963
An oldie where the main argument is that reasons for action are causes for action. Reasons 'rationalize' action by showing: (pg685)
a) a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind
b) believing one's actions are of this kind
These two combine to form a 'primary reason' for why an agent performed an action. (pg686) The paper then describes how to construct a primary reason, and then argues that a primary reason for an action is the action's cause.
Author discusses how, in general, primary reasons are given and how they should be given. (pg686-690) Further discussion is spent defending against some small technicalities: justifying isn't the same as giving reasons (pg691), and that re-describing reasons doesn't rule out reasons being causes. (pg691-3)
Lastly is the defense for the thesis that a primary reason for an action is its cause.
The objections:
A. Causes are events, and mental states aren't events.
Reply: there are mental events that are almost always part of primary reasons
B. Effects and Causes must be logically distinct, primary reasons aren't distinct from their actions
Reply: logically they are, even though, perhaps, they aren't always distinct grammatically (see pg687-8)
C. Causes relate to Effects by a lawlike generality, there are no such available in actions
Reply: true, but the trouble here is that you're looking for laws among the wrong kinds of things
D. Knowledge of Cause and Effect is inductive, but self-knowledge about reasons isn't
Reply: this isn't essential to causes and effects
E. Talking about causes of actions is weird, either removing the agent or involving infinite regress
Reply: not when you use reasons as causes!
10/31/08
Smith, Michael - The Explanatory Role Of Being Rational
10/31/2008
This paper starts with a discussion of the classical Humean description of action, as being a belief and a desire put together in a particular causal way to produce an action. Author argues that there is actually another piece to this story, that the agent so doing is instrumentally rational. So, put this way we have:
a desire for an end + a means-ends belief + instrumental rationality = an action
Roughly, this corresponds to Hempel's deductivist claim about what schema action needs to conform to: (pg90)
1- Actor was in situation of type C
2- A was a rational agent
3- In a type C situation, any rational agent will do X
Conclusion: A does X
Author quotes Hempel, who defends this schema. (pg91-2) The instrumental rationality isn't just having the capacity, it's exercising it. (pg94-5)
This approach was criticized by Davidson, who claimed that instrumental rationality is the background assumption of action, not a peculiar constitutive element. (pg96-8) Author responds to this point by discussing a problem that Davidson himself had: that of 'wayward internal causation' (pg100-1). This is where the appropriate belief and desire are formed but something else ends up causing the intended action. The consensus on a fix of this is to use modal propositions about how the agent would have behaved under slight variations in the situation. Author argues this already imports elements of very local instrumental rationality. (pg101-2)
Author wants to expand this local rationality to mean a larger kind of rationality altogether (pg102). For this author uses a thought experiment of a John, who has a desire to be healthy and believes that flexing his bicep will do so, but so will flexing his triceps.(pg102-8) Good instrumental rationality should assign equal preference for either action if both are equally salubrious, lesser if one is lesser, etc.
The second part of the paper considers how rationality might play a non-constitutive part in action, namely playing a part in forming beliefs and forming desires. (pg110-120) Here there can be rational ways to form means-ends beliefs, and less rational ways. But what of desires? Surely a Humean will deny rational ways to form desires. Author here tries to convince us that we can appeal to reason about what we should desire in a non-instrumental way (pg116-121), perhaps showing that some situations are 'reason-giving'. The schema would go as follows:
1- A was in situation of type E
2- A was a rational subject
3- In a situation of type E and rational agent will desire the end that Q
Conclusion: A rationally desired the end that Q
This paper starts with a discussion of the classical Humean description of action, as being a belief and a desire put together in a particular causal way to produce an action. Author argues that there is actually another piece to this story, that the agent so doing is instrumentally rational. So, put this way we have:
a desire for an end + a means-ends belief + instrumental rationality = an action
Roughly, this corresponds to Hempel's deductivist claim about what schema action needs to conform to: (pg90)
1- Actor was in situation of type C
2- A was a rational agent
3- In a type C situation, any rational agent will do X
Conclusion: A does X
Author quotes Hempel, who defends this schema. (pg91-2) The instrumental rationality isn't just having the capacity, it's exercising it. (pg94-5)
This approach was criticized by Davidson, who claimed that instrumental rationality is the background assumption of action, not a peculiar constitutive element. (pg96-8) Author responds to this point by discussing a problem that Davidson himself had: that of 'wayward internal causation' (pg100-1). This is where the appropriate belief and desire are formed but something else ends up causing the intended action. The consensus on a fix of this is to use modal propositions about how the agent would have behaved under slight variations in the situation. Author argues this already imports elements of very local instrumental rationality. (pg101-2)
Author wants to expand this local rationality to mean a larger kind of rationality altogether (pg102). For this author uses a thought experiment of a John, who has a desire to be healthy and believes that flexing his bicep will do so, but so will flexing his triceps.(pg102-8) Good instrumental rationality should assign equal preference for either action if both are equally salubrious, lesser if one is lesser, etc.
The second part of the paper considers how rationality might play a non-constitutive part in action, namely playing a part in forming beliefs and forming desires. (pg110-120) Here there can be rational ways to form means-ends beliefs, and less rational ways. But what of desires? Surely a Humean will deny rational ways to form desires. Author here tries to convince us that we can appeal to reason about what we should desire in a non-instrumental way (pg116-121), perhaps showing that some situations are 'reason-giving'. The schema would go as follows:
1- A was in situation of type E
2- A was a rational subject
3- In a situation of type E and rational agent will desire the end that Q
Conclusion: A rationally desired the end that Q
10/23/08
Fish, Stanley - Buttons and Bows
10/24/2008
New York Times, October 12, 2008
An article in the secular media about a few examples of teachers in public schools and publicly funded educational institutions being restricted by the administration from wearing buttons that endorse candidates. Author describes the potential US Constitutional issues here regarding free speech, refers to the supreme court case of Tinker v Des Moines where a test is given about restrictions on free speech: does it 'materially disrupt the work and discipline of the school'? In many cases of students' speech, the answer is no. Author argues that the teacher's displaying his/her views may alter the way a student studies, writes papers, etc. Author argues that teachers aren't restricted from wearing buttons outside of the classroom, just inside where they prime duties are to teach, not to proselytize.
New York Times, October 12, 2008
An article in the secular media about a few examples of teachers in public schools and publicly funded educational institutions being restricted by the administration from wearing buttons that endorse candidates. Author describes the potential US Constitutional issues here regarding free speech, refers to the supreme court case of Tinker v Des Moines where a test is given about restrictions on free speech: does it 'materially disrupt the work and discipline of the school'? In many cases of students' speech, the answer is no. Author argues that the teacher's displaying his/her views may alter the way a student studies, writes papers, etc. Author argues that teachers aren't restricted from wearing buttons outside of the classroom, just inside where they prime duties are to teach, not to proselytize.
10/17/08
Nichols, Shaun & Knobe, Joshua - Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuition
10/17/2008
Nous, vol 41 number 4 2007
This paper explores how affect plays a role in evaluating moral responsibility. Here the debate is framed in a way to shed some light on an age-old debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism in moral theory. Compatibilism is the theory that moral agency is compatible with a deterministic universe. Incompatibilism is the opposite: moral agency doesn't wholly apply if we live in a deterministic universe. Philosophers have relied on different bits of psychological and anecdotal evidence for claiming that people are either largely compatibilists or largely incompatibilists.
The paper seeks to show that in some contexts people come out as incompatibilists, yet in others they are strongly compatibilist. The difference comes out instead when affective responses are elicited in a description of a hypothetical where subjects have to assign moral responsibility. At times when the description is largely abstract and a deterministic world is posited, people reply with incompatibilist-type responses, largely alleviating moral responsibility. When a more concrete situation is described, using names and giving an identifying story to the moral hypothetical, people assign moral agency (or moral blame) and become compatibilists. (pg664-671) This effect becomes less pronounced as concrete hypotheticals become more terse and resemble short abstract hypotheticals. (pg670) Also of note is that people are more apt to give harsher punishments once the transgressor has been identified, rather than prior to that identification. (pg665)
Authors propose 3 distinct theories that could account for this phenomenon. (pg671-5) They are as follows:
Performance Error Model: affective responses distort people's judgments, making them unable to apply their theory of moral responsibility. Thus people are largely incompatibilists but readily assign moral responsibility when they have an affective response to a hypothetical. This has an affinity with people willing to hold people more responsible when they are experiencing even unrelated negative emotions.
Affective Competence Model: employing affective responses about moral situations is the core method by which moral judgments are reached, thus the abstract hypotheticals are problematic, not the concrete ones. Hence people are fundamentally compatibilist.
Concrete Competence Model: it is concreteness, not affect, that is the primary difference here; abstract hypotheticals fail to adequately signal the subject (or a special 'moral module' inside the subject) for a moral judgment, while concrete hypotheticals do.
Authors consider that hybrid answers are also possible, but they advocate one in particular: 'Affect serves both as part of the fundamental competence underlying responsibility judgments and as a factor that can sometimes lead to performance errors.' (pg674) Authors then try to show some other evidence that might eliminate one of the models, and possibly support their own hybrid theory.
The evidence offered (pg675-7) now dealt with two concrete hypotheticals, one 'high-affect' about rape and the other 'low-affect' about tax evasion. This experiement attempted to control for concreteness. The results were that people were compatibilists about rape but incompatibilists about tax evasion. The Affective Competence model might have a hard time accounting for the difference that is also revealed between a deterministic condition and a indeterministic-free-will condition.(pg676-7)
Lastly, authors examine how their findings might change the way philosophers view people's intuitions about (in)compatibilism. (pg677-680)
Nous, vol 41 number 4 2007
This paper explores how affect plays a role in evaluating moral responsibility. Here the debate is framed in a way to shed some light on an age-old debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism in moral theory. Compatibilism is the theory that moral agency is compatible with a deterministic universe. Incompatibilism is the opposite: moral agency doesn't wholly apply if we live in a deterministic universe. Philosophers have relied on different bits of psychological and anecdotal evidence for claiming that people are either largely compatibilists or largely incompatibilists.
The paper seeks to show that in some contexts people come out as incompatibilists, yet in others they are strongly compatibilist. The difference comes out instead when affective responses are elicited in a description of a hypothetical where subjects have to assign moral responsibility. At times when the description is largely abstract and a deterministic world is posited, people reply with incompatibilist-type responses, largely alleviating moral responsibility. When a more concrete situation is described, using names and giving an identifying story to the moral hypothetical, people assign moral agency (or moral blame) and become compatibilists. (pg664-671) This effect becomes less pronounced as concrete hypotheticals become more terse and resemble short abstract hypotheticals. (pg670) Also of note is that people are more apt to give harsher punishments once the transgressor has been identified, rather than prior to that identification. (pg665)
Authors propose 3 distinct theories that could account for this phenomenon. (pg671-5) They are as follows:
Performance Error Model: affective responses distort people's judgments, making them unable to apply their theory of moral responsibility. Thus people are largely incompatibilists but readily assign moral responsibility when they have an affective response to a hypothetical. This has an affinity with people willing to hold people more responsible when they are experiencing even unrelated negative emotions.
Affective Competence Model: employing affective responses about moral situations is the core method by which moral judgments are reached, thus the abstract hypotheticals are problematic, not the concrete ones. Hence people are fundamentally compatibilist.
Concrete Competence Model: it is concreteness, not affect, that is the primary difference here; abstract hypotheticals fail to adequately signal the subject (or a special 'moral module' inside the subject) for a moral judgment, while concrete hypotheticals do.
Authors consider that hybrid answers are also possible, but they advocate one in particular: 'Affect serves both as part of the fundamental competence underlying responsibility judgments and as a factor that can sometimes lead to performance errors.' (pg674) Authors then try to show some other evidence that might eliminate one of the models, and possibly support their own hybrid theory.
The evidence offered (pg675-7) now dealt with two concrete hypotheticals, one 'high-affect' about rape and the other 'low-affect' about tax evasion. This experiement attempted to control for concreteness. The results were that people were compatibilists about rape but incompatibilists about tax evasion. The Affective Competence model might have a hard time accounting for the difference that is also revealed between a deterministic condition and a indeterministic-free-will condition.(pg676-7)
Lastly, authors examine how their findings might change the way philosophers view people's intuitions about (in)compatibilism. (pg677-680)
10/10/08
Munzer, Stephen - From Innocense to Purity of Heart-- and Back Again
10/10/2008
unpublished paper
This paper is mostly an exploration of what innocence means, how it can be lost, and then what would have to happen for it to be regained, or perhaps just surpassed. Author begins by giving 5 different accounts of innocence:
1. Lack of knowledge of evil
2. Absence of sin or moral wrongdoing
3. Lack of awareness of moral complexity
4. Lack of an experience of moral difficulty/intimate encounter with evil
5. Lack of a capacity to do harm, as of knowledge, intention or will
Author points out that 5. is not a metaphysical or logical inability to harm, but instead some sort of agency inability. This raises the possibility of 'purity of heart', meaning an intentional incapacity to do wrong.
Author discusses how the loss of the various types of innocence might occur, and then proceeds to discuss two examples, that of jealousy and ambition. Author claims it might be possible to become ambitious or jealous and then, after concerted effort and time, extinguish those intentions to regain innocence. Yet the objection to this isn't that innocence is regained but instead some higher level of moral maturity is reached. Author then discusses his replies, perhaps that the objection is too cognitive and that, intellectually-- sure-- there is a difference, but the two situations might be morally similar.
The objection, however, brings up the possibility of a morally superior state after the loss of innocence and the extinction of the evil that caused such a loss. Author mentions how baptism might play into this as a sense of renewal, though it does not return innocence. Lastly, author discusses purity of heart in the bible.
unpublished paper
This paper is mostly an exploration of what innocence means, how it can be lost, and then what would have to happen for it to be regained, or perhaps just surpassed. Author begins by giving 5 different accounts of innocence:
1. Lack of knowledge of evil
2. Absence of sin or moral wrongdoing
3. Lack of awareness of moral complexity
4. Lack of an experience of moral difficulty/intimate encounter with evil
5. Lack of a capacity to do harm, as of knowledge, intention or will
Author points out that 5. is not a metaphysical or logical inability to harm, but instead some sort of agency inability. This raises the possibility of 'purity of heart', meaning an intentional incapacity to do wrong.
Author discusses how the loss of the various types of innocence might occur, and then proceeds to discuss two examples, that of jealousy and ambition. Author claims it might be possible to become ambitious or jealous and then, after concerted effort and time, extinguish those intentions to regain innocence. Yet the objection to this isn't that innocence is regained but instead some higher level of moral maturity is reached. Author then discusses his replies, perhaps that the objection is too cognitive and that, intellectually-- sure-- there is a difference, but the two situations might be morally similar.
The objection, however, brings up the possibility of a morally superior state after the loss of innocence and the extinction of the evil that caused such a loss. Author mentions how baptism might play into this as a sense of renewal, though it does not return innocence. Lastly, author discusses purity of heart in the bible.
10/3/08
Mitchell, Susan - Integrating Knowledge: Complexity, Science and Policy Chapter 2
10/03/2008
Unpublished Manuscript
This chapter mainly deals with the problem of reduction of complex systems. Author argues for a language that 'tracks the diversity' in holistic behavior versus behavior of the parts. There are many kinds of reduction, from Kim's ontological reductionism to epistemic and methodological reduction. Author takes the position that a reduction that entails 'a "nothing more than" account' will miss 'important features' of the behavior of complex systems. It is 'too meager a conceptual framework'. [This appears to be a stance against epistemic reduction.]
Author first discusses how materialism gives prima facie reasons for ontological reduction. However 'reductionism actually makes a stronger claim, namely that there is some basic level of description that corresponds to the basic fundamental level of matter'. Mill and CD Broad took up some of Aristotle's discussion on "emergence" and put forward an epistemic account of non-reducibility e.g. wetness of water. Once most of these examples were shown to actually be reducible, it seemed reductionism had no barriers. Emergence again appeared in the 1970s when discussing neurological complexity. It is in this context that Kim makes the strong case for ontological reductionism.
Author discusses Kim's reductionism and points out the bold assumption he makes: that 'every material object has a unique complete microstructural description'. Author believes this condition won't be satisfied with type-instantiation (multiple realizeability) rather than token-instantiation. Further, to believe that our descriptions of the world can be unified into one language mistakenly believes that our language can successfully map onto reality perfectly in every case, avoiding e.g. bad grammars and generalities.
Author's most lengthy response is as follows: complex systems aren't all just aggregations of simple parts. There are feedback systems, chaotic systems, 'non-linear' dynamics, etc. that are missed on 'any other account of reduction'. Author describes the flight of groups of starling birds and of foraging bees in a colony. One of the issues here is predictability: an account of the individual bird or bee will not predict how the group behaves.
Unpublished Manuscript
This chapter mainly deals with the problem of reduction of complex systems. Author argues for a language that 'tracks the diversity' in holistic behavior versus behavior of the parts. There are many kinds of reduction, from Kim's ontological reductionism to epistemic and methodological reduction. Author takes the position that a reduction that entails 'a "nothing more than" account' will miss 'important features' of the behavior of complex systems. It is 'too meager a conceptual framework'. [This appears to be a stance against epistemic reduction.]
Author first discusses how materialism gives prima facie reasons for ontological reduction. However 'reductionism actually makes a stronger claim, namely that there is some basic level of description that corresponds to the basic fundamental level of matter'. Mill and CD Broad took up some of Aristotle's discussion on "emergence" and put forward an epistemic account of non-reducibility e.g. wetness of water. Once most of these examples were shown to actually be reducible, it seemed reductionism had no barriers. Emergence again appeared in the 1970s when discussing neurological complexity. It is in this context that Kim makes the strong case for ontological reductionism.
Author discusses Kim's reductionism and points out the bold assumption he makes: that 'every material object has a unique complete microstructural description'. Author believes this condition won't be satisfied with type-instantiation (multiple realizeability) rather than token-instantiation. Further, to believe that our descriptions of the world can be unified into one language mistakenly believes that our language can successfully map onto reality perfectly in every case, avoiding e.g. bad grammars and generalities.
Author's most lengthy response is as follows: complex systems aren't all just aggregations of simple parts. There are feedback systems, chaotic systems, 'non-linear' dynamics, etc. that are missed on 'any other account of reduction'. Author describes the flight of groups of starling birds and of foraging bees in a colony. One of the issues here is predictability: an account of the individual bird or bee will not predict how the group behaves.
9/26/08
Gert, Joshua - What Colors Could Not Be: An Argument For Color Primitivism
09/26/2008
Journal of Philosophy, March 2008
This is a paper that suggests that any way of reducing colors to physical or dispositional properties will give more modal properties to color than they should have. Author begins the paper with an analogy to Benacerraf's work on numbers, arguing they are primitive and not reducible to sets. The problem with reduction that Benacerraf reveals is that numbers are reducible to more than one system of sets. To pick between one seems ad hoc, but regardless of this, once picking one there are certain weird questions about numbers that have weird answers e.g.: 'does "3" contain "1" and "2"?' Yes? No? Either answer is weird because the question is 'ill-formed'. However, reducing numbers to sets 'forces' an answer to such a question, thereby giving numbers more properties than they should have. The solution is to make numbers primitive. Author takes this method of argument as an analogy to color.
Author wants color to be fully explained from within the domain of color. It is certainly possible that there will be physical-reductive facts (about surface reflectance, visual perception) that co-instantiate with color, but author argues this is like the set-theoretic account of numbers; they don't reduce to them. (pg130-1) Author takes the fact that there are disputes between color realists as analogous to the different methods of reducing numbers to sets. (pg132-3)
Author's positive account of color primitivism is that color terms do not rigidly designate any properties, nor do they non-rigidly designate any properties either. Instead, color rigidly designates colors. (pg136) If color terms designated anything other than that, then there would be ill-posed modal questions about colors that have truth values, which author argues needs to be avoided. An objection to this view is why you can't extend it by analogy to all property terms, like e.g. shape. Author replies that there are other observational/physical conditions for most other properties can that yield facts-of-the-matter in modal settings (pg139-140).
In the next section author takes Mark Johnston's discussion about 5 core beliefs about color. Johnston argues that these 5 core beliefs are inconsistent and therefore no solution to the reduction of color should have to account for all 5. Author's approach is to suggest a solution to what color is that can accommodate all 5 core beliefs (after he alters one of them). This is meant to recommend color primitivism. (pg 141) Author weakens and re-writes one of the beliefs:
Revelation: The intrinsic nature of Canary Yellow (CY) is fully revealed in an experience as of something CY
Re-written/Modest Revelation: A complete understanding of what CY is can be given by an experience as of something CY, in someone with normal human vision who has already acquired color concepts. (pg142)
Initially, Revelation conflicted with Explanation: Sometimes something's being CY explains why it looks CY. Author argues that with color primitivism, 'Modest Revelation' does not conflict with 'Explanation' (pg144-5) Author then walks through the other accounts of color: that it's a disjunctive primary quality/property of objects (pg145-6), that it's a disposition of a certain kind (pg147-8), that it's a secondary property of reflection (pg148-151). It is here where the reductionist is given a choice of saying that the properties that give rise to color are either nomologically or metaphysically connected to color. Author argues that either choice yields silly truth-values to ill-formed modal questions, and that the color primitivist does not have to pick between these two options. (pg149-150)
Lastly, author takes on the objection of spectrum inversion and considers Wittgenstein's private language argument as the reply to it (pg152-3). Author also discusses the possibility of animal color spectrum being larger than ours is.
Journal of Philosophy, March 2008
This is a paper that suggests that any way of reducing colors to physical or dispositional properties will give more modal properties to color than they should have. Author begins the paper with an analogy to Benacerraf's work on numbers, arguing they are primitive and not reducible to sets. The problem with reduction that Benacerraf reveals is that numbers are reducible to more than one system of sets. To pick between one seems ad hoc, but regardless of this, once picking one there are certain weird questions about numbers that have weird answers e.g.: 'does "3" contain "1" and "2"?' Yes? No? Either answer is weird because the question is 'ill-formed'. However, reducing numbers to sets 'forces' an answer to such a question, thereby giving numbers more properties than they should have. The solution is to make numbers primitive. Author takes this method of argument as an analogy to color.
Author wants color to be fully explained from within the domain of color. It is certainly possible that there will be physical-reductive facts (about surface reflectance, visual perception) that co-instantiate with color, but author argues this is like the set-theoretic account of numbers; they don't reduce to them. (pg130-1) Author takes the fact that there are disputes between color realists as analogous to the different methods of reducing numbers to sets. (pg132-3)
Author's positive account of color primitivism is that color terms do not rigidly designate any properties, nor do they non-rigidly designate any properties either. Instead, color rigidly designates colors. (pg136) If color terms designated anything other than that, then there would be ill-posed modal questions about colors that have truth values, which author argues needs to be avoided. An objection to this view is why you can't extend it by analogy to all property terms, like e.g. shape. Author replies that there are other observational/physical conditions for most other properties can that yield facts-of-the-matter in modal settings (pg139-140).
In the next section author takes Mark Johnston's discussion about 5 core beliefs about color. Johnston argues that these 5 core beliefs are inconsistent and therefore no solution to the reduction of color should have to account for all 5. Author's approach is to suggest a solution to what color is that can accommodate all 5 core beliefs (after he alters one of them). This is meant to recommend color primitivism. (pg 141) Author weakens and re-writes one of the beliefs:
Revelation: The intrinsic nature of Canary Yellow (CY) is fully revealed in an experience as of something CY
Re-written/Modest Revelation: A complete understanding of what CY is can be given by an experience as of something CY, in someone with normal human vision who has already acquired color concepts. (pg142)
Initially, Revelation conflicted with Explanation: Sometimes something's being CY explains why it looks CY. Author argues that with color primitivism, 'Modest Revelation' does not conflict with 'Explanation' (pg144-5) Author then walks through the other accounts of color: that it's a disjunctive primary quality/property of objects (pg145-6), that it's a disposition of a certain kind (pg147-8), that it's a secondary property of reflection (pg148-151). It is here where the reductionist is given a choice of saying that the properties that give rise to color are either nomologically or metaphysically connected to color. Author argues that either choice yields silly truth-values to ill-formed modal questions, and that the color primitivist does not have to pick between these two options. (pg149-150)
Lastly, author takes on the objection of spectrum inversion and considers Wittgenstein's private language argument as the reply to it (pg152-3). Author also discusses the possibility of animal color spectrum being larger than ours is.
9/18/08
Lopes, Dominic McIver - Nobody Needs A Theory of Art
09/19/2008
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 3 March 2008
This paper tries to dispose of the contentious drive for a theory of art and instead replace it with a Theory of the Arts, meaning a theory of painting, sculpture, theatre, and so on. Author offers his simple analysis:An item is a work of Art iff it is produced by a kind of activity that is an Art Form.
Author takes some time to give a history: by the 1700s various distinctions were being drawn between science and art and between aesthetic and moral goodness. (pg 110-2) The rise of 'the arts' was a new phenomenon in Western Culture. There could be 4 lessons from this: (pg112)
1) The concept of Art is historically conditioned
2) There was no art prior to the 1700s (dubious: it relies on there not being a concept of Art prior to there being a theory)
3) The concept of Art comes from a theory of Art
4) Better than 3: the concept of Art comes from a theory of the Arts Author argues that the early moderns were more concerned with a Theory of the Arts, not of Art. The avant-garde in the 1900s was taken as a challenge of Art, not of the Arts, thus an interest in a Theory of Art. (pg114)
Author discusses the two camps for Theory of Art: the functionalist and the proceduralist. The functionalist takes Art to perform a certain function (e.g. aesthetic, experiential). The proceduralist takes Art to be created a certain way (according to specific rules, recipes). (pg116) Functionalists tend to put avant-garde cases outside of Art, while proceduralists tend to include them. The fight is partially over what is included and what isn't: over intuitions, not just explanation. Author also discusses another possible theory criterion: that a Theory of Art should account for why it is so valuable, either culturally or economically. Beardsley (functionalist) does incorporate this desidriatum into his theory, while Dickie (proceduralist) does not; both claim this is a virtue.(pg118) Author claims that conflicting intuitions and conflicting theoretical criteria signal an impasse.
Author discusses how many of us feel bafflement when confronted with an avant-garde work. But what kind of bafflement? Is it conceptual or theoretical? If it is conceptual bafflement, we wouldn't be able to say whether it was Art or not. If it is theoretical bafflement, we wouldn't be able to say why it's Art (or why it isn't).(pg119) Author argues that most of us, most of the time, can tell that an object is Art because of the context it is in. (pg120) The hard part is figuring out what Art Form avant-garde pieces fall into.(pg121-2) Next is theoretical bafflement, which is the standard problem: why is it Art? But if we can settle-- prior to this question-- what Art Form the work is in, this issue is irrelevant. The question is 'why is it sculpture?' not 'why is it Art?'. (pg122-3)
Under this model, author points to four possible outcomes when confronted with the avant-garde:
1) An Art Form admits this work as one of its kind: Art!
2) No Art Form admits this work: Not Art
3) No Art Form admits this work: Yet it is Art
4) No Art Form admits this work but it creates a new Art Form (e.g. conceptual art, film)
Author argues that only in the third case do we need a Theory of Art, and none of the famous examples fit into that third category. Most of the time it is usual and customary to create a new Art Form and thus cases of 3) become 4). (pg123) Author considers searching for a Theory of Art to be a category mistake (pg 123-4)
Lastly, author answers some small objections and shows some of the upshot to accepting his analysis.
9/12/08
Kawall, Jason - The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-being
09/12/2008
The Journal of Value Inquiry 33, 1999
This is a relatively short paper written to defend Mental State Welfare theories against the Experience Machine. The first part of the paper brings out the intuitions about what someones welfare is: it has to affect the individual for it to affect her well-being. (pg381-2) Author then quotes Nozick's Experience Machine argument, but claims that the EM does not hit only against MSW theories. What the EM argues for is our unwillingness to abandon our commitments, whether it be for other things in the real world or not. As an example, author asks us consider achieving perfect virtue, happiness and accomplishments but having to never see your friends and family again. Author says that few would take this, making the analogy between this choice and the EM choice.
Author claims that just because we have commitments we are unwilling to abandon doesn't make them necessary for our well-being. (pg384) Author argues that there is a separation between what we value and what is good for our well-being, possibly creating conflicts between rival values.
In the final part of the paper, author considers a soldier that jumps on a grenade in order to save his fellows. The analysis is that he had a commitment to their lives that conflicted with his own well-being. The possible objection is that there is no conflict; he has accomplished something he values, which is a noble thing, and thus that contributed to his well-being, but not his MSW, thus MSW is incorrect. Author replies, perhaps weakly, that it is possible his MSW would have been worse if he hadn't stifled the grenade: living with the guilt, etc. This reduces it to a matter of prudence or instrumental value.
The Journal of Value Inquiry 33, 1999
This is a relatively short paper written to defend Mental State Welfare theories against the Experience Machine. The first part of the paper brings out the intuitions about what someones welfare is: it has to affect the individual for it to affect her well-being. (pg381-2) Author then quotes Nozick's Experience Machine argument, but claims that the EM does not hit only against MSW theories. What the EM argues for is our unwillingness to abandon our commitments, whether it be for other things in the real world or not. As an example, author asks us consider achieving perfect virtue, happiness and accomplishments but having to never see your friends and family again. Author says that few would take this, making the analogy between this choice and the EM choice.
Author claims that just because we have commitments we are unwilling to abandon doesn't make them necessary for our well-being. (pg384) Author argues that there is a separation between what we value and what is good for our well-being, possibly creating conflicts between rival values.
In the final part of the paper, author considers a soldier that jumps on a grenade in order to save his fellows. The analysis is that he had a commitment to their lives that conflicted with his own well-being. The possible objection is that there is no conflict; he has accomplished something he values, which is a noble thing, and thus that contributed to his well-being, but not his MSW, thus MSW is incorrect. Author replies, perhaps weakly, that it is possible his MSW would have been worse if he hadn't stifled the grenade: living with the guilt, etc. This reduces it to a matter of prudence or instrumental value.
9/5/08
Rivera-Lopez, Eduardo - Are Mental State Welfarism and Our Concern for Non-Experiential Goals Incompatible?
09/05/2008
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly #88 (2007)
This paper tries to show that a version of Mental State Welfarism can account for the thesis that we have legitimate non-experiential goals. Author calls this Compatibility, and because a form of MSW (Mental State Welfarism) includes desires for objective accomplishments, it does not follow that if this form of MSW is true that we would plug into the experience machine. Thus the experience machine can be rejected even for a form of MSW.
Author begins discussion with a discussion of MSW: the subjective satisfaction of desires is the only intrinsically valuable thing. (pg74-5) Note that this is an agent-neutral definition: it doesn't say what is valuable from the agent's perspective, just what is valuable for the agent from an objective perspective (pg84).
The most common objection to MSW is the experience machine, which posits a device that would make you believe you had satisfied your desires: e.g. gave you the subjective satisfaction (that is the only intrinsically valuable thing). The lesson from the experience machine is that we have desires about what really (objectively) happens, not just what we experience: the non-experiential goals thesis. Author treats this thesis as legitimate for value ethics. (pg76) Author points out that a sophisticated hedonist (pg77) who argues that objective goals are just instrumental isn't an effective reply to the experience machine.
Author defends any version of MSW by appealing to the intuition that 'nothing can have intrinsic value if it does not affect someone' (pg78) and gives some examples (pg78-9). Then author launches into an Objector and Defender (of Compatibility) in the form of a dialogue. (pg79-84)
The argument goes as follows:
1) Desire-Satisfaction MSW is the only account of intrinsic value
2) D-S MSWelfarists still have reality-centered desires
3) Removing reality-centered desires from Desire-Satisfaction MSW will remove the 'Desire' part from the D-S MSW.
4) Giving up reality-centered desires will significantly alter the content of the agent's desires, probably impoverishing them and making entrance to the experience machine conditional on significant personal-identity alteration. Furthermore, the life within the experience machine would be unappealing, since the agent would believe she is doing all the things she no longer desires to do. The D-S MSWelfarist would reject the experience machine.
Author compares Non-Experiential Goals to D-S MSW. D-S MSW is an agent-neutral, external value theory. N-E Goals is an agent-perspective value proposition. Author compares these differences to the theories of 'indirect' consequentialism, which says that agent-perspective rules like 'don't kill' must be absolute, but from the external perspective they are just instrumental ways of usually promoting valuable consequences. Yet the agent must believe these are unbreakable rules for the whole system to work! Author calls this moral schizophrenia (pg85) and argues that it seems analogous to the situation in value theory, only much less conflicted and more plausible. In moral theory, there could be two competing norms for the same action. In value theory, two norms (experience-centered desire or reality-centered desire) don't compete because we naturally have reality-centered desires. (pg86) [important]
Lastly, author rejects that this Compatible D-S MSW theory entails plugging into the experience machine. It might give a prima facie reason for plugging other people into the experience machine without their knowledge (but not plugging those people in that you have a desire to see do a particular thing in the world). (pg87-88)
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly #88 (2007)
This paper tries to show that a version of Mental State Welfarism can account for the thesis that we have legitimate non-experiential goals. Author calls this Compatibility, and because a form of MSW (Mental State Welfarism) includes desires for objective accomplishments, it does not follow that if this form of MSW is true that we would plug into the experience machine. Thus the experience machine can be rejected even for a form of MSW.
Author begins discussion with a discussion of MSW: the subjective satisfaction of desires is the only intrinsically valuable thing. (pg74-5) Note that this is an agent-neutral definition: it doesn't say what is valuable from the agent's perspective, just what is valuable for the agent from an objective perspective (pg84).
The most common objection to MSW is the experience machine, which posits a device that would make you believe you had satisfied your desires: e.g. gave you the subjective satisfaction (that is the only intrinsically valuable thing). The lesson from the experience machine is that we have desires about what really (objectively) happens, not just what we experience: the non-experiential goals thesis. Author treats this thesis as legitimate for value ethics. (pg76) Author points out that a sophisticated hedonist (pg77) who argues that objective goals are just instrumental isn't an effective reply to the experience machine.
Author defends any version of MSW by appealing to the intuition that 'nothing can have intrinsic value if it does not affect someone' (pg78) and gives some examples (pg78-9). Then author launches into an Objector and Defender (of Compatibility) in the form of a dialogue. (pg79-84)
The argument goes as follows:
1) Desire-Satisfaction MSW is the only account of intrinsic value
2) D-S MSWelfarists still have reality-centered desires
3) Removing reality-centered desires from Desire-Satisfaction MSW will remove the 'Desire' part from the D-S MSW.
4) Giving up reality-centered desires will significantly alter the content of the agent's desires, probably impoverishing them and making entrance to the experience machine conditional on significant personal-identity alteration. Furthermore, the life within the experience machine would be unappealing, since the agent would believe she is doing all the things she no longer desires to do. The D-S MSWelfarist would reject the experience machine.
Author compares Non-Experiential Goals to D-S MSW. D-S MSW is an agent-neutral, external value theory. N-E Goals is an agent-perspective value proposition. Author compares these differences to the theories of 'indirect' consequentialism, which says that agent-perspective rules like 'don't kill' must be absolute, but from the external perspective they are just instrumental ways of usually promoting valuable consequences. Yet the agent must believe these are unbreakable rules for the whole system to work! Author calls this moral schizophrenia (pg85) and argues that it seems analogous to the situation in value theory, only much less conflicted and more plausible. In moral theory, there could be two competing norms for the same action. In value theory, two norms (experience-centered desire or reality-centered desire) don't compete because we naturally have reality-centered desires. (pg86) [important]
Lastly, author rejects that this Compatible D-S MSW theory entails plugging into the experience machine. It might give a prima facie reason for plugging other people into the experience machine without their knowledge (but not plugging those people in that you have a desire to see do a particular thing in the world). (pg87-88)
8/29/08
Badhwar, Neera - Is Realism Really Bad For You? A Realistic Response
08/29/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Feb 2008
This is a paper about how achieving realistic beliefs and having a reality-oriented attitude is not just important for true happiness, but also somewhat conceptually necessary. Author argues against two skeptical arguments, one being a common-sense view that 'sometimes it's better not-to-know than to-know' and the other is the social-science work by Shelly Taylor and Jonathon Brown on how mild illusions about one's worth and abilities are important for true happiness.
Author first argues that true happiness is a combination of subjective happiness and objective worth. First Abraham Maslow claim that realistic people tend to integrate the 'pleasure principle' with the 'reality principle' to better attain virtues such as unselfishness, caring, etc. Carl Rogers claims that a fully functioning person is honest with herself and honest in how she presents herself to others. (pg85-6) Author describes how Aristotle put as a requisite to happiness practical wisdom, which entails a high degree of self- and other-knowledge and the disposition to act on such wisdom. Author proposes the combination of subjective welfare and objective worth (like virtues) as true happiness. Author also claims that we consider it valuable to be in touch with reality, using rejection of the experience machine as a case in point (pg87-88).
Importantly, author claims realism as 'conceptually necessary' for a life of objective worth:
1) A component to true happiness is to live truly objectively worthwhile lives
2) We cannot know whether we live truly objectively worthwhile lives if we are deluded
3) We cannot know if we have true happiness if we are deluded
What 'realism/being realistic' entails:
'reality-oriented and informed about the important facts of your own life and human life in general, and disposed to act accordingly' (pg89)
The first challenge is from the common-sense notion that sometimes it is better not-t0-know than to-know. The realist is going to be interested in discovering things that might be better-off being left alone. Author argues that the opposite of realist is the self-deceived, and that they are more 'likely to skin their shines on the rough edges of reality' than the realist. (pg90) Author does claim, however that it is possible that learning a fact that adds to your subjective displeasure can actually be good for you, too. Only in the following circumstances:
1) You are aware of some habitual/characteristic negligence
2) Knowledge of x (subjectively unhappy thing) is related to this negligence
3) You use knowledge of x to fix this negligence
Author claims that this is good for you because it will help avoid future tragedies (and also makes you objectively worth more). (pg91)
Author concedes that there is some knowledge that isn't conducive to happiness, and acknowledges that subjective welfare and objective worth may conflict, making happiness difficult to attain. (pg91-2)
More effort and time in the essay is focused on the scientific challenge by Taylor and Brown. Their articles suggest that mild positive illusions about self-worth, abilities, and subjective welfare are conducive for well-being. Also, those under these mild positive illusions tend to be more open, caring, creative, imaginative, ready to grow, etc., therefore it is also conducive to objective worth. Taylor & Brown consider the realists to be a somewhat depressive bunch (pg92) (Downbeat), and the Upbeat to have unrealistic optimism about self-evaluations, abilities, and subjective welfare. Author attacks the empirical work and the conclusions drawn from it.
II2- Taylor & Brown use college students' self-reports (perhaps college students are a bad sample?) and report that 60% say they are happier than average-- logically impossible. Author points out that only 20% have to be wrong-- the others could just be realistic. Author claims that most people are overly optimistic in some areas of life, pessimistic in others, realistic in others. (pg96) Author also disputes that there is a correlation between a positive illusion and subjective happiness. Taylor & Brown assume that most people are happy, but author argues there are relative degrees and that this is a bad assumption. The other evidence comes from comparisons to the Downbeat. Author also employs the critical work of Colvin and Block. Author argues that if there are no depressive realists (Downbeats), then there is no comparison to Upbeats, leaving untouched the issue of being a realist. (pg97-8)
II3- Author argues we can't trust self-reports of happiness from Upbeats. A self-reporting Upbeat will give a higher rating on a happiness scale, but author argues that such a person only has the illusion of happiness, not genuine subjective happiness. (pg98-9) More importantly, author claims this is not causal to having other Upbeat qualities (illusion of greater control, greater abilities, ) but conceptually connected-- the Upbeat will have an illusion of all of these things, as well as the illusion of being happier (pg99). [This argument relies on subjective happiness being an achievement rather than a state, it relies on the illusion of happiness being different from actually being happy.]
II4-II5- Author takes on the Taylor & Brown view that Upbeats are more likely to live objectively worthwhile lives because they are more likely to be engaged, grow, be creative, etc. (pg100) Author grants (for the sake of argument) that there are true depressed realists (Downbeats). If this is so, then there are three options: (pg101)
1) Downbeats see reality truly as bad
2) Downbeats aren't realistic enough to see what is good
3) There are no true Downbeats, just depressives
In this case, only 1) could be construed against realism, but author instead blames reality, not realism. (pg101) Author argues from common sense that those who see their own shortcomings are more apt to grow and change and be open to new ideas or people, in other words, not Upbeats but realists. (pg 101-2) Author also draws an important distinction between ignorant realists and Upbeats. (pg102)
II6- Author takes on the other studies made by Taylor & Brown, that of the optimism of HIV-positive gay men. (pg103-5)
II7- Author gives the example of a well-adjusted realist Catherine Royce, who is afflicted with ALS and is both subjectively happy and reports being objective worthy as a counterexample.
Journal of Philosophy, Feb 2008
This is a paper about how achieving realistic beliefs and having a reality-oriented attitude is not just important for true happiness, but also somewhat conceptually necessary. Author argues against two skeptical arguments, one being a common-sense view that 'sometimes it's better not-to-know than to-know' and the other is the social-science work by Shelly Taylor and Jonathon Brown on how mild illusions about one's worth and abilities are important for true happiness.
Author first argues that true happiness is a combination of subjective happiness and objective worth. First Abraham Maslow claim that realistic people tend to integrate the 'pleasure principle' with the 'reality principle' to better attain virtues such as unselfishness, caring, etc. Carl Rogers claims that a fully functioning person is honest with herself and honest in how she presents herself to others. (pg85-6) Author describes how Aristotle put as a requisite to happiness practical wisdom, which entails a high degree of self- and other-knowledge and the disposition to act on such wisdom. Author proposes the combination of subjective welfare and objective worth (like virtues) as true happiness. Author also claims that we consider it valuable to be in touch with reality, using rejection of the experience machine as a case in point (pg87-88).
Importantly, author claims realism as 'conceptually necessary' for a life of objective worth:
1) A component to true happiness is to live truly objectively worthwhile lives
2) We cannot know whether we live truly objectively worthwhile lives if we are deluded
3) We cannot know if we have true happiness if we are deluded
What 'realism/being realistic' entails:
'reality-oriented and informed about the important facts of your own life and human life in general, and disposed to act accordingly' (pg89)
The first challenge is from the common-sense notion that sometimes it is better not-t0-know than to-know. The realist is going to be interested in discovering things that might be better-off being left alone. Author argues that the opposite of realist is the self-deceived, and that they are more 'likely to skin their shines on the rough edges of reality' than the realist. (pg90) Author does claim, however that it is possible that learning a fact that adds to your subjective displeasure can actually be good for you, too. Only in the following circumstances:
1) You are aware of some habitual/characteristic negligence
2) Knowledge of x (subjectively unhappy thing) is related to this negligence
3) You use knowledge of x to fix this negligence
Author claims that this is good for you because it will help avoid future tragedies (and also makes you objectively worth more). (pg91)
Author concedes that there is some knowledge that isn't conducive to happiness, and acknowledges that subjective welfare and objective worth may conflict, making happiness difficult to attain. (pg91-2)
More effort and time in the essay is focused on the scientific challenge by Taylor and Brown. Their articles suggest that mild positive illusions about self-worth, abilities, and subjective welfare are conducive for well-being. Also, those under these mild positive illusions tend to be more open, caring, creative, imaginative, ready to grow, etc., therefore it is also conducive to objective worth. Taylor & Brown consider the realists to be a somewhat depressive bunch (pg92) (Downbeat), and the Upbeat to have unrealistic optimism about self-evaluations, abilities, and subjective welfare. Author attacks the empirical work and the conclusions drawn from it.
II2- Taylor & Brown use college students' self-reports (perhaps college students are a bad sample?) and report that 60% say they are happier than average-- logically impossible. Author points out that only 20% have to be wrong-- the others could just be realistic. Author claims that most people are overly optimistic in some areas of life, pessimistic in others, realistic in others. (pg96) Author also disputes that there is a correlation between a positive illusion and subjective happiness. Taylor & Brown assume that most people are happy, but author argues there are relative degrees and that this is a bad assumption. The other evidence comes from comparisons to the Downbeat. Author also employs the critical work of Colvin and Block. Author argues that if there are no depressive realists (Downbeats), then there is no comparison to Upbeats, leaving untouched the issue of being a realist. (pg97-8)
II3- Author argues we can't trust self-reports of happiness from Upbeats. A self-reporting Upbeat will give a higher rating on a happiness scale, but author argues that such a person only has the illusion of happiness, not genuine subjective happiness. (pg98-9) More importantly, author claims this is not causal to having other Upbeat qualities (illusion of greater control, greater abilities, ) but conceptually connected-- the Upbeat will have an illusion of all of these things, as well as the illusion of being happier (pg99). [This argument relies on subjective happiness being an achievement rather than a state, it relies on the illusion of happiness being different from actually being happy.]
II4-II5- Author takes on the Taylor & Brown view that Upbeats are more likely to live objectively worthwhile lives because they are more likely to be engaged, grow, be creative, etc. (pg100) Author grants (for the sake of argument) that there are true depressed realists (Downbeats). If this is so, then there are three options: (pg101)
1) Downbeats see reality truly as bad
2) Downbeats aren't realistic enough to see what is good
3) There are no true Downbeats, just depressives
In this case, only 1) could be construed against realism, but author instead blames reality, not realism. (pg101) Author argues from common sense that those who see their own shortcomings are more apt to grow and change and be open to new ideas or people, in other words, not Upbeats but realists. (pg 101-2) Author also draws an important distinction between ignorant realists and Upbeats. (pg102)
II6- Author takes on the other studies made by Taylor & Brown, that of the optimism of HIV-positive gay men. (pg103-5)
II7- Author gives the example of a well-adjusted realist Catherine Royce, who is afflicted with ALS and is both subjectively happy and reports being objective worthy as a counterexample.
8/15/08
Crane, Tim - Fraught with Ought
08/15/2008
London Review of Books, June 19 2008
This is a review of two books collecting the works of Wilfrid Sellars. Author describes the three main points to Sellars' systematic philosophy. The first is that science is the descriptor of reality. The problem with this claim is that we don't live in the world described by science; we live in a world of a manifest image. Instead of denying this is a problem, Sellars confronted it with his second main point: the meaning of a word can be expressed by what correct inferences you can make in its usage. Author contrasts this with Frege, who considered meaning to be referring a property to an object.
The final discussion by the author is Sellars' work on qualia, or 'the myth of the given', which highlights his third main point: 'all awareness is a linguistic affair', including inner thoughts being construed instead as inner speech. Author is unconvinced on this point, since Sellars seems to embrace an emergent feature of our brains.
London Review of Books, June 19 2008
This is a review of two books collecting the works of Wilfrid Sellars. Author describes the three main points to Sellars' systematic philosophy. The first is that science is the descriptor of reality. The problem with this claim is that we don't live in the world described by science; we live in a world of a manifest image. Instead of denying this is a problem, Sellars confronted it with his second main point: the meaning of a word can be expressed by what correct inferences you can make in its usage. Author contrasts this with Frege, who considered meaning to be referring a property to an object.
The final discussion by the author is Sellars' work on qualia, or 'the myth of the given', which highlights his third main point: 'all awareness is a linguistic affair', including inner thoughts being construed instead as inner speech. Author is unconvinced on this point, since Sellars seems to embrace an emergent feature of our brains.
8/1/08
Chomsky, Noam - We Own The World
08/01/2008
Information Clearing House.info Zmedia Institute Talk, June 2007
This is a relatively informal discussion from author that was originally a talk given. The paper has one crucial argument: debate and policy decisions in the US are made once specific assumptions have already been made, one of which is that the United States of America owns the world.
Author starts with a discussion about the mid-term elections and how the debate about 'Iranian interference' went, suggested that the sub-text or assumption behind both sides of the debate was that we own Iraq. Author looks back to the Vietnam war and analyzes the debates and memoirs in light of the bombing campaigns that took place in the North and South and interpreted them using the assumption that we owned Vietnam.
Author then posits that the US isn't a functioning democracy, at least in foreign policy. E.g. 2/3 of Americans want an end to the Cuba embargo, a majority want an Iraq pullout, but it doesn't happen. The way to fix countries like Iraq, Iran is to make them more democratic. That is the way to fix America too, ironically.
Author then discusses how this assumption is even in the 'liberal' media like NPR, where the discussion of the missile defense system-- a system that is more geared to make first strikes without retaliations rather than to defend against first strikes-- assumes that installing it is legitimate, since 'we own the world'.
The final discussion is about history, where the author recounts the series of Iran, Iraq, Russian, Chinese-US relations. Author interprets US actions as unilateral and self-excluding-- meaning that we expect other countries to play by the rules, but not the US.
Author finally remarks that eduction in elite institutions might be part of the blindspot that many elites have with unpopular ideas.
Information Clearing House.info Zmedia Institute Talk, June 2007
This is a relatively informal discussion from author that was originally a talk given. The paper has one crucial argument: debate and policy decisions in the US are made once specific assumptions have already been made, one of which is that the United States of America owns the world.
Author starts with a discussion about the mid-term elections and how the debate about 'Iranian interference' went, suggested that the sub-text or assumption behind both sides of the debate was that we own Iraq. Author looks back to the Vietnam war and analyzes the debates and memoirs in light of the bombing campaigns that took place in the North and South and interpreted them using the assumption that we owned Vietnam.
Author then posits that the US isn't a functioning democracy, at least in foreign policy. E.g. 2/3 of Americans want an end to the Cuba embargo, a majority want an Iraq pullout, but it doesn't happen. The way to fix countries like Iraq, Iran is to make them more democratic. That is the way to fix America too, ironically.
Author then discusses how this assumption is even in the 'liberal' media like NPR, where the discussion of the missile defense system-- a system that is more geared to make first strikes without retaliations rather than to defend against first strikes-- assumes that installing it is legitimate, since 'we own the world'.
The final discussion is about history, where the author recounts the series of Iran, Iraq, Russian, Chinese-US relations. Author interprets US actions as unilateral and self-excluding-- meaning that we expect other countries to play by the rules, but not the US.
Author finally remarks that eduction in elite institutions might be part of the blindspot that many elites have with unpopular ideas.
7/18/08
Shellenberg, Susanna - The Situation-Dependency of Perception
07/18/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 2, Feb 2008
This paper explores the thesis of mind-independent, situation-dependent properties of external objects. First, some distinctions:
Intrinsic property- a property of an object that does not depend on the object's relations to other individuals distinct from itself (pg55-6).
Situation-dependent property- a property of an object that it has by virtue of the presentation having situational features (pg56-7).
The thesis is simple: objects are presented to human perception as situational-dependent properties that are mind-independent properties of external objects that present intrinsic properties of an object with situational features. (pg56-7)
Author gives some background on the thinking on features such as this: often they are 'conflated' into mind-dependent appearances or as a representational issue. Author discusses indirect realism and phenomenalism, which get their arguments going by discussing cases of how differing angles or distance from objects alters their appearance, though, of course, the object itself isn't altered. (pg58, pg71) Author will later claim that this type of argument won't support mind-dependent representations, since such an event can be considered situation-dependent properties.
The argument for situation-dependent properties is simple: objects have intrinsic properties but also is subject to situational features that any other perceiver, in the same spatio-temporal conditions, would also perceive. (pg60-1) Author likens this idea to Peacock's idea of a 'scene', though there are important differences (pg61-2).
It is crucial to understand that author is not re-defining the distinction between properties of an object and how an object appears. 'Appears' is a mind-dependent term; author is instead picking out a new section of the world, external properties an object has by virtue of the situation it is in relative to the perceiver. (pg62-3) Author also holds that there are mind-dependent representations (subjectivity of perception), and that representations will vary based on the perceptual abilities of the perceiver (pg64-5). Author goes on a lengthy example of two trees that we judge are intrinsically the same height, even though one is closer to us than the other. (pg65-9) The upshot to this discussion is that the 'accuracy conditions' of a given perceptual experience now include not just the intrinsic properties of the object but also the situation-dependent properties, or perhaps a description of the situational features. (pg73) Furthermore, some purported 'illusions' in the philosophical literature (stick half-submerged in a beaker of water: is it bent?) will be explained adequately given situation-dependent properties (SD properties).
Author argues that there is epistemic dependence of our knowledge of intrinsic properties on situation-dependent properties. This is because the nature of perception makes it that all objects have situational features. (pg75-6) This isn't causal dependence, and, interestingly, author claims that it isn't inferential dependence, either. (pg77) Author instead claims that knowledge of intrinsic properties is mediated by situation-dependent properties. It seems that we readily attend to intrinsic properties while ignoring SD properties, though we sometimes can recognize the SD properties as well. (pg78-80)
Author claims that the result of this argument is a way to merge some of the intuitions of direct realism and indirect realism and/or phenomenalism. (pg81-2)
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 2, Feb 2008
This paper explores the thesis of mind-independent, situation-dependent properties of external objects. First, some distinctions:
Intrinsic property- a property of an object that does not depend on the object's relations to other individuals distinct from itself (pg55-6).
Situation-dependent property- a property of an object that it has by virtue of the presentation having situational features (pg56-7).
The thesis is simple: objects are presented to human perception as situational-dependent properties that are mind-independent properties of external objects that present intrinsic properties of an object with situational features. (pg56-7)
Author gives some background on the thinking on features such as this: often they are 'conflated' into mind-dependent appearances or as a representational issue. Author discusses indirect realism and phenomenalism, which get their arguments going by discussing cases of how differing angles or distance from objects alters their appearance, though, of course, the object itself isn't altered. (pg58, pg71) Author will later claim that this type of argument won't support mind-dependent representations, since such an event can be considered situation-dependent properties.
The argument for situation-dependent properties is simple: objects have intrinsic properties but also is subject to situational features that any other perceiver, in the same spatio-temporal conditions, would also perceive. (pg60-1) Author likens this idea to Peacock's idea of a 'scene', though there are important differences (pg61-2).
It is crucial to understand that author is not re-defining the distinction between properties of an object and how an object appears. 'Appears' is a mind-dependent term; author is instead picking out a new section of the world, external properties an object has by virtue of the situation it is in relative to the perceiver. (pg62-3) Author also holds that there are mind-dependent representations (subjectivity of perception), and that representations will vary based on the perceptual abilities of the perceiver (pg64-5). Author goes on a lengthy example of two trees that we judge are intrinsically the same height, even though one is closer to us than the other. (pg65-9) The upshot to this discussion is that the 'accuracy conditions' of a given perceptual experience now include not just the intrinsic properties of the object but also the situation-dependent properties, or perhaps a description of the situational features. (pg73) Furthermore, some purported 'illusions' in the philosophical literature (stick half-submerged in a beaker of water: is it bent?) will be explained adequately given situation-dependent properties (SD properties).
Author argues that there is epistemic dependence of our knowledge of intrinsic properties on situation-dependent properties. This is because the nature of perception makes it that all objects have situational features. (pg75-6) This isn't causal dependence, and, interestingly, author claims that it isn't inferential dependence, either. (pg77) Author instead claims that knowledge of intrinsic properties is mediated by situation-dependent properties. It seems that we readily attend to intrinsic properties while ignoring SD properties, though we sometimes can recognize the SD properties as well. (pg78-80)
Author claims that the result of this argument is a way to merge some of the intuitions of direct realism and indirect realism and/or phenomenalism. (pg81-2)
7/11/08
Scalia, Antonin - District of Columbia v Heller
07/11/2008
No. 07-290, June 26, 2008
This is a supreme court decision that has been summarized far better elsewhere, I'm sure. However, it does serve to go over the main arguments in broad strokes. Author delivers the opinion of the court. At issue is a hand-gun ban in DC which, in the court's opinion, violates the 2nd Amendment:
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
Author separates the 'prefatory clause' from the 'operative clause', focusing first on 'the right of the people to keep and bear Arms'. Author argues that this is an individual right, one extended not just to members of a militia or a sub-set of the population, but to all individuals in the polity. Author engages in a long discussion of the usage and origin of the words 'keep', 'bear' and 'arms'. Author then posits that the right to own and carry weapons was for the purpose of 'confrontation' and self-defense. Author relies on other laws drafted at the time as evidence for the intent of the framers of the Amendment. Author then discusses the 'prefatory clause', which is the 'Well-regulated Militia' portion. Author talks about how the framers were worried that tyrants would disarm the people and thereby take their ability to resist away. Seen in this context, author claims that the reading of the 'operative clause' is sensible.
Author takes some time to rebut the dissent's interpretations, then discusses various contexts after the amendment was ratified where the speech supports the reading of the right as a right to bear arms in self-defense. Crucial to the rejection of Stevens' discussion of the various drafts the amendment went through is the author's claim that the 2nd Amendment codified an existing, common-law right, not fashion a new one.
Author discusses the past cases that involved 2nd Amendment protection. Author claims that in US v Miller, it was the type of weapon involved that didn't get 2nd Amendment protection, not that the individuals were using a weapon for non-military purposes. Author defends against the claim that small-arms weapons for militia use today wouldn't work against tanks and bombers-- author counters that 'the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right'
Finally, author looks at the current case and declares that handguns are popular as self-defense weapons, that trigger locks wouldn't allow for quick enough defense, and that both parts of the law are unconstitutional.
Stevens, Jon delivered the first of two dissenting opinions
Stevens agrees that the 2nd Amendment is a right of the people, but argues that does nothing to establish the scope of the right. Stevens argues that 'the people' is referring to a right of individuals who are members of a group, similarly to the right to peaceably assemble. In analysis of the text he links 'keep and bear arms' as an expression used in military contexts. Stevens claims that the most natural reading of the Amendment is that it protects the right to use and posess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia, which was also an existing right too.
Stevens discusses the history of the drafting of the 2nd Amendment and highlights how the drafts did not involve self-defense uses of arms, even though proposed drafts did so. Stevens reinterprets the post-enactment discussions that Scalia uses, notably Joseph Story's views.
Stevens then reviews the various cases that have previously dealt with the 2nd Amendment (much like Scalia), but interprets them to turn on, e.g. in the Miller case-- the non-military use of weapons, etc.
Breyer, Stephen delivers the second dissenting opinion
Breyer assumes (for the sake of argument) that the 2nd Amendment grants a personal right for self-defense. He then says that this right is not unrestricted and needs to be subject to some sort of constitutional standard, like a 'rational basis' or 'rational relationship'. In this case, Breyer advocates an 'interest balancing' approach.
Breyer discusses the briefs filed that the laws written have not reduced crime. He reviews the different evidence offered and concludes that the evidence is indecisive. Thus, the district is trying to reduce crime using a possible method (there is evidence on both sides), and Breyer sees this as a legitimate balance of interests.
No. 07-290, June 26, 2008
This is a supreme court decision that has been summarized far better elsewhere, I'm sure. However, it does serve to go over the main arguments in broad strokes. Author delivers the opinion of the court. At issue is a hand-gun ban in DC which, in the court's opinion, violates the 2nd Amendment:
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
Author separates the 'prefatory clause' from the 'operative clause', focusing first on 'the right of the people to keep and bear Arms'. Author argues that this is an individual right, one extended not just to members of a militia or a sub-set of the population, but to all individuals in the polity. Author engages in a long discussion of the usage and origin of the words 'keep', 'bear' and 'arms'. Author then posits that the right to own and carry weapons was for the purpose of 'confrontation' and self-defense. Author relies on other laws drafted at the time as evidence for the intent of the framers of the Amendment. Author then discusses the 'prefatory clause', which is the 'Well-regulated Militia' portion. Author talks about how the framers were worried that tyrants would disarm the people and thereby take their ability to resist away. Seen in this context, author claims that the reading of the 'operative clause' is sensible.
Author takes some time to rebut the dissent's interpretations, then discusses various contexts after the amendment was ratified where the speech supports the reading of the right as a right to bear arms in self-defense. Crucial to the rejection of Stevens' discussion of the various drafts the amendment went through is the author's claim that the 2nd Amendment codified an existing, common-law right, not fashion a new one.
Author discusses the past cases that involved 2nd Amendment protection. Author claims that in US v Miller, it was the type of weapon involved that didn't get 2nd Amendment protection, not that the individuals were using a weapon for non-military purposes. Author defends against the claim that small-arms weapons for militia use today wouldn't work against tanks and bombers-- author counters that 'the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right'
Finally, author looks at the current case and declares that handguns are popular as self-defense weapons, that trigger locks wouldn't allow for quick enough defense, and that both parts of the law are unconstitutional.
Stevens, Jon delivered the first of two dissenting opinions
Stevens agrees that the 2nd Amendment is a right of the people, but argues that does nothing to establish the scope of the right. Stevens argues that 'the people' is referring to a right of individuals who are members of a group, similarly to the right to peaceably assemble. In analysis of the text he links 'keep and bear arms' as an expression used in military contexts. Stevens claims that the most natural reading of the Amendment is that it protects the right to use and posess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia, which was also an existing right too.
Stevens discusses the history of the drafting of the 2nd Amendment and highlights how the drafts did not involve self-defense uses of arms, even though proposed drafts did so. Stevens reinterprets the post-enactment discussions that Scalia uses, notably Joseph Story's views.
Stevens then reviews the various cases that have previously dealt with the 2nd Amendment (much like Scalia), but interprets them to turn on, e.g. in the Miller case-- the non-military use of weapons, etc.
Breyer, Stephen delivers the second dissenting opinion
Breyer assumes (for the sake of argument) that the 2nd Amendment grants a personal right for self-defense. He then says that this right is not unrestricted and needs to be subject to some sort of constitutional standard, like a 'rational basis' or 'rational relationship'. In this case, Breyer advocates an 'interest balancing' approach.
Breyer discusses the briefs filed that the laws written have not reduced crime. He reviews the different evidence offered and concludes that the evidence is indecisive. Thus, the district is trying to reduce crime using a possible method (there is evidence on both sides), and Breyer sees this as a legitimate balance of interests.
6/27/08
Black, Max - Austin On Performatives
06/27/2008
The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol 38 No 145 July 1963
This is a relatively short paper that reviews Austin's lectures about performatives and constatives, and his attempt to establish a new tri-fold system of categorization between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts.
First, author summarizes Austin's discussion of performative speech-acts like 'I promise x'. These are ideal cases of 'PerformativeA', which is: 'doing something other than, or more than, saying something true or false' (pg219). The problem here is that the analysis is too weak. It lets in things like 'I say the bridge is out!'. This is more than a true/false utterance-- it is an assertion and a warning. Hence 'PerformativeB' is a performative if it has the form 'I [present tense singular verb] X' if the circumstances are such that the person in question is actually doing that verb. (warn, reprimand, state) Author considers PerfomativeB's to be 'self-labeling utterances' and rather uninteresting, preferring the other to be performatives proper (pg220-1).
In trying to get more specific, Author points out the 'ceremonial' or 'conventional' aspects of performatives. They usually are:
i. rule governed (as to the way the act is supposed to happen)
ii. self-validating (doing them makes them valid)
iii. public and 'claim generating'
iv. part of a cultural understanding or ceremonially significant
(pg 222)
The problem here is that it seems just speaking any old sentence (even one with a truth-value) can conform to all these specifications.
Author believes it was the continual vagueness that led Austin to try the three-fold distinction:
Locutionary: the sense & reference of an utterance-- the speaker's meaning
Illocutionary: the intent (or intended effect) with which the utterance was made
Perlocutionary: the actual effect on the hearers ('was that a promise?')
(pg 223-4)
Author throws doubt over whether Loc. and Illoc. are truly distinct, even though Austin seemed more focused on whether Illoc. and Perloc. were truly distinct. Author suggests that to truly understand an Loc. act, you should know it also as an Illoc. act, which collapses the two into one: Loc. act. If this is so, the new re-working looks a lot like the old one, and again a systematic approach to natural language seems to falter.
The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol 38 No 145 July 1963
This is a relatively short paper that reviews Austin's lectures about performatives and constatives, and his attempt to establish a new tri-fold system of categorization between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts.
First, author summarizes Austin's discussion of performative speech-acts like 'I promise x'. These are ideal cases of 'PerformativeA', which is: 'doing something other than, or more than, saying something true or false' (pg219). The problem here is that the analysis is too weak. It lets in things like 'I say the bridge is out!'. This is more than a true/false utterance-- it is an assertion and a warning. Hence 'PerformativeB' is a performative if it has the form 'I [present tense singular verb] X' if the circumstances are such that the person in question is actually doing that verb. (warn, reprimand, state) Author considers PerfomativeB's to be 'self-labeling utterances' and rather uninteresting, preferring the other to be performatives proper (pg220-1).
In trying to get more specific, Author points out the 'ceremonial' or 'conventional' aspects of performatives. They usually are:
i. rule governed (as to the way the act is supposed to happen)
ii. self-validating (doing them makes them valid)
iii. public and 'claim generating'
iv. part of a cultural understanding or ceremonially significant
(pg 222)
The problem here is that it seems just speaking any old sentence (even one with a truth-value) can conform to all these specifications.
Author believes it was the continual vagueness that led Austin to try the three-fold distinction:
Locutionary: the sense & reference of an utterance-- the speaker's meaning
Illocutionary: the intent (or intended effect) with which the utterance was made
Perlocutionary: the actual effect on the hearers ('was that a promise?')
(pg 223-4)
Author throws doubt over whether Loc. and Illoc. are truly distinct, even though Austin seemed more focused on whether Illoc. and Perloc. were truly distinct. Author suggests that to truly understand an Loc. act, you should know it also as an Illoc. act, which collapses the two into one: Loc. act. If this is so, the new re-working looks a lot like the old one, and again a systematic approach to natural language seems to falter.
6/20/08
Schwitzgebel, Eric - The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
06/20/2008
Philosophical Review, Vol 117 No 2 2008
This is a prolonged skeptical discussion about introspection and the notion of the infallibility of current conscious experience. The paper has more of a conversational style rather than present any logical arguments in an explicit format. Author first points out that most of the skeptics up until now have not questioned current conscious experience, leaving it instead as the last refuge. Author tries to show that introspection is unreliable in two ways (pg265):
1- it often goes wrong or yields the wrong results
2- it often fails to do anything or yield any result at all
Author says that we fail at 'assessing the causes of our mental states' for 'even the most basic features of our currently ongoing conscious experience'. (pg247) The only places in the philosophical/psychological communities where the author has seen arguments like this is possibly in the behaviorists (who reject the importance of introspection) or perhaps with 'Eastern meditative traditions'. (pg246-7)
Introspection is considered 'a species of attention to currently ongoing conscious experience'. Even though infallibilism is out of favor, most hold that in favorable circumstances introspection can 'reliably reveal at least the broad outlines of one's currently ongoing experience' (pg248).
iii. Author first discusses emotion, asking whether it is partially constituted by cognitive elements, or not? Are emotional states always felt phenomenally? Do emotional states like 'joy' have the same feel most of the time? (pg249-50) Author suggests that this is not just a matter of how we describe our CCE (current conscious experience) but that the qualia aren't entirely evident.
iv. Author then discusses introspection of particular instances of emotional experience (pg251-2), like the one you're having right now. Does introspection reveal it as clearly as your eyes reveal the place you're in? Consider another person pointing out that you're angry-- which you honestly deny because you don't feel anything.
v. Author next turns to introspection of CCE when it comes to perception. Author grants that CCE of vision perception is difficult to get wrong. (pg 252-3) Yet in dreams we do get CCE wrong; we make judgments that are 'baldly incoherent' about what our CCE is. For instance, author doubts that there is color in dreams, yet we judge there to be. So was our CCE of color, or not? This argument turns on our making the judgment that we experienced red when we didn't in fact experience red.
vi. Author asks us to consider visual perception-- we have a good handle on the visual worlds, especially within certain limits of focus, yet we mostly get wrong how narrow our focus is. We think it is a few feet wide, but in fact it is just a few inches. (pg254-6) If this is so, our CCE of our visual field is not as clear as we think it is. We're 'wrong about an absolutely fundamental and pervasive aspect of [our] sensory consciousness'. (pg256)
vii. Does thought have a distinctive phenomenal character, aside from imagery? After a seminar in 2002, philosophers disagreed 17-8, the majority saying yes, the minority saying that either 'imagery exhausts it' or 'no phenomenal character'. (pg257-8) Author suggests this is because there is no answer-- introspection fails.
viii. Author considers pain and paradigm cases of 'foveal colors'. But these are easy cases and using these 'rigs the game' (pg259-60) Can't we generate the belief we're in pain without the there being a pain in CCE? Why then do people think they're infallible? Because no one ever corrects us on these inner episodes.
ix. Sometimes I can say 'I'm thinking' and it is true. But this infallibility is 'cheap', since it is self-referentially supplying the conditions for truth. (pg260-1) This doesn't work as well when you say: 'I'm thinking of the entire Taj Mahal in full detail'. Author also suggests that many ways out of this doubt is to 'change the topic': is 'I'm thinking about x' really a judgment about CCE?
x. Author discusses an objection to his view: introspection shows how things appear to us; maybe we can be wrong about what those things actually are, but not how they appear. Author draws a distinction between epistemic 'appears' and 'phenomenal' appears. It might be possible that sometimes an epistemic report on CCE is infallible if the existence conditions equal the truth conditions. Yet a phenomenal report of 'appears' might be tainted by judgment or belief, like believing there's an optical illusion when there isn't one. (pg262-3)
x. Author casts doubt that CCE is so grossly different to allow for all these problems with divergence but also to be infallible. (pg264-5)
xi. Author considers the charge that he is pushing the limits of introspection, but thinks that if it moves from CCE, it is changing the topic. (pg266)
Lastly, author suggests that visual experience of the external world is much more stable than introspection of CCE.
Philosophical Review, Vol 117 No 2 2008
This is a prolonged skeptical discussion about introspection and the notion of the infallibility of current conscious experience. The paper has more of a conversational style rather than present any logical arguments in an explicit format. Author first points out that most of the skeptics up until now have not questioned current conscious experience, leaving it instead as the last refuge. Author tries to show that introspection is unreliable in two ways (pg265):
1- it often goes wrong or yields the wrong results
2- it often fails to do anything or yield any result at all
Author says that we fail at 'assessing the causes of our mental states' for 'even the most basic features of our currently ongoing conscious experience'. (pg247) The only places in the philosophical/psychological communities where the author has seen arguments like this is possibly in the behaviorists (who reject the importance of introspection) or perhaps with 'Eastern meditative traditions'. (pg246-7)
Introspection is considered 'a species of attention to currently ongoing conscious experience'. Even though infallibilism is out of favor, most hold that in favorable circumstances introspection can 'reliably reveal at least the broad outlines of one's currently ongoing experience' (pg248).
iii. Author first discusses emotion, asking whether it is partially constituted by cognitive elements, or not? Are emotional states always felt phenomenally? Do emotional states like 'joy' have the same feel most of the time? (pg249-50) Author suggests that this is not just a matter of how we describe our CCE (current conscious experience) but that the qualia aren't entirely evident.
iv. Author then discusses introspection of particular instances of emotional experience (pg251-2), like the one you're having right now. Does introspection reveal it as clearly as your eyes reveal the place you're in? Consider another person pointing out that you're angry-- which you honestly deny because you don't feel anything.
v. Author next turns to introspection of CCE when it comes to perception. Author grants that CCE of vision perception is difficult to get wrong. (pg 252-3) Yet in dreams we do get CCE wrong; we make judgments that are 'baldly incoherent' about what our CCE is. For instance, author doubts that there is color in dreams, yet we judge there to be. So was our CCE of color, or not? This argument turns on our making the judgment that we experienced red when we didn't in fact experience red.
vi. Author asks us to consider visual perception-- we have a good handle on the visual worlds, especially within certain limits of focus, yet we mostly get wrong how narrow our focus is. We think it is a few feet wide, but in fact it is just a few inches. (pg254-6) If this is so, our CCE of our visual field is not as clear as we think it is. We're 'wrong about an absolutely fundamental and pervasive aspect of [our] sensory consciousness'. (pg256)
vii. Does thought have a distinctive phenomenal character, aside from imagery? After a seminar in 2002, philosophers disagreed 17-8, the majority saying yes, the minority saying that either 'imagery exhausts it' or 'no phenomenal character'. (pg257-8) Author suggests this is because there is no answer-- introspection fails.
viii. Author considers pain and paradigm cases of 'foveal colors'. But these are easy cases and using these 'rigs the game' (pg259-60) Can't we generate the belief we're in pain without the there being a pain in CCE? Why then do people think they're infallible? Because no one ever corrects us on these inner episodes.
ix. Sometimes I can say 'I'm thinking' and it is true. But this infallibility is 'cheap', since it is self-referentially supplying the conditions for truth. (pg260-1) This doesn't work as well when you say: 'I'm thinking of the entire Taj Mahal in full detail'. Author also suggests that many ways out of this doubt is to 'change the topic': is 'I'm thinking about x' really a judgment about CCE?
x. Author discusses an objection to his view: introspection shows how things appear to us; maybe we can be wrong about what those things actually are, but not how they appear. Author draws a distinction between epistemic 'appears' and 'phenomenal' appears. It might be possible that sometimes an epistemic report on CCE is infallible if the existence conditions equal the truth conditions. Yet a phenomenal report of 'appears' might be tainted by judgment or belief, like believing there's an optical illusion when there isn't one. (pg262-3)
x. Author casts doubt that CCE is so grossly different to allow for all these problems with divergence but also to be infallible. (pg264-5)
xi. Author considers the charge that he is pushing the limits of introspection, but thinks that if it moves from CCE, it is changing the topic. (pg266)
Lastly, author suggests that visual experience of the external world is much more stable than introspection of CCE.
6/13/08
Kiteley, Murray - Verbs of Speech & Danto, Arthur - A Note on Expressions of the Referring Sort
06/13/2008
Kiteley, Murray - Verbs of Speech
This is a short discussion on Austin's How To Do Things With Words, where he introduces the category of 'performatives'. Also mentioned was the fact that once a present-tense verb performative is made into a past-tense verb, it can have a truth value and thus wouldn't be a performative.
Danto, Arthur - A Note on Expressions of the Referring Sort
Author writes a response paper to Strawson's 'On Referring' and and Earl Russell's discussion as well. Author takes a stance against a certain type of logic of ordinary language that takes a sentence that refers to nothing as neither true nor false. For instance: 'The building on south-west corner of 116th st is beautiful'. If there is no building there, the argument goes, then the sentence is neither true nor false. Author points out that if this is allowed to stand, then the speaker of such a sentence couldn't be considered lying, since lying is saying something false (pg405). But if this was a business context where purchasing the 'building' was involved, such a sentence might easily constitute fraud-- untrue statements being an integral part of fraud. Author suggests that ordinary language stretches over too many different contexts and cases to allow for one strict logic. (pg407)
Kiteley, Murray - Verbs of Speech
This is a short discussion on Austin's How To Do Things With Words, where he introduces the category of 'performatives'. Also mentioned was the fact that once a present-tense verb performative is made into a past-tense verb, it can have a truth value and thus wouldn't be a performative.
Danto, Arthur - A Note on Expressions of the Referring Sort
Author writes a response paper to Strawson's 'On Referring' and and Earl Russell's discussion as well. Author takes a stance against a certain type of logic of ordinary language that takes a sentence that refers to nothing as neither true nor false. For instance: 'The building on south-west corner of 116th st is beautiful'. If there is no building there, the argument goes, then the sentence is neither true nor false. Author points out that if this is allowed to stand, then the speaker of such a sentence couldn't be considered lying, since lying is saying something false (pg405). But if this was a business context where purchasing the 'building' was involved, such a sentence might easily constitute fraud-- untrue statements being an integral part of fraud. Author suggests that ordinary language stretches over too many different contexts and cases to allow for one strict logic. (pg407)
6/6/08
Ryle, Gilbert - The Will
06/06/2008
The Concept of Mind Ch 3, Penguin Books 1966
This is the third chapter in a famous book where author's main concern is arguing that the use of 'mind' as opposed to 'matter' is a category-mistake, similar to thinking that 'a pair of gloves' is something extra one also buys when one buys 'one left-handed glove and one right-handed glove'. In previous chapters, author takes care to lay out a crucial distinction and style of argumentation that will serve him in this one: the knowing how vs. knowing that distinction and the ad infinitum reductio. Author establishes early on that there can be abilities and performances to which we naturally and rightly apply predicates such as 'intelligently' 'shrewdly' 'prudently' where there is not plausibly some activity of considering rules, maxims, or other that-propositions performed by the subject. It isn't that the mind is thinking what rules to apply 'shrewdly' and then doing so, instead, we are doing something shrewdly. If the mind was, then we'd have a reductio ad infinitum, since we would also have to antecedently shrewdly consider whether to apply these rules or those rules, this set of that-propositions or an other set.
In chapter 3, author first claims that the term 'volition' and 'the will' are technical terms that ordinary language almost never uses, and certainly not in the way that philosophers do. Author later points out that it seems ordinary usage of the word 'voluntary' is almost exclusively reserved for discussing actions that were contrary to good expectations (pg67), though philosophers also want to use this term to describe actions in line with expectations as well. Thus the oddity: 'could you have helped being kind fo that child?'. (pg68)
Author dislikes talk of the will or volitions for many reasons:
1) It postulates a third entity or power that is needed to give the mind efficacy on the body, but it is a theoretical result, not an empirical finding.
2) Since volitions cannot be witnessed, we have no grounds for inferring what they are in a person. Further, a person himself might not even know which volition effected which action. (pg64-5)
3) The connection between the mind's volition and the body's movements is a mystery, yes, but of the insoluble type, not like 'the cause of cancer'.
4) Some solely mental activities merit will-like predicates being applied to them, so now we will require to know about how mind volitions are formed-- is there an antecedently formed mind-volition volition? Author gives a reductio. (pg65-6)
Author is careful to distinguish between what common thought processes won't do when looking for 'the will' or volitions (examine pg66-7). What is a more fruitful discussion is to look at what we're talking about when we talk about 'voluntary' and 'could not have helped' and so on. Author describes a boy charged with tying a reef-knot, but instead ties a granny-knot. In order to find out whether it was voluntary or not, we can use a variety of potentially publically available information: did the boy know and practice the proper knot? etc (pg69). We also talk of volitions when contrasting them with things done under complusion or by outside forces, like being carried out to sea while on your yacht (pg71-2).
The discussion of purposive vs mechanistic explanations eventually brings out the reason, author contends, why philosophers are so intent on keeping the will; the 'bogy of mechanism'. (pg73) This launches the last part of the chapter, an extended discussion of how two different sets of predicates can apply to the same action-- perhaps moving a piece in chess or shooting a billiard ball-- one that describes the movements mechanistically, the other as 'wisely-moved' or 'expertly-hit'. (pg75-78) This is arguing for the irreducibility of mental descriptions, even if they supervene on physical descriptions.
Kiteley, Murray - Verbs of Speech
This is a short discussion on Austin's How To Do Things With Words, where he introduces the category of 'performatives', or speech-acts. Also mentioned was the fact that once a speech-act is made into a past-tense verb, it can have a truth value instead of a speech-act.
The Concept of Mind Ch 3, Penguin Books 1966
This is the third chapter in a famous book where author's main concern is arguing that the use of 'mind' as opposed to 'matter' is a category-mistake, similar to thinking that 'a pair of gloves' is something extra one also buys when one buys 'one left-handed glove and one right-handed glove'. In previous chapters, author takes care to lay out a crucial distinction and style of argumentation that will serve him in this one: the knowing how vs. knowing that distinction and the ad infinitum reductio. Author establishes early on that there can be abilities and performances to which we naturally and rightly apply predicates such as 'intelligently' 'shrewdly' 'prudently' where there is not plausibly some activity of considering rules, maxims, or other that-propositions performed by the subject. It isn't that the mind is thinking what rules to apply 'shrewdly' and then doing so, instead, we are doing something shrewdly. If the mind was, then we'd have a reductio ad infinitum, since we would also have to antecedently shrewdly consider whether to apply these rules or those rules, this set of that-propositions or an other set.
In chapter 3, author first claims that the term 'volition' and 'the will' are technical terms that ordinary language almost never uses, and certainly not in the way that philosophers do. Author later points out that it seems ordinary usage of the word 'voluntary' is almost exclusively reserved for discussing actions that were contrary to good expectations (pg67), though philosophers also want to use this term to describe actions in line with expectations as well. Thus the oddity: 'could you have helped being kind fo that child?'. (pg68)
Author dislikes talk of the will or volitions for many reasons:
1) It postulates a third entity or power that is needed to give the mind efficacy on the body, but it is a theoretical result, not an empirical finding.
2) Since volitions cannot be witnessed, we have no grounds for inferring what they are in a person. Further, a person himself might not even know which volition effected which action. (pg64-5)
3) The connection between the mind's volition and the body's movements is a mystery, yes, but of the insoluble type, not like 'the cause of cancer'.
4) Some solely mental activities merit will-like predicates being applied to them, so now we will require to know about how mind volitions are formed-- is there an antecedently formed mind-volition volition? Author gives a reductio. (pg65-6)
Author is careful to distinguish between what common thought processes won't do when looking for 'the will' or volitions (examine pg66-7). What is a more fruitful discussion is to look at what we're talking about when we talk about 'voluntary' and 'could not have helped' and so on. Author describes a boy charged with tying a reef-knot, but instead ties a granny-knot. In order to find out whether it was voluntary or not, we can use a variety of potentially publically available information: did the boy know and practice the proper knot? etc (pg69). We also talk of volitions when contrasting them with things done under complusion or by outside forces, like being carried out to sea while on your yacht (pg71-2).
The discussion of purposive vs mechanistic explanations eventually brings out the reason, author contends, why philosophers are so intent on keeping the will; the 'bogy of mechanism'. (pg73) This launches the last part of the chapter, an extended discussion of how two different sets of predicates can apply to the same action-- perhaps moving a piece in chess or shooting a billiard ball-- one that describes the movements mechanistically, the other as 'wisely-moved' or 'expertly-hit'. (pg75-78) This is arguing for the irreducibility of mental descriptions, even if they supervene on physical descriptions.
Kiteley, Murray - Verbs of Speech
This is a short discussion on Austin's How To Do Things With Words, where he introduces the category of 'performatives', or speech-acts. Also mentioned was the fact that once a speech-act is made into a past-tense verb, it can have a truth value instead of a speech-act.
5/30/08
Samuels, Richard - Is Innateness A Confused Concept?
05/30/2008
The Innate Mind Vol 3, ch 2 Oxford Press 2007 Carruthers, Laurence, Stich, eds.
This is an extended reply to an objection, leveled recently about the concept of innateness, that it is hopelessly confused, confounding, and that it should be jettisoned in the realm of cognitive science (Griffiths). Author replies that this argument is inconclusive and proposes conditions for innateness that author claims avoids these objections. First, the objection:
The challenge is to the concept of innate, what the author labels 'INNATE'. The challenge is that INNATE confounds many independent properties into one concept. These independent properties are 'empirically dissociable' (pg19), but the concept INNATE confounds these properties together, thereby confusing the concept itself. (pg19) The different 'i-properties' are, e.g., as follows: (pg18-9)
1. Having an adaptive evolutionary explanation
2. Being insensitive to external variation
3. Being present at birth/inborn
4. Being universal, either pancultural or monomorphic (same trait accross cultures)
5. Not being acquired by learning
Author doesn't deny that these i-properties, or at least many of them, are commonly associated with INNATE, that they are empirically dissociable, and that much discussion these days is confused. Author first distinguishes between a confused concept and word ambiguity (pg20). Word ambiguity is just people using a word in different contexts and referring to different things. Concept confusion is that disparate things are grouped together into one. (pg21) Further, author argues that the confusion found in INNATE must be constitutive of the concept, not simply that it's associated with this or that property. (pg21-2) Author suggests (but does not endorse) a possible response to Griffiths: INNATE is a natural kind that is the causal origin of many of the properties associated with it. It isn't necessary that all the properties come out in all cases-- we should just expect a 'cluster of symptoms' (pg23-4
Author gives his analysis of INNATE as a 'Psychological Primitive', something that:
a) is posited by some correct psychological theory
b) is given to no correct psychological explanation of it's acquisition (in principle, not just currently)
c) is acquired by the normal course of development of the organism in question
(pg25)
With this analysis, author discusses the virtues of this as the basis for the concept INNATE. (pg27-8)
1) It is wholly consistent with the 'Interactionist Thesis', roughly, that development comes from both nature and nurture, while some of the i-properties imply that they come just from nature
2) It makes clearer much of the discussion in cognitive science today
3) It gives cognitive science something useful to do with the concept INNATE
Author then reviews the various i-properties and how most of them, with the exception of the property of being unlearned, are neither necessary nor sufficient for innateness. However, many of them bear a positive evidentiary relation (raise the probability of something being innate) to innateness. (pg28-31)
The last section deals with why, in cognitive science today, debates on innateness seems to be so confused. Author blames ambiguity, fallacious argumentation, and incomplete science (failure of convergence). Another peril is folk-psychology, the 'sink-hole' that it is easy even for scientists to fall into. (pg34-5) Lastly, author discusses a problem with his analysis of INNATE. The problem is that different frameworks of learning/acquisition may show different behaviors/traits to be innate. This is because of the void-filling nature of the concept. Thus author argues that we must simultaneously pursue the two questions:
-What innate structures are there?- and -what is the best theory of cognition?-
The Innate Mind Vol 3, ch 2 Oxford Press 2007 Carruthers, Laurence, Stich, eds.
This is an extended reply to an objection, leveled recently about the concept of innateness, that it is hopelessly confused, confounding, and that it should be jettisoned in the realm of cognitive science (Griffiths). Author replies that this argument is inconclusive and proposes conditions for innateness that author claims avoids these objections. First, the objection:
The challenge is to the concept of innate, what the author labels 'INNATE'. The challenge is that INNATE confounds many independent properties into one concept. These independent properties are 'empirically dissociable' (pg19), but the concept INNATE confounds these properties together, thereby confusing the concept itself. (pg19) The different 'i-properties' are, e.g., as follows: (pg18-9)
1. Having an adaptive evolutionary explanation
2. Being insensitive to external variation
3. Being present at birth/inborn
4. Being universal, either pancultural or monomorphic (same trait accross cultures)
5. Not being acquired by learning
Author doesn't deny that these i-properties, or at least many of them, are commonly associated with INNATE, that they are empirically dissociable, and that much discussion these days is confused. Author first distinguishes between a confused concept and word ambiguity (pg20). Word ambiguity is just people using a word in different contexts and referring to different things. Concept confusion is that disparate things are grouped together into one. (pg21) Further, author argues that the confusion found in INNATE must be constitutive of the concept, not simply that it's associated with this or that property. (pg21-2) Author suggests (but does not endorse) a possible response to Griffiths: INNATE is a natural kind that is the causal origin of many of the properties associated with it. It isn't necessary that all the properties come out in all cases-- we should just expect a 'cluster of symptoms' (pg23-4
Author gives his analysis of INNATE as a 'Psychological Primitive', something that:
a) is posited by some correct psychological theory
b) is given to no correct psychological explanation of it's acquisition (in principle, not just currently)
c) is acquired by the normal course of development of the organism in question
(pg25)
With this analysis, author discusses the virtues of this as the basis for the concept INNATE. (pg27-8)
1) It is wholly consistent with the 'Interactionist Thesis', roughly, that development comes from both nature and nurture, while some of the i-properties imply that they come just from nature
2) It makes clearer much of the discussion in cognitive science today
3) It gives cognitive science something useful to do with the concept INNATE
Author then reviews the various i-properties and how most of them, with the exception of the property of being unlearned, are neither necessary nor sufficient for innateness. However, many of them bear a positive evidentiary relation (raise the probability of something being innate) to innateness. (pg28-31)
The last section deals with why, in cognitive science today, debates on innateness seems to be so confused. Author blames ambiguity, fallacious argumentation, and incomplete science (failure of convergence). Another peril is folk-psychology, the 'sink-hole' that it is easy even for scientists to fall into. (pg34-5) Lastly, author discusses a problem with his analysis of INNATE. The problem is that different frameworks of learning/acquisition may show different behaviors/traits to be innate. This is because of the void-filling nature of the concept. Thus author argues that we must simultaneously pursue the two questions:
-What innate structures are there?- and -what is the best theory of cognition?-
5/23/08
Cresswell, Max - Abstract Entities in the Causal Order
05/23/2008
This is a paper discussing some attempts to argue against the existence, or at least our knowledge of, abstract entities. Author unlocks a short logical argument and shows that it has concealed metaphysical premises that need further argumentation. The argument in question goes as follows:
(1) We can only have knowledge of things which are part of the causal order
(2) Abstract entities are not part of the causal order
(3) We cannot have knowledge of abstract entities
The first section of the paper discusses the proposition as an abstract entity. The knowledge relation holds between a person and a proposition due, some platonist might say, it's part in the causal order. But the existence of a proposition isn't in the causal order-- it's truth or falsity is. Hence there is some equivocation in 'part of the causal order' in (2) (pg2).
To counter this, you might want to make explicit a metaphysical assumption (6): No entity whose existence is logically necessary (a proposition) can stand to any other entity in any contingent (e.g. true or false) relation. (pg3). Author reveals this as a metaphysical premise that needs argumentation. Perhaps, instead of arguing for (6), we'd care to reduce the abstract object 'a proposition' to concrete facts, which would mean we'd have to claim that when such a reduction is possible, propositions don't exist. The problem here is that there can be mutual reduction-- propositions in terms of facts, facts in terms of propositions. This leads to a discussion of possible world theories (pg3-4) where Lewis (concrete objects making abstract objects true) is compared to Plantinga, who uses abstract entities (haecceities) to make concrete facts true.
The second part of the paper discusses abstract propositional knowledge like 'p or ~p'. Here you don't have to know anything about the causal order to know that this is true (pg5). Author explores how to incorporate numbers (abstract entities) into propositions that are quasi-mathematical (pg6-7), or to work with mathematical statements with no empirical content. Author wants to separate our ability to 'access a special class of entities which are not part of the causal order' from empistemological problems of how we are able to do math in the first place. (pg9)
This is a paper discussing some attempts to argue against the existence, or at least our knowledge of, abstract entities. Author unlocks a short logical argument and shows that it has concealed metaphysical premises that need further argumentation. The argument in question goes as follows:
(1) We can only have knowledge of things which are part of the causal order
(2) Abstract entities are not part of the causal order
(3) We cannot have knowledge of abstract entities
The first section of the paper discusses the proposition as an abstract entity. The knowledge relation holds between a person and a proposition due, some platonist might say, it's part in the causal order. But the existence of a proposition isn't in the causal order-- it's truth or falsity is. Hence there is some equivocation in 'part of the causal order' in (2) (pg2).
To counter this, you might want to make explicit a metaphysical assumption (6): No entity whose existence is logically necessary (a proposition) can stand to any other entity in any contingent (e.g. true or false) relation. (pg3). Author reveals this as a metaphysical premise that needs argumentation. Perhaps, instead of arguing for (6), we'd care to reduce the abstract object 'a proposition' to concrete facts, which would mean we'd have to claim that when such a reduction is possible, propositions don't exist. The problem here is that there can be mutual reduction-- propositions in terms of facts, facts in terms of propositions. This leads to a discussion of possible world theories (pg3-4) where Lewis (concrete objects making abstract objects true) is compared to Plantinga, who uses abstract entities (haecceities) to make concrete facts true.
The second part of the paper discusses abstract propositional knowledge like 'p or ~p'. Here you don't have to know anything about the causal order to know that this is true (pg5). Author explores how to incorporate numbers (abstract entities) into propositions that are quasi-mathematical (pg6-7), or to work with mathematical statements with no empirical content. Author wants to separate our ability to 'access a special class of entities which are not part of the causal order' from empistemological problems of how we are able to do math in the first place. (pg9)
5/9/08
Taylor, Charles - The Culture of Modernity
05/09/2008
Sources of Self, Harvard Press 1989 Ch 17
In this chapter author explores the rise of the valuation of sentiment by both philosophers and the public at large in the 18th century England, France and other developing countries like Germany and America. Author first recaps what he recently finished discussing (in previous chapters?) about the rise in interest in economic productivity as a method for accruing honor or respect, as compared to the more aristocratic ideals of winning military victories.
Author first discusses the rise in the modern novel, which turned away from epic archetypes and more toward the 'portrayal of the particular'. In conjuring the particular, the story became about a particular person and their particular life, including their emotions. This captured the imagination of the public, who felt gripped by their imagination of these sentiments. (pg294-6) What also changed was what author calls 'time-consciousness' (pg287-8); because stories were more particular, this de-emphasized the archetypal, 'ontic-logos' method of story-telling, where the universe is portrayed as working in thematic ways at all times. Time was now seen to be more like space, homogenous and empty. Lastly, this shift began to portray life as a narration, not just of outer accomplishments but of inner space. (pg289)
The next shift is the growth in marriage and family life as based on affection. This starts with larger demands on the family unit, therefore a call for more voluntary entrance to such an structure. This stood in contrast to a patriarchal model. But author argues that all this was fueled by placing greater weight in the feeling of love, especially naturalizing it as a right (pg 290). This seems to be coupled with placing greater importance on children, and childhood as distinct from being an adult. As such, it follows that raising children is a special act, requiring special work- from the family. Private rooms began to be incorporated in home construction. Author argues that the entire family life began to shift into somewhere to take solace from a hard world, rather than something to have while you participate in the world. (pg292-3)
Another change was he rise of the English garden, and 'country living' in general. What was important here wasn't the appreciation of balance, reason, or simplicity in nature, but instead what sentiments were brought out in being out in 'natural' surroundings. (pg297) English gardens were designed to look unkept, or rather not organized by a human hand. Neo-classicism fought directly against this (pg299).
Lastly, author discusses how the religions began to move away from theology and more toward conviction and devotion-- sentiments.
Sources of Self, Harvard Press 1989 Ch 17
In this chapter author explores the rise of the valuation of sentiment by both philosophers and the public at large in the 18th century England, France and other developing countries like Germany and America. Author first recaps what he recently finished discussing (in previous chapters?) about the rise in interest in economic productivity as a method for accruing honor or respect, as compared to the more aristocratic ideals of winning military victories.
Author first discusses the rise in the modern novel, which turned away from epic archetypes and more toward the 'portrayal of the particular'. In conjuring the particular, the story became about a particular person and their particular life, including their emotions. This captured the imagination of the public, who felt gripped by their imagination of these sentiments. (pg294-6) What also changed was what author calls 'time-consciousness' (pg287-8); because stories were more particular, this de-emphasized the archetypal, 'ontic-logos' method of story-telling, where the universe is portrayed as working in thematic ways at all times. Time was now seen to be more like space, homogenous and empty. Lastly, this shift began to portray life as a narration, not just of outer accomplishments but of inner space. (pg289)
The next shift is the growth in marriage and family life as based on affection. This starts with larger demands on the family unit, therefore a call for more voluntary entrance to such an structure. This stood in contrast to a patriarchal model. But author argues that all this was fueled by placing greater weight in the feeling of love, especially naturalizing it as a right (pg 290). This seems to be coupled with placing greater importance on children, and childhood as distinct from being an adult. As such, it follows that raising children is a special act, requiring special work- from the family. Private rooms began to be incorporated in home construction. Author argues that the entire family life began to shift into somewhere to take solace from a hard world, rather than something to have while you participate in the world. (pg292-3)
Another change was he rise of the English garden, and 'country living' in general. What was important here wasn't the appreciation of balance, reason, or simplicity in nature, but instead what sentiments were brought out in being out in 'natural' surroundings. (pg297) English gardens were designed to look unkept, or rather not organized by a human hand. Neo-classicism fought directly against this (pg299).
Lastly, author discusses how the religions began to move away from theology and more toward conviction and devotion-- sentiments.
4/18/08
Smith, Barry - Should African-Americans Forgive White Americans?
04/18/2008
For Discussion at the Kahn Institute
Author asks the question given in the title. The first part of the essay discusses what it is to forgive: to overcome resentment. Resentment is:
'Anger and hatred toward those whom you believe have harmed you without justification or excuse.'
Author discusses the reasons that forgiveness in general is often desirable: it staves off retaliation, it frees up creative energy. But since resentment is the proper response to defend self-regard and respect, if the transgressor will repeat the offence, forgiveness shows a lack of self-respect. The best time for forgiveness is when the transgressor shows legitimate repentance and willingness to repair the damage.
Author reviews the harms done to African-Americans and submits that most of those who actually did the harm are dead, and that most alive white Americans are willing to give opportunity to African-Americans, though most will also reject the case for reparations. There is also the possibility of expanding the case for culpability to the next generation, that it can 'spill-down', yet author rejects this as unjust. Author also is skeptical about how much white Americans have benefited from slavery as compared to African-Americans. But perhaps there is still resentment; author points out this is a different kind of resentment, since it doesn't respond to an attack on African-Americans' self-regard.
Author concludes that African-Americans should try to get an apology from the government without the call for more governmental programs, and that if this is done, African-Americans should forgive currently alive white Americans.
For Discussion at the Kahn Institute
Author asks the question given in the title. The first part of the essay discusses what it is to forgive: to overcome resentment. Resentment is:
'Anger and hatred toward those whom you believe have harmed you without justification or excuse.'
Author discusses the reasons that forgiveness in general is often desirable: it staves off retaliation, it frees up creative energy. But since resentment is the proper response to defend self-regard and respect, if the transgressor will repeat the offence, forgiveness shows a lack of self-respect. The best time for forgiveness is when the transgressor shows legitimate repentance and willingness to repair the damage.
Author reviews the harms done to African-Americans and submits that most of those who actually did the harm are dead, and that most alive white Americans are willing to give opportunity to African-Americans, though most will also reject the case for reparations. There is also the possibility of expanding the case for culpability to the next generation, that it can 'spill-down', yet author rejects this as unjust. Author also is skeptical about how much white Americans have benefited from slavery as compared to African-Americans. But perhaps there is still resentment; author points out this is a different kind of resentment, since it doesn't respond to an attack on African-Americans' self-regard.
Author concludes that African-Americans should try to get an apology from the government without the call for more governmental programs, and that if this is done, African-Americans should forgive currently alive white Americans.
3/28/08
Burge, Tyler - Predication and Truth (Review of Donald Davidson book)
03/28/2008
Journal of Philosophy, November 2007
Author gives a long review of Donald Davidson's book Truth And Predication. The review is at least three parts: a discussion of Davidson's conception of truth and then a discussion of his view of predication, then a critique of Davidson's views on predication.
Davidson takes Tarski's T-sentences as the basis for his truth theory. Author agrees with Davidson that deflationist positions of truth don't capture quantification and truth is more than extensional. Author proceeds to discuss Davidson's rejection of correspondence theories as misunderstanding such theories and too narrow a view (pg581-3).
In chapter 3 Davidson gives a 'rational reconstruction' of how to arrive at a theory of meaning and belief that adds to the missing parts of Tarski's theory. Author takes this as a re-formulation of Davidson's major contributions to philosophy, yet discusses how confusing Davidson's talk can be. On one hand, it appears people have to be following a semantic rule in order to build a theory of meaning, which is countered by how people actually learn language. It is also countered by evidence of 'perceptual reference' and 'propositional inference' in non-human animals and young children. (pg285-6) On the other, he thinks people just need to behave 'as if' they are conforming to those rules, yet author thinks that such talk isn't what Davidson is committed to. (pg584-5)
The next part of the paper is dealing with Davidson's 'problem of predication', which is the regress argument if predicates are names for properties. (pg586-590) Davidson wants a theory of predication to satisfy 4 criteria: (pg586-7)
1. predication should be connected to truth
2. predication is not explained by trying to associate objects with universals, properties, etc.
3. predication is kept separate from the question of the existence of properties, universals, etc.
4. the solution must allow for predication
Davidson appears to waffle between claiming that having predication refer to properties is unnecessary for it to work, and claiming that understanding predication as reference doesn't complete the understanding of predication. When discussing the regress problem, Davidson is loose with his talk, at least according to the author, who shows ways of avoiding the regress while still referring to properties. "The regress gets started if the syntactic and semantic relations of a predicate are assimilated to those of a singular term." (pg 590)
Author defends types of regress. Regression of explanation is bad, regression (infinity) of objects isn't a theory-killer-- there is no real philosophical problem with having infinite entities. There is a philosophical problem with having an infinite explanationatory scheme (pg592).
Author argues that predication has two parts: first it indicates or refers to properties and second it attributes that it is true of the singular term used in the argument (or place) if the predicate. (pg593-594) Author spends some time defending Frege against Davidson. Author asserts that Frege was wrong to believe that predicates can't be predicated without turning them into singular terms. (pg598-601) It is because predicates play a different semantic role than singular terms do that you don't turn a predicate into a singular term when you apply another predicate to it.
Author criticizes Davidson's concept of reference and 'being-true-of'. For Davidson, these concepts are loose and should be whatever works to get true sentences to be come out as true. Here the only 'primitive' concept is truth. (pg605-6) Author argues that though reference and predication are dependent on truth, truth is 'partially explicated in terms of notions of reference and predication'. (pg607) They help explain how truth is related to truth makers.
Journal of Philosophy, November 2007
Author gives a long review of Donald Davidson's book Truth And Predication. The review is at least three parts: a discussion of Davidson's conception of truth and then a discussion of his view of predication, then a critique of Davidson's views on predication.
Davidson takes Tarski's T-sentences as the basis for his truth theory. Author agrees with Davidson that deflationist positions of truth don't capture quantification and truth is more than extensional. Author proceeds to discuss Davidson's rejection of correspondence theories as misunderstanding such theories and too narrow a view (pg581-3).
In chapter 3 Davidson gives a 'rational reconstruction' of how to arrive at a theory of meaning and belief that adds to the missing parts of Tarski's theory. Author takes this as a re-formulation of Davidson's major contributions to philosophy, yet discusses how confusing Davidson's talk can be. On one hand, it appears people have to be following a semantic rule in order to build a theory of meaning, which is countered by how people actually learn language. It is also countered by evidence of 'perceptual reference' and 'propositional inference' in non-human animals and young children. (pg285-6) On the other, he thinks people just need to behave 'as if' they are conforming to those rules, yet author thinks that such talk isn't what Davidson is committed to. (pg584-5)
The next part of the paper is dealing with Davidson's 'problem of predication', which is the regress argument if predicates are names for properties. (pg586-590) Davidson wants a theory of predication to satisfy 4 criteria: (pg586-7)
1. predication should be connected to truth
2. predication is not explained by trying to associate objects with universals, properties, etc.
3. predication is kept separate from the question of the existence of properties, universals, etc.
4. the solution must allow for predication
Davidson appears to waffle between claiming that having predication refer to properties is unnecessary for it to work, and claiming that understanding predication as reference doesn't complete the understanding of predication. When discussing the regress problem, Davidson is loose with his talk, at least according to the author, who shows ways of avoiding the regress while still referring to properties. "The regress gets started if the syntactic and semantic relations of a predicate are assimilated to those of a singular term." (pg 590)
Author defends types of regress. Regression of explanation is bad, regression (infinity) of objects isn't a theory-killer-- there is no real philosophical problem with having infinite entities. There is a philosophical problem with having an infinite explanationatory scheme (pg592).
Author argues that predication has two parts: first it indicates or refers to properties and second it attributes that it is true of the singular term used in the argument (or place) if the predicate. (pg593-594) Author spends some time defending Frege against Davidson. Author asserts that Frege was wrong to believe that predicates can't be predicated without turning them into singular terms. (pg598-601) It is because predicates play a different semantic role than singular terms do that you don't turn a predicate into a singular term when you apply another predicate to it.
Author criticizes Davidson's concept of reference and 'being-true-of'. For Davidson, these concepts are loose and should be whatever works to get true sentences to be come out as true. Here the only 'primitive' concept is truth. (pg605-6) Author argues that though reference and predication are dependent on truth, truth is 'partially explicated in terms of notions of reference and predication'. (pg607) They help explain how truth is related to truth makers.
3/14/08
Godfrey-Smith, Peter - Conditions for Evolution by Natural Selection
03/14/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 10 October 2007
A paper involving mathematically technical formulations of the components of evolution by natural selection, this paper has a modes conclusion. The paper aims to clarify the status of the various conditions given for evolution by natural selection (ENS). Some condition sets should be considered summaries, or descriptions of all the various ways change in a population can be considered ENS. Other condition sets give sufficient conditions for ENS, outlining a recipe ENS. These condition sets are idealizations, since they might not capture all of the various cases of ENS. Author's main point is to distinguish between these two and warn against not distinguishing them.
Generally, there are three main components to ENS as given in condition sets:
1. Phenotypic variation
2. Differential fitness
3. Heritability/heredity
Author brings up a number of cases that certain phrasings of ENS don't get right:
Case 1: Culling: no reproduction therefore no heredity, yet there is differential fitness because some organisms die more rapidly than others
Reply: this isn't a case of ENS, at least not yet (pg494)
Case 2: differential reproduction with no differential fitness: organisms reproduce the same amounts, but faster than others
Reply: the standard condition sets of ENS are idealized with discrete generations that don't overlap and reproduce at the same time (pg496)
Author discusses the problems with heredity and heritability mixed with fitness. It appears the two concepts should be kept separate, but differential fitness that is heritable should show up in future generations. Differential fitness itself doesn't suggest heritability-- a certain disposition needs to be present for a population to 'respond' to selection. (pg500) This is supposed to be heritability, and it is has a set of difficulties.
Case 3: 'Biased Inheritance': a heritable trait that improves fitness sometimes is heritable, sometimes not. Overall fitness remains unchanged after a new generation.
Case 4: A heritable trait that also improves fitness doesn't come from parent to child in the right way (pg502)
Replies: tie together fitness with heritability in the recipes of evolution, unfortunately connecting two concepts that we wanted to keep separate.
Author discusses arcane equations that are meant to separate heritability from fitness. (pg506-509) [If anyone thinks I'm going to commit the hours need to understand this, forget it.]
The final problems author brings up is heritability by accident and genetic drift. (pg510) These can be fixed by saying that genuine cases of ENS has a causal link between the phenotypic trait's fitness value and the inheritance of that trait. The problem with 'causal link' is that it is vague and not easily expressed in an equation. Author examines an alternate equation and finds it inadequate.
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 10 October 2007
A paper involving mathematically technical formulations of the components of evolution by natural selection, this paper has a modes conclusion. The paper aims to clarify the status of the various conditions given for evolution by natural selection (ENS). Some condition sets should be considered summaries, or descriptions of all the various ways change in a population can be considered ENS. Other condition sets give sufficient conditions for ENS, outlining a recipe ENS. These condition sets are idealizations, since they might not capture all of the various cases of ENS. Author's main point is to distinguish between these two and warn against not distinguishing them.
Generally, there are three main components to ENS as given in condition sets:
1. Phenotypic variation
2. Differential fitness
3. Heritability/heredity
Author brings up a number of cases that certain phrasings of ENS don't get right:
Case 1: Culling: no reproduction therefore no heredity, yet there is differential fitness because some organisms die more rapidly than others
Reply: this isn't a case of ENS, at least not yet (pg494)
Case 2: differential reproduction with no differential fitness: organisms reproduce the same amounts, but faster than others
Reply: the standard condition sets of ENS are idealized with discrete generations that don't overlap and reproduce at the same time (pg496)
Author discusses the problems with heredity and heritability mixed with fitness. It appears the two concepts should be kept separate, but differential fitness that is heritable should show up in future generations. Differential fitness itself doesn't suggest heritability-- a certain disposition needs to be present for a population to 'respond' to selection. (pg500) This is supposed to be heritability, and it is has a set of difficulties.
Case 3: 'Biased Inheritance': a heritable trait that improves fitness sometimes is heritable, sometimes not. Overall fitness remains unchanged after a new generation.
Case 4: A heritable trait that also improves fitness doesn't come from parent to child in the right way (pg502)
Replies: tie together fitness with heritability in the recipes of evolution, unfortunately connecting two concepts that we wanted to keep separate.
Author discusses arcane equations that are meant to separate heritability from fitness. (pg506-509) [If anyone thinks I'm going to commit the hours need to understand this, forget it.]
The final problems author brings up is heritability by accident and genetic drift. (pg510) These can be fixed by saying that genuine cases of ENS has a causal link between the phenotypic trait's fitness value and the inheritance of that trait. The problem with 'causal link' is that it is vague and not easily expressed in an equation. Author examines an alternate equation and finds it inadequate.
3/7/08
Klein, Colin - An Imperative Theory of Pain
03/07/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Oct 2007
Author begins with discussing the problems with pain for intentionalism, which is the theory that the mental qualities of a thought are exhausted by its intentional content. The problem with pain is that its representational content seems to be a small part of the qualitative aspect of pain that we feel. Thus there have been theories that take pains as primitive, or those that take them as jointly (representational) intentional and also primitive. Author proposes that pains are intentional, just that the content is an imperative, not a representation.
There are some good examples of imperative sensations, or sensations with imperative content, for instance hunger, sleepiness, itching. These are usually positive-- that is, requiring that the subject do something. They also don't particularly represent the world a certain way, author claims. (pg519) Author puts forth pains as imperatives in the negative sense-- to avoid doing the thing that causes pain. He makes two 'notes': the first is that common locutions say that there are pains in places. Instead, it would be more apt to say there are pains when one does things. Secondly, pains are usually received when 'moving in the world', not being 'static and idle'. (pg521-2). Author's last claim is that the imperative account is all 'there is to say about pain'. (pg522)
Author then discusses two objections to the imperative account of pain.
Objection 1: Pain is a report of tissue damage in the body. Author calls this a myth and points out that the imperative account gives indirect evidence for tissue damage, and that is all that is necessary. Author has 3 replies:
1) Pain often comes without tissue damage (pg523)
2) Pain often is unreliable when reporting tissue damage (pg524)
3) Pain as information would fail as a protective mechanism (pg525-6) This is because information can be used and interpreted in all varieties of ways, while pain needs to be a command against all sorts of actions.
Objection 2: Morphine Pain
There are many cases of people reporting feeling pain but also 'not minding it', or quite content with it. This threatens the imperative theory because if you don't feel the imperative, you shouldn't feel the pain. Author points out that such patients are unmotivated by any imperative, not just those of pain. (pg529) Author draws a distinction:
Primary affect of pain: immediate unpleasantness of pain
Secondary affect of pain: emotional responses evoked by pain, like anxiety, concern, etc.
Author proposes that morphine eliminates the secondary affect, but not the primary, and that both have different imperatives. The secondary is more complex, while the primary is usually just avoidance of the kinds of things that cause the pain. The prediction is that morphine patients, then, would avoid those kinds of things but without the usually care and concern. Author claims that this is confirmed in observation. (pg 529-30)
Author concludes by discussing open areas of discussion: general pain not associated with action: headache, menstrual pain, etc. Also the qualitative differences in pains: sharp, dull, shooting. Another open area is psychological and emotional pain. Another is attention and pain-- the relationship and powers they have over each other.
Journal of Philosophy, Oct 2007
Author begins with discussing the problems with pain for intentionalism, which is the theory that the mental qualities of a thought are exhausted by its intentional content. The problem with pain is that its representational content seems to be a small part of the qualitative aspect of pain that we feel. Thus there have been theories that take pains as primitive, or those that take them as jointly (representational) intentional and also primitive. Author proposes that pains are intentional, just that the content is an imperative, not a representation.
There are some good examples of imperative sensations, or sensations with imperative content, for instance hunger, sleepiness, itching. These are usually positive-- that is, requiring that the subject do something. They also don't particularly represent the world a certain way, author claims. (pg519) Author puts forth pains as imperatives in the negative sense-- to avoid doing the thing that causes pain. He makes two 'notes': the first is that common locutions say that there are pains in places. Instead, it would be more apt to say there are pains when one does things. Secondly, pains are usually received when 'moving in the world', not being 'static and idle'. (pg521-2). Author's last claim is that the imperative account is all 'there is to say about pain'. (pg522)
Author then discusses two objections to the imperative account of pain.
Objection 1: Pain is a report of tissue damage in the body. Author calls this a myth and points out that the imperative account gives indirect evidence for tissue damage, and that is all that is necessary. Author has 3 replies:
1) Pain often comes without tissue damage (pg523)
2) Pain often is unreliable when reporting tissue damage (pg524)
3) Pain as information would fail as a protective mechanism (pg525-6) This is because information can be used and interpreted in all varieties of ways, while pain needs to be a command against all sorts of actions.
Objection 2: Morphine Pain
There are many cases of people reporting feeling pain but also 'not minding it', or quite content with it. This threatens the imperative theory because if you don't feel the imperative, you shouldn't feel the pain. Author points out that such patients are unmotivated by any imperative, not just those of pain. (pg529) Author draws a distinction:
Primary affect of pain: immediate unpleasantness of pain
Secondary affect of pain: emotional responses evoked by pain, like anxiety, concern, etc.
Author proposes that morphine eliminates the secondary affect, but not the primary, and that both have different imperatives. The secondary is more complex, while the primary is usually just avoidance of the kinds of things that cause the pain. The prediction is that morphine patients, then, would avoid those kinds of things but without the usually care and concern. Author claims that this is confirmed in observation. (pg 529-30)
Author concludes by discussing open areas of discussion: general pain not associated with action: headache, menstrual pain, etc. Also the qualitative differences in pains: sharp, dull, shooting. Another open area is psychological and emotional pain. Another is attention and pain-- the relationship and powers they have over each other.
2/29/08
Pinker, Steven - The Moral Instinct
02/29/2008
New York Times Magazine, January 13, 2008
This is a popular press article, so much of it is a watering-down and more loosely-concluded than a more academic article. Author first discusses how we might have a 'moralization switch', which is different from other norms. There are a few 'hallmarks' for moralization: universal reasoning, and that transgressions deserve punishment. Author talks about how some things that used to be simple lifestyle choices (smoking, vegetarianism) became moralized, and previously moralized things (divorce, homosexuality) have lost much of their moral aspect.
Next the discussion turns to how, according to new psychological and neurological evidence, we make snap, intuitive judgments about a moral case and then rationalize it. We don't reason through it, we rational-ize it. The lesson form this is that there seems to be a universal moral code already established within us-- it just might not be one that follows rational rules of harm, justice, etc. It could be law-like, but still have conflicts with a more reasoned approach (e.g. trolley problems).
Author then discusses the work of Haidt and others that places more dimensions to moralizing than just harm/care and justice/fairness. (See previous article). Author tries to explain much of our cultural moralistic differences (among the purely cultural accidental aspects of what is sacred, what is profane) as placing more emphasis on one of the five different moralizing dimensions (e.g. Islam on profanity, Japanese on authority). The next discussion is about the possible genetic usefulness of these moral judgments. Altruism and fairness is explained by a summary of the work of Trivers, discussing recriprocal altruism and cheater detection. The best way to avoid being a cheater is to be a non-cheater, or a fair-player. (Or to believe you're a fair player...)
Author then responds to worries that unmasking our moral senses will somehow cheapen them. He counters that it will give us a greater understanding of our biases and take a more rational approach to building a better moral system. The next concern: what is the status of a 'moral truth'? Author discusses two supports for morality-- the external and one of the aspects of reasoning.
External: enlightened self-interest in the modern world (the 'prevalence of non-zero-sum games) is rational and also leads to cooperation
Internal: moral reasoning is not 1st personal but 3rd personal-- adopting a non-particular viewpoint-- this core, author claims, has bolstered some of history's best moral systems.
New York Times Magazine, January 13, 2008
This is a popular press article, so much of it is a watering-down and more loosely-concluded than a more academic article. Author first discusses how we might have a 'moralization switch', which is different from other norms. There are a few 'hallmarks' for moralization: universal reasoning, and that transgressions deserve punishment. Author talks about how some things that used to be simple lifestyle choices (smoking, vegetarianism) became moralized, and previously moralized things (divorce, homosexuality) have lost much of their moral aspect.
Next the discussion turns to how, according to new psychological and neurological evidence, we make snap, intuitive judgments about a moral case and then rationalize it. We don't reason through it, we rational-ize it. The lesson form this is that there seems to be a universal moral code already established within us-- it just might not be one that follows rational rules of harm, justice, etc. It could be law-like, but still have conflicts with a more reasoned approach (e.g. trolley problems).
Author then discusses the work of Haidt and others that places more dimensions to moralizing than just harm/care and justice/fairness. (See previous article). Author tries to explain much of our cultural moralistic differences (among the purely cultural accidental aspects of what is sacred, what is profane) as placing more emphasis on one of the five different moralizing dimensions (e.g. Islam on profanity, Japanese on authority). The next discussion is about the possible genetic usefulness of these moral judgments. Altruism and fairness is explained by a summary of the work of Trivers, discussing recriprocal altruism and cheater detection. The best way to avoid being a cheater is to be a non-cheater, or a fair-player. (Or to believe you're a fair player...)
Author then responds to worries that unmasking our moral senses will somehow cheapen them. He counters that it will give us a greater understanding of our biases and take a more rational approach to building a better moral system. The next concern: what is the status of a 'moral truth'? Author discusses two supports for morality-- the external and one of the aspects of reasoning.
External: enlightened self-interest in the modern world (the 'prevalence of non-zero-sum games) is rational and also leads to cooperation
Internal: moral reasoning is not 1st personal but 3rd personal-- adopting a non-particular viewpoint-- this core, author claims, has bolstered some of history's best moral systems.
2/22/08
Haidt, Jonathan - Moral Psychology and the Misunderstanding of Religion
02/22/2008
The Edge 222, The Reality Club 09/12/2007 (Link)
Author writes a paper partially related to his book, the Happiness Hypothesis and also reflective of his work in social psychology and philosophy. Specifically, the issue is around morality, and its relation to religion. Author starts with a contrast of rational moral doctrines that are rule-following and law-like and emotional or 'disgust' reactions to morally salient situations that are then post-hoc reasoned to justify. Part of this is a change in the way we see moral development-- from the older, Kohlberg-style levels of conscious rational thought, to automatic, unconscious processes more tuned to emotions e.g. revulsion, disgust. Author puts forward what he considers the main tenets of the new psychological study of moral reasoning:
1) Intuitive primacy but not dictatorship- we make snap judgments but our reasoning can override them
2) Moral thinking is for social doing- when we mount moral arguments, they are mostly for pragmatic, political purposes
3) Morality binds and builds- shared moral decisions and public discussion on what ought to be done binds people together, serving as social cohesion. Author discusses the renewing possibility of group selection to encourage cohesion, cooperation.
4) Morality is about more than harm and fairness- the academic books, written by academics, mostly talk about harms or fairness. Gilligan convinced us that there was another dimension: 'care'. But still this falls short of capturing the moral reasoning. Through his research, author concludes there are at least three more dimensions:
1- justice/fairness
2- harm/care
+3- ingroup/loyalty
+4- authority/respect
+5- purity/sanctity
These can be considered 'learning modules' that we have evolved to pick up given our cultural surroundings. The last three serve to bind people to a group, while the first two are 'individualizing', meaning that they serve to protect individuals from each other. Author points out that he has found secular liberals give the first 2 to morality, while religious conservatives take all 5 as morality.
The next part of the paper, author takes the work of the 'new atheists' to be not scientific thinking but the kind of 'moral' thinking he discussed above. He holds these 'scientific' thinkers to the standard of science and not of the 'moral thinking' he just developed. He uses examples from the books of Dawkins, Harris, Dennett. Harris gives a 'standard liberal definition of morality': morality is about happiness and suffering. Author proposes his alternative:
"Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible."
Author claims the 'standard liberal' definition is a 'contractual approach', while his is a 'beehive approach'. The beehive approach takes religion as a key component in the development of morality, and acknowledges that it has its discontents, but also points out that religious conservatives are more likely to give to charity, time, money, and blood. They also report being happier, healthier, and they live longer. This evidence author claims Dennett denies-- again being unfair to the proper place of religious commitments. Author concludes by saying that "every longstanding ideology and way of life contains some wisdom, some insights into ways of suppressing selfishness, enhancing cooperation, and ultimately enhancing human flourishing."
Replies
David Sloan Wilson:
These four questions need to be answered by the new atheists:
1) Is there any empirical evidence for the existence of supernatural agents?
2) If not, how can we explain the universal aspect of religion in naturalistic terms?
3) What are the effects of religion, good and bad, on human welfare?
4) How can we use these understandings to advance our society?
Wilson claims that e.g. Dawkins, only focuses on the first question, which leaves a lot out.
Michael Shermer
Religion is a force for both good and bad. It kills, maims, suppresses difference. Yet it also makes people happier, healthier, and promotes a more social cohesion. The difficulty is that when we get into complex societies of large sizes, we needed to make institutions that encouraged social cohesion and also human flourishing-- the two main ones were organized religion and centralized government. We now need to try to convince the world to make new institutions in the place of the old ones.
Sam Harris
Where is the 'wisdom' in the many, many religions that, e.g., conducted human sacrifice? Haidt might want to gloss over the actual beliefs and look at what purposes they serve, but the actual beliefs do matter-- they're bogus. Harris interprets the 3 'other' dimensions of morality as just subsets of the care/harm dimension. For example-- being worried about taking the lord's name in vain (respect/authority) is just being worried you'll go to hell (harm/care). Science shouldn't care whether false religious beliefs lead to better lives-- science is about getting the empirical work right, and religions generally fail.
PZ Myers
Myers likes in general the discussion of the expansion of morality. He heavily criticizes Haidt's likening of the new atheists to religious thinkers. Meyers says that Haidt equates the new dimensions of morality with religious practice. Must (necessarily) we have religion to have this full-fledged morality? Certainly not. Myers spins the discussion of welfare and charity, saying that most charities secular liberals do not trust, and that they are also dissatisfied moreso than conservatives with the direction of the country, world, etc. Myers also says that if believing in a false thing gives me extra life, extra happiness, he doesn't want it.
Marc Hauser
Hauser talks about the possibility of group selection for religious modules. Hauser concludes it has not yet been shown and that individual or gene-centric selection has been far more explanatory. Hauser also tries to distinguish two different issues:
- the evolution of morality as a biological faculty that guides our intuitive judgments
- the ways in which cultural factors, including religion, can alter our explicit moral judgments
The target here is the evidence that religious people give more. The problem is that in some moral judgments, both religious and non-religious decide equally. Do the religious give more because they are religious, or because they are more beehive oriented and are more likely to take on religion?
Hadit has a final entry, where he discusses three main points:
1) the possibility of group selection
2) religious people really are happier and more charitable
3) binding/beehive moralities can be good for us (emphasis on 'can')
The Edge 222, The Reality Club 09/12/2007 (Link)
Author writes a paper partially related to his book, the Happiness Hypothesis and also reflective of his work in social psychology and philosophy. Specifically, the issue is around morality, and its relation to religion. Author starts with a contrast of rational moral doctrines that are rule-following and law-like and emotional or 'disgust' reactions to morally salient situations that are then post-hoc reasoned to justify. Part of this is a change in the way we see moral development-- from the older, Kohlberg-style levels of conscious rational thought, to automatic, unconscious processes more tuned to emotions e.g. revulsion, disgust. Author puts forward what he considers the main tenets of the new psychological study of moral reasoning:
1) Intuitive primacy but not dictatorship- we make snap judgments but our reasoning can override them
2) Moral thinking is for social doing- when we mount moral arguments, they are mostly for pragmatic, political purposes
3) Morality binds and builds- shared moral decisions and public discussion on what ought to be done binds people together, serving as social cohesion. Author discusses the renewing possibility of group selection to encourage cohesion, cooperation.
4) Morality is about more than harm and fairness- the academic books, written by academics, mostly talk about harms or fairness. Gilligan convinced us that there was another dimension: 'care'. But still this falls short of capturing the moral reasoning. Through his research, author concludes there are at least three more dimensions:
1- justice/fairness
2- harm/care
+3- ingroup/loyalty
+4- authority/respect
+5- purity/sanctity
These can be considered 'learning modules' that we have evolved to pick up given our cultural surroundings. The last three serve to bind people to a group, while the first two are 'individualizing', meaning that they serve to protect individuals from each other. Author points out that he has found secular liberals give the first 2 to morality, while religious conservatives take all 5 as morality.
The next part of the paper, author takes the work of the 'new atheists' to be not scientific thinking but the kind of 'moral' thinking he discussed above. He holds these 'scientific' thinkers to the standard of science and not of the 'moral thinking' he just developed. He uses examples from the books of Dawkins, Harris, Dennett. Harris gives a 'standard liberal definition of morality': morality is about happiness and suffering. Author proposes his alternative:
"Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible."
Author claims the 'standard liberal' definition is a 'contractual approach', while his is a 'beehive approach'. The beehive approach takes religion as a key component in the development of morality, and acknowledges that it has its discontents, but also points out that religious conservatives are more likely to give to charity, time, money, and blood. They also report being happier, healthier, and they live longer. This evidence author claims Dennett denies-- again being unfair to the proper place of religious commitments. Author concludes by saying that "every longstanding ideology and way of life contains some wisdom, some insights into ways of suppressing selfishness, enhancing cooperation, and ultimately enhancing human flourishing."
Replies
David Sloan Wilson:
These four questions need to be answered by the new atheists:
1) Is there any empirical evidence for the existence of supernatural agents?
2) If not, how can we explain the universal aspect of religion in naturalistic terms?
3) What are the effects of religion, good and bad, on human welfare?
4) How can we use these understandings to advance our society?
Wilson claims that e.g. Dawkins, only focuses on the first question, which leaves a lot out.
Michael Shermer
Religion is a force for both good and bad. It kills, maims, suppresses difference. Yet it also makes people happier, healthier, and promotes a more social cohesion. The difficulty is that when we get into complex societies of large sizes, we needed to make institutions that encouraged social cohesion and also human flourishing-- the two main ones were organized religion and centralized government. We now need to try to convince the world to make new institutions in the place of the old ones.
Sam Harris
Where is the 'wisdom' in the many, many religions that, e.g., conducted human sacrifice? Haidt might want to gloss over the actual beliefs and look at what purposes they serve, but the actual beliefs do matter-- they're bogus. Harris interprets the 3 'other' dimensions of morality as just subsets of the care/harm dimension. For example-- being worried about taking the lord's name in vain (respect/authority) is just being worried you'll go to hell (harm/care). Science shouldn't care whether false religious beliefs lead to better lives-- science is about getting the empirical work right, and religions generally fail.
PZ Myers
Myers likes in general the discussion of the expansion of morality. He heavily criticizes Haidt's likening of the new atheists to religious thinkers. Meyers says that Haidt equates the new dimensions of morality with religious practice. Must (necessarily) we have religion to have this full-fledged morality? Certainly not. Myers spins the discussion of welfare and charity, saying that most charities secular liberals do not trust, and that they are also dissatisfied moreso than conservatives with the direction of the country, world, etc. Myers also says that if believing in a false thing gives me extra life, extra happiness, he doesn't want it.
Marc Hauser
Hauser talks about the possibility of group selection for religious modules. Hauser concludes it has not yet been shown and that individual or gene-centric selection has been far more explanatory. Hauser also tries to distinguish two different issues:
- the evolution of morality as a biological faculty that guides our intuitive judgments
- the ways in which cultural factors, including religion, can alter our explicit moral judgments
The target here is the evidence that religious people give more. The problem is that in some moral judgments, both religious and non-religious decide equally. Do the religious give more because they are religious, or because they are more beehive oriented and are more likely to take on religion?
Hadit has a final entry, where he discusses three main points:
1) the possibility of group selection
2) religious people really are happier and more charitable
3) binding/beehive moralities can be good for us (emphasis on 'can')
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