Pinker, Steven - The Moral Instinct

02/29/2008

New York Times Magazine, January 13, 2008

This is a popular press article, so much of it is a watering-down and more loosely-concluded than a more academic article. Author first discusses how we might have a 'moralization switch', which is different from other norms. There are a few 'hallmarks' for moralization: universal reasoning, and that transgressions deserve punishment. Author talks about how some things that used to be simple lifestyle choices (smoking, vegetarianism) became moralized, and previously moralized things (divorce, homosexuality) have lost much of their moral aspect.

Next the discussion turns to how, according to new psychological and neurological evidence, we make snap, intuitive judgments about a moral case and then rationalize it. We don't reason through it, we rational-ize it. The lesson form this is that there seems to be a universal moral code already established within us-- it just might not be one that follows rational rules of harm, justice, etc. It could be law-like, but still have conflicts with a more reasoned approach (e.g. trolley problems).

Author then discusses the work of Haidt and others that places more dimensions to moralizing than just harm/care and justice/fairness. (See previous article). Author tries to explain much of our cultural moralistic differences (among the purely cultural accidental aspects of what is sacred, what is profane) as placing more emphasis on one of the five different moralizing dimensions (e.g. Islam on profanity, Japanese on authority). The next discussion is about the possible genetic usefulness of these moral judgments. Altruism and fairness is explained by a summary of the work of Trivers, discussing recriprocal altruism and cheater detection. The best way to avoid being a cheater is to be a non-cheater, or a fair-player. (Or to believe you're a fair player...)

Author then responds to worries that unmasking our moral senses will somehow cheapen them. He counters that it will give us a greater understanding of our biases and take a more rational approach to building a better moral system. The next concern: what is the status of a 'moral truth'? Author discusses two supports for morality-- the external and one of the aspects of reasoning.
External: enlightened self-interest in the modern world (the 'prevalence of non-zero-sum games) is rational and also leads to cooperation
Internal: moral reasoning is not 1st personal but 3rd personal-- adopting a non-particular viewpoint-- this core, author claims, has bolstered some of history's best moral systems.