Davidson, Donald - Intending

11/21/2008

Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 5 Clarendon Press 1980

A landmark essay that begins with a distinction between having an intention and forming an intention. Author gives the first take on his idea of acting with an intention: you act for a reason. The difference is brought out in the following examples: (pg83-85)
1) His reason for boarding a plane marked 'London' was that he wanted to board a plane headed for London, England, and he believed the plane marked 'London' was going there.
2) His intention in boarding the plane marked 'London' was to board a plane headed for London, England.
Author comments that 1) entails 2), but not necessarily 2) entails 1). Also, the belief in 1) is opaque-- you can't substitute into it (for instance, if the plane marked 'London' was going to London, Ontario). Yet the plane in 2) is transparent. Author also suggests that the 'intention in boarding the plane marked...' is opaque. (pg85) Reasons comprised of beliefs and pro-attitude 'value judgments' (pg86) underwrite intentions, though many intentional actions aren't done by actively forming an intention. (pg85) The problem with this traditional account is intervening causation that manages to perform the action but not for the right reasons. (pg87) A more fruitful discussion of intention might be better served by looking at 'pure intending', that is, intending without accompanied by action. (pg88)

--Is pure intending an action? Not in the performative sense. (pg89-91)

--Is intending to act a belief that one will do so? This is tricky. Adding 'if I can' to an intention is superfluous, unless it is an overt speech act to reduce the probability of your intention happening. (pg92-3) Yet an intention might be formed even when you believe it will be difficult, or unlikely, that you'll complete the action. (pg95)

--Is intending to do something the same as wanting to do it? Here we have a problem from Anscombe where the desire to eat something sweet might be expressed as a law-like generalization that will make tons of variegated actions as desirable (e.g. eating candy laced with poison). 'The trouble about pure intending is that there is no action to judge simply good or desirable' (pg97) Author proposes that actions that are desirable in a certain attribute (e.g. sweet-eating) are prima facie judgments. There must be a further judgment that this attribute is enough to act on, an all-out judgment that results in 'This action is desirable' (pg98). Having specificity is very important because it picks from the class of possible actions one particular action that can be evaluated (pg96). Pure intending (an all-out judgment) for a certain action type is also possible if there are background beliefs and conditions that will avoid undesirable actions. (pg98)

Lastly, author clears up the earlier issue of 'if I can' and such: an all-out judgment about what is desirable is held 'given the rest of what I believe about the immediate future'. (pg99-100) Author also distinguishes from intentions and wishes, aside from wishes not consistent with what one believes is possible, there is little to distinguish them, except the assertion that intentions are 'not mere' wishes (pg101).