09/12/2008
The Journal of Value Inquiry 33, 1999
This is a relatively short paper written to defend Mental State Welfare theories against the Experience Machine. The first part of the paper brings out the intuitions about what someones welfare is: it has to affect the individual for it to affect her well-being. (pg381-2) Author then quotes Nozick's Experience Machine argument, but claims that the EM does not hit only against MSW theories. What the EM argues for is our unwillingness to abandon our commitments, whether it be for other things in the real world or not. As an example, author asks us consider achieving perfect virtue, happiness and accomplishments but having to never see your friends and family again. Author says that few would take this, making the analogy between this choice and the EM choice.
Author claims that just because we have commitments we are unwilling to abandon doesn't make them necessary for our well-being. (pg384) Author argues that there is a separation between what we value and what is good for our well-being, possibly creating conflicts between rival values.
In the final part of the paper, author considers a soldier that jumps on a grenade in order to save his fellows. The analysis is that he had a commitment to their lives that conflicted with his own well-being. The possible objection is that there is no conflict; he has accomplished something he values, which is a noble thing, and thus that contributed to his well-being, but not his MSW, thus MSW is incorrect. Author replies, perhaps weakly, that it is possible his MSW would have been worse if he hadn't stifled the grenade: living with the guilt, etc. This reduces it to a matter of prudence or instrumental value.
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