Davidson, Donald - How is Weakness of the Will Possible?

11/14/2008

Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 2 Clarendon Press 1980

A reprinting of a paper where author tries to deal with the logical problem of weakness of the will in intentional actions. Davidson first decides this is the same as incontinence (pg21-2), and gives a definition: (pg22)

A acts incontinently iff: A does x intentionally; A believes that y is open to him; A judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than x.

The problem is that an intentional action seems to be one done once all things are considered. There seems to be an inconsistent triad:
P1) If A wants x more than y and can do either and acts intentionally, A will do x over y
P2) If A judges that it's better to do x than y, A will want to do x more than y
P3) There are incontinent actions
Author doesn't want to pick away at these premises, but instead largely affirm them and also claim they aren't inconsistent. (pg23-4)

I. What follows is a discussion largely about the nature of intentional action, how it's opaque to substitution (pg25), how it is independent from moralizing (pg29-30), how it doesn't argue for any particular meta-ethical theory (pg26). Author also argues strongly that we must resist the temptation to reject P2 (pg27-8).

II. Author discusses Aristotle's practical syllogism and Aquinas' account of the incontinent man. (pg31-3) This leads to a specific point: even if we get rid of the multiple sources for desire, just within, say, the desire to act morally and only morally there can be conflict. Author rejects the 'single principle' solution. (pg34) In Aristotle, Aquinas and Hare, the battle is between two forces, one wins. In Plato and Butler and perhaps Dante, there are three actors: the two forces, and then another, 'the will' or 'conscience' that decides which wins. (pg35-6)

The solution to the problem of incontinence is to hold that there is a prima facie judgment based on a set of reasons that holds x desirable, but there is another, all-things-considered judgment based on a set of reasons (that includes the earlier set) that holds y more desirable. A performs x, and there is no logical contradition between an all-things-considered (universalized) judgment and a prima facie one. (pg37-39) 'If we are to have a coherent theory of practical reason, we must give up the idea that we can detacth conclusions about what is desirable ... from the principles that lend those conclusions colour. The trouble lies in the tacit assumption that moral principles have the form of universalized conditionals; once this assumption is made, nothing we can do with a prima facie operator in the conclusion will save things' (pg37)