03/27/2009
Frog & Toad: Analysis Vol 56 No 2 April 1996
Underestimating self-control: Analysis Vol 57 No 2 April 1997
Kennett & Smith:
This paper is written about the philosophical problem of self-control, specifically synchronic resistance, which is considered here by the authors as 'not to do what we most want to do' at the same time as we want to do it. This is separate from diachronic self-control, which is taking action now to resist acting on what you anticipate will be your strongest desire in the future (pg67-8). The premise of the problem is that action is produced from intrinsic desires of a certain strength mixing with beliefs, being transmitted rationally over 'the means-ends relation' into extrinsic desires of the same strength, then the strongest extrinsic desire becoming an action. The question is how you could avoid doing your strongest intrinsic desire; how self-control is possible synchronically.
The first explanation (1.) from Kennett & Smith is that there can be a failure in transmitting intrinsic desires into extrinsic ones: thus a stronger intrinsic desire for good health doesn't become a stronger extrinsic desire to avoid eating cookies (compared to a weaker intrinsic desire for sweets becoming the strongest extrinsic desire). This they consider to be a failure in instrumental rationality.
The second explanation (2.) for self-control is to be 'orthonomous', which is a kind of action that results when one is fully rational, not just instrumentally. To be 'fully rational' one needs to have 'knowledge of all the relevant facts' (pg66). Being orthonomous (having orthonomy) means acting according to what your desires would be if you were fully rational. So since it is fully rational to intrinsically desire good health over sweets, even if one had no extrinsic desires for good health, one could override extrinsic desires for sweets. Authors tell a tale for how this might be psychologically possible (pg66).
The next part of the paper (3.) tries to avoid a contradiction of the following form: I want most to eat sweets and want even more (more than most?) to prevent myself from eating treats. The solution is to treat the exercise of self-control as not a contradictory action (or a contradictory trying) but instead as the occurrence of thoughts and dispositions that allow the transmission of the relevant intrinsic desires for health across the means-ends relation (e.g. having thoughts that picture sweets as disgusting things). This 'doing' is not an action because, authors claim, it doesn't satisfy the standard picture that an action is a caused by a desire to x and then beliefs about how to get x. (pg69) Instead, having such thoughts enable orthonomy or a fix to one's instrumental rationality. (pg69-70)
Mele:
This response takes the premise of the Kennett & Smith paper to task as being faulty. The problem is that it's quite difficult to formulate how exactly the connection between intrinsic desires and intentional action is made. Author argues that Kennett & Smith's claim that 'whenever we do something [and whenever we try do to something] we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do' (K&S pg63) is just false, and gives a counterexample of sipping tea while reading article x. Certainly he wanted to read article x more than article y, but he didn't want to sip tea more than read article y. Yet he sipped tea nonetheless. The key here is that it is tricky to specify when and how desires will conflict in action and when they won't, and the possibility of instrumental irrationality makes any sort of mix possible. (pg120-121) (Here it seems author argues that because instrumental rationality is possible, so is it possible to desire to eat sweets and also desire to reduce that desire.) So it is certainly possible to have an intrinsic desire to reduce the power of the extrinsic desire of eating sweets (this would count as a second-order desire).
Mele also argues that, given instrumental irrationality, one can have a desire to engage in a 'picturing technique' that then enables synchronic self-control. But this desire would have been intentionally actional, a 'trying', and therefore allows that synchronic self-control can also be actional. (pg122)
3/27/09
3/18/09
Weinberg, Steven - Without God
03/20/2009
The New York Review of Books Vol 55 No 14 Sept 25, 2008
A short article for the popular press, the first section discusses the 4 tensions author sees between religion and science, then the second section talks about how we can live without the concept of a deity.
Importantly, author doesn't see a tension in how religion has historically made pronouncements on how natural events work (e.g. world created in 6 days). Instead:
1) Belief in god is often marshaled as the best explanation for mysterious phenomena. As science has had the most success in explaining these phenomena, the appeal of belief in god has receded.
2) Humans' role in the order of the cosmos seems rather contingent and haphazard-- not 'special'-- especially with the advancement of theories of evolution and cosmology. Author argues that that consciousness seems to be the last bastion on specialness.
3) The theory that the world has natural, unbreakable laws (discovered by science) is contrary to god being omnipotent. Author argues this is more a Muslim rather than Christian tension, but also suggests that this argument has significantly affected the Islamic world's interest in religion.
4) Religion relies on authorities for its truth, science on discoveries that follow a formal process. While science has its heroes, the pronouncements of them is open, not closed like they can be in religious discourse.
The second part suggests some ways to live given that there is no belief in god and that 'the worldview of science is rather chilling'. Author suggests humor, 'ordinary pleasures' or the flesh, aesthetic pleasures (though he claims that without religion-inspired art, art wouldn't have as much of a history). Also, he makes the case that moral decline will not result from non-belief. Author argues that the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient god is a non-sequitur to moral theory anyway-- you have to decide whether to do what that god says or not anyway. But the greatest problem we have without god is that there is no afterlife now; author suggests that the possibility of an afterlife was never really that comforting in the first place.
The New York Review of Books Vol 55 No 14 Sept 25, 2008
A short article for the popular press, the first section discusses the 4 tensions author sees between religion and science, then the second section talks about how we can live without the concept of a deity.
Importantly, author doesn't see a tension in how religion has historically made pronouncements on how natural events work (e.g. world created in 6 days). Instead:
1) Belief in god is often marshaled as the best explanation for mysterious phenomena. As science has had the most success in explaining these phenomena, the appeal of belief in god has receded.
2) Humans' role in the order of the cosmos seems rather contingent and haphazard-- not 'special'-- especially with the advancement of theories of evolution and cosmology. Author argues that that consciousness seems to be the last bastion on specialness.
3) The theory that the world has natural, unbreakable laws (discovered by science) is contrary to god being omnipotent. Author argues this is more a Muslim rather than Christian tension, but also suggests that this argument has significantly affected the Islamic world's interest in religion.
4) Religion relies on authorities for its truth, science on discoveries that follow a formal process. While science has its heroes, the pronouncements of them is open, not closed like they can be in religious discourse.
The second part suggests some ways to live given that there is no belief in god and that 'the worldview of science is rather chilling'. Author suggests humor, 'ordinary pleasures' or the flesh, aesthetic pleasures (though he claims that without religion-inspired art, art wouldn't have as much of a history). Also, he makes the case that moral decline will not result from non-belief. Author argues that the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient god is a non-sequitur to moral theory anyway-- you have to decide whether to do what that god says or not anyway. But the greatest problem we have without god is that there is no afterlife now; author suggests that the possibility of an afterlife was never really that comforting in the first place.
3/13/09
Coyne, Jerry - Seeing and Believing: The neverending attempt to reconcile science and religion, and why it is doomed to fail
03/13/2009
The New Republic, Feb 4 2009
This is a book review of two attempts to show how belief in god and evolution are compatible, one by Giberson "Saving Darwin: How to be a Christian and Believe in Evolution" and other by Miller "Only a Theory: Evolution and the Battle for America's Soul". Author believes that these attempts are flawed, as are all attempts to try to have science and religion coexist. The first thing that author discredits is the weak 'god is nature' argument offered by Spinoza, who has a cousin in Einstein's 'god is bewildering wonder' conception. This makes god 'meaningless'-- according to author a true reconciliation must be not through the eyes of liberal theologians but of the common theistic, interactive deity religion.
Author gives his analysis of the 4 traits of creationists:
1) Devout belief in god
2) God miraculously intervened in the development of life
3) One of these interventions was the creation of humans
4) All have some sort of 'irreducible complexity' argument about how evolution couldn't have produced such a complex system incrementally.
Both Miller and Giberson reject the theory of Intelligent Design. They credit the origin of ordinary Americans trying to put this into schools as a type of anti-authoritarian strand in American culture. They also place much of the vehement culture wars around this issue on the virulent atheists like Dawkins and Dennett.
Author claims the biggest part of the argument for compatibility is the evolutionary convergence, the 'niche' that humans occupy-- using a known evolutionary theory that the world constrains practical developments to favor things like wings, eyes, endoskeletons. Yet author argues that humans are a very unlikely convergence, having only evolved 'once, in Africa'.
The other argument for creationists is the 'fine tuning of the universe', which employs the idea that the universe needs to be set up to be 'just right' to allow life to evolve and thrive-- the so-called 'anthropic principle'. Author's reply to this is that science is working on it, and that, so far as we know, it was pretty inefficient to create the entire universe so that 14bn years later, humans would evolve.
Next, author considers Gould's NOMA: Non-Overlapping Magisteria and argues that it would be nice for religion to not make any claims about the natural world, but in practice it does, all the time. Also, if religion offers a type of 'truth', is it falsifiable? Is it anything like the truths offered as explanations for the natural world given by science?
Author believes that both Miller and Giberson eventually display 3/4 of the Creationist tennets: 1-3. The real conflict isn't between religion and science but between religion and 'secular reason'-- the kind of reason that believes that reason has to be shown in most other human pursuits-- and they are 'incompatible' as well. Perhaps they are compatible in the same sense you can commit adultery at the same time as being married, but this just shows that a person can keep contradictory concepts in mind, not that they are compatible, author quips. In the end, author argues that an endeavor that reconciles old-style religion (that includes creationism) is bound to be contradicted and defeated by, science.
The New Republic, Feb 4 2009
This is a book review of two attempts to show how belief in god and evolution are compatible, one by Giberson "Saving Darwin: How to be a Christian and Believe in Evolution" and other by Miller "Only a Theory: Evolution and the Battle for America's Soul". Author believes that these attempts are flawed, as are all attempts to try to have science and religion coexist. The first thing that author discredits is the weak 'god is nature' argument offered by Spinoza, who has a cousin in Einstein's 'god is bewildering wonder' conception. This makes god 'meaningless'-- according to author a true reconciliation must be not through the eyes of liberal theologians but of the common theistic, interactive deity religion.
Author gives his analysis of the 4 traits of creationists:
1) Devout belief in god
2) God miraculously intervened in the development of life
3) One of these interventions was the creation of humans
4) All have some sort of 'irreducible complexity' argument about how evolution couldn't have produced such a complex system incrementally.
Both Miller and Giberson reject the theory of Intelligent Design. They credit the origin of ordinary Americans trying to put this into schools as a type of anti-authoritarian strand in American culture. They also place much of the vehement culture wars around this issue on the virulent atheists like Dawkins and Dennett.
Author claims the biggest part of the argument for compatibility is the evolutionary convergence, the 'niche' that humans occupy-- using a known evolutionary theory that the world constrains practical developments to favor things like wings, eyes, endoskeletons. Yet author argues that humans are a very unlikely convergence, having only evolved 'once, in Africa'.
The other argument for creationists is the 'fine tuning of the universe', which employs the idea that the universe needs to be set up to be 'just right' to allow life to evolve and thrive-- the so-called 'anthropic principle'. Author's reply to this is that science is working on it, and that, so far as we know, it was pretty inefficient to create the entire universe so that 14bn years later, humans would evolve.
Next, author considers Gould's NOMA: Non-Overlapping Magisteria and argues that it would be nice for religion to not make any claims about the natural world, but in practice it does, all the time. Also, if religion offers a type of 'truth', is it falsifiable? Is it anything like the truths offered as explanations for the natural world given by science?
Author believes that both Miller and Giberson eventually display 3/4 of the Creationist tennets: 1-3. The real conflict isn't between religion and science but between religion and 'secular reason'-- the kind of reason that believes that reason has to be shown in most other human pursuits-- and they are 'incompatible' as well. Perhaps they are compatible in the same sense you can commit adultery at the same time as being married, but this just shows that a person can keep contradictory concepts in mind, not that they are compatible, author quips. In the end, author argues that an endeavor that reconciles old-style religion (that includes creationism) is bound to be contradicted and defeated by, science.
3/6/09
Albert, David & Rivka, Galchen - A Quantum Threat
03/06/2009
Scientific American, March 2009
An article in a popular science magazine that gives a history and modern understanding on quantum physics and its relation to the theory of special relativity. The screwiest thing about quantum physics is its 'nonlocality', meaning that particles manage to affect each other without being next to each other, that is, without being local and having no intervening physical connection between them. This spooky action at a distance is what Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen declared, in their EPR argument, was the reason that quantum physics is an incomplete theory, missing part of reality. Bohr responded instead that this part of reality is just plain murky, and that physics should give up its quest to give a complete and finalized picture of the universe. This reply underwrote much of the philosophical approach of physics until the 1990s, when accurate models of the quantum realm began to gain strength. The drawback was that it seemed that Einstein's theory of special relativity was being theoretically threatened. Authors pinpoint Tim Maudlin's 1994 book Quantum Nonlocality and Relativity as one of the strongest challengers: entanglement of particles seems to involve 'absolute simultaneity' of causal or informational transmission, which is incompatible with the impossibility of faster-than-light transmissions postulated by special relativity.
The new science tries either to repair these problems for the two theories or to keep the tension and jettison a third 'primordial' assumption, for instance, that there is an exact physical condition of the world at a certain time.
Scientific American, March 2009
An article in a popular science magazine that gives a history and modern understanding on quantum physics and its relation to the theory of special relativity. The screwiest thing about quantum physics is its 'nonlocality', meaning that particles manage to affect each other without being next to each other, that is, without being local and having no intervening physical connection between them. This spooky action at a distance is what Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen declared, in their EPR argument, was the reason that quantum physics is an incomplete theory, missing part of reality. Bohr responded instead that this part of reality is just plain murky, and that physics should give up its quest to give a complete and finalized picture of the universe. This reply underwrote much of the philosophical approach of physics until the 1990s, when accurate models of the quantum realm began to gain strength. The drawback was that it seemed that Einstein's theory of special relativity was being theoretically threatened. Authors pinpoint Tim Maudlin's 1994 book Quantum Nonlocality and Relativity as one of the strongest challengers: entanglement of particles seems to involve 'absolute simultaneity' of causal or informational transmission, which is incompatible with the impossibility of faster-than-light transmissions postulated by special relativity.
The new science tries either to repair these problems for the two theories or to keep the tension and jettison a third 'primordial' assumption, for instance, that there is an exact physical condition of the world at a certain time.
2/27/09
Westphal, Jonathan - The future and the truth-value links: a common sense view
02/27/2009
Analysis, Vol 66 No 1 Jan 2006
This article gives an argument for the truth-value of future-tense sentences like 'I'm meeting with Johnson tomorrow.' Author's intention is to show that future events can make current ones about it true or false when uttered, though we have to wait until the future happens to determine which. He considers this the 'common sense view' that 'preserves bivalence' and also claims this conforms to Ockham's conception of time as given by Adams & Kretzman. This is contrary to the Aristotelean view that future-tense sentences have no truth value.
The problem with using the future to underwrite the truth-value of future-tense sentences is that you could get into trouble with a valid but unsound argument:
Let 'A' be a proposition about a future event E
1) if an event E is in the future, it isn't occurring now
2) E is in the future
3) E isn't not occurring
4) If A is true, E is now occurring
5) A is not true
6) A is false
Author believes that 4 is the false premise and wishes to re-write it to be:
4*) if A is true, E has occurred, or is occurring, or will occur.
Dummett offers a variety of views (that author expands upon) about the reality of the past, present, and future-- author likes this model, though it is 'still much too far away'. To bring out the value of eternalism for making future-tense sentences true, author discusses how a future-tensed sentence could be true when we have to wait for it (that is, wait until the future becomes the present) for it to be true. So 'I will meet Johnson' might be made true when I meet Johnson, except not really: the sentence 'I will meet Johnson' isn't made true when 'I meet Johnson', since the latter is a different sentence. The easy solution to the 'toy' problem is to claim that both sentences express the same proposition, namely '[I] [meeting] [Johnson] [date]'. This requires what Dummett calls 'truth-value links', which insist 'perforce' that if this proposition is true, it is true at all times, whether it has yet to occur, or has already occurred, or is now occurring.
The use of truth-value links bolsters only a conditional claim: if future-tense sentences can express true propositions, then present-tense sentences expressing the same proposition must be true once the future in question comes.
2/20/09
Westphal, Jonathan - The Retrenchability of 'The Present'
02/20/2009
Analysis, Vol 62 No 1 2002
This paper tries to undo the common problem of 'the present' as having no substance, no extension. St Agustine is quoted as framing the problem: the past just happened, the future is yet to happen. Anytime you look at a divisible section of time, some part is the future, some the past-- the present has no length. Author argues this is a fallacy of composition; Augustine insists that the whole of a unit of time must also be within one of its container units, e.g. the whole of 2001 must be within May 2001. Author argues this is an 'absurd' requirement, using a spatial analogy of 'here' in place of 'the present'. Yet the permissibility of using such a counter-example is disputed by GEL Owen, who defended the asymmetry of space to time for himself and Aristotle, on the argument that time past is irretreiveably closed while 'over there' and 'over here' is open, alterable. Author replies first by pointing out that he does not need to level symmerty between space and time for his analogy to be plausible. Secondly, author argues that 'the present' sometimes can count as a year, sometimes a month, depending on the context of use-- much like 'here'. Lastly, author points out that 'the present' is 'logically incomplete', requiring a determinant like 'day', 'epoch', 'election-cycle'. One curious problem might be that this doesn't seem to be the same with 'the future'.
Analysis, Vol 62 No 1 2002
This paper tries to undo the common problem of 'the present' as having no substance, no extension. St Agustine is quoted as framing the problem: the past just happened, the future is yet to happen. Anytime you look at a divisible section of time, some part is the future, some the past-- the present has no length. Author argues this is a fallacy of composition; Augustine insists that the whole of a unit of time must also be within one of its container units, e.g. the whole of 2001 must be within May 2001. Author argues this is an 'absurd' requirement, using a spatial analogy of 'here' in place of 'the present'. Yet the permissibility of using such a counter-example is disputed by GEL Owen, who defended the asymmetry of space to time for himself and Aristotle, on the argument that time past is irretreiveably closed while 'over there' and 'over here' is open, alterable. Author replies first by pointing out that he does not need to level symmerty between space and time for his analogy to be plausible. Secondly, author argues that 'the present' sometimes can count as a year, sometimes a month, depending on the context of use-- much like 'here'. Lastly, author points out that 'the present' is 'logically incomplete', requiring a determinant like 'day', 'epoch', 'election-cycle'. One curious problem might be that this doesn't seem to be the same with 'the future'.
2/13/09
Allen-Hermanson, Sean - Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies?
02/13/2009
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 55 No 8 August 2008
This paper attempts to show that bees are natural zombies and lay out a kind of consciousness test for animals 'lower' on the phylogenetic scale from humans. The argument turns as follows: the phenomenon of blindsight can reasonably establish beliefs or proto-belief-like cognitive schemes without consciousness. Bees share analogous similarities with blindsighted chimpanzees, thus by analogy bees can be blindsighted-- like zombies. Author uses a representationalist theory of consciousness, which claims that the subjective nature of consciousness is exhausted by it's representational content. (pg390) There are two varieties of this theory, the FOT 'First-Order Thought' and the HOT 'Higher-Order Thought' theories. The major advantage of FOT is that it allows for non-human animals to have consciousness (pg391).
Author wants to use FOT but thinks that it is faced with a dilemma where it must either admit that anything that uses concepts/thinks/has beliefs is conscious, or that things that seem to employ proto-beliefs aren't doing so. (pg391) Author thinks that he can find a middle road where FOT doesn't fall into this trap by revising it into FOT*, where phenomenally conscious states are those sensory representations poised to construct first-order thoughts specific for action rather than conceptual adjustment and manipulation-- poised, 'abstract' [fuzzy?], non-conceptual 'dorsal-style'(pg406).
Author sketches FOT: phenomenal awareness depends on tokening first-order thoughts or judgments. FOT thinkers are Dretske, Tye, Kirk. (pg392-7) Author discusses the objection to the entire representationalist program is blindsight, which appears to give weird kinds of first-order thoughts but no consciousness. (pg397-408) The goal here is to discuss the problems with blindsight and conclude that though it is a difficult objection, it isn't devastating to FOT. One interesting discussion is about the 'two-systems' reply to blindsight where there is a 'ventral' and a 'dorsal' system of seeing, the former dealing with representing objects and the latter dealing with action with respect to those objects. (pg400)
Author moves to a study of purported blindsight in a monkey, where it is supposed to touch a button when there is 'no-stimulus' in the occluded field. Monkeys get this wrong by affirming 'no-stimulus' when there is one. But, on the other hand, under certain conditions they will also reliably find the stimulus when it is present (pg408-9) The next step is to imagine that there are some animals that are just like this naturally, 'natural zombies'. The honey bee is a possibility, something that shows world-mapping capabilities (proto-beliefs?) but probably couldn't distinguish whether there is a stimulus present or there is no stimulus, thus, author argues, establishing it as blindsighted, according to a theoretical scientific experiment he is proposing (pg410-413).
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 55 No 8 August 2008
This paper attempts to show that bees are natural zombies and lay out a kind of consciousness test for animals 'lower' on the phylogenetic scale from humans. The argument turns as follows: the phenomenon of blindsight can reasonably establish beliefs or proto-belief-like cognitive schemes without consciousness. Bees share analogous similarities with blindsighted chimpanzees, thus by analogy bees can be blindsighted-- like zombies. Author uses a representationalist theory of consciousness, which claims that the subjective nature of consciousness is exhausted by it's representational content. (pg390) There are two varieties of this theory, the FOT 'First-Order Thought' and the HOT 'Higher-Order Thought' theories. The major advantage of FOT is that it allows for non-human animals to have consciousness (pg391).
Author wants to use FOT but thinks that it is faced with a dilemma where it must either admit that anything that uses concepts/thinks/has beliefs is conscious, or that things that seem to employ proto-beliefs aren't doing so. (pg391) Author thinks that he can find a middle road where FOT doesn't fall into this trap by revising it into FOT*, where phenomenally conscious states are those sensory representations poised to construct first-order thoughts specific for action rather than conceptual adjustment and manipulation-- poised, 'abstract' [fuzzy?], non-conceptual 'dorsal-style'(pg406).
Author sketches FOT: phenomenal awareness depends on tokening first-order thoughts or judgments. FOT thinkers are Dretske, Tye, Kirk. (pg392-7) Author discusses the objection to the entire representationalist program is blindsight, which appears to give weird kinds of first-order thoughts but no consciousness. (pg397-408) The goal here is to discuss the problems with blindsight and conclude that though it is a difficult objection, it isn't devastating to FOT. One interesting discussion is about the 'two-systems' reply to blindsight where there is a 'ventral' and a 'dorsal' system of seeing, the former dealing with representing objects and the latter dealing with action with respect to those objects. (pg400)
Author moves to a study of purported blindsight in a monkey, where it is supposed to touch a button when there is 'no-stimulus' in the occluded field. Monkeys get this wrong by affirming 'no-stimulus' when there is one. But, on the other hand, under certain conditions they will also reliably find the stimulus when it is present (pg408-9) The next step is to imagine that there are some animals that are just like this naturally, 'natural zombies'. The honey bee is a possibility, something that shows world-mapping capabilities (proto-beliefs?) but probably couldn't distinguish whether there is a stimulus present or there is no stimulus, thus, author argues, establishing it as blindsighted, according to a theoretical scientific experiment he is proposing (pg410-413).
2/6/09
Read, Stephen - Monism: The One True Logic
02/06/2009
In this paper author attacks the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, which tries to admit to classical, constructionist and situational logics as all equally valid. Author categorizes their argument as follows:
1. Validity (V) is defined as: (V) A conclusion 'A' follows from premises iff in any case the premises are true is also a case when A is true. (here cases are 'worlds' or 'constructions' or 'situations')
2. A 'logic' specifies the cases mentioned in (V)
3. There are at least two different specifications
(pg1)
Author represents Beall & Restall as reconstructing different times when (V) can be specified: in classical logic, (V) is preserved in 'complete and consistent situations' like 'worlds'. Constructive logic specifies (V) in possibly incomplete or indeterminate situations, and finally relevance logic specifies a logic that satisfies (V) in inconsistent situations. (pg1) Author now repeats Graham Priest's challenge to this account: take logic K1 and K2-- in K1 premises P imply conclusion C. In K2, P doesn't imply C. P is true. Is C true? Author argues this challenge forces the position that K1 is superior to K2 (K1 being classical logic here). (pg2-3)
Author believes that Beall & Restall's logical pluralism by trying to preserve truth under (V) will plunge into inconsistency (pg4), a major sticking point being the non-dialetheic paraconsistentist, who belives that Ex Falso Quodlibet (from a contradiction, anything follows) is invalid but also doesn't believe that contradictions can be true. (pg5-6) The Beall & Restall reply is to ask for not just truth-preservation but also relevance-preservation from (V), but author argues this doesn't fit the bill either (pg6).
The problem, author believes, is to try to write the semantics of non-classical logics in 'classical metalanguage'. This puts the classicist in an unfair advantage when evaluating validity (pg7). Author unravels this argument in the pages that follow (pg8-10), by the way examining the claims of Varzi and Yagisawa in trying to establish the coherency of possible impossible worlds. Author offers instead relevance logic as the one true logic and chastises Beall & Restall for 'combining non-classical theory with a classical metatheory' (pg9).
In this paper author attacks the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, which tries to admit to classical, constructionist and situational logics as all equally valid. Author categorizes their argument as follows:
1. Validity (V) is defined as: (V) A conclusion 'A' follows from premises iff in any case the premises are true is also a case when A is true. (here cases are 'worlds' or 'constructions' or 'situations')
2. A 'logic' specifies the cases mentioned in (V)
3. There are at least two different specifications
(pg1)
Author represents Beall & Restall as reconstructing different times when (V) can be specified: in classical logic, (V) is preserved in 'complete and consistent situations' like 'worlds'. Constructive logic specifies (V) in possibly incomplete or indeterminate situations, and finally relevance logic specifies a logic that satisfies (V) in inconsistent situations. (pg1) Author now repeats Graham Priest's challenge to this account: take logic K1 and K2-- in K1 premises P imply conclusion C. In K2, P doesn't imply C. P is true. Is C true? Author argues this challenge forces the position that K1 is superior to K2 (K1 being classical logic here). (pg2-3)
Author believes that Beall & Restall's logical pluralism by trying to preserve truth under (V) will plunge into inconsistency (pg4), a major sticking point being the non-dialetheic paraconsistentist, who belives that Ex Falso Quodlibet (from a contradiction, anything follows) is invalid but also doesn't believe that contradictions can be true. (pg5-6) The Beall & Restall reply is to ask for not just truth-preservation but also relevance-preservation from (V), but author argues this doesn't fit the bill either (pg6).
The problem, author believes, is to try to write the semantics of non-classical logics in 'classical metalanguage'. This puts the classicist in an unfair advantage when evaluating validity (pg7). Author unravels this argument in the pages that follow (pg8-10), by the way examining the claims of Varzi and Yagisawa in trying to establish the coherency of possible impossible worlds. Author offers instead relevance logic as the one true logic and chastises Beall & Restall for 'combining non-classical theory with a classical metatheory' (pg9).
1/30/09
Donagan, Alan - Philosophical Progress and the Theory of Action
01/30/2009
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55 1981-2, also reprinted as chapter 1 in Action, Reason, and Value
In this paper author tried to give a rendering of the progress that has been made in the philosophy of human action since Aristotle. Author first admits Rorty's point that the content of philosophy is often influenced by whatever is currently fashionable or reflective of academic power struggles. Author proceeds though to give a construction of the progress on theories of human action (as distinct from action that humans--and animals-- do) that goes from Aristotle to Aquinas to Frege and then Davidson.
Author's first topic is Aristotle's theory of human action and claims the theory is a causal one, placing rational appetite in conjunction with intellectual deliberation about means-ends reasoning. (pg4-5) The famous objection raised by Ryle in The Concept of Mind was as follows: if the components to the causal story aren't human actions, how can the result be? Author defends the causal theory by claiming Ryle is question-begging on a causal story-- causes are different from their effects, so non-human-action causes can effect a human-action. (pg6-8) Author then also critiques Aristotle because of his claim that one's ethical character is reflected at all times in one's rational appetite (a necessary component for choice and action). Thus weakness of the will is not chosen-- an unappealing result. (pg8) An enduring lesson from Aristotle is that humans only act on what they think it is possible for them to do.
Aquinas systematized and cleaned up Aristotle's theory, naming the faculty that hosts the rational appetite 'the will'. Importantly, Aquinas also created an 'intention', which wills an end through a means. But the intention is for the ends; a 'choice' is for the means. (pg9) Author considers that the concept of causation used here is not the same as its 'post-Humean relative': the ancient causal theory is one of essences within objects activating changes in other objects, rather than 'nomological relation between events'. (pg10) This raises the challenge to the causal account of human action raised by Wittgenstein and Ryle (again), namely that it is semantic-mental relations, not physical causes, that underwrite human action. (pg10-11) Author points out, however, that semantic relations can enter into causal ones and he will continue to interpret the progress in terms of causation. (pg12)
The next part of the paper deals with the opacity of intentions, e.g. Oedipus intending to kill the stranger that insulted him, but not intending to kill his father, even though the insulting stranger and his father are the same person (though he didn't know it). (pg12-16) Here Frege enters with his analysis of referents in opaque conditions (indirect reference) and he adds an important feature to the theory: 'an action as an individual event cannot be intended. It is intended only to the extent that it makes true a proposition that is intended' (pg15) Thus the addition that an action is to make true a proposition that it intends. Author also considers wayward causation problems (pg16-19) as well. His (and Frankfurt's) solution is adding a proviso: the bodily movements (or mental processes) that are supposed to accomplish a particular end depend on my intending to move (or think) them in order to make the particular end happen. (pg18-19)
The last problem in the causal theory of human action that the author deals with is the problem of what parts of a causal sequence are included in a human action. Do we include the effects of an action in it? Do we include the causes? (pg19-20) Hornsby argues for including the causes of human actions in the action itself, a break, author claims, from Aristotle. According to Donagan, Aristotle claimed that the act of intending and then choosing causes a human action, but isn't a human action itself. Hornsby's mistake, according to author, is of narrating an event rather than looking for the specific bodily movements that the action consisted in. (pg20-21)
The other part of this problem is that an intention seems to effect an action, but an intention forms in the brain and therefore effects just a bunch of neuro-electrical signals. Maybe; but add this to the claim that the effects of actions aren't included in the actions themselves and it seems to claim that overt bodily movements (that are the effects of neuro-electical signals) aren't part of a human action! (pg20-21). Excluding effects from the analysis of actions separates bodily movements from actions, since they are the far-end causal effects of many internal physical processes (pg21). Author's solution is to remember Frege's proviso on actions: intending in action is not intending the occurring effects, but a proposition those effects make true. (pg22) Finally, the author brings to bear Aquinas' treatment of choices for means and intentions for ends on the problem of how to include seemingly peripheral bodily movements into human actions. (pg23)
1/23/09
Restall, Greg - What Does Pittsburgh Have to Do with Canberra?
01/23/2009
rough draft of paper given May 1, 2008
This is a paper that attempts to connect proof theory and the pragmatic semantics of inference to the philosophical notions of metaphysical necessity, analyticity, and a priori knowledge (pg2). The paper begins by reviewing the origins of author's particular brand of pragmatism, birthed by Wittgenstein's 'meaning is use' injunction but interpreted by Brandom as a normative exhortation: what x means is how one should use x e.g. in an assertion or denial (pg2-3). The pragmatic elements author borrows from Gentzen, where traditional forms of contradiction are read as 'self-defeating' (rather than, perhaps, metaphysically impossible). (pg3) The validity of logical consequence is that it gives license to inference; thus, author seeks to connect (or perhaps, underwrite) the semantics of a term with normative pragmatism in logic. (pg3-6)
There are three 'triangular' concepts in philosophy that author wants to connect together through his logic. They are:
-Metaphysical necessity (using modality)
-A priori knowability
-Analyticity, or the framework that underwrite analytic truth
Author gives a little history of these concepts in philosophy since Kant (pg6-8). Of keen interest was Kripke's version of necessary a posteriori. Author claims this is a kind of necessity but not as robust as we're accustomed to since it may be metaphysical but not epistemological. (pg8) Author thinks this prompts Davies & Humberstone to give a 'two-dimensional semantics' where there is a distinction in possible world semantics between: (pg8-9)
-When we consider what the actual world might be like (epistemic possibility)
-How other worlds are different from (or the same as) the actual one (metaphysical possibility)
Thus worlds that might be metaphysically impossible (1 dimension of necessity) might still be epistemically possible-- we don't know that it's impossible (yet, or at all). Author uses the work of Jackson and Chalmers to extend this discussion into the metaphysical/epistemic (Davies & Humberstone don't use that distinction when talking about their two dimensions of modality), but also believes that Chalmers gets it wrong on the value of this distinction between metaphysical modality and epistemic modality. Author also believes that 2-d semantics doesn't give a proper account of what a possible world is. (pg 9-10)
For a re-framing of the 2-d semantics, author turns to inferentialism. He tries to connect the a priori with considering what other worlds might be like (metaphysical possibility) independent of what we know is or isn't the case. Author considers this 'indicative supposition' (pg10-13). Then there is 'subjunctive supposition', which works when you're 'planning' action-- it doesn't matter what is metaphysically true or not, the only thing that matters is what you know or believe (epistemic possibility) (pg13-14). This connects to necessity in the Kripkean sense: H2O is necessarily water because of how we are going to treat H2O and water in all possible worlds... [?]
Author concludes with some summaries of his arguments and by acknowledging that his theory relies on cognitive psychology for its verification. (pg15)
-When we consider what the actual world might be like (epistemic possibility)
-How other worlds are different from (or the same as) the actual one (metaphysical possibility)
Thus worlds that might be metaphysically impossible (1 dimension of necessity) might still be epistemically possible-- we don't know that it's impossible (yet, or at all). Author uses the work of Jackson and Chalmers to extend this discussion into the metaphysical/epistemic (Davies & Humberstone don't use that distinction when talking about their two dimensions of modality), but also believes that Chalmers gets it wrong on the value of this distinction between metaphysical modality and epistemic modality. Author also believes that 2-d semantics doesn't give a proper account of what a possible world is. (pg 9-10)
For a re-framing of the 2-d semantics, author turns to inferentialism. He tries to connect the a priori with considering what other worlds might be like (metaphysical possibility) independent of what we know is or isn't the case. Author considers this 'indicative supposition' (pg10-13). Then there is 'subjunctive supposition', which works when you're 'planning' action-- it doesn't matter what is metaphysically true or not, the only thing that matters is what you know or believe (epistemic possibility) (pg13-14). This connects to necessity in the Kripkean sense: H2O is necessarily water because of how we are going to treat H2O and water in all possible worlds... [?]
Author concludes with some summaries of his arguments and by acknowledging that his theory relies on cognitive psychology for its verification. (pg15)
12/19/08
Royce, Josiah - The Problem of Christianity Chapters 2, 9 and 13
12/19/2008
Edition with Introduction by John E Smith
The selections from chapter 2 and is about the problem of the composition and identity of a community. Author first seeks to establish that there are genuine creations of a community that reflect intelligence but cannot be reduced to the creations of any of the individuals, e.g. customs, language, religion. Author claims that the appropriate unit here is that of the community, which will have psychological laws (and deserving of certain moral treatment) all of its own. In chapter 9 author lays out the objections to this view, that of the many composing the one, and specifically how there are three parts of an individual that seem un-malleable: (VII)
1) we have an intimate connection to our own feelings and not to those of others
2) we have an intimate connection to our own thoughts and not to those of others
3) our deeds are done individually, by my own will for which I am only responsible
Author believes this final feature is the one of the most moral significance and complicates it by suggesting there are times when, in the throes of a mob or collective, you do something that didn't originate from your own considered judgment but instead from group 'ethical pluralism'. Author discusses how James was forced to concede that there were times when individuals became part of a larger collective, yet author doesn't believe that James had found the appropriate identifying conditions. (VIII-IX) The aspect of a group that makes it a community is an analog to the aspect of a present human organism that makes it a self: a sense of history and self-conscious placement within that history. (X-XI) The individual interprets its history and projects its future, just as it places itself within a history that it shares with the community's history. Author calls this a 'community of memory'.
Chapter 13 deals with interpretation, starting with a 'community of interpretation' in the sciences. Before a particular scientists' work is adopted into the general consensus of knowledge, it must be accepted by the scientific community in general, specifically they must understand and interpret what data she used and how her conclusions relate to the rest of scientific knowledge. This is a 'triadic' process (II-VI) where the individual scientist relates her concepts about the world to others, who then relate their concepts to her concepts and then to the world-- a method of interpretation. Author uses the example of two men in a row boat: neither can confirm the others' peculiar perspective, so therefore the real properties real row boat is a matter of interpreting their different perceptions in a communal space about the real row boat. (V)
The second part of the chapter seeks to underwrite the how necessary is the existence of the community of interpretation. Author does this by making it requisite for the existence of the real world. There are two general theses in metaphysics, author calls them 'the idea of present experience and the idea of the goal of experience' (XII). This is a version of a becoming/being or appearance/Reality distinction. The goal of metaphysics is to interpret these thesis into a working model: to interpret. Yet interpretation takes a communal nature, especially when 'no man should be a judge in his own case' especially when there is a social, communal interest in the outcome. (III-IV) Thus the interpretation of the real world and a community of interpretation are intricately related and as sure as we are there is a real world, we also presuppose a community of interpretation.
Edition with Introduction by John E Smith
The selections from chapter 2 and is about the problem of the composition and identity of a community. Author first seeks to establish that there are genuine creations of a community that reflect intelligence but cannot be reduced to the creations of any of the individuals, e.g. customs, language, religion. Author claims that the appropriate unit here is that of the community, which will have psychological laws (and deserving of certain moral treatment) all of its own. In chapter 9 author lays out the objections to this view, that of the many composing the one, and specifically how there are three parts of an individual that seem un-malleable: (VII)
1) we have an intimate connection to our own feelings and not to those of others
2) we have an intimate connection to our own thoughts and not to those of others
3) our deeds are done individually, by my own will for which I am only responsible
Author believes this final feature is the one of the most moral significance and complicates it by suggesting there are times when, in the throes of a mob or collective, you do something that didn't originate from your own considered judgment but instead from group 'ethical pluralism'. Author discusses how James was forced to concede that there were times when individuals became part of a larger collective, yet author doesn't believe that James had found the appropriate identifying conditions. (VIII-IX) The aspect of a group that makes it a community is an analog to the aspect of a present human organism that makes it a self: a sense of history and self-conscious placement within that history. (X-XI) The individual interprets its history and projects its future, just as it places itself within a history that it shares with the community's history. Author calls this a 'community of memory'.
Chapter 13 deals with interpretation, starting with a 'community of interpretation' in the sciences. Before a particular scientists' work is adopted into the general consensus of knowledge, it must be accepted by the scientific community in general, specifically they must understand and interpret what data she used and how her conclusions relate to the rest of scientific knowledge. This is a 'triadic' process (II-VI) where the individual scientist relates her concepts about the world to others, who then relate their concepts to her concepts and then to the world-- a method of interpretation. Author uses the example of two men in a row boat: neither can confirm the others' peculiar perspective, so therefore the real properties real row boat is a matter of interpreting their different perceptions in a communal space about the real row boat. (V)
The second part of the chapter seeks to underwrite the how necessary is the existence of the community of interpretation. Author does this by making it requisite for the existence of the real world. There are two general theses in metaphysics, author calls them 'the idea of present experience and the idea of the goal of experience' (XII). This is a version of a becoming/being or appearance/Reality distinction. The goal of metaphysics is to interpret these thesis into a working model: to interpret. Yet interpretation takes a communal nature, especially when 'no man should be a judge in his own case' especially when there is a social, communal interest in the outcome. (III-IV) Thus the interpretation of the real world and a community of interpretation are intricately related and as sure as we are there is a real world, we also presuppose a community of interpretation.
12/12/08
Davidson, Donald - Interpretation: Hard In Theory, Easy In Practice
12/12/2008
Paper given in 1998
The paper tries to establish the mutual dependence of language and thought, more aptly conceptualization. When comparing with a form of conceptual atomism (Fodor), author distinguishes between having a concept which is 'simply to discriminate objects or properties of one sort or another' and 'plac[ing] objects in[to] a category' (pg2), the latter being the approach he prefers. To place something into a category is to 'opine that it belongs there, and opnions are prone to error, they are true or false, and they are in part identified by their relations to other judgments' (pg2)
The paper wanders through the typical problems of interpreting another's propositional content from their speech.(pg3-4) With the example of a non-human animal that is able to discriminate between colors, author want to know how we can eliminate the possiblity that it 'isn't the activation of certain rods and cones in his eyes, or the firing of certain optic nerves...' instead of color. If we can't distinguish between the various possible causes for the parrot (Alex's) response, then we can't determine the content of the answer. But if we cannot attribute content to Alex, then we can't attribute thought, since there is no thought without content. (pg4-5)
Interestingly, in this paper Davidson retracts his Swampman argument, claming that 'science fiction stories that imagine thigs that never happen provide poor testing ground for our intuitions concerning concepts like the concept of a person' (pg6)
Author tours through a brief history of the various realist and nominalist positions from Plato to Quine, then concludes that there is a difference between 'showing, by one's behavior, that one merely responds to perceptual similarities, and that one has a criterion for grouping things found perceptually similar.' (pg10) To have a concept 'is to be able to judge, that is, believe, that something falls under the concept. Having a concept is like knowing what a predicate means... in other words, no concepts without propositional contents'. (pg10-11)
So how do we attribute these to people or non-human animals? We can know that propositional attitudes like belief are also related to intentions, perceptions, memories, desires, hopes, etc (pg11), so finding any will give us reason to assume the rest (pg11). Author briefly sketches his triangulation argument, that we're given reason to attribute conceptualization when we encounter not just animals that perceive (pg12) but also ones that recognize when they make mistakes, that is, can distinguish between objective conditions and their categorizations. Not only this, but 'it seems likely that a mind cannot accpt the idea of error without some notion of how error is to be explained. We know of no way all this can be shared by creatures except through the use of language' (pg13). Language and thought become interdependent, with true conceptualization arising 'only in a social setting, and in that setting conceptualization and thought emerge accompanied by the development of language' (pg14).
Paper given in 1998
The paper tries to establish the mutual dependence of language and thought, more aptly conceptualization. When comparing with a form of conceptual atomism (Fodor), author distinguishes between having a concept which is 'simply to discriminate objects or properties of one sort or another' and 'plac[ing] objects in[to] a category' (pg2), the latter being the approach he prefers. To place something into a category is to 'opine that it belongs there, and opnions are prone to error, they are true or false, and they are in part identified by their relations to other judgments' (pg2)
The paper wanders through the typical problems of interpreting another's propositional content from their speech.(pg3-4) With the example of a non-human animal that is able to discriminate between colors, author want to know how we can eliminate the possiblity that it 'isn't the activation of certain rods and cones in his eyes, or the firing of certain optic nerves...' instead of color. If we can't distinguish between the various possible causes for the parrot (Alex's) response, then we can't determine the content of the answer. But if we cannot attribute content to Alex, then we can't attribute thought, since there is no thought without content. (pg4-5)
Interestingly, in this paper Davidson retracts his Swampman argument, claming that 'science fiction stories that imagine thigs that never happen provide poor testing ground for our intuitions concerning concepts like the concept of a person' (pg6)
Author tours through a brief history of the various realist and nominalist positions from Plato to Quine, then concludes that there is a difference between 'showing, by one's behavior, that one merely responds to perceptual similarities, and that one has a criterion for grouping things found perceptually similar.' (pg10) To have a concept 'is to be able to judge, that is, believe, that something falls under the concept. Having a concept is like knowing what a predicate means... in other words, no concepts without propositional contents'. (pg10-11)
So how do we attribute these to people or non-human animals? We can know that propositional attitudes like belief are also related to intentions, perceptions, memories, desires, hopes, etc (pg11), so finding any will give us reason to assume the rest (pg11). Author briefly sketches his triangulation argument, that we're given reason to attribute conceptualization when we encounter not just animals that perceive (pg12) but also ones that recognize when they make mistakes, that is, can distinguish between objective conditions and their categorizations. Not only this, but 'it seems likely that a mind cannot accpt the idea of error without some notion of how error is to be explained. We know of no way all this can be shared by creatures except through the use of language' (pg13). Language and thought become interdependent, with true conceptualization arising 'only in a social setting, and in that setting conceptualization and thought emerge accompanied by the development of language' (pg14).
12/5/08
Davidson, Donald - Mental Events
12/05/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 11 Clarendon Press 1980
In this essay author lays out the support for the theory of anamalous monism, which is needed because he wants to make the following triad consistent:
1) At least some mental events interact causally with physical events.
2) Where there is causality, there is a description of deterministic lawfulness.
3) There are no strict deterministic laws that predict or explain mental events.
These seem inconsistent and all plausible. The first part of the paper deals with giving a view of physicalism that is consistent with 3. Author lays out an identity theory where mental events are identical to physical ones, and events are tokens 'unrepeatable, dated individuals'. (pg209) There is some difficulty with including bona fide mental events among all the physical ones. (pg210-12) Author proposes to consider intentionality as the criterion. (pg211) The downside of this approach is that it denies there are 'strict laws connecting the mental and the physical', a kind-kind identity (pg212-13). The different kinds of of monism and dualism are described, with author taking anamalous monism and briefly describing it.
The second part of the paper defends the downside of the theory that there are no strict psychophysical laws. This seems to be a case of philosophy encroaching on science, which author wants to deny. (pg216-219) Author uses an analogy of how using behaviorism in trying to define belief has failed us, and that a more general point is that the holism in interpretation of the mental is what restricts the possibility of psychophysical laws. Author also delves into the grue / bleen problem. Author lays out a distinction between homonomic and heteronomic generalizations, heteronomic being ones that, in order to describe the lawfulness of a generalization, needs to shift between vocabularies. (pg219) Author discusses the problem of 'longer-than': it is only a problem until there are a whole 'set of axioms, laws or postulates', e.g., the idea of rigid, macroscopic objects that 'longer-than' is a part of, that underwrite lawlike statements of the physical sciences. (pg221) The ideal in the physical sciences is to have a homonomic set of descriptions, yet much of it is still heteronomic, especially all the areas that link the mental to the physical. (pg221-2) 'There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence' (pg222).
The last part of the paper proves the identity of the mental to the physical, or at least those mental events that cause physical ones and vice versa. Mental events that enter into causal relations with physical ones must be subject to physical law (of causation), thus have a physical description, hence is physical. (pg224) Note that this only works for mental events that interact with physical ones via causation.
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 11 Clarendon Press 1980
In this essay author lays out the support for the theory of anamalous monism, which is needed because he wants to make the following triad consistent:
1) At least some mental events interact causally with physical events.
2) Where there is causality, there is a description of deterministic lawfulness.
3) There are no strict deterministic laws that predict or explain mental events.
These seem inconsistent and all plausible. The first part of the paper deals with giving a view of physicalism that is consistent with 3. Author lays out an identity theory where mental events are identical to physical ones, and events are tokens 'unrepeatable, dated individuals'. (pg209) There is some difficulty with including bona fide mental events among all the physical ones. (pg210-12) Author proposes to consider intentionality as the criterion. (pg211) The downside of this approach is that it denies there are 'strict laws connecting the mental and the physical', a kind-kind identity (pg212-13). The different kinds of of monism and dualism are described, with author taking anamalous monism and briefly describing it.
The second part of the paper defends the downside of the theory that there are no strict psychophysical laws. This seems to be a case of philosophy encroaching on science, which author wants to deny. (pg216-219) Author uses an analogy of how using behaviorism in trying to define belief has failed us, and that a more general point is that the holism in interpretation of the mental is what restricts the possibility of psychophysical laws. Author also delves into the grue / bleen problem. Author lays out a distinction between homonomic and heteronomic generalizations, heteronomic being ones that, in order to describe the lawfulness of a generalization, needs to shift between vocabularies. (pg219) Author discusses the problem of 'longer-than': it is only a problem until there are a whole 'set of axioms, laws or postulates', e.g., the idea of rigid, macroscopic objects that 'longer-than' is a part of, that underwrite lawlike statements of the physical sciences. (pg221) The ideal in the physical sciences is to have a homonomic set of descriptions, yet much of it is still heteronomic, especially all the areas that link the mental to the physical. (pg221-2) 'There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence' (pg222).
The last part of the paper proves the identity of the mental to the physical, or at least those mental events that cause physical ones and vice versa. Mental events that enter into causal relations with physical ones must be subject to physical law (of causation), thus have a physical description, hence is physical. (pg224) Note that this only works for mental events that interact with physical ones via causation.
11/21/08
Davidson, Donald - Intending
11/21/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 5 Clarendon Press 1980
A landmark essay that begins with a distinction between having an intention and forming an intention. Author gives the first take on his idea of acting with an intention: you act for a reason. The difference is brought out in the following examples: (pg83-85)
1) His reason for boarding a plane marked 'London' was that he wanted to board a plane headed for London, England, and he believed the plane marked 'London' was going there.
2) His intention in boarding the plane marked 'London' was to board a plane headed for London, England.
Author comments that 1) entails 2), but not necessarily 2) entails 1). Also, the belief in 1) is opaque-- you can't substitute into it (for instance, if the plane marked 'London' was going to London, Ontario). Yet the plane in 2) is transparent. Author also suggests that the 'intention in boarding the plane marked...' is opaque. (pg85) Reasons comprised of beliefs and pro-attitude 'value judgments' (pg86) underwrite intentions, though many intentional actions aren't done by actively forming an intention. (pg85) The problem with this traditional account is intervening causation that manages to perform the action but not for the right reasons. (pg87) A more fruitful discussion of intention might be better served by looking at 'pure intending', that is, intending without accompanied by action. (pg88)
--Is pure intending an action? Not in the performative sense. (pg89-91)
--Is intending to act a belief that one will do so? This is tricky. Adding 'if I can' to an intention is superfluous, unless it is an overt speech act to reduce the probability of your intention happening. (pg92-3) Yet an intention might be formed even when you believe it will be difficult, or unlikely, that you'll complete the action. (pg95)
--Is intending to do something the same as wanting to do it? Here we have a problem from Anscombe where the desire to eat something sweet might be expressed as a law-like generalization that will make tons of variegated actions as desirable (e.g. eating candy laced with poison). 'The trouble about pure intending is that there is no action to judge simply good or desirable' (pg97) Author proposes that actions that are desirable in a certain attribute (e.g. sweet-eating) are prima facie judgments. There must be a further judgment that this attribute is enough to act on, an all-out judgment that results in 'This action is desirable' (pg98). Having specificity is very important because it picks from the class of possible actions one particular action that can be evaluated (pg96). Pure intending (an all-out judgment) for a certain action type is also possible if there are background beliefs and conditions that will avoid undesirable actions. (pg98)
Lastly, author clears up the earlier issue of 'if I can' and such: an all-out judgment about what is desirable is held 'given the rest of what I believe about the immediate future'. (pg99-100) Author also distinguishes from intentions and wishes, aside from wishes not consistent with what one believes is possible, there is little to distinguish them, except the assertion that intentions are 'not mere' wishes (pg101).
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 5 Clarendon Press 1980
A landmark essay that begins with a distinction between having an intention and forming an intention. Author gives the first take on his idea of acting with an intention: you act for a reason. The difference is brought out in the following examples: (pg83-85)
1) His reason for boarding a plane marked 'London' was that he wanted to board a plane headed for London, England, and he believed the plane marked 'London' was going there.
2) His intention in boarding the plane marked 'London' was to board a plane headed for London, England.
Author comments that 1) entails 2), but not necessarily 2) entails 1). Also, the belief in 1) is opaque-- you can't substitute into it (for instance, if the plane marked 'London' was going to London, Ontario). Yet the plane in 2) is transparent. Author also suggests that the 'intention in boarding the plane marked...' is opaque. (pg85) Reasons comprised of beliefs and pro-attitude 'value judgments' (pg86) underwrite intentions, though many intentional actions aren't done by actively forming an intention. (pg85) The problem with this traditional account is intervening causation that manages to perform the action but not for the right reasons. (pg87) A more fruitful discussion of intention might be better served by looking at 'pure intending', that is, intending without accompanied by action. (pg88)
--Is pure intending an action? Not in the performative sense. (pg89-91)
--Is intending to act a belief that one will do so? This is tricky. Adding 'if I can' to an intention is superfluous, unless it is an overt speech act to reduce the probability of your intention happening. (pg92-3) Yet an intention might be formed even when you believe it will be difficult, or unlikely, that you'll complete the action. (pg95)
--Is intending to do something the same as wanting to do it? Here we have a problem from Anscombe where the desire to eat something sweet might be expressed as a law-like generalization that will make tons of variegated actions as desirable (e.g. eating candy laced with poison). 'The trouble about pure intending is that there is no action to judge simply good or desirable' (pg97) Author proposes that actions that are desirable in a certain attribute (e.g. sweet-eating) are prima facie judgments. There must be a further judgment that this attribute is enough to act on, an all-out judgment that results in 'This action is desirable' (pg98). Having specificity is very important because it picks from the class of possible actions one particular action that can be evaluated (pg96). Pure intending (an all-out judgment) for a certain action type is also possible if there are background beliefs and conditions that will avoid undesirable actions. (pg98)
Lastly, author clears up the earlier issue of 'if I can' and such: an all-out judgment about what is desirable is held 'given the rest of what I believe about the immediate future'. (pg99-100) Author also distinguishes from intentions and wishes, aside from wishes not consistent with what one believes is possible, there is little to distinguish them, except the assertion that intentions are 'not mere' wishes (pg101).
11/14/08
Davidson, Donald - How is Weakness of the Will Possible?
11/14/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 2 Clarendon Press 1980
A reprinting of a paper where author tries to deal with the logical problem of weakness of the will in intentional actions. Davidson first decides this is the same as incontinence (pg21-2), and gives a definition: (pg22)
A acts incontinently iff: A does x intentionally; A believes that y is open to him; A judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than x.
The problem is that an intentional action seems to be one done once all things are considered. There seems to be an inconsistent triad:
P1) If A wants x more than y and can do either and acts intentionally, A will do x over y
P2) If A judges that it's better to do x than y, A will want to do x more than y
P3) There are incontinent actions
Author doesn't want to pick away at these premises, but instead largely affirm them and also claim they aren't inconsistent. (pg23-4)
I. What follows is a discussion largely about the nature of intentional action, how it's opaque to substitution (pg25), how it is independent from moralizing (pg29-30), how it doesn't argue for any particular meta-ethical theory (pg26). Author also argues strongly that we must resist the temptation to reject P2 (pg27-8).
II. Author discusses Aristotle's practical syllogism and Aquinas' account of the incontinent man. (pg31-3) This leads to a specific point: even if we get rid of the multiple sources for desire, just within, say, the desire to act morally and only morally there can be conflict. Author rejects the 'single principle' solution. (pg34) In Aristotle, Aquinas and Hare, the battle is between two forces, one wins. In Plato and Butler and perhaps Dante, there are three actors: the two forces, and then another, 'the will' or 'conscience' that decides which wins. (pg35-6)
The solution to the problem of incontinence is to hold that there is a prima facie judgment based on a set of reasons that holds x desirable, but there is another, all-things-considered judgment based on a set of reasons (that includes the earlier set) that holds y more desirable. A performs x, and there is no logical contradition between an all-things-considered (universalized) judgment and a prima facie one. (pg37-39) 'If we are to have a coherent theory of practical reason, we must give up the idea that we can detacth conclusions about what is desirable ... from the principles that lend those conclusions colour. The trouble lies in the tacit assumption that moral principles have the form of universalized conditionals; once this assumption is made, nothing we can do with a prima facie operator in the conclusion will save things' (pg37)
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 2 Clarendon Press 1980
A reprinting of a paper where author tries to deal with the logical problem of weakness of the will in intentional actions. Davidson first decides this is the same as incontinence (pg21-2), and gives a definition: (pg22)
A acts incontinently iff: A does x intentionally; A believes that y is open to him; A judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than x.
The problem is that an intentional action seems to be one done once all things are considered. There seems to be an inconsistent triad:
P1) If A wants x more than y and can do either and acts intentionally, A will do x over y
P2) If A judges that it's better to do x than y, A will want to do x more than y
P3) There are incontinent actions
Author doesn't want to pick away at these premises, but instead largely affirm them and also claim they aren't inconsistent. (pg23-4)
I. What follows is a discussion largely about the nature of intentional action, how it's opaque to substitution (pg25), how it is independent from moralizing (pg29-30), how it doesn't argue for any particular meta-ethical theory (pg26). Author also argues strongly that we must resist the temptation to reject P2 (pg27-8).
II. Author discusses Aristotle's practical syllogism and Aquinas' account of the incontinent man. (pg31-3) This leads to a specific point: even if we get rid of the multiple sources for desire, just within, say, the desire to act morally and only morally there can be conflict. Author rejects the 'single principle' solution. (pg34) In Aristotle, Aquinas and Hare, the battle is between two forces, one wins. In Plato and Butler and perhaps Dante, there are three actors: the two forces, and then another, 'the will' or 'conscience' that decides which wins. (pg35-6)
The solution to the problem of incontinence is to hold that there is a prima facie judgment based on a set of reasons that holds x desirable, but there is another, all-things-considered judgment based on a set of reasons (that includes the earlier set) that holds y more desirable. A performs x, and there is no logical contradition between an all-things-considered (universalized) judgment and a prima facie one. (pg37-39) 'If we are to have a coherent theory of practical reason, we must give up the idea that we can detacth conclusions about what is desirable ... from the principles that lend those conclusions colour. The trouble lies in the tacit assumption that moral principles have the form of universalized conditionals; once this assumption is made, nothing we can do with a prima facie operator in the conclusion will save things' (pg37)
11/7/08
Davidson, Donald - Actions, Reasons, and Causes
11/07/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 23 1963
An oldie where the main argument is that reasons for action are causes for action. Reasons 'rationalize' action by showing: (pg685)
a) a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind
b) believing one's actions are of this kind
These two combine to form a 'primary reason' for why an agent performed an action. (pg686) The paper then describes how to construct a primary reason, and then argues that a primary reason for an action is the action's cause.
Author discusses how, in general, primary reasons are given and how they should be given. (pg686-690) Further discussion is spent defending against some small technicalities: justifying isn't the same as giving reasons (pg691), and that re-describing reasons doesn't rule out reasons being causes. (pg691-3)
Lastly is the defense for the thesis that a primary reason for an action is its cause.
The objections:
A. Causes are events, and mental states aren't events.
Reply: there are mental events that are almost always part of primary reasons
B. Effects and Causes must be logically distinct, primary reasons aren't distinct from their actions
Reply: logically they are, even though, perhaps, they aren't always distinct grammatically (see pg687-8)
C. Causes relate to Effects by a lawlike generality, there are no such available in actions
Reply: true, but the trouble here is that you're looking for laws among the wrong kinds of things
D. Knowledge of Cause and Effect is inductive, but self-knowledge about reasons isn't
Reply: this isn't essential to causes and effects
E. Talking about causes of actions is weird, either removing the agent or involving infinite regress
Reply: not when you use reasons as causes!
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 23 1963
An oldie where the main argument is that reasons for action are causes for action. Reasons 'rationalize' action by showing: (pg685)
a) a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind
b) believing one's actions are of this kind
These two combine to form a 'primary reason' for why an agent performed an action. (pg686) The paper then describes how to construct a primary reason, and then argues that a primary reason for an action is the action's cause.
Author discusses how, in general, primary reasons are given and how they should be given. (pg686-690) Further discussion is spent defending against some small technicalities: justifying isn't the same as giving reasons (pg691), and that re-describing reasons doesn't rule out reasons being causes. (pg691-3)
Lastly is the defense for the thesis that a primary reason for an action is its cause.
The objections:
A. Causes are events, and mental states aren't events.
Reply: there are mental events that are almost always part of primary reasons
B. Effects and Causes must be logically distinct, primary reasons aren't distinct from their actions
Reply: logically they are, even though, perhaps, they aren't always distinct grammatically (see pg687-8)
C. Causes relate to Effects by a lawlike generality, there are no such available in actions
Reply: true, but the trouble here is that you're looking for laws among the wrong kinds of things
D. Knowledge of Cause and Effect is inductive, but self-knowledge about reasons isn't
Reply: this isn't essential to causes and effects
E. Talking about causes of actions is weird, either removing the agent or involving infinite regress
Reply: not when you use reasons as causes!
10/31/08
Smith, Michael - The Explanatory Role Of Being Rational
10/31/2008
This paper starts with a discussion of the classical Humean description of action, as being a belief and a desire put together in a particular causal way to produce an action. Author argues that there is actually another piece to this story, that the agent so doing is instrumentally rational. So, put this way we have:
a desire for an end + a means-ends belief + instrumental rationality = an action
Roughly, this corresponds to Hempel's deductivist claim about what schema action needs to conform to: (pg90)
1- Actor was in situation of type C
2- A was a rational agent
3- In a type C situation, any rational agent will do X
Conclusion: A does X
Author quotes Hempel, who defends this schema. (pg91-2) The instrumental rationality isn't just having the capacity, it's exercising it. (pg94-5)
This approach was criticized by Davidson, who claimed that instrumental rationality is the background assumption of action, not a peculiar constitutive element. (pg96-8) Author responds to this point by discussing a problem that Davidson himself had: that of 'wayward internal causation' (pg100-1). This is where the appropriate belief and desire are formed but something else ends up causing the intended action. The consensus on a fix of this is to use modal propositions about how the agent would have behaved under slight variations in the situation. Author argues this already imports elements of very local instrumental rationality. (pg101-2)
Author wants to expand this local rationality to mean a larger kind of rationality altogether (pg102). For this author uses a thought experiment of a John, who has a desire to be healthy and believes that flexing his bicep will do so, but so will flexing his triceps.(pg102-8) Good instrumental rationality should assign equal preference for either action if both are equally salubrious, lesser if one is lesser, etc.
The second part of the paper considers how rationality might play a non-constitutive part in action, namely playing a part in forming beliefs and forming desires. (pg110-120) Here there can be rational ways to form means-ends beliefs, and less rational ways. But what of desires? Surely a Humean will deny rational ways to form desires. Author here tries to convince us that we can appeal to reason about what we should desire in a non-instrumental way (pg116-121), perhaps showing that some situations are 'reason-giving'. The schema would go as follows:
1- A was in situation of type E
2- A was a rational subject
3- In a situation of type E and rational agent will desire the end that Q
Conclusion: A rationally desired the end that Q
This paper starts with a discussion of the classical Humean description of action, as being a belief and a desire put together in a particular causal way to produce an action. Author argues that there is actually another piece to this story, that the agent so doing is instrumentally rational. So, put this way we have:
a desire for an end + a means-ends belief + instrumental rationality = an action
Roughly, this corresponds to Hempel's deductivist claim about what schema action needs to conform to: (pg90)
1- Actor was in situation of type C
2- A was a rational agent
3- In a type C situation, any rational agent will do X
Conclusion: A does X
Author quotes Hempel, who defends this schema. (pg91-2) The instrumental rationality isn't just having the capacity, it's exercising it. (pg94-5)
This approach was criticized by Davidson, who claimed that instrumental rationality is the background assumption of action, not a peculiar constitutive element. (pg96-8) Author responds to this point by discussing a problem that Davidson himself had: that of 'wayward internal causation' (pg100-1). This is where the appropriate belief and desire are formed but something else ends up causing the intended action. The consensus on a fix of this is to use modal propositions about how the agent would have behaved under slight variations in the situation. Author argues this already imports elements of very local instrumental rationality. (pg101-2)
Author wants to expand this local rationality to mean a larger kind of rationality altogether (pg102). For this author uses a thought experiment of a John, who has a desire to be healthy and believes that flexing his bicep will do so, but so will flexing his triceps.(pg102-8) Good instrumental rationality should assign equal preference for either action if both are equally salubrious, lesser if one is lesser, etc.
The second part of the paper considers how rationality might play a non-constitutive part in action, namely playing a part in forming beliefs and forming desires. (pg110-120) Here there can be rational ways to form means-ends beliefs, and less rational ways. But what of desires? Surely a Humean will deny rational ways to form desires. Author here tries to convince us that we can appeal to reason about what we should desire in a non-instrumental way (pg116-121), perhaps showing that some situations are 'reason-giving'. The schema would go as follows:
1- A was in situation of type E
2- A was a rational subject
3- In a situation of type E and rational agent will desire the end that Q
Conclusion: A rationally desired the end that Q
10/23/08
Fish, Stanley - Buttons and Bows
10/24/2008
New York Times, October 12, 2008
An article in the secular media about a few examples of teachers in public schools and publicly funded educational institutions being restricted by the administration from wearing buttons that endorse candidates. Author describes the potential US Constitutional issues here regarding free speech, refers to the supreme court case of Tinker v Des Moines where a test is given about restrictions on free speech: does it 'materially disrupt the work and discipline of the school'? In many cases of students' speech, the answer is no. Author argues that the teacher's displaying his/her views may alter the way a student studies, writes papers, etc. Author argues that teachers aren't restricted from wearing buttons outside of the classroom, just inside where they prime duties are to teach, not to proselytize.
New York Times, October 12, 2008
An article in the secular media about a few examples of teachers in public schools and publicly funded educational institutions being restricted by the administration from wearing buttons that endorse candidates. Author describes the potential US Constitutional issues here regarding free speech, refers to the supreme court case of Tinker v Des Moines where a test is given about restrictions on free speech: does it 'materially disrupt the work and discipline of the school'? In many cases of students' speech, the answer is no. Author argues that the teacher's displaying his/her views may alter the way a student studies, writes papers, etc. Author argues that teachers aren't restricted from wearing buttons outside of the classroom, just inside where they prime duties are to teach, not to proselytize.
10/17/08
Nichols, Shaun & Knobe, Joshua - Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuition
10/17/2008
Nous, vol 41 number 4 2007
This paper explores how affect plays a role in evaluating moral responsibility. Here the debate is framed in a way to shed some light on an age-old debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism in moral theory. Compatibilism is the theory that moral agency is compatible with a deterministic universe. Incompatibilism is the opposite: moral agency doesn't wholly apply if we live in a deterministic universe. Philosophers have relied on different bits of psychological and anecdotal evidence for claiming that people are either largely compatibilists or largely incompatibilists.
The paper seeks to show that in some contexts people come out as incompatibilists, yet in others they are strongly compatibilist. The difference comes out instead when affective responses are elicited in a description of a hypothetical where subjects have to assign moral responsibility. At times when the description is largely abstract and a deterministic world is posited, people reply with incompatibilist-type responses, largely alleviating moral responsibility. When a more concrete situation is described, using names and giving an identifying story to the moral hypothetical, people assign moral agency (or moral blame) and become compatibilists. (pg664-671) This effect becomes less pronounced as concrete hypotheticals become more terse and resemble short abstract hypotheticals. (pg670) Also of note is that people are more apt to give harsher punishments once the transgressor has been identified, rather than prior to that identification. (pg665)
Authors propose 3 distinct theories that could account for this phenomenon. (pg671-5) They are as follows:
Performance Error Model: affective responses distort people's judgments, making them unable to apply their theory of moral responsibility. Thus people are largely incompatibilists but readily assign moral responsibility when they have an affective response to a hypothetical. This has an affinity with people willing to hold people more responsible when they are experiencing even unrelated negative emotions.
Affective Competence Model: employing affective responses about moral situations is the core method by which moral judgments are reached, thus the abstract hypotheticals are problematic, not the concrete ones. Hence people are fundamentally compatibilist.
Concrete Competence Model: it is concreteness, not affect, that is the primary difference here; abstract hypotheticals fail to adequately signal the subject (or a special 'moral module' inside the subject) for a moral judgment, while concrete hypotheticals do.
Authors consider that hybrid answers are also possible, but they advocate one in particular: 'Affect serves both as part of the fundamental competence underlying responsibility judgments and as a factor that can sometimes lead to performance errors.' (pg674) Authors then try to show some other evidence that might eliminate one of the models, and possibly support their own hybrid theory.
The evidence offered (pg675-7) now dealt with two concrete hypotheticals, one 'high-affect' about rape and the other 'low-affect' about tax evasion. This experiement attempted to control for concreteness. The results were that people were compatibilists about rape but incompatibilists about tax evasion. The Affective Competence model might have a hard time accounting for the difference that is also revealed between a deterministic condition and a indeterministic-free-will condition.(pg676-7)
Lastly, authors examine how their findings might change the way philosophers view people's intuitions about (in)compatibilism. (pg677-680)
Nous, vol 41 number 4 2007
This paper explores how affect plays a role in evaluating moral responsibility. Here the debate is framed in a way to shed some light on an age-old debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism in moral theory. Compatibilism is the theory that moral agency is compatible with a deterministic universe. Incompatibilism is the opposite: moral agency doesn't wholly apply if we live in a deterministic universe. Philosophers have relied on different bits of psychological and anecdotal evidence for claiming that people are either largely compatibilists or largely incompatibilists.
The paper seeks to show that in some contexts people come out as incompatibilists, yet in others they are strongly compatibilist. The difference comes out instead when affective responses are elicited in a description of a hypothetical where subjects have to assign moral responsibility. At times when the description is largely abstract and a deterministic world is posited, people reply with incompatibilist-type responses, largely alleviating moral responsibility. When a more concrete situation is described, using names and giving an identifying story to the moral hypothetical, people assign moral agency (or moral blame) and become compatibilists. (pg664-671) This effect becomes less pronounced as concrete hypotheticals become more terse and resemble short abstract hypotheticals. (pg670) Also of note is that people are more apt to give harsher punishments once the transgressor has been identified, rather than prior to that identification. (pg665)
Authors propose 3 distinct theories that could account for this phenomenon. (pg671-5) They are as follows:
Performance Error Model: affective responses distort people's judgments, making them unable to apply their theory of moral responsibility. Thus people are largely incompatibilists but readily assign moral responsibility when they have an affective response to a hypothetical. This has an affinity with people willing to hold people more responsible when they are experiencing even unrelated negative emotions.
Affective Competence Model: employing affective responses about moral situations is the core method by which moral judgments are reached, thus the abstract hypotheticals are problematic, not the concrete ones. Hence people are fundamentally compatibilist.
Concrete Competence Model: it is concreteness, not affect, that is the primary difference here; abstract hypotheticals fail to adequately signal the subject (or a special 'moral module' inside the subject) for a moral judgment, while concrete hypotheticals do.
Authors consider that hybrid answers are also possible, but they advocate one in particular: 'Affect serves both as part of the fundamental competence underlying responsibility judgments and as a factor that can sometimes lead to performance errors.' (pg674) Authors then try to show some other evidence that might eliminate one of the models, and possibly support their own hybrid theory.
The evidence offered (pg675-7) now dealt with two concrete hypotheticals, one 'high-affect' about rape and the other 'low-affect' about tax evasion. This experiement attempted to control for concreteness. The results were that people were compatibilists about rape but incompatibilists about tax evasion. The Affective Competence model might have a hard time accounting for the difference that is also revealed between a deterministic condition and a indeterministic-free-will condition.(pg676-7)
Lastly, authors examine how their findings might change the way philosophers view people's intuitions about (in)compatibilism. (pg677-680)
10/10/08
Munzer, Stephen - From Innocense to Purity of Heart-- and Back Again
10/10/2008
unpublished paper
This paper is mostly an exploration of what innocence means, how it can be lost, and then what would have to happen for it to be regained, or perhaps just surpassed. Author begins by giving 5 different accounts of innocence:
1. Lack of knowledge of evil
2. Absence of sin or moral wrongdoing
3. Lack of awareness of moral complexity
4. Lack of an experience of moral difficulty/intimate encounter with evil
5. Lack of a capacity to do harm, as of knowledge, intention or will
Author points out that 5. is not a metaphysical or logical inability to harm, but instead some sort of agency inability. This raises the possibility of 'purity of heart', meaning an intentional incapacity to do wrong.
Author discusses how the loss of the various types of innocence might occur, and then proceeds to discuss two examples, that of jealousy and ambition. Author claims it might be possible to become ambitious or jealous and then, after concerted effort and time, extinguish those intentions to regain innocence. Yet the objection to this isn't that innocence is regained but instead some higher level of moral maturity is reached. Author then discusses his replies, perhaps that the objection is too cognitive and that, intellectually-- sure-- there is a difference, but the two situations might be morally similar.
The objection, however, brings up the possibility of a morally superior state after the loss of innocence and the extinction of the evil that caused such a loss. Author mentions how baptism might play into this as a sense of renewal, though it does not return innocence. Lastly, author discusses purity of heart in the bible.
unpublished paper
This paper is mostly an exploration of what innocence means, how it can be lost, and then what would have to happen for it to be regained, or perhaps just surpassed. Author begins by giving 5 different accounts of innocence:
1. Lack of knowledge of evil
2. Absence of sin or moral wrongdoing
3. Lack of awareness of moral complexity
4. Lack of an experience of moral difficulty/intimate encounter with evil
5. Lack of a capacity to do harm, as of knowledge, intention or will
Author points out that 5. is not a metaphysical or logical inability to harm, but instead some sort of agency inability. This raises the possibility of 'purity of heart', meaning an intentional incapacity to do wrong.
Author discusses how the loss of the various types of innocence might occur, and then proceeds to discuss two examples, that of jealousy and ambition. Author claims it might be possible to become ambitious or jealous and then, after concerted effort and time, extinguish those intentions to regain innocence. Yet the objection to this isn't that innocence is regained but instead some higher level of moral maturity is reached. Author then discusses his replies, perhaps that the objection is too cognitive and that, intellectually-- sure-- there is a difference, but the two situations might be morally similar.
The objection, however, brings up the possibility of a morally superior state after the loss of innocence and the extinction of the evil that caused such a loss. Author mentions how baptism might play into this as a sense of renewal, though it does not return innocence. Lastly, author discusses purity of heart in the bible.
10/3/08
Mitchell, Susan - Integrating Knowledge: Complexity, Science and Policy Chapter 2
10/03/2008
Unpublished Manuscript
This chapter mainly deals with the problem of reduction of complex systems. Author argues for a language that 'tracks the diversity' in holistic behavior versus behavior of the parts. There are many kinds of reduction, from Kim's ontological reductionism to epistemic and methodological reduction. Author takes the position that a reduction that entails 'a "nothing more than" account' will miss 'important features' of the behavior of complex systems. It is 'too meager a conceptual framework'. [This appears to be a stance against epistemic reduction.]
Author first discusses how materialism gives prima facie reasons for ontological reduction. However 'reductionism actually makes a stronger claim, namely that there is some basic level of description that corresponds to the basic fundamental level of matter'. Mill and CD Broad took up some of Aristotle's discussion on "emergence" and put forward an epistemic account of non-reducibility e.g. wetness of water. Once most of these examples were shown to actually be reducible, it seemed reductionism had no barriers. Emergence again appeared in the 1970s when discussing neurological complexity. It is in this context that Kim makes the strong case for ontological reductionism.
Author discusses Kim's reductionism and points out the bold assumption he makes: that 'every material object has a unique complete microstructural description'. Author believes this condition won't be satisfied with type-instantiation (multiple realizeability) rather than token-instantiation. Further, to believe that our descriptions of the world can be unified into one language mistakenly believes that our language can successfully map onto reality perfectly in every case, avoiding e.g. bad grammars and generalities.
Author's most lengthy response is as follows: complex systems aren't all just aggregations of simple parts. There are feedback systems, chaotic systems, 'non-linear' dynamics, etc. that are missed on 'any other account of reduction'. Author describes the flight of groups of starling birds and of foraging bees in a colony. One of the issues here is predictability: an account of the individual bird or bee will not predict how the group behaves.
Unpublished Manuscript
This chapter mainly deals with the problem of reduction of complex systems. Author argues for a language that 'tracks the diversity' in holistic behavior versus behavior of the parts. There are many kinds of reduction, from Kim's ontological reductionism to epistemic and methodological reduction. Author takes the position that a reduction that entails 'a "nothing more than" account' will miss 'important features' of the behavior of complex systems. It is 'too meager a conceptual framework'. [This appears to be a stance against epistemic reduction.]
Author first discusses how materialism gives prima facie reasons for ontological reduction. However 'reductionism actually makes a stronger claim, namely that there is some basic level of description that corresponds to the basic fundamental level of matter'. Mill and CD Broad took up some of Aristotle's discussion on "emergence" and put forward an epistemic account of non-reducibility e.g. wetness of water. Once most of these examples were shown to actually be reducible, it seemed reductionism had no barriers. Emergence again appeared in the 1970s when discussing neurological complexity. It is in this context that Kim makes the strong case for ontological reductionism.
Author discusses Kim's reductionism and points out the bold assumption he makes: that 'every material object has a unique complete microstructural description'. Author believes this condition won't be satisfied with type-instantiation (multiple realizeability) rather than token-instantiation. Further, to believe that our descriptions of the world can be unified into one language mistakenly believes that our language can successfully map onto reality perfectly in every case, avoiding e.g. bad grammars and generalities.
Author's most lengthy response is as follows: complex systems aren't all just aggregations of simple parts. There are feedback systems, chaotic systems, 'non-linear' dynamics, etc. that are missed on 'any other account of reduction'. Author describes the flight of groups of starling birds and of foraging bees in a colony. One of the issues here is predictability: an account of the individual bird or bee will not predict how the group behaves.
9/26/08
Gert, Joshua - What Colors Could Not Be: An Argument For Color Primitivism
09/26/2008
Journal of Philosophy, March 2008
This is a paper that suggests that any way of reducing colors to physical or dispositional properties will give more modal properties to color than they should have. Author begins the paper with an analogy to Benacerraf's work on numbers, arguing they are primitive and not reducible to sets. The problem with reduction that Benacerraf reveals is that numbers are reducible to more than one system of sets. To pick between one seems ad hoc, but regardless of this, once picking one there are certain weird questions about numbers that have weird answers e.g.: 'does "3" contain "1" and "2"?' Yes? No? Either answer is weird because the question is 'ill-formed'. However, reducing numbers to sets 'forces' an answer to such a question, thereby giving numbers more properties than they should have. The solution is to make numbers primitive. Author takes this method of argument as an analogy to color.
Author wants color to be fully explained from within the domain of color. It is certainly possible that there will be physical-reductive facts (about surface reflectance, visual perception) that co-instantiate with color, but author argues this is like the set-theoretic account of numbers; they don't reduce to them. (pg130-1) Author takes the fact that there are disputes between color realists as analogous to the different methods of reducing numbers to sets. (pg132-3)
Author's positive account of color primitivism is that color terms do not rigidly designate any properties, nor do they non-rigidly designate any properties either. Instead, color rigidly designates colors. (pg136) If color terms designated anything other than that, then there would be ill-posed modal questions about colors that have truth values, which author argues needs to be avoided. An objection to this view is why you can't extend it by analogy to all property terms, like e.g. shape. Author replies that there are other observational/physical conditions for most other properties can that yield facts-of-the-matter in modal settings (pg139-140).
In the next section author takes Mark Johnston's discussion about 5 core beliefs about color. Johnston argues that these 5 core beliefs are inconsistent and therefore no solution to the reduction of color should have to account for all 5. Author's approach is to suggest a solution to what color is that can accommodate all 5 core beliefs (after he alters one of them). This is meant to recommend color primitivism. (pg 141) Author weakens and re-writes one of the beliefs:
Revelation: The intrinsic nature of Canary Yellow (CY) is fully revealed in an experience as of something CY
Re-written/Modest Revelation: A complete understanding of what CY is can be given by an experience as of something CY, in someone with normal human vision who has already acquired color concepts. (pg142)
Initially, Revelation conflicted with Explanation: Sometimes something's being CY explains why it looks CY. Author argues that with color primitivism, 'Modest Revelation' does not conflict with 'Explanation' (pg144-5) Author then walks through the other accounts of color: that it's a disjunctive primary quality/property of objects (pg145-6), that it's a disposition of a certain kind (pg147-8), that it's a secondary property of reflection (pg148-151). It is here where the reductionist is given a choice of saying that the properties that give rise to color are either nomologically or metaphysically connected to color. Author argues that either choice yields silly truth-values to ill-formed modal questions, and that the color primitivist does not have to pick between these two options. (pg149-150)
Lastly, author takes on the objection of spectrum inversion and considers Wittgenstein's private language argument as the reply to it (pg152-3). Author also discusses the possibility of animal color spectrum being larger than ours is.
Journal of Philosophy, March 2008
This is a paper that suggests that any way of reducing colors to physical or dispositional properties will give more modal properties to color than they should have. Author begins the paper with an analogy to Benacerraf's work on numbers, arguing they are primitive and not reducible to sets. The problem with reduction that Benacerraf reveals is that numbers are reducible to more than one system of sets. To pick between one seems ad hoc, but regardless of this, once picking one there are certain weird questions about numbers that have weird answers e.g.: 'does "3" contain "1" and "2"?' Yes? No? Either answer is weird because the question is 'ill-formed'. However, reducing numbers to sets 'forces' an answer to such a question, thereby giving numbers more properties than they should have. The solution is to make numbers primitive. Author takes this method of argument as an analogy to color.
Author wants color to be fully explained from within the domain of color. It is certainly possible that there will be physical-reductive facts (about surface reflectance, visual perception) that co-instantiate with color, but author argues this is like the set-theoretic account of numbers; they don't reduce to them. (pg130-1) Author takes the fact that there are disputes between color realists as analogous to the different methods of reducing numbers to sets. (pg132-3)
Author's positive account of color primitivism is that color terms do not rigidly designate any properties, nor do they non-rigidly designate any properties either. Instead, color rigidly designates colors. (pg136) If color terms designated anything other than that, then there would be ill-posed modal questions about colors that have truth values, which author argues needs to be avoided. An objection to this view is why you can't extend it by analogy to all property terms, like e.g. shape. Author replies that there are other observational/physical conditions for most other properties can that yield facts-of-the-matter in modal settings (pg139-140).
In the next section author takes Mark Johnston's discussion about 5 core beliefs about color. Johnston argues that these 5 core beliefs are inconsistent and therefore no solution to the reduction of color should have to account for all 5. Author's approach is to suggest a solution to what color is that can accommodate all 5 core beliefs (after he alters one of them). This is meant to recommend color primitivism. (pg 141) Author weakens and re-writes one of the beliefs:
Revelation: The intrinsic nature of Canary Yellow (CY) is fully revealed in an experience as of something CY
Re-written/Modest Revelation: A complete understanding of what CY is can be given by an experience as of something CY, in someone with normal human vision who has already acquired color concepts. (pg142)
Initially, Revelation conflicted with Explanation: Sometimes something's being CY explains why it looks CY. Author argues that with color primitivism, 'Modest Revelation' does not conflict with 'Explanation' (pg144-5) Author then walks through the other accounts of color: that it's a disjunctive primary quality/property of objects (pg145-6), that it's a disposition of a certain kind (pg147-8), that it's a secondary property of reflection (pg148-151). It is here where the reductionist is given a choice of saying that the properties that give rise to color are either nomologically or metaphysically connected to color. Author argues that either choice yields silly truth-values to ill-formed modal questions, and that the color primitivist does not have to pick between these two options. (pg149-150)
Lastly, author takes on the objection of spectrum inversion and considers Wittgenstein's private language argument as the reply to it (pg152-3). Author also discusses the possibility of animal color spectrum being larger than ours is.
9/18/08
Lopes, Dominic McIver - Nobody Needs A Theory of Art
09/19/2008
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 3 March 2008
This paper tries to dispose of the contentious drive for a theory of art and instead replace it with a Theory of the Arts, meaning a theory of painting, sculpture, theatre, and so on. Author offers his simple analysis:An item is a work of Art iff it is produced by a kind of activity that is an Art Form.
Author takes some time to give a history: by the 1700s various distinctions were being drawn between science and art and between aesthetic and moral goodness. (pg 110-2) The rise of 'the arts' was a new phenomenon in Western Culture. There could be 4 lessons from this: (pg112)
1) The concept of Art is historically conditioned
2) There was no art prior to the 1700s (dubious: it relies on there not being a concept of Art prior to there being a theory)
3) The concept of Art comes from a theory of Art
4) Better than 3: the concept of Art comes from a theory of the Arts Author argues that the early moderns were more concerned with a Theory of the Arts, not of Art. The avant-garde in the 1900s was taken as a challenge of Art, not of the Arts, thus an interest in a Theory of Art. (pg114)
Author discusses the two camps for Theory of Art: the functionalist and the proceduralist. The functionalist takes Art to perform a certain function (e.g. aesthetic, experiential). The proceduralist takes Art to be created a certain way (according to specific rules, recipes). (pg116) Functionalists tend to put avant-garde cases outside of Art, while proceduralists tend to include them. The fight is partially over what is included and what isn't: over intuitions, not just explanation. Author also discusses another possible theory criterion: that a Theory of Art should account for why it is so valuable, either culturally or economically. Beardsley (functionalist) does incorporate this desidriatum into his theory, while Dickie (proceduralist) does not; both claim this is a virtue.(pg118) Author claims that conflicting intuitions and conflicting theoretical criteria signal an impasse.
Author discusses how many of us feel bafflement when confronted with an avant-garde work. But what kind of bafflement? Is it conceptual or theoretical? If it is conceptual bafflement, we wouldn't be able to say whether it was Art or not. If it is theoretical bafflement, we wouldn't be able to say why it's Art (or why it isn't).(pg119) Author argues that most of us, most of the time, can tell that an object is Art because of the context it is in. (pg120) The hard part is figuring out what Art Form avant-garde pieces fall into.(pg121-2) Next is theoretical bafflement, which is the standard problem: why is it Art? But if we can settle-- prior to this question-- what Art Form the work is in, this issue is irrelevant. The question is 'why is it sculpture?' not 'why is it Art?'. (pg122-3)
Under this model, author points to four possible outcomes when confronted with the avant-garde:
1) An Art Form admits this work as one of its kind: Art!
2) No Art Form admits this work: Not Art
3) No Art Form admits this work: Yet it is Art
4) No Art Form admits this work but it creates a new Art Form (e.g. conceptual art, film)
Author argues that only in the third case do we need a Theory of Art, and none of the famous examples fit into that third category. Most of the time it is usual and customary to create a new Art Form and thus cases of 3) become 4). (pg123) Author considers searching for a Theory of Art to be a category mistake (pg 123-4)
Lastly, author answers some small objections and shows some of the upshot to accepting his analysis.
9/12/08
Kawall, Jason - The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-being
09/12/2008
The Journal of Value Inquiry 33, 1999
This is a relatively short paper written to defend Mental State Welfare theories against the Experience Machine. The first part of the paper brings out the intuitions about what someones welfare is: it has to affect the individual for it to affect her well-being. (pg381-2) Author then quotes Nozick's Experience Machine argument, but claims that the EM does not hit only against MSW theories. What the EM argues for is our unwillingness to abandon our commitments, whether it be for other things in the real world or not. As an example, author asks us consider achieving perfect virtue, happiness and accomplishments but having to never see your friends and family again. Author says that few would take this, making the analogy between this choice and the EM choice.
Author claims that just because we have commitments we are unwilling to abandon doesn't make them necessary for our well-being. (pg384) Author argues that there is a separation between what we value and what is good for our well-being, possibly creating conflicts between rival values.
In the final part of the paper, author considers a soldier that jumps on a grenade in order to save his fellows. The analysis is that he had a commitment to their lives that conflicted with his own well-being. The possible objection is that there is no conflict; he has accomplished something he values, which is a noble thing, and thus that contributed to his well-being, but not his MSW, thus MSW is incorrect. Author replies, perhaps weakly, that it is possible his MSW would have been worse if he hadn't stifled the grenade: living with the guilt, etc. This reduces it to a matter of prudence or instrumental value.
The Journal of Value Inquiry 33, 1999
This is a relatively short paper written to defend Mental State Welfare theories against the Experience Machine. The first part of the paper brings out the intuitions about what someones welfare is: it has to affect the individual for it to affect her well-being. (pg381-2) Author then quotes Nozick's Experience Machine argument, but claims that the EM does not hit only against MSW theories. What the EM argues for is our unwillingness to abandon our commitments, whether it be for other things in the real world or not. As an example, author asks us consider achieving perfect virtue, happiness and accomplishments but having to never see your friends and family again. Author says that few would take this, making the analogy between this choice and the EM choice.
Author claims that just because we have commitments we are unwilling to abandon doesn't make them necessary for our well-being. (pg384) Author argues that there is a separation between what we value and what is good for our well-being, possibly creating conflicts between rival values.
In the final part of the paper, author considers a soldier that jumps on a grenade in order to save his fellows. The analysis is that he had a commitment to their lives that conflicted with his own well-being. The possible objection is that there is no conflict; he has accomplished something he values, which is a noble thing, and thus that contributed to his well-being, but not his MSW, thus MSW is incorrect. Author replies, perhaps weakly, that it is possible his MSW would have been worse if he hadn't stifled the grenade: living with the guilt, etc. This reduces it to a matter of prudence or instrumental value.
9/5/08
Rivera-Lopez, Eduardo - Are Mental State Welfarism and Our Concern for Non-Experiential Goals Incompatible?
09/05/2008
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly #88 (2007)
This paper tries to show that a version of Mental State Welfarism can account for the thesis that we have legitimate non-experiential goals. Author calls this Compatibility, and because a form of MSW (Mental State Welfarism) includes desires for objective accomplishments, it does not follow that if this form of MSW is true that we would plug into the experience machine. Thus the experience machine can be rejected even for a form of MSW.
Author begins discussion with a discussion of MSW: the subjective satisfaction of desires is the only intrinsically valuable thing. (pg74-5) Note that this is an agent-neutral definition: it doesn't say what is valuable from the agent's perspective, just what is valuable for the agent from an objective perspective (pg84).
The most common objection to MSW is the experience machine, which posits a device that would make you believe you had satisfied your desires: e.g. gave you the subjective satisfaction (that is the only intrinsically valuable thing). The lesson from the experience machine is that we have desires about what really (objectively) happens, not just what we experience: the non-experiential goals thesis. Author treats this thesis as legitimate for value ethics. (pg76) Author points out that a sophisticated hedonist (pg77) who argues that objective goals are just instrumental isn't an effective reply to the experience machine.
Author defends any version of MSW by appealing to the intuition that 'nothing can have intrinsic value if it does not affect someone' (pg78) and gives some examples (pg78-9). Then author launches into an Objector and Defender (of Compatibility) in the form of a dialogue. (pg79-84)
The argument goes as follows:
1) Desire-Satisfaction MSW is the only account of intrinsic value
2) D-S MSWelfarists still have reality-centered desires
3) Removing reality-centered desires from Desire-Satisfaction MSW will remove the 'Desire' part from the D-S MSW.
4) Giving up reality-centered desires will significantly alter the content of the agent's desires, probably impoverishing them and making entrance to the experience machine conditional on significant personal-identity alteration. Furthermore, the life within the experience machine would be unappealing, since the agent would believe she is doing all the things she no longer desires to do. The D-S MSWelfarist would reject the experience machine.
Author compares Non-Experiential Goals to D-S MSW. D-S MSW is an agent-neutral, external value theory. N-E Goals is an agent-perspective value proposition. Author compares these differences to the theories of 'indirect' consequentialism, which says that agent-perspective rules like 'don't kill' must be absolute, but from the external perspective they are just instrumental ways of usually promoting valuable consequences. Yet the agent must believe these are unbreakable rules for the whole system to work! Author calls this moral schizophrenia (pg85) and argues that it seems analogous to the situation in value theory, only much less conflicted and more plausible. In moral theory, there could be two competing norms for the same action. In value theory, two norms (experience-centered desire or reality-centered desire) don't compete because we naturally have reality-centered desires. (pg86) [important]
Lastly, author rejects that this Compatible D-S MSW theory entails plugging into the experience machine. It might give a prima facie reason for plugging other people into the experience machine without their knowledge (but not plugging those people in that you have a desire to see do a particular thing in the world). (pg87-88)
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly #88 (2007)
This paper tries to show that a version of Mental State Welfarism can account for the thesis that we have legitimate non-experiential goals. Author calls this Compatibility, and because a form of MSW (Mental State Welfarism) includes desires for objective accomplishments, it does not follow that if this form of MSW is true that we would plug into the experience machine. Thus the experience machine can be rejected even for a form of MSW.
Author begins discussion with a discussion of MSW: the subjective satisfaction of desires is the only intrinsically valuable thing. (pg74-5) Note that this is an agent-neutral definition: it doesn't say what is valuable from the agent's perspective, just what is valuable for the agent from an objective perspective (pg84).
The most common objection to MSW is the experience machine, which posits a device that would make you believe you had satisfied your desires: e.g. gave you the subjective satisfaction (that is the only intrinsically valuable thing). The lesson from the experience machine is that we have desires about what really (objectively) happens, not just what we experience: the non-experiential goals thesis. Author treats this thesis as legitimate for value ethics. (pg76) Author points out that a sophisticated hedonist (pg77) who argues that objective goals are just instrumental isn't an effective reply to the experience machine.
Author defends any version of MSW by appealing to the intuition that 'nothing can have intrinsic value if it does not affect someone' (pg78) and gives some examples (pg78-9). Then author launches into an Objector and Defender (of Compatibility) in the form of a dialogue. (pg79-84)
The argument goes as follows:
1) Desire-Satisfaction MSW is the only account of intrinsic value
2) D-S MSWelfarists still have reality-centered desires
3) Removing reality-centered desires from Desire-Satisfaction MSW will remove the 'Desire' part from the D-S MSW.
4) Giving up reality-centered desires will significantly alter the content of the agent's desires, probably impoverishing them and making entrance to the experience machine conditional on significant personal-identity alteration. Furthermore, the life within the experience machine would be unappealing, since the agent would believe she is doing all the things she no longer desires to do. The D-S MSWelfarist would reject the experience machine.
Author compares Non-Experiential Goals to D-S MSW. D-S MSW is an agent-neutral, external value theory. N-E Goals is an agent-perspective value proposition. Author compares these differences to the theories of 'indirect' consequentialism, which says that agent-perspective rules like 'don't kill' must be absolute, but from the external perspective they are just instrumental ways of usually promoting valuable consequences. Yet the agent must believe these are unbreakable rules for the whole system to work! Author calls this moral schizophrenia (pg85) and argues that it seems analogous to the situation in value theory, only much less conflicted and more plausible. In moral theory, there could be two competing norms for the same action. In value theory, two norms (experience-centered desire or reality-centered desire) don't compete because we naturally have reality-centered desires. (pg86) [important]
Lastly, author rejects that this Compatible D-S MSW theory entails plugging into the experience machine. It might give a prima facie reason for plugging other people into the experience machine without their knowledge (but not plugging those people in that you have a desire to see do a particular thing in the world). (pg87-88)
8/29/08
Badhwar, Neera - Is Realism Really Bad For You? A Realistic Response
08/29/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Feb 2008
This is a paper about how achieving realistic beliefs and having a reality-oriented attitude is not just important for true happiness, but also somewhat conceptually necessary. Author argues against two skeptical arguments, one being a common-sense view that 'sometimes it's better not-to-know than to-know' and the other is the social-science work by Shelly Taylor and Jonathon Brown on how mild illusions about one's worth and abilities are important for true happiness.
Author first argues that true happiness is a combination of subjective happiness and objective worth. First Abraham Maslow claim that realistic people tend to integrate the 'pleasure principle' with the 'reality principle' to better attain virtues such as unselfishness, caring, etc. Carl Rogers claims that a fully functioning person is honest with herself and honest in how she presents herself to others. (pg85-6) Author describes how Aristotle put as a requisite to happiness practical wisdom, which entails a high degree of self- and other-knowledge and the disposition to act on such wisdom. Author proposes the combination of subjective welfare and objective worth (like virtues) as true happiness. Author also claims that we consider it valuable to be in touch with reality, using rejection of the experience machine as a case in point (pg87-88).
Importantly, author claims realism as 'conceptually necessary' for a life of objective worth:
1) A component to true happiness is to live truly objectively worthwhile lives
2) We cannot know whether we live truly objectively worthwhile lives if we are deluded
3) We cannot know if we have true happiness if we are deluded
What 'realism/being realistic' entails:
'reality-oriented and informed about the important facts of your own life and human life in general, and disposed to act accordingly' (pg89)
The first challenge is from the common-sense notion that sometimes it is better not-t0-know than to-know. The realist is going to be interested in discovering things that might be better-off being left alone. Author argues that the opposite of realist is the self-deceived, and that they are more 'likely to skin their shines on the rough edges of reality' than the realist. (pg90) Author does claim, however that it is possible that learning a fact that adds to your subjective displeasure can actually be good for you, too. Only in the following circumstances:
1) You are aware of some habitual/characteristic negligence
2) Knowledge of x (subjectively unhappy thing) is related to this negligence
3) You use knowledge of x to fix this negligence
Author claims that this is good for you because it will help avoid future tragedies (and also makes you objectively worth more). (pg91)
Author concedes that there is some knowledge that isn't conducive to happiness, and acknowledges that subjective welfare and objective worth may conflict, making happiness difficult to attain. (pg91-2)
More effort and time in the essay is focused on the scientific challenge by Taylor and Brown. Their articles suggest that mild positive illusions about self-worth, abilities, and subjective welfare are conducive for well-being. Also, those under these mild positive illusions tend to be more open, caring, creative, imaginative, ready to grow, etc., therefore it is also conducive to objective worth. Taylor & Brown consider the realists to be a somewhat depressive bunch (pg92) (Downbeat), and the Upbeat to have unrealistic optimism about self-evaluations, abilities, and subjective welfare. Author attacks the empirical work and the conclusions drawn from it.
II2- Taylor & Brown use college students' self-reports (perhaps college students are a bad sample?) and report that 60% say they are happier than average-- logically impossible. Author points out that only 20% have to be wrong-- the others could just be realistic. Author claims that most people are overly optimistic in some areas of life, pessimistic in others, realistic in others. (pg96) Author also disputes that there is a correlation between a positive illusion and subjective happiness. Taylor & Brown assume that most people are happy, but author argues there are relative degrees and that this is a bad assumption. The other evidence comes from comparisons to the Downbeat. Author also employs the critical work of Colvin and Block. Author argues that if there are no depressive realists (Downbeats), then there is no comparison to Upbeats, leaving untouched the issue of being a realist. (pg97-8)
II3- Author argues we can't trust self-reports of happiness from Upbeats. A self-reporting Upbeat will give a higher rating on a happiness scale, but author argues that such a person only has the illusion of happiness, not genuine subjective happiness. (pg98-9) More importantly, author claims this is not causal to having other Upbeat qualities (illusion of greater control, greater abilities, ) but conceptually connected-- the Upbeat will have an illusion of all of these things, as well as the illusion of being happier (pg99). [This argument relies on subjective happiness being an achievement rather than a state, it relies on the illusion of happiness being different from actually being happy.]
II4-II5- Author takes on the Taylor & Brown view that Upbeats are more likely to live objectively worthwhile lives because they are more likely to be engaged, grow, be creative, etc. (pg100) Author grants (for the sake of argument) that there are true depressed realists (Downbeats). If this is so, then there are three options: (pg101)
1) Downbeats see reality truly as bad
2) Downbeats aren't realistic enough to see what is good
3) There are no true Downbeats, just depressives
In this case, only 1) could be construed against realism, but author instead blames reality, not realism. (pg101) Author argues from common sense that those who see their own shortcomings are more apt to grow and change and be open to new ideas or people, in other words, not Upbeats but realists. (pg 101-2) Author also draws an important distinction between ignorant realists and Upbeats. (pg102)
II6- Author takes on the other studies made by Taylor & Brown, that of the optimism of HIV-positive gay men. (pg103-5)
II7- Author gives the example of a well-adjusted realist Catherine Royce, who is afflicted with ALS and is both subjectively happy and reports being objective worthy as a counterexample.
Journal of Philosophy, Feb 2008
This is a paper about how achieving realistic beliefs and having a reality-oriented attitude is not just important for true happiness, but also somewhat conceptually necessary. Author argues against two skeptical arguments, one being a common-sense view that 'sometimes it's better not-to-know than to-know' and the other is the social-science work by Shelly Taylor and Jonathon Brown on how mild illusions about one's worth and abilities are important for true happiness.
Author first argues that true happiness is a combination of subjective happiness and objective worth. First Abraham Maslow claim that realistic people tend to integrate the 'pleasure principle' with the 'reality principle' to better attain virtues such as unselfishness, caring, etc. Carl Rogers claims that a fully functioning person is honest with herself and honest in how she presents herself to others. (pg85-6) Author describes how Aristotle put as a requisite to happiness practical wisdom, which entails a high degree of self- and other-knowledge and the disposition to act on such wisdom. Author proposes the combination of subjective welfare and objective worth (like virtues) as true happiness. Author also claims that we consider it valuable to be in touch with reality, using rejection of the experience machine as a case in point (pg87-88).
Importantly, author claims realism as 'conceptually necessary' for a life of objective worth:
1) A component to true happiness is to live truly objectively worthwhile lives
2) We cannot know whether we live truly objectively worthwhile lives if we are deluded
3) We cannot know if we have true happiness if we are deluded
What 'realism/being realistic' entails:
'reality-oriented and informed about the important facts of your own life and human life in general, and disposed to act accordingly' (pg89)
The first challenge is from the common-sense notion that sometimes it is better not-t0-know than to-know. The realist is going to be interested in discovering things that might be better-off being left alone. Author argues that the opposite of realist is the self-deceived, and that they are more 'likely to skin their shines on the rough edges of reality' than the realist. (pg90) Author does claim, however that it is possible that learning a fact that adds to your subjective displeasure can actually be good for you, too. Only in the following circumstances:
1) You are aware of some habitual/characteristic negligence
2) Knowledge of x (subjectively unhappy thing) is related to this negligence
3) You use knowledge of x to fix this negligence
Author claims that this is good for you because it will help avoid future tragedies (and also makes you objectively worth more). (pg91)
Author concedes that there is some knowledge that isn't conducive to happiness, and acknowledges that subjective welfare and objective worth may conflict, making happiness difficult to attain. (pg91-2)
More effort and time in the essay is focused on the scientific challenge by Taylor and Brown. Their articles suggest that mild positive illusions about self-worth, abilities, and subjective welfare are conducive for well-being. Also, those under these mild positive illusions tend to be more open, caring, creative, imaginative, ready to grow, etc., therefore it is also conducive to objective worth. Taylor & Brown consider the realists to be a somewhat depressive bunch (pg92) (Downbeat), and the Upbeat to have unrealistic optimism about self-evaluations, abilities, and subjective welfare. Author attacks the empirical work and the conclusions drawn from it.
II2- Taylor & Brown use college students' self-reports (perhaps college students are a bad sample?) and report that 60% say they are happier than average-- logically impossible. Author points out that only 20% have to be wrong-- the others could just be realistic. Author claims that most people are overly optimistic in some areas of life, pessimistic in others, realistic in others. (pg96) Author also disputes that there is a correlation between a positive illusion and subjective happiness. Taylor & Brown assume that most people are happy, but author argues there are relative degrees and that this is a bad assumption. The other evidence comes from comparisons to the Downbeat. Author also employs the critical work of Colvin and Block. Author argues that if there are no depressive realists (Downbeats), then there is no comparison to Upbeats, leaving untouched the issue of being a realist. (pg97-8)
II3- Author argues we can't trust self-reports of happiness from Upbeats. A self-reporting Upbeat will give a higher rating on a happiness scale, but author argues that such a person only has the illusion of happiness, not genuine subjective happiness. (pg98-9) More importantly, author claims this is not causal to having other Upbeat qualities (illusion of greater control, greater abilities, ) but conceptually connected-- the Upbeat will have an illusion of all of these things, as well as the illusion of being happier (pg99). [This argument relies on subjective happiness being an achievement rather than a state, it relies on the illusion of happiness being different from actually being happy.]
II4-II5- Author takes on the Taylor & Brown view that Upbeats are more likely to live objectively worthwhile lives because they are more likely to be engaged, grow, be creative, etc. (pg100) Author grants (for the sake of argument) that there are true depressed realists (Downbeats). If this is so, then there are three options: (pg101)
1) Downbeats see reality truly as bad
2) Downbeats aren't realistic enough to see what is good
3) There are no true Downbeats, just depressives
In this case, only 1) could be construed against realism, but author instead blames reality, not realism. (pg101) Author argues from common sense that those who see their own shortcomings are more apt to grow and change and be open to new ideas or people, in other words, not Upbeats but realists. (pg 101-2) Author also draws an important distinction between ignorant realists and Upbeats. (pg102)
II6- Author takes on the other studies made by Taylor & Brown, that of the optimism of HIV-positive gay men. (pg103-5)
II7- Author gives the example of a well-adjusted realist Catherine Royce, who is afflicted with ALS and is both subjectively happy and reports being objective worthy as a counterexample.
8/15/08
Crane, Tim - Fraught with Ought
08/15/2008
London Review of Books, June 19 2008
This is a review of two books collecting the works of Wilfrid Sellars. Author describes the three main points to Sellars' systematic philosophy. The first is that science is the descriptor of reality. The problem with this claim is that we don't live in the world described by science; we live in a world of a manifest image. Instead of denying this is a problem, Sellars confronted it with his second main point: the meaning of a word can be expressed by what correct inferences you can make in its usage. Author contrasts this with Frege, who considered meaning to be referring a property to an object.
The final discussion by the author is Sellars' work on qualia, or 'the myth of the given', which highlights his third main point: 'all awareness is a linguistic affair', including inner thoughts being construed instead as inner speech. Author is unconvinced on this point, since Sellars seems to embrace an emergent feature of our brains.
London Review of Books, June 19 2008
This is a review of two books collecting the works of Wilfrid Sellars. Author describes the three main points to Sellars' systematic philosophy. The first is that science is the descriptor of reality. The problem with this claim is that we don't live in the world described by science; we live in a world of a manifest image. Instead of denying this is a problem, Sellars confronted it with his second main point: the meaning of a word can be expressed by what correct inferences you can make in its usage. Author contrasts this with Frege, who considered meaning to be referring a property to an object.
The final discussion by the author is Sellars' work on qualia, or 'the myth of the given', which highlights his third main point: 'all awareness is a linguistic affair', including inner thoughts being construed instead as inner speech. Author is unconvinced on this point, since Sellars seems to embrace an emergent feature of our brains.
8/1/08
Chomsky, Noam - We Own The World
08/01/2008
Information Clearing House.info Zmedia Institute Talk, June 2007
This is a relatively informal discussion from author that was originally a talk given. The paper has one crucial argument: debate and policy decisions in the US are made once specific assumptions have already been made, one of which is that the United States of America owns the world.
Author starts with a discussion about the mid-term elections and how the debate about 'Iranian interference' went, suggested that the sub-text or assumption behind both sides of the debate was that we own Iraq. Author looks back to the Vietnam war and analyzes the debates and memoirs in light of the bombing campaigns that took place in the North and South and interpreted them using the assumption that we owned Vietnam.
Author then posits that the US isn't a functioning democracy, at least in foreign policy. E.g. 2/3 of Americans want an end to the Cuba embargo, a majority want an Iraq pullout, but it doesn't happen. The way to fix countries like Iraq, Iran is to make them more democratic. That is the way to fix America too, ironically.
Author then discusses how this assumption is even in the 'liberal' media like NPR, where the discussion of the missile defense system-- a system that is more geared to make first strikes without retaliations rather than to defend against first strikes-- assumes that installing it is legitimate, since 'we own the world'.
The final discussion is about history, where the author recounts the series of Iran, Iraq, Russian, Chinese-US relations. Author interprets US actions as unilateral and self-excluding-- meaning that we expect other countries to play by the rules, but not the US.
Author finally remarks that eduction in elite institutions might be part of the blindspot that many elites have with unpopular ideas.
Information Clearing House.info Zmedia Institute Talk, June 2007
This is a relatively informal discussion from author that was originally a talk given. The paper has one crucial argument: debate and policy decisions in the US are made once specific assumptions have already been made, one of which is that the United States of America owns the world.
Author starts with a discussion about the mid-term elections and how the debate about 'Iranian interference' went, suggested that the sub-text or assumption behind both sides of the debate was that we own Iraq. Author looks back to the Vietnam war and analyzes the debates and memoirs in light of the bombing campaigns that took place in the North and South and interpreted them using the assumption that we owned Vietnam.
Author then posits that the US isn't a functioning democracy, at least in foreign policy. E.g. 2/3 of Americans want an end to the Cuba embargo, a majority want an Iraq pullout, but it doesn't happen. The way to fix countries like Iraq, Iran is to make them more democratic. That is the way to fix America too, ironically.
Author then discusses how this assumption is even in the 'liberal' media like NPR, where the discussion of the missile defense system-- a system that is more geared to make first strikes without retaliations rather than to defend against first strikes-- assumes that installing it is legitimate, since 'we own the world'.
The final discussion is about history, where the author recounts the series of Iran, Iraq, Russian, Chinese-US relations. Author interprets US actions as unilateral and self-excluding-- meaning that we expect other countries to play by the rules, but not the US.
Author finally remarks that eduction in elite institutions might be part of the blindspot that many elites have with unpopular ideas.
7/18/08
Shellenberg, Susanna - The Situation-Dependency of Perception
07/18/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 2, Feb 2008
This paper explores the thesis of mind-independent, situation-dependent properties of external objects. First, some distinctions:
Intrinsic property- a property of an object that does not depend on the object's relations to other individuals distinct from itself (pg55-6).
Situation-dependent property- a property of an object that it has by virtue of the presentation having situational features (pg56-7).
The thesis is simple: objects are presented to human perception as situational-dependent properties that are mind-independent properties of external objects that present intrinsic properties of an object with situational features. (pg56-7)
Author gives some background on the thinking on features such as this: often they are 'conflated' into mind-dependent appearances or as a representational issue. Author discusses indirect realism and phenomenalism, which get their arguments going by discussing cases of how differing angles or distance from objects alters their appearance, though, of course, the object itself isn't altered. (pg58, pg71) Author will later claim that this type of argument won't support mind-dependent representations, since such an event can be considered situation-dependent properties.
The argument for situation-dependent properties is simple: objects have intrinsic properties but also is subject to situational features that any other perceiver, in the same spatio-temporal conditions, would also perceive. (pg60-1) Author likens this idea to Peacock's idea of a 'scene', though there are important differences (pg61-2).
It is crucial to understand that author is not re-defining the distinction between properties of an object and how an object appears. 'Appears' is a mind-dependent term; author is instead picking out a new section of the world, external properties an object has by virtue of the situation it is in relative to the perceiver. (pg62-3) Author also holds that there are mind-dependent representations (subjectivity of perception), and that representations will vary based on the perceptual abilities of the perceiver (pg64-5). Author goes on a lengthy example of two trees that we judge are intrinsically the same height, even though one is closer to us than the other. (pg65-9) The upshot to this discussion is that the 'accuracy conditions' of a given perceptual experience now include not just the intrinsic properties of the object but also the situation-dependent properties, or perhaps a description of the situational features. (pg73) Furthermore, some purported 'illusions' in the philosophical literature (stick half-submerged in a beaker of water: is it bent?) will be explained adequately given situation-dependent properties (SD properties).
Author argues that there is epistemic dependence of our knowledge of intrinsic properties on situation-dependent properties. This is because the nature of perception makes it that all objects have situational features. (pg75-6) This isn't causal dependence, and, interestingly, author claims that it isn't inferential dependence, either. (pg77) Author instead claims that knowledge of intrinsic properties is mediated by situation-dependent properties. It seems that we readily attend to intrinsic properties while ignoring SD properties, though we sometimes can recognize the SD properties as well. (pg78-80)
Author claims that the result of this argument is a way to merge some of the intuitions of direct realism and indirect realism and/or phenomenalism. (pg81-2)
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 2, Feb 2008
This paper explores the thesis of mind-independent, situation-dependent properties of external objects. First, some distinctions:
Intrinsic property- a property of an object that does not depend on the object's relations to other individuals distinct from itself (pg55-6).
Situation-dependent property- a property of an object that it has by virtue of the presentation having situational features (pg56-7).
The thesis is simple: objects are presented to human perception as situational-dependent properties that are mind-independent properties of external objects that present intrinsic properties of an object with situational features. (pg56-7)
Author gives some background on the thinking on features such as this: often they are 'conflated' into mind-dependent appearances or as a representational issue. Author discusses indirect realism and phenomenalism, which get their arguments going by discussing cases of how differing angles or distance from objects alters their appearance, though, of course, the object itself isn't altered. (pg58, pg71) Author will later claim that this type of argument won't support mind-dependent representations, since such an event can be considered situation-dependent properties.
The argument for situation-dependent properties is simple: objects have intrinsic properties but also is subject to situational features that any other perceiver, in the same spatio-temporal conditions, would also perceive. (pg60-1) Author likens this idea to Peacock's idea of a 'scene', though there are important differences (pg61-2).
It is crucial to understand that author is not re-defining the distinction between properties of an object and how an object appears. 'Appears' is a mind-dependent term; author is instead picking out a new section of the world, external properties an object has by virtue of the situation it is in relative to the perceiver. (pg62-3) Author also holds that there are mind-dependent representations (subjectivity of perception), and that representations will vary based on the perceptual abilities of the perceiver (pg64-5). Author goes on a lengthy example of two trees that we judge are intrinsically the same height, even though one is closer to us than the other. (pg65-9) The upshot to this discussion is that the 'accuracy conditions' of a given perceptual experience now include not just the intrinsic properties of the object but also the situation-dependent properties, or perhaps a description of the situational features. (pg73) Furthermore, some purported 'illusions' in the philosophical literature (stick half-submerged in a beaker of water: is it bent?) will be explained adequately given situation-dependent properties (SD properties).
Author argues that there is epistemic dependence of our knowledge of intrinsic properties on situation-dependent properties. This is because the nature of perception makes it that all objects have situational features. (pg75-6) This isn't causal dependence, and, interestingly, author claims that it isn't inferential dependence, either. (pg77) Author instead claims that knowledge of intrinsic properties is mediated by situation-dependent properties. It seems that we readily attend to intrinsic properties while ignoring SD properties, though we sometimes can recognize the SD properties as well. (pg78-80)
Author claims that the result of this argument is a way to merge some of the intuitions of direct realism and indirect realism and/or phenomenalism. (pg81-2)
7/11/08
Scalia, Antonin - District of Columbia v Heller
07/11/2008
No. 07-290, June 26, 2008
This is a supreme court decision that has been summarized far better elsewhere, I'm sure. However, it does serve to go over the main arguments in broad strokes. Author delivers the opinion of the court. At issue is a hand-gun ban in DC which, in the court's opinion, violates the 2nd Amendment:
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
Author separates the 'prefatory clause' from the 'operative clause', focusing first on 'the right of the people to keep and bear Arms'. Author argues that this is an individual right, one extended not just to members of a militia or a sub-set of the population, but to all individuals in the polity. Author engages in a long discussion of the usage and origin of the words 'keep', 'bear' and 'arms'. Author then posits that the right to own and carry weapons was for the purpose of 'confrontation' and self-defense. Author relies on other laws drafted at the time as evidence for the intent of the framers of the Amendment. Author then discusses the 'prefatory clause', which is the 'Well-regulated Militia' portion. Author talks about how the framers were worried that tyrants would disarm the people and thereby take their ability to resist away. Seen in this context, author claims that the reading of the 'operative clause' is sensible.
Author takes some time to rebut the dissent's interpretations, then discusses various contexts after the amendment was ratified where the speech supports the reading of the right as a right to bear arms in self-defense. Crucial to the rejection of Stevens' discussion of the various drafts the amendment went through is the author's claim that the 2nd Amendment codified an existing, common-law right, not fashion a new one.
Author discusses the past cases that involved 2nd Amendment protection. Author claims that in US v Miller, it was the type of weapon involved that didn't get 2nd Amendment protection, not that the individuals were using a weapon for non-military purposes. Author defends against the claim that small-arms weapons for militia use today wouldn't work against tanks and bombers-- author counters that 'the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right'
Finally, author looks at the current case and declares that handguns are popular as self-defense weapons, that trigger locks wouldn't allow for quick enough defense, and that both parts of the law are unconstitutional.
Stevens, Jon delivered the first of two dissenting opinions
Stevens agrees that the 2nd Amendment is a right of the people, but argues that does nothing to establish the scope of the right. Stevens argues that 'the people' is referring to a right of individuals who are members of a group, similarly to the right to peaceably assemble. In analysis of the text he links 'keep and bear arms' as an expression used in military contexts. Stevens claims that the most natural reading of the Amendment is that it protects the right to use and posess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia, which was also an existing right too.
Stevens discusses the history of the drafting of the 2nd Amendment and highlights how the drafts did not involve self-defense uses of arms, even though proposed drafts did so. Stevens reinterprets the post-enactment discussions that Scalia uses, notably Joseph Story's views.
Stevens then reviews the various cases that have previously dealt with the 2nd Amendment (much like Scalia), but interprets them to turn on, e.g. in the Miller case-- the non-military use of weapons, etc.
Breyer, Stephen delivers the second dissenting opinion
Breyer assumes (for the sake of argument) that the 2nd Amendment grants a personal right for self-defense. He then says that this right is not unrestricted and needs to be subject to some sort of constitutional standard, like a 'rational basis' or 'rational relationship'. In this case, Breyer advocates an 'interest balancing' approach.
Breyer discusses the briefs filed that the laws written have not reduced crime. He reviews the different evidence offered and concludes that the evidence is indecisive. Thus, the district is trying to reduce crime using a possible method (there is evidence on both sides), and Breyer sees this as a legitimate balance of interests.
No. 07-290, June 26, 2008
This is a supreme court decision that has been summarized far better elsewhere, I'm sure. However, it does serve to go over the main arguments in broad strokes. Author delivers the opinion of the court. At issue is a hand-gun ban in DC which, in the court's opinion, violates the 2nd Amendment:
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
Author separates the 'prefatory clause' from the 'operative clause', focusing first on 'the right of the people to keep and bear Arms'. Author argues that this is an individual right, one extended not just to members of a militia or a sub-set of the population, but to all individuals in the polity. Author engages in a long discussion of the usage and origin of the words 'keep', 'bear' and 'arms'. Author then posits that the right to own and carry weapons was for the purpose of 'confrontation' and self-defense. Author relies on other laws drafted at the time as evidence for the intent of the framers of the Amendment. Author then discusses the 'prefatory clause', which is the 'Well-regulated Militia' portion. Author talks about how the framers were worried that tyrants would disarm the people and thereby take their ability to resist away. Seen in this context, author claims that the reading of the 'operative clause' is sensible.
Author takes some time to rebut the dissent's interpretations, then discusses various contexts after the amendment was ratified where the speech supports the reading of the right as a right to bear arms in self-defense. Crucial to the rejection of Stevens' discussion of the various drafts the amendment went through is the author's claim that the 2nd Amendment codified an existing, common-law right, not fashion a new one.
Author discusses the past cases that involved 2nd Amendment protection. Author claims that in US v Miller, it was the type of weapon involved that didn't get 2nd Amendment protection, not that the individuals were using a weapon for non-military purposes. Author defends against the claim that small-arms weapons for militia use today wouldn't work against tanks and bombers-- author counters that 'the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right'
Finally, author looks at the current case and declares that handguns are popular as self-defense weapons, that trigger locks wouldn't allow for quick enough defense, and that both parts of the law are unconstitutional.
Stevens, Jon delivered the first of two dissenting opinions
Stevens agrees that the 2nd Amendment is a right of the people, but argues that does nothing to establish the scope of the right. Stevens argues that 'the people' is referring to a right of individuals who are members of a group, similarly to the right to peaceably assemble. In analysis of the text he links 'keep and bear arms' as an expression used in military contexts. Stevens claims that the most natural reading of the Amendment is that it protects the right to use and posess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia, which was also an existing right too.
Stevens discusses the history of the drafting of the 2nd Amendment and highlights how the drafts did not involve self-defense uses of arms, even though proposed drafts did so. Stevens reinterprets the post-enactment discussions that Scalia uses, notably Joseph Story's views.
Stevens then reviews the various cases that have previously dealt with the 2nd Amendment (much like Scalia), but interprets them to turn on, e.g. in the Miller case-- the non-military use of weapons, etc.
Breyer, Stephen delivers the second dissenting opinion
Breyer assumes (for the sake of argument) that the 2nd Amendment grants a personal right for self-defense. He then says that this right is not unrestricted and needs to be subject to some sort of constitutional standard, like a 'rational basis' or 'rational relationship'. In this case, Breyer advocates an 'interest balancing' approach.
Breyer discusses the briefs filed that the laws written have not reduced crime. He reviews the different evidence offered and concludes that the evidence is indecisive. Thus, the district is trying to reduce crime using a possible method (there is evidence on both sides), and Breyer sees this as a legitimate balance of interests.
6/27/08
Black, Max - Austin On Performatives
06/27/2008
The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol 38 No 145 July 1963
This is a relatively short paper that reviews Austin's lectures about performatives and constatives, and his attempt to establish a new tri-fold system of categorization between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts.
First, author summarizes Austin's discussion of performative speech-acts like 'I promise x'. These are ideal cases of 'PerformativeA', which is: 'doing something other than, or more than, saying something true or false' (pg219). The problem here is that the analysis is too weak. It lets in things like 'I say the bridge is out!'. This is more than a true/false utterance-- it is an assertion and a warning. Hence 'PerformativeB' is a performative if it has the form 'I [present tense singular verb] X' if the circumstances are such that the person in question is actually doing that verb. (warn, reprimand, state) Author considers PerfomativeB's to be 'self-labeling utterances' and rather uninteresting, preferring the other to be performatives proper (pg220-1).
In trying to get more specific, Author points out the 'ceremonial' or 'conventional' aspects of performatives. They usually are:
i. rule governed (as to the way the act is supposed to happen)
ii. self-validating (doing them makes them valid)
iii. public and 'claim generating'
iv. part of a cultural understanding or ceremonially significant
(pg 222)
The problem here is that it seems just speaking any old sentence (even one with a truth-value) can conform to all these specifications.
Author believes it was the continual vagueness that led Austin to try the three-fold distinction:
Locutionary: the sense & reference of an utterance-- the speaker's meaning
Illocutionary: the intent (or intended effect) with which the utterance was made
Perlocutionary: the actual effect on the hearers ('was that a promise?')
(pg 223-4)
Author throws doubt over whether Loc. and Illoc. are truly distinct, even though Austin seemed more focused on whether Illoc. and Perloc. were truly distinct. Author suggests that to truly understand an Loc. act, you should know it also as an Illoc. act, which collapses the two into one: Loc. act. If this is so, the new re-working looks a lot like the old one, and again a systematic approach to natural language seems to falter.
The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol 38 No 145 July 1963
This is a relatively short paper that reviews Austin's lectures about performatives and constatives, and his attempt to establish a new tri-fold system of categorization between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts.
First, author summarizes Austin's discussion of performative speech-acts like 'I promise x'. These are ideal cases of 'PerformativeA', which is: 'doing something other than, or more than, saying something true or false' (pg219). The problem here is that the analysis is too weak. It lets in things like 'I say the bridge is out!'. This is more than a true/false utterance-- it is an assertion and a warning. Hence 'PerformativeB' is a performative if it has the form 'I [present tense singular verb] X' if the circumstances are such that the person in question is actually doing that verb. (warn, reprimand, state) Author considers PerfomativeB's to be 'self-labeling utterances' and rather uninteresting, preferring the other to be performatives proper (pg220-1).
In trying to get more specific, Author points out the 'ceremonial' or 'conventional' aspects of performatives. They usually are:
i. rule governed (as to the way the act is supposed to happen)
ii. self-validating (doing them makes them valid)
iii. public and 'claim generating'
iv. part of a cultural understanding or ceremonially significant
(pg 222)
The problem here is that it seems just speaking any old sentence (even one with a truth-value) can conform to all these specifications.
Author believes it was the continual vagueness that led Austin to try the three-fold distinction:
Locutionary: the sense & reference of an utterance-- the speaker's meaning
Illocutionary: the intent (or intended effect) with which the utterance was made
Perlocutionary: the actual effect on the hearers ('was that a promise?')
(pg 223-4)
Author throws doubt over whether Loc. and Illoc. are truly distinct, even though Austin seemed more focused on whether Illoc. and Perloc. were truly distinct. Author suggests that to truly understand an Loc. act, you should know it also as an Illoc. act, which collapses the two into one: Loc. act. If this is so, the new re-working looks a lot like the old one, and again a systematic approach to natural language seems to falter.
6/20/08
Schwitzgebel, Eric - The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
06/20/2008
Philosophical Review, Vol 117 No 2 2008
This is a prolonged skeptical discussion about introspection and the notion of the infallibility of current conscious experience. The paper has more of a conversational style rather than present any logical arguments in an explicit format. Author first points out that most of the skeptics up until now have not questioned current conscious experience, leaving it instead as the last refuge. Author tries to show that introspection is unreliable in two ways (pg265):
1- it often goes wrong or yields the wrong results
2- it often fails to do anything or yield any result at all
Author says that we fail at 'assessing the causes of our mental states' for 'even the most basic features of our currently ongoing conscious experience'. (pg247) The only places in the philosophical/psychological communities where the author has seen arguments like this is possibly in the behaviorists (who reject the importance of introspection) or perhaps with 'Eastern meditative traditions'. (pg246-7)
Introspection is considered 'a species of attention to currently ongoing conscious experience'. Even though infallibilism is out of favor, most hold that in favorable circumstances introspection can 'reliably reveal at least the broad outlines of one's currently ongoing experience' (pg248).
iii. Author first discusses emotion, asking whether it is partially constituted by cognitive elements, or not? Are emotional states always felt phenomenally? Do emotional states like 'joy' have the same feel most of the time? (pg249-50) Author suggests that this is not just a matter of how we describe our CCE (current conscious experience) but that the qualia aren't entirely evident.
iv. Author then discusses introspection of particular instances of emotional experience (pg251-2), like the one you're having right now. Does introspection reveal it as clearly as your eyes reveal the place you're in? Consider another person pointing out that you're angry-- which you honestly deny because you don't feel anything.
v. Author next turns to introspection of CCE when it comes to perception. Author grants that CCE of vision perception is difficult to get wrong. (pg 252-3) Yet in dreams we do get CCE wrong; we make judgments that are 'baldly incoherent' about what our CCE is. For instance, author doubts that there is color in dreams, yet we judge there to be. So was our CCE of color, or not? This argument turns on our making the judgment that we experienced red when we didn't in fact experience red.
vi. Author asks us to consider visual perception-- we have a good handle on the visual worlds, especially within certain limits of focus, yet we mostly get wrong how narrow our focus is. We think it is a few feet wide, but in fact it is just a few inches. (pg254-6) If this is so, our CCE of our visual field is not as clear as we think it is. We're 'wrong about an absolutely fundamental and pervasive aspect of [our] sensory consciousness'. (pg256)
vii. Does thought have a distinctive phenomenal character, aside from imagery? After a seminar in 2002, philosophers disagreed 17-8, the majority saying yes, the minority saying that either 'imagery exhausts it' or 'no phenomenal character'. (pg257-8) Author suggests this is because there is no answer-- introspection fails.
viii. Author considers pain and paradigm cases of 'foveal colors'. But these are easy cases and using these 'rigs the game' (pg259-60) Can't we generate the belief we're in pain without the there being a pain in CCE? Why then do people think they're infallible? Because no one ever corrects us on these inner episodes.
ix. Sometimes I can say 'I'm thinking' and it is true. But this infallibility is 'cheap', since it is self-referentially supplying the conditions for truth. (pg260-1) This doesn't work as well when you say: 'I'm thinking of the entire Taj Mahal in full detail'. Author also suggests that many ways out of this doubt is to 'change the topic': is 'I'm thinking about x' really a judgment about CCE?
x. Author discusses an objection to his view: introspection shows how things appear to us; maybe we can be wrong about what those things actually are, but not how they appear. Author draws a distinction between epistemic 'appears' and 'phenomenal' appears. It might be possible that sometimes an epistemic report on CCE is infallible if the existence conditions equal the truth conditions. Yet a phenomenal report of 'appears' might be tainted by judgment or belief, like believing there's an optical illusion when there isn't one. (pg262-3)
x. Author casts doubt that CCE is so grossly different to allow for all these problems with divergence but also to be infallible. (pg264-5)
xi. Author considers the charge that he is pushing the limits of introspection, but thinks that if it moves from CCE, it is changing the topic. (pg266)
Lastly, author suggests that visual experience of the external world is much more stable than introspection of CCE.
Philosophical Review, Vol 117 No 2 2008
This is a prolonged skeptical discussion about introspection and the notion of the infallibility of current conscious experience. The paper has more of a conversational style rather than present any logical arguments in an explicit format. Author first points out that most of the skeptics up until now have not questioned current conscious experience, leaving it instead as the last refuge. Author tries to show that introspection is unreliable in two ways (pg265):
1- it often goes wrong or yields the wrong results
2- it often fails to do anything or yield any result at all
Author says that we fail at 'assessing the causes of our mental states' for 'even the most basic features of our currently ongoing conscious experience'. (pg247) The only places in the philosophical/psychological communities where the author has seen arguments like this is possibly in the behaviorists (who reject the importance of introspection) or perhaps with 'Eastern meditative traditions'. (pg246-7)
Introspection is considered 'a species of attention to currently ongoing conscious experience'. Even though infallibilism is out of favor, most hold that in favorable circumstances introspection can 'reliably reveal at least the broad outlines of one's currently ongoing experience' (pg248).
iii. Author first discusses emotion, asking whether it is partially constituted by cognitive elements, or not? Are emotional states always felt phenomenally? Do emotional states like 'joy' have the same feel most of the time? (pg249-50) Author suggests that this is not just a matter of how we describe our CCE (current conscious experience) but that the qualia aren't entirely evident.
iv. Author then discusses introspection of particular instances of emotional experience (pg251-2), like the one you're having right now. Does introspection reveal it as clearly as your eyes reveal the place you're in? Consider another person pointing out that you're angry-- which you honestly deny because you don't feel anything.
v. Author next turns to introspection of CCE when it comes to perception. Author grants that CCE of vision perception is difficult to get wrong. (pg 252-3) Yet in dreams we do get CCE wrong; we make judgments that are 'baldly incoherent' about what our CCE is. For instance, author doubts that there is color in dreams, yet we judge there to be. So was our CCE of color, or not? This argument turns on our making the judgment that we experienced red when we didn't in fact experience red.
vi. Author asks us to consider visual perception-- we have a good handle on the visual worlds, especially within certain limits of focus, yet we mostly get wrong how narrow our focus is. We think it is a few feet wide, but in fact it is just a few inches. (pg254-6) If this is so, our CCE of our visual field is not as clear as we think it is. We're 'wrong about an absolutely fundamental and pervasive aspect of [our] sensory consciousness'. (pg256)
vii. Does thought have a distinctive phenomenal character, aside from imagery? After a seminar in 2002, philosophers disagreed 17-8, the majority saying yes, the minority saying that either 'imagery exhausts it' or 'no phenomenal character'. (pg257-8) Author suggests this is because there is no answer-- introspection fails.
viii. Author considers pain and paradigm cases of 'foveal colors'. But these are easy cases and using these 'rigs the game' (pg259-60) Can't we generate the belief we're in pain without the there being a pain in CCE? Why then do people think they're infallible? Because no one ever corrects us on these inner episodes.
ix. Sometimes I can say 'I'm thinking' and it is true. But this infallibility is 'cheap', since it is self-referentially supplying the conditions for truth. (pg260-1) This doesn't work as well when you say: 'I'm thinking of the entire Taj Mahal in full detail'. Author also suggests that many ways out of this doubt is to 'change the topic': is 'I'm thinking about x' really a judgment about CCE?
x. Author discusses an objection to his view: introspection shows how things appear to us; maybe we can be wrong about what those things actually are, but not how they appear. Author draws a distinction between epistemic 'appears' and 'phenomenal' appears. It might be possible that sometimes an epistemic report on CCE is infallible if the existence conditions equal the truth conditions. Yet a phenomenal report of 'appears' might be tainted by judgment or belief, like believing there's an optical illusion when there isn't one. (pg262-3)
x. Author casts doubt that CCE is so grossly different to allow for all these problems with divergence but also to be infallible. (pg264-5)
xi. Author considers the charge that he is pushing the limits of introspection, but thinks that if it moves from CCE, it is changing the topic. (pg266)
Lastly, author suggests that visual experience of the external world is much more stable than introspection of CCE.
6/13/08
Kiteley, Murray - Verbs of Speech & Danto, Arthur - A Note on Expressions of the Referring Sort
06/13/2008
Kiteley, Murray - Verbs of Speech
This is a short discussion on Austin's How To Do Things With Words, where he introduces the category of 'performatives'. Also mentioned was the fact that once a present-tense verb performative is made into a past-tense verb, it can have a truth value and thus wouldn't be a performative.
Danto, Arthur - A Note on Expressions of the Referring Sort
Author writes a response paper to Strawson's 'On Referring' and and Earl Russell's discussion as well. Author takes a stance against a certain type of logic of ordinary language that takes a sentence that refers to nothing as neither true nor false. For instance: 'The building on south-west corner of 116th st is beautiful'. If there is no building there, the argument goes, then the sentence is neither true nor false. Author points out that if this is allowed to stand, then the speaker of such a sentence couldn't be considered lying, since lying is saying something false (pg405). But if this was a business context where purchasing the 'building' was involved, such a sentence might easily constitute fraud-- untrue statements being an integral part of fraud. Author suggests that ordinary language stretches over too many different contexts and cases to allow for one strict logic. (pg407)
Kiteley, Murray - Verbs of Speech
This is a short discussion on Austin's How To Do Things With Words, where he introduces the category of 'performatives'. Also mentioned was the fact that once a present-tense verb performative is made into a past-tense verb, it can have a truth value and thus wouldn't be a performative.
Danto, Arthur - A Note on Expressions of the Referring Sort
Author writes a response paper to Strawson's 'On Referring' and and Earl Russell's discussion as well. Author takes a stance against a certain type of logic of ordinary language that takes a sentence that refers to nothing as neither true nor false. For instance: 'The building on south-west corner of 116th st is beautiful'. If there is no building there, the argument goes, then the sentence is neither true nor false. Author points out that if this is allowed to stand, then the speaker of such a sentence couldn't be considered lying, since lying is saying something false (pg405). But if this was a business context where purchasing the 'building' was involved, such a sentence might easily constitute fraud-- untrue statements being an integral part of fraud. Author suggests that ordinary language stretches over too many different contexts and cases to allow for one strict logic. (pg407)
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